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Abstract
 Using the framework of political economy of media, this dissertation examines the 
history of the Jewish working class counterpublic in the United States during the interwar period 
and its relationships to the broader public sphere. Between 1919 and 1941, organic intellectuals, 
such as B.C. Vladeck, J.B.S. Hardman, Fannia Cohn, and Morris Novik, employed strategies to 
maintain the Yiddish-language newspaper the Forward, worker education programs, and radio 
station WEVD. These forms of media and cultural production were shaped by internal conflicts 
and struggles within the counterpublic, as well as evolving practices and ideas around 
advertising, public relations, and democracy. 
 Vladeck, Hardman, Cohn and Novik all helped to extend Yiddish socialist culture through 
the reactionary 1920s while laying the groundwork for an American working class culture 
represented by the CIO in the 1930s, and a broad consensus around a commercial media system 
by the postwar period. This history demonstrates the challenges, conflicts, and contradictions that 
emerge in media production within counterpublics, and posits that other similar case studies are 
necessary in order develop enlightened strategies to democratize our contemporary media 
system. 
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Chapter One:
History From the Middle1: 
A Gramscian Approach to Understanding Working-Class Media2  
 What is the importance of working-class media and culture to the maintenance of labor 
activism? I ask this question at a moment of uncertainty in the state of the U.S. and global 
economy, and in the state of media and, particularly, journalism. Since the 1980s, neoliberal 
policies have assaulted the democratic potential of the media system and created a globally-
reaching, oligopolistic cartel of a half-dozen multinational corporations that produce the lion’s 
share of media consumed within the United States.3 At the same time, a similar logic has led to a 
crackdown on labor unions and a dramatic decline in the influence of working-class 
organizations in our politics and culture. As a result, labor and the working-class are largely 
marginalized by the media system, and their viewpoints and values tend to be excluded from for-
profit journalism and entertainment.4  
 This problem did not begin under neoliberalism. A longer examination of the relationship 
between labor and communication systems reveals how this problem became exacerbated over 
the decades, and more importantly, how it has more often than not been challenged by workers to 
varying degrees. Given the commodification of media and communications through the course of 
1
1 This term was suggested in a personal meeting with media historian John Nerone.
2 Many ideas in this chapter have been published in the article Brian Dolber, “From Socialism to ‘Sentiment’: 
Toward a Political Economy of Communities, Counterpublics and Their Media Through Jewish Working Class 
History.” Communication Theory 21, no. 1 (2011): 90-109.
3 Robert W. McChesney, Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communication Politics in Dubious Times. (New York: 
New Press, 1999), 15-77; Ben Bagdikian, The New Media Monopoly. (Boston: Beacon Press, 2004).  
4 See, for example, Deepa Kumar, Outside the Box: Corporate Media, Globalization and the UPS Strike. (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 2008); Michael Parenti, Inventing Reality: The Politics of Mass Media. (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1986); William Puette, Through Jaundiced Eyes: How the Media View Organized Labor. (Ithaca, 
NY: ILR Press, 1992); Christopher Martin, Framed!: Labor and the Corporate Media. (Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 
2003).
the twentieth century, political economists in media studies should place labor at the center of 
their analysis of this history of communications. Ben Scott has identified three areas of inquiry 
into the historic relationship between organized labor and communication: labor and the state, 
labor and the communications industry, and labor and culture.5 The questions addressed in this 
dissertation are firmly located within the third category—labor and culture. Rather than 
discussing challenges working-class organizations have made to the regulation of media 
industries, or the role of workers within media industries, I concern myself here with the ways in 
which working-class movements have produced their own media in order to further their 
political and social goals. 
 One prime example in need of serious academic study in communications history is the 
experience of the Jewish labor movement in the U.S., and its use of mass media during the 
interwar period. Although this particular segment of the labor movement—the unions in the 
garment industry, working class fraternal organizations such as the Workmen’s Circle, and 
Jewish segments of the Socialist Party (SP) and Communist Party (CP) based chiefly in New 
York City—has been the topic of a great deal of scholarship in working class history, it has gone 
virtually unnoticed by U.S. media historians.6 This is an oversight because the Jewish labor 
movement devoted more thought, energy and resources, than any other segment of the working 
2
5 Ben Scott, “Organizing the Media Structure,” Ch. 3 in “Labor’s New Deal for Journalism,” Ph.D. Dissertation, 
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 2009, 3.
6 A few examples, which are cited throughout this dissertation include: Melech Epstein, Jewish Labor in USA: An 
Industrial, Political and Cultural History of the Jewish Labor Movement (New York: Trade Union Sponsoring 
Committee, 1950-53); Irving Howe, World of Our Fathers: The Journey of East European Jews to America and the 
Life They Found and Made. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976); Nora Levin, While Messiah Tarried: 
Jewish Socialist Movements, 1871-1917. (New York: Schocken Books, 1977); Steven Fraser, Labor Will Rule: 
Sidney Hillman and the Rise of American Labor. (New York: Free Press, 1991); Annelise Orleck, Common Sense 
and a Little Fire: Women and Working-Class Politics in the United States, 1900-1965 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1995); Daniel Katz, “A Union of Many Cultures: Yiddish Socialism and Interracial Organizing 
in the International Ladies‘ Garment Workers‘ Union, 1913-1941.” Ph.D. Dissertation, Rutgers University, 2003; 
and Tony Michels, A Fire in Their Hearts: Yiddish Socialists in New York. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2005). 
class towards the development of media that would support the aims of labor and provide the 
basis for a system of alternative culture and social critique into the postwar era. In the 1920s and 
1930s, while a national commercial media system became solidified as part of American 
everyday life, the Jewish labor movement struggled within a complicated political environment 
to maintain and grow forms of working-class communication.  
 The Jewish labor movement during the 1920s provides a missing link in the 
historiography of working-class media and culture of the 1930s. Media historians have done 
significant research on the working-class press during the early twentieth century, and on the rise 
of a working-class culture under the New Deal. However, the prior decade of the 1920s has been 
widely overlooked. While much of the labor movement retreated during this time period under 
the conservative leadership of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), the social unionism that 
flourished within New York’s Yiddish-speaking community put an important emphasis on labor 
education and mass media in order to build a culture of class struggle. These efforts provided a 
cornerstone for the development of a broader, national working-class culture in later years, 
manifest in the formation of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). 
 However, the Jewish working class was by no means unified in its efforts in media and 
cultural development. An illness took hold within the Jewish working class in the 1920s with the 
growth of two cancers: mass culture and governmental repression. Political divisions grew 
between Socialists and Communists, and within trade unions along generational and gender 
lines. These obstacles prevented the Jewish labor movement from developing a unified strategy 
to maintain itself as what communication theorists have termed a “counterpublic.”7 Despite these 
3
7 Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy,” in 
Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 109-142; Michael Warner,  
Publics and Counterpublics (New York: Zone Books, 2002).
differences, though, the leadership of the Jewish working class maintained a commitment to 
developing its own journalism and culture. The variety of impulses toward cultural production 
that emerged helped preserve the labor movement as a whole in its most precarious moments, 
and ultimately provided a basis for what has been called the “cultural front,” or the CIO’s 
“culture of unity.”
 These terms derive from two significant works in American studies and working-class 
history—Michael Denning’s The Cultural Front and Lizabeth Cohen’s Making a New Deal. Both 
of these authors are indebted to the work of Antonio Gramsci, and are interested in the 
development of “historical blocs.” These are social formations which emerge from the 
“contradictory and discordant ensemble of the superstructures” reflecting “the ensemble of the 
social relations of production.” Thus, as Denning explains they are “both an alliance of social 
forces and a specific social formation.” Although the Popular Front, with its base in the labor 
movement, “never achieved national power or hegemony, remaining an unruly part of 
Roosevelt’s New Deal alliance, its economic, political and cultural authority among the ethnic 
working classes of the greatest metropolises and industrial towns of North America was far 
reaching.”8 
 How did the U.S. working class reach this apex? The media, cultural, and educational 
efforts of the Jewish labor movement in the 1920s and early 1930s played a crucial role in laying 
the groundwork for the political and cultural successes of the left during the New Deal era. The 
political divisiveness that characterized radical politics in the 1920s brought about a flowering of 
4
8 Michael Denning, The Cultural Front: The Laboring of American Culture in the Twentieth Century (New York: 
Verso, 1998), 6; Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990); Antonio Gramsci, Selections From the Prison Notebooks, trans. and ed. Quentin 
Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 366.
strategies—commercial, democratic, feminist and Communist—to ultimately preserve radical 
culture and provide an important opportunity for its eventual fruition during the late-1930s and 
1940s. By this time, these different strategies would coalesce and become a cornerstone of the 
transformative “culture of unity.”9 
 I locate this history within the context of both the U.S. media, and the politics of labor 
and ethnicity during the interwar era. Mass media and the labor movement were being reshaped 
in the early twentieth century by similar social forces. As other communications historians have 
noted, Gramsci’s observations provide a sound theoretical basis to study the many challenges to 
this order that were occurring from within the working class. In the wake of World War One, 
Gramsci described the new relationship emerging between the state, civil society and 
intellectuals. He argued that under modern capitalism, intellectuals serve “as the dominant 
group’s ‘deputies’ exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political 
government.” These comprise both the “spontaneous” consent the masses give “to the general 
direction imposed on social life”—the dominant class’ norms, values, and practices—and “the 
apparatus of state coercive power which ‘legally’ enforces discipline on those groups who do not 
‘consent’ either actively or passively.”10 
  This observation has two important implications for both media and working class 
historians. The first of these is the increasingly important role of ideological production—namely 
state and corporate propaganda—in combating the working class’ disruptions to the bourgeois 
order. Modern public relations techniques were first developed during the early 1900s to bolster 
the public image of corporations and robber barons as they faced challenges from organized 
5
9 Cohen, Making a New Deal, 324.
10 Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, 36.
labor, muckraking journalists and a middle-class Progressive movement. During the same period, 
the Americanization movement-- a collaborative effort between big business and government-- 
worked to combat the revolutionary elements within immigrant communities by selling ethnic 
leaders on the assimilation project. These efforts came to a head when, in 1917, President 
Woodrow Wilson formed the Committee on Public Information (CPI), enlisting a slew of modern 
intellectuals to help garner support for U.S. participation in the First World War. Led by the 
former muckraker George Creel, the CPI sought to use modern communication technologies and 
methods to promote the war effort. Creel directed that, “The printed word, the spoken word, 
motion pictures, the telegraph, the wireless, posters, signboards, and every possible media should 
be used to drive home the justice of America’s cause.”11 
 As Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky have noted, Walter Lippmann’s discussion of 
the need to “manufacture consent” spoke to the central role propaganda played in the 
maintaining the status quo during the 1920s.  After cooperating with the CPI during the war, 
Lippmann became quite concerned with the power of propaganda, and the willingness of the 
public to believe it. The public’s inability to have direct knowledge of all issues with which 
citizens must contend in the modern world made it necessary for responsible experts to take 
charge of government and shape the public’s perception to gain support for their well-meaning 
agenda.12 From this perspective, democracy could be controlled—and thus preserved—through 
ideological rather than coercive means.       
6
11 Stuart Ewen, PR!: The  Social History of Spin (New York: Basic Books, 1996); Alex Carey, Taking the Risk Out of 
Democracy: Corporate Propaganda Versus Freedom and Liberty. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997),
37-63; Ewen, PR! 112. 
12 Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media. (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 2002), lix; Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Free Press, 1997). 
 But, as Gramsci suggests, the management of public opinion did not displace more 
explicit forms of repression. Attacks on the dissident press by both state and vigilante forces have 
been part and parcel of the American media landscape since the colonial period. The war 
provided the context for boosting such draconian efforts. Approximately nine hundred people 
went to prison under the Espionage Act for speaking or writing in opposition to the war, 
including SP leader Eugene V. Debs, anarchists Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman, and 
over one hundred members of Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). The Department of 
Justice sponsored an American Protective League, comprised of 100,000 community leaders in 
six hundred cities, charged with finding cases of disloyalty often through spying and reading the 
mail of suspected radicals. In addition, the CPI and the national press offered their support to 
vigilante groups which called “for all patriots to join in the suppression of anti-draft and 
seditious acts and sentiment.”13   
 While legislative action and enforcement created problems for radical organizations, the 
actions of Postmaster-General Burleson most directly influenced the ability to communicate anti-
war, and other radical ideas, through the press. Burleson used his power to deny second-class 
postal rates to periodicals, thus barring most radical publications from the mails. Between 1916 
and 1920, 137 daily and 2,268 weekly newspapers disappeared. While many of these failures 
were the result of economic trends and wartime shortages, left-leaning papers were far more 
7
13 John Nerone, Violence Against the Press: Policing the Public Sphere in U.S. History (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994); Howard Zinn, A People’s History of the United States 1492 to the Present. (New York: 
HarperPerennial, 1995), 356-64; Steven Vaughn, Holding Fast the Inner Lines: Democracy, Nationalism and the 
Committee on Public Information (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 216. 
likely to fold.14 The combined effects of corporate propaganda and state repression put labor in a 
severely weakened position in the battle for ideas by the 1920s.
The State-Corporate Nexus and the Rise of the Culture Industry
 World War One was an important turning point in the history of mass media in the United 
States, laying the groundwork for the emergence of a national, commercially-driven media 
system. Alongside the creation of the CPI and increased censorship, the federal government 
made significant decisions regarding the regulation and development of new communications 
technologies in the service of profit between 1917 and 1919. Corporate entities—namely 
commercial newspapers and motion picture studios-- were rewarded for cooperating with the war 
effort while pacifists and radicals were kept from expressing dissident ideas outside of 
legitimate, commercial channels. By the war’s end, there had been a fundamental shift in the 
relationships among the press, the state, and the public. The new state-corporate nexus offered 
privileged status to the advertising industry and Hollywood, while military research would 
spawn the Radio Corporation of America (RCA).
 The close-knit relationship between the government and private enterprise was 
instrumental in institutionalizing a national commercial media system during the 1920s and 
1930s. This system, in turn, would largely reflect the economic and ideological interests of the 
corporate class. The professionalization of advertising and journalism, the rise of the Hollywood 
studio system, and the commercialization of broadcasting reflected the logic of an emerging 
“corporate liberal framework” and worked to perpetuate the common-sense nature of such forms 
8
14 Frank Grubbs, The Struggle for Labor Loyalty: Gompers, the AF of L, and the Pacifists, 1917-1920. (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 1968), 89; Nerone, Violence, 181.
of social organization.15 As the historiography indicates, these changes in the mass media system 
were linked to broader shifts in the U.S. political economy and had severe cultural consequences.
Advertising 
 Political economists of communications have demonstrated that advertising plays an 
important role in configuring relationships between labor and capital. On the one hand, the 
proliferation of advertising throughout the social realm demands the production of “commodity 
audiences.” Leisure time-- time spent away from the traditional workplace-- becomes a site of 
accumulation as audiences produce surplus value for entertainment providers by making 
advertising time or space valuable to purchase. On the other hand, advertising obscures the 
material nature of commodities by focusing consumer attention on constructed brand identities 
physical properties or modes of production.16 Thus, the history of advertising and the history of 
class are inextricably linked.   
 The advertising industry dates back to the emergence of national markets, the growth of 
the industrial economy during the post-Civil War era. Expenditures on advertising increased by 
9
15 Thomas Streeter, Selling the Air: A Critique of the Policy of Commercial Broadcasting in the United States 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 156. Although the relationship between the motion picture industry, 
the federal government and social forces that countered the rise of Hollywood is of great interest, it is tangential to 
the issues I have researched in this dissertation. For that reason, I have not included an explanation of this process 
here. However, several works that touch on this history and have informed my thinking regarding the rise of a state-
corporate nexus and its relationship to working-class media, as well as Jewish culture in the U.S., include, Larry 
Ceplair and Steven Englund, The Inquisition in Hollywood: Politics in the Film Community (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1983); Neal Gabler, An Empire of Their Own: How the Jews Invented Hollywood (New York: 
Crown Publishers, 1988); Michael Rogin, Blackface, White Noise: Jewish Immigrants in the Hollywood Melting Pot 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); Steven J. Ross, Working-Class Hollywood: Silent Film and the 
Shaping of Class in America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); Lee Grieveson, Policing Cinema: 
Movies and Censorship in Early-Twentieth Century America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); 
Steven Alan Carr, Hollywood and Anti-Semitism: A Cultural History up to World War II (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001); Gerald Horne, Class Struggle in Hollywood: Moguls, Mobsters, Stars, Reds and Trade 
Unionists, 1930-1950. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2001); and Paul Buhle, From the Lower East Side to 
Hollywood: Jews in American Popular Culture (New York: Verso, 2004). 
16 Dallas W. Smythe, “Communications: Blindspot of Western Marxism.”  Canadian Journal of Political and Social 
Theory 1, no. 3 (1977): 1-28; Sut Jhally, Codes of Advertising: Fetishism and the Political Economy of Meaning in 
the Consumer Society, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987).
700 percent between 1867 and 1890, reaching $360 million. In 1870, only 40 advertising 
agencies existed in New York City. Within two decades, there were 400, making it the center of 
the booming new industry.17 
 It was not until the 1920s, though, that advertising became a bona fide professional 
enterprise. This transformation might be the most overlooked, yet most important shift in the 
media system to occur during the interwar era. Advertising played a crucial role in maintaining 
the emerging system of “monopoly capitalism.” As economists Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy 
argued, the “truly fantastic outpouring of resources,” dedicated to advertising, “does not reflect 
some frivolous irrationality in corporate managements or some peculiar predilection of the 
American people for singing commercials, garish billboards, and magazines and newspapers 
flooded with advertising copy.” Instead, advertising is “an indispensable tool,” because in 
concentrated, oligopolistic markets, firms must stimulate demand for their products by avoiding 
a potentially destructive price war. As Inger Stole puts it, “The rise of oligopoly is the gasoline 
that fuels the flames of modern advertising.”18     
 Thus, economic conditions mandated that advertising become a widely acceptable  
institution within American capitalism. State reliance on advertisers during World War I gave the 
industry a newfound legitimacy. At the onset of U.S. entry into the war, the advertising industry 
actively sought to aid the government in promoting the effort. Herbert S. Houston, the president 
of the Associated Advertising Clubs of the World, argued that advertising could help democracy 
and business, the two working in tandem. In 1917, linking advertisers with the government, he 
10
17 Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy, Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order 
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966); David R. Spencer, The Yellow Journalism: The Press and America’s 
Emergence as a World Power (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 53.  
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helped create the National Advertising Advisory Board in order to sell the Liberty Loan and Red 
Cross drives. By the end of that year, the CPI established its own advertising division. The 
Division of Advertising “enhanced the prestige of advertising men, who sought to have the 
government pay for advertising.” Although this attempt failed, they demonstrated the possibility 
for national campaigns, and made advertising viewed as a respectable profession.19  
 In this context, it became increasingly necessary “to create consumers efficiently” as 
mass production expanded. Advertisers were forced “to develop universal notions of what makes 
people respond, going beyond the ‘horse sense’ psychology that had characterized the earlier 
industry.” Admen wanted to “erase the Barnum image” and “seize every opportunity to associate 
themselves with high culture and ‘business statesmanship.’” Advertisers constructed themselves 
as offering a gateway to modern life.20  
 Ads not only promoted the sale of products in oligopolistic markets—they perpetuated an 
individualistic, consumer ideology, particularly among the middle class. As early as 1899, 
Thorstein Veblen noted that advertising worked to strengthen cultural norms, perpetuating the 
wasteful social impetus towards “conspicuous consumption.” “The aim of the advertiser,” wrote 
Veblen “is to arrest attention and then present his statement in such a manner that it is easily 
assimilated into the thoughts and habits of the person whose conviction is to be influenced.” This 
cultural trend grew alongside the advertising industry. By the end of the 1920s, “material 
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nationalism cast the nation not as imagined communities but as an aggregate of appetites 
expressed in goods. Advertisers defined the nation as imagined commodities.”21
Journalism and the Public
 As a structuring force within the mass media, the advertising revolution spurred a 
transformation in the press. The commercialization of journalism in the U.S. dates back to the 
1830s, with the rise of the penny press. By the 1890s, news had become a commodity—the result 
of a process of production organized around the profit motive and the drive to increase revenues 
and cut costs. However, due to the need to increase their advertising revenue, the newspaper 
industry was largely consolidated and dominated by a few newspaper chains by the 1920s. In 
1909-10, 58 percent of America’s cities had a vibrant press, varying in ownership and 
perspective. By 1920, that same percentage would be under monopoly control. This 
commercialization helped fuel a sympathetic relationship between the new public relations 
industry and the press. Newspaper chains allowed PR practitioners access to large portions of the 
press, while the press benefited from the burgeoning firms’ subsidies.22 
 The emerging ideology of professionalism within the newsroom worked to make 
criticism of press concentration irrelevant. All the major journalism schools had been founded by 
1920, while none had existed at the turn of the century. By 1923, the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors (ASNE) was formed to solidify “the separation of church and state”— giving 
the impression of a distinction between the editorial and business departments—at newspapers, 
and counter the power of publishers. The publishers ultimately won the battle. Although 
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“criticism of owners and advertisers for not respecting the autonomy of editors and reporters was 
acceptable...criticism of the capitalist basis of the newspaper…industry was now inviolable.”23    
 Commercial imperatives were only one aspect, though, of the new journalistic 
environment of the 1920s. In the post-CPI era, it became apparent to many intellectuals that the 
public and journalists alike were highly malleable, and needed to be guided towards proper 
choices by experts in order to preserve democracy. As Walter Lippmann argued in his classic 
Public Opinion (1922), “[P]ublic opinions must be organized for the press if they are to be 
sound, not by the press as is the case today.”24 The press agent, then, played a central role in 
disseminating information that could be legitimately reported. “The development of the publicity 
man,” wrote Lippmann, 
 is a clear sign that the facts of modern life do not spontaneously take a shape in which 
 they can be known. They must be given a shape by somebody, and since in the daily 
 routine reporters cannot give a shape to facts, and since there is little disinterested 
 organization of intelligence, the need for some formulation is being met by the interested 
 parties—
everyone from corporations and banks to suffragists and labor unions.25 
 It deserves noting, however, that Corporate America most successfully developed and 
implemented these techniques. Companies such as AT&T and General Electric used increasingly 
sophisticated methods of portraying themselves as operating in the public’s interest.26 Taking 
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advantage of professional journalism’s demand for official sources, public relations agents made 
the reporter, “a tool of elite class interests,” reducing the journalist to a “scribe.”27 
 Thus, two contradictory impulses emerged, laying the groundwork for professional 
journalism. On the one hand, there was an increase in the expectation of objectivity spurred by 
the reliance on “expert” sources. On the other hand, in contrast with the muckraking 
investigations of the earlier Progressive era, journalism became increasingly reflective of the 
perspectives and social goals of the powerful. Taken together, in conjunction with the political 
repression of World War I and its aftermath, the growth of the newspaper industry brought about 
the narrowing of perspectives legitimated within the public sphere.     
The Rise of Broadcasting
 A third area in which the state-corporate nexus worked to reshape the media landscape in 
the wake of World War I was in the rise of broadcasting. The U.S. government’s involvement in 
regulating wireless telegraphy dates back to 1904, when the Navy was given authority over 
coastal stations. The Radio Act of 1912 later created a comprehensive plan to regulate wireless, 
dividing the spectrum among ship, coastal, amateur and government frequencies. At the same 
time, several large corporations began cooperating with the federal government on research and 
development to perfect wireless telephony.28 
 Upon U.S. entry into the war in 1917, the Navy took over all wireless stations based on 
provision in the 1912 Act. Amateur experimenters were forced off of the airwaves, and corporate 
entities such as General Electric, the United Fruit Company and Westinghouse were guaranteed 
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patent protection. For one year, from August 1, 1918 through July 31, 1919, the U.S. government 
owned the nation’s wire communication system, under Postmaster General Burleson authority.29  
 Although Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels wanted Congress to pass legislation 
nationalizing wireless communication permanently, it would be a mistake to view this period as 
one where the state, on the whole, was hostile to corporate power. As advertisers, film studios 
and newspapers did with the CPI, private communications firms were expected to cooperate with 
military goals, and in the end, they were handsomely rewarded. The relationship between 
government and communications corporations, generally, was a “military-corporate love fest.” 
Companies that did work willingly with the government benefited handsomely, creating “a co-
ordinated industry” that symbolized the United States’ newfound status as a world power.30 
 A coalition of corporate managers, military representatives and members of the Wilson 
administration organized the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) in 1919, bringing together 
the interests of General Electric, the assets of the dismantled American Marconi, and the patents 
the Navy acquired from the Federal Telegraph Company. Around the same time, AT&T, who had 
understood the government’s ownership plan of the Bell System during the previous year as 
necessary within the context of the “war emergency,” received $9.3 million from the U.S. 
Treasury to help balance its deficit.31 These two bodies would be instrumental in the 
development of commercial broadcasting during the next decade, having received massive 
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assistance and security from the federal government. By the end of World War I, the state had 
helped to establish broadcasting as an arena of potential profit.    
 During the next decade, radio broadcasting became a hobby for many working-class and 
middle-class people in the early 1920s. As journalism, public relations, advertising, and the 
motion picture industry professionalized, the airwaves remained a space for locally-based 
communication among amateurs for the bulk of the 1920s. Thus, radio broadcasting provided 
one possible space for the reinvigoration of democracy.
 In its earliest years, broadcasting had a grassroots orientation. Most broadcasting was 
done only at 100 watts, where good service could only be received within a three-mile radius. 
While the federal government pursued radicals and limited speech during the Palmer Raids and 
the Red Scare, it also lifted the ban on amateur broadcasting in 1919, and returning veterans 
reinvigorated the old hobby with new, more advanced equipment they had used during the war. 
By June 1920 there were fifteen times as many amateur stations as there were other types of 
stations combined, with 6,103 licensed amateurs.  That number climbed to over 10,000 by the 
following year.32      
  By this point, large-scale commercial interests began considering the possibility of 
profiting from amateur activity. Westinghouse, having been in a slump since the end of the war, 
saw the opportunity to broadcast amateur concerts from its own transmitter in Pittsburgh, 
reaching a larger audience and creating a market for radio receivers. The new station, KDKA, 
“set off a national mania,” and Westinghouse built 500 watt transmitters in Newark, Chicago, 
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and Springfield, Massachusetts. By the next year, the company joined the RCA patent pool, 
along with the United Fruit Company. Sales of RCA manufactured radio receivers skyrocketed.33  
 Other commercial entities also became involved in broadcasting. For example, the 
Detroit News and the New York Globe led the way in establishing radio supplements to 
newspapers. By the end of the year, the professionalized newspaper industry owned 69 radio 
stations. Department stores also established stations for the purposes of self-promotion. Finally, 
in 1922, AT&T embarked on a controversial new business model—“toll broadcasting”—from its 
station WEAF, introducing advertising over the airwaves.34
 From the beginning, the federal government clearly favored the corporate interests over 
the amateurs. The Department of Commerce forbade amateurs from broadcasting at above 200 
meters. Corporate-owned stations, on the other hand, were assigned the 360-meter slot. The 
experimentation of amateurs presented a challenge to the radio trust’s conception of how the 
medium could be used, and forced RCA “to reorient its manufacturing priorities, its corporate 
strategies, indeed, its entire way of thinking about the technology under its control.”35 
 But others also worked to make use of the emerging medium, moving it from middle-
class garages and into social institutions. Chief among these institutions were universities. The 
winter of 1921-22 brought “a huge academic procession to the air” led by the Latter-Day Saints 
University in Salt Lake City and the University of Wisconsin. By the end of 1922, seventy-four 
17
33 Barnouw, A Tower in Babel, 70.
34 Barnouw, A Tower in Babel, 98-106.
35 Douglas, Inventing, 302-3.
colleges and universities had broadcasting licenses, and by 1925 there were 128. Educational 
broadcasting allowed for people to take courses, and even receive degrees, from their homes.36    
 By 1926, however, three major commercial radio networks were underway-- NBC’s Red 
and Blue Network, and CBS. NBC developed under RCA vice president David Sarnoff’s watch 
as a way to boost the sales of listening sets, while CBS was established by the Columbia 
Phonograph Company and soon received investments from the Paramount film studio. Relying 
on advertising support, both of these companies and their networks, then, were thus linked to the 
rest of the culture industry. While competition could be fierce between these two giants in the 
early days of commercial broadcasting, executives understood “that the economic development, 
political goals, and regulatory stability of the nascent industry required cooperation.” Together, 
the networks “marched in lockstep,” and created a united front against those who advocated 
legislation that supported non-commercial broadcasting.37       
 The establishment of the Federal Radio Commission (FRC) by the Radio Act of 1927, 
and the implementation of that body’s General Order 40 in 1928, placed the bulk of the nation’s 
radio spectrum in the hands of the networks and other commercial stations. Although hotly 
contested by a politically diverse reform movement in the following years, the commercial 
broadcasting system was finally solidified with the passage of the Communications Act of 
1934.38  
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Working-Class Media in Critical Junctures 
 The dominance of a commercial media system dependent on state support, however, was 
by no means inevitable. The development of this system faced intense criticism and was met 
with formidable resistance in multiple forms. Many facets of the national media and 
communications industries were called into question to varying degrees during their 
development through the first half of the twentieth century. In particular, critical media scholars 
have repeatedly pointed to the 1920s and 1930s as an era where working class organizations and 
their middle-class allies challenged the rise of commercial radio, the corporate press, Hollywood, 
and the advertising industry.39 
 Robert W. McChesney has dubbed this point in media history a “critical juncture.” A 
critical juncture is a historical moment where the rise of new media technologies, criticism of the 
status quo, and social upheaval coalesce to create the potential for transformations in the media 
system.40 While McChesney originally argued that debate over the commercial media system 
essentially ended in 1934 with the passage of the Communications Act, more recent scholarship 
has demonstrated that contestation continued into the postwar era. Victor Pickard and Ben Scott 
have suggested that negotiations around the terms of commercial radio and professional 
journalism continued well into the 1940s, mirroring the CIO-era, leading towards a “postwar 
settlement” on the principles of self-regulation within the mass media.41 
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 The CIO unions continued to push these concerns, particularly around radio broadcasting. 
Elizabeth Fones-Wolf notes that a new wave of labor radio and a discourse concerning “listeners’ 
rights” emerged in the immediate post-war era with the advent of FM broadcasting. The 
International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union (ILGWU), the United Autoworkers (UAW) and 
the United Electrical and Radio Workers (UE) attempted to build their own FM radio stations. 
By the end of the 1940s, the UAW and ILGWU had opened five FM stations, which 
conservatives feared represented the rise of a “laboristic state,” forming “the nucleus of a pro-
labor network blanketing the major U.S. metropolitan areas.” These efforts countered 
increasingly conservative propaganda efforts from corporate America, and the political onslaught 
against unions and the New Deal such as the Taft-Hartley Act. Thus, the presence of labor radio 
worked to sustain New Deal liberalism through the 1950s.42   
 Despite these successes, it is safe to say that the broad contours of the media system by 
the postwar era did not reflect the aims of the radical wing of the labor movement. Reformers’ 
failures have led critics to dismiss the Habermasian histories that chronicle them as overly 
nostalgic for the past and overly pessimistic about the present and future. Paul Starr argues that 
they rely on a “radical narrative…of struggle and betrayal” where media history is characterized 
by “the suppression of alternatives.” Although Starr notes that “the radical democrat spies rays of 
hope in occasional bursts of public protest over the power of the big media,” he sees this view of 
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media history as ignorant of the “mixed, though on the whole positive, character” of the 
development of commercial mass media.43
 While Starr acknowledges the contingency of mass media systems, he rests his 
understanding on a liberal conception of “constitutive choices” which obfuscates the role of class 
power. In his formulation, all parties participating in debates around the structure of media seem 
to exist on a level playing field. At the same time, Starr reduces the radical approach to a vulgar 
Marxism where fights over mass media are zero-sum games. From this perspective, anything 
short of significant control over the mass media by working-class interests, or “the public,” 
would be a loss.  
 A Gramscian view however, suggests that the study of working-class efforts to shape 
communications systems is essential to understanding the total character of a media system, 
including its contradictions and fissures. These efforts are particularly important during critical 
junctures because they help constitute “the superstructures of civil society.” These 
superstructures “are like the trench-systems of modern warfare,” and they become key 
battlegrounds in the “wars of position” particularly during “the great economic crises.”44 Rather 
than a zero-sum game, studying these “wars of position” can account for resistant efforts and 
look at the important contributions they make to the overall political climate and the organization 
of power.   
21
43 Michael Schudson, “Public Spheres, Imagined Communities, and the Underdeveloped Historical Understanding 
of Journalism,” in Explorations in Communication History, ed. Barbie Zelizer (New York: Taylor and Francis, 
2008), 183-5; Paul Starr, “Democratic Theory and the History of Communications.” Paper given at “Back to the 
Future: Explorations in Communications and History,” Annenberg School for Communication, University of 
Pennsylvania. December 1, 2006.
44 Victor Pickard, “Whether the Giants Should Be Slain or Persuaded to be Good: Revisiting the Hutchins 
Commission and the Role of Media in a Democratic Society,” Critical Studies in Media Communication 27, n. 4 
(2010), 395-6; Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, 39.
 This approach is supported by the all-too limited communications historiography of 
working-class media, where we see a continuous dialectical relationship between working-class 
media institutions and the broader media system. Since the 1830s, the labor press has played a 
central role in shaping the contours of the U.S. media system by providing alternative media 
structures, as well as criticism of the capitalist press. Rodger Streitmatter has shown the 
importance of the early working-class press in the 1830s in challenging the emerging two party 
system and fighting for real political gains, including the ten-hour work day, public education, 
and abolishing imprisonment for debt and child labor. Similarly, Dan Schiller has argued that the 
penny press emerged as a commoditized response to working class criticisms of the elite party 
papers.45 
The rapid industrialization and the emergence of corporate power, alongside the growth 
in immigration, brought about the rise of an urban working-class in the U.S. by the last quarter of 
the nineteenth century. By this point, labor newspapers became an important part in organizing 
resistance to the industrial order, and in countering the influence of the profit-driven press. Holly 
Allen has shown the importance of the Knights of Labor’s newspapers in developing a 
“movement culture,” rather than creating passive consumers of information. Jonathan Bekken 
has argued that working-class newspapers of the early 1900s—many of them written in foreign 
languages— “stemmed from an alternative press ideology, one that sought to erase distinctions 
between newspapers and readers and to involve its supporters in every aspect of the newspaper, 
from management and editorial decisions to reporting.” Hundreds of radical dailies, weeklies and 
monthlies were published by an expanding array of radical organizations, including the Industrial 
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Workers of the World (IWW), the Socialist Labor Party (SLP), and smaller publishing 
associations affiliated with unions, or anarchist or socialist organizations, as the basic premise of 
the capitalist system was increasingly questioned.      
 Bekken, however, offers a decline narrative ending in 1930. Focusing on the radical press 
in Chicago, he argues that by the late 1920s, 
 Chicago’s radical working-class movements had entered an irreversible decline 
 brought on by factors including increased factionalism in the wake of the 1919 split in the 
 Socialist Party, red scares that deported many radical activists and intimidated others, 
 restrictions on new immigration, and the erosion of the mutual-aid societies and related 
 institutions resulting partly from the foregoing but especially from two decades of hard 
 economic conditions that forced immigrant workers to turn from their own institutions to 
 state and federal programs to ensure their survival. Working class organizations and 
 newspapers collapsed or retrenched during the Depression. While the Communist Party 
 would enjoy a resurgence in the 1930s, and radical currents would survive for decades to 
 come, radical workers’ movements would never again be as deeply rooted in the 
 everyday lives of Chicago’s working class as they had been in the decades  spanning the 
 1880s through the mid 1920s.46    
 Similarly, working-class historian Tony Michels’ study of the Yiddish socialists 
on New York’s Lower East Side reveals the prevalence of a “newspaper culture” through 
the First World War and the Russian Revolution, where thousands of workers attended  
“excursions, balls, literary evenings, and anniversary celebrations,” often with the 
purpose of raising money for the newspapers.47 But Michel’s narrative ends in 1922 as the unity 
around the SP disintegrated. Thus, Bekken and Michels both offer little insight into the 
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connection between the flourishing of left-wing culture in the 1930s and earlier efforts, 
particularly by Jewish immigrants, at the turn of the century. 
 Neither media nor working class historians have explained how the labor movement and 
other radical organizations used media during the 1920s and the pre-New Deal Depression-era. 
Lizabeth Cohen’s Making a New Deal begins to address this gap in the historiography. In her 
study of Chicago during the interwar period, Cohen uses a Gramscian framework to note how the 
CIO was built from the bottom up within the institutions and through the cultural practices that 
took root in the 1920s. For Cohen, “what matters most in explaining why workers acted 
politically in the ways they did during the mid-thirties is the change in workers’ own orientation 
during the 1920s and 1930s. Working-class Americans underwent a gradual shift in attitudes and 
practices over the intervening decade and a half as a result of a wide range of social and cultural 
experiences,” including the rise of “welfare capitalism,” the growth of chain stores and consumer 
culture, and the prevalence of mass media including radio and motion pictures. 
 Arguing against the thrust of Frankfurt School theory, Cohen says that mass culture, “did 
not in itself challenge working people’s existing values and relationships. Rather, the impact of 
mass culture depended on the social and economic contexts in which it developed and the 
manner in which it was experienced, in other words, how mass culture was produced, distributed 
and consumed.”48 Radio and motion pictures in particular, she argues, became integrated into the 
fabric of Chicago’s working-class ethnic communities and helped, in many cases, to reinforce 
communal bonds. At the same time, particularly by the end of the 1920s and 1930s, the 
commercialization of radio and the growth of large movie houses created multiethnic 
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environments where workers came together as consumers. According to Cohen, this acceptance 
of American consumerism, particularly among immigrants’ U.S.-born children, though, did not 
mean that mass culture led to the repudiation of ethnic identity, but rather, “help[ed] them 
reconcile foreign pasts with contemporary American culture.”49 Cohen’s focus, however, is on 
how these changes were viewed and experienced by workers in their everyday lives. The ways in 
which the institutions of the labor movement reacted and worked to shape those experiences is 
quite a different matter. 
 Emphasizing the important role of Gramsci’s “organic intellectuals” helps us to 
understand this process better. As the products of “organic intellectuals,” working-class media 
challenge the “common-sense” perpetuated by the elite under modern capitalism. Gramsci noted, 
that working-class media “develop certain forms of new intellectualism and…determine its new 
concepts.” This new intellectual must be “an active [participant] in practical life, as constructor, 
organiser, ‘permanent persuader’ and not just a simple orator.” Nathan Godfried demonstrates a 
deep connection between organic intellectuals and working-class media. Edward Nockels and 
John Fitzpatrick of the Chicago Federation of Labor (CFL), for example, were instrumental in 
pushing for the creation of WCFL, an important labor radio station in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Drawing from George Lipsitz, Godfried argues that these two men “learned ‘about the world by 
trying to change it,’ and they changed the ‘world by learning about it from the perspective of the 
needs and aspirations of their social group.’”50
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 Organic intellectuals and working-class media are central to the transformation of civil 
society under capitalism. This suggests a need to do working-class media history not from the 
top (by examining the role of political and economic elites in shaping the dominant media 
system) or the bottom (by examining the interaction of average working people with different 
cultural products), but from the middle, focusing on the organic intellectuals who structured 
working-class media institutions. While the immigrant working class made meaning from a 
cross-section of mediated messages and cultural experiences, organic intellectuals played a 
special role in ensuring that alternatives to the dominant, commercial media system existed and 
could provide a platform for organizing for political, economic and social change. These women 
and men determined how to acquire funding and how to navigate difficult political terrain. They 
implemented visions of how media and culture could build democracy. They had successes and 
they made mistakes. Their decisions helped to shape the media system’s total landscape, and 
influenced the outcomes of labor’s struggle. By turning towards the middle, media historians 
position themselves to better grasp the intricacies and contingencies of the political and cultural 
struggle for hegemony. 
Jewishness, the Labor Movement and American Culture 
 During the interwar years, in the face of a dramatically shifting media system, labor 
unions and left-wing political parties developed new strategies that could maintain a “movement 
culture” through politically difficult moments. Nowhere was this truer than within New York’s 
Jewish working-class universe. Although the subject of much social history, little 
communications history has focused on this crucial segment of the U.S. working class and their 
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cultural forms. The Jewish working class in the United States was particularly positioned to play 
this important cultural role because of its class status and its social values which differed 
significantly from the dominant Protestant-capitalist order. As historian Daniel Katz argues, this 
manifested itself in a commitment towards “social unionism,” placing emphasis on the labor 
movement not merely as a device for improved wages and conditions, but as an organization 
dedicated to creating new and transformative ways of life.51 
This understanding coincides with insights derived from scholarship within cultural 
studies and cultural history. Drawing from Gramsci, much work in these areas has noted that 
race, ethnicity, gender and other forms of identity in conjunction with class are sites in which 
opposition to the hegemonic structure manifests. Although the post-structural turn in cultural 
studies during the 1980s led many scholars away from a Marxian approach, Stuart Hall has 
argued that Gramsci’s “non-reductive” approach to Marxism points towards a need to study class 
alongside race, helping to complicate and give nuance to historical analysis.52 
Although his writing on race and ethnicity was limited, Gramsci did argue that the history 
of immigration in the United States presented a problem for the development of a “national 
popular,” a historical bloc formed between national and popular aspirations and mediated by 
intellectuals that could work to reshape the hegemonic order. As a result, there was a “need to 
fuse together in a single national crucible with a unitary culture the different forms of culture 
imported by immigrants of differing national origins” in the U.S.53 This is exactly what happened 
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during the 1930s, as the second generation of “new immigrants” from eastern and southern 
Europe came of age as Americans. 
George Lipsitz argues that one of Denning’s most important contributions offered in The 
Cultural Front is “his recuperation of ethnicity as a powerful independent generator of radical 
politics during the 1930s and 1940s rather than as simply one site where class consciousness 
emerged.” It was through the new multi-ethnic collaborations, described by Denning and Cohen, 
that “America” and “Americaness” became redefined, although not un-problematically. “[A]
ffirmation of ethnic identity during the 1930s and 1940s as part of strategies for addressing and 
redressing the humiliating subordinations of working-class life and inverting the ideological 
formulations that rendered immigrants and their children as unworthy and unwelcome 
participants in American politics eventually evolved into an uncritical cultural pluralism after 
World War II,” while excluding African Americans from the real economic gains made by the 
new “white” working class through the New Deal coalition. Further, Lipsitz argues that the New 
Deal coalition’s emphasis on redefining “American” identity was due, in part, to xenophobia and 
racism that led oppressed groups to want to escape stigmatization, as well as a need to link the 
left to the American republican tradition, contrasting the early “producer democracy” with “a 
parasitical capitalism” that had betrayed the true American tradition.54
In the 1920s and 1930s, Jews experienced dramatic shifts in identity, representation, and 
their relationship to the dominant U.S. culture. As Jewish immigrants in the 1920s were cut off 
from the Old World by new quotas, they and their children became increasingly integrated into 
an emerging consumer society. In the post-World War One moment, a new liberal elite discourse 
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emerged that rejected the notion that all Jews were part of a radical fringe, and that they could be 
good Americans. An increase in Jewish representation in municipal government alongside the 
growing power of labor unions began to place Jewish immigrants in visible positions of power. 
Mass media products, such as the 1927 Warner Bros.’ film, The Jazz Singer, which told the story 
of Jewish assimilation into whiteness via blackface minstrelsy re-articulated this possibility. At 
the same time, the most conservative elements of American society revamped anti-Semitism, 
with the popularity of Henry Ford’s Dearborn Independent and its publication of the fictitious 
“Protocols of the Elders of Zion.” The “Americanization” process would be shaped by the 
tensions between these two poles.55      
Emerging out of the “new” working-class history, much scholarship has focused on how 
Americanization happened “from the bottom up” as a result of interethnic cooperation in urban 
communities and on the shop floor. But little emphasis has been placed on the role of organic 
intellectuals in mediating this process, particularly through working-class media. When media 
have been a central topic of discussion, scholars have generally referred to the commercial mass 
media and their relationship to the immigrant experience. For example, Neal Gabler has focused 
on the role of Jewish immigrant entrepreneurs within the culture industries. Gabler views the rise 
of Hollywood as a product of the Jewish immigrant experience through which Jewish-Americans 
were able to enter into the mainstream and (literally) project their vision of the United States to 
the world. From a more critical perspective, Paul Buhle offers a similar narrative, focusing not 
on the role of moguls but on the role of Yiddishkayt—Jewish working class culture—as 
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providing the roots for American mass culture.56 What strategies, though, did working-class 
institutions-- the SP, the CP, and the garment industry trade unions—use to sustain this ethnic, 
working-class culture and put it to political use during the critical juncture of the interwar era?
There are clues to this answer throughout working-class media historiography. This is 
particularly true of scholarship surrounding the quintessential New Deal medium—radio. Nathan 
Godfried’s and Bob McChesney’s research on the Chicago Federation of Labor’s (CFL) station 
WCFL demonstrates that it served as an important site of contestation during the broadcasting 
reform fight in the late-1920s an early-1930s. Edward Nockels—who Godfried understands as a 
classic “organic intellectual”—and the CFL played a central role in trying to protect the rights of 
non-commercial broadcasters, supporting the Wagner-Hatfield Amendment which would have 
put aside 25 percent of the airwaves for non-commercial use. The station also challenged the 
commercial conception of broadcasting by working to offer “a first-class program that would be 
‘entertaining and educational at the same time’” supplementing mass public gatherings that had 
developed working-class solidarity in the past. State pressures and the need for revenue from 
advertisers, however, forced Nockels and WCFL to make many compromises. Still, the station 
remained an essentially counter-hegemonic force on the airwaves through much of its 
programming and its unique ownership structure. 
 Through its labor programming, ethnic hours, [and other unique content], WCFL made 
 itself a community and grass-roots institution. Its moments of crass commercialization 
 and growing reliance on advertising notwithstanding, labor radio performed a valuable 
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 service to Chicago’s working classes by promoting and strengthening [what Lizabeth 
 Cohen called] ‘ethnic and working class affiliations.’57
 Nockels’ vision for WCFL was largely in synch with the social unionism of the Jewish 
garment unions and their focus on worker education. The Yiddish left’s own experiment with 
radio was WEVD. Godfried has also studied this station, but has yet to adequately contextualize 
it within the world of the Jewish labor movement. Owned first by the SP’s Debs Memorial Trust 
with strong support from the ILGWU, and later by the Forward Association, the publisher of the 
Jewish Daily Forward, WEVD challenged the corporate conception of radio broadcasting while 
making significant concessions in terms of both structure and content in order to remain on the 
air. Originally dedicated to providing educational programming, the station faced obstacles from 
the state-corporate nexus to offering an alternative to corporate broadcasting. Forced to justify 
WEVD’s existence as a non-profit station to the Federal Radio Commission (FRC), the SP 
argued that denying its license amounted to the suppression of minority rights to free speech. 
Godfried argues that the SP’s decision to equate the working class with a “dissident” group, 
rather than majority worked to legitimate commercial radio. After being purchased by the 
Forward newspaper in 1932, WEVD increasingly aired sponsored programming in order to 
offset the cost of sustained labor programs. Commercially sponsored Yiddish entertainment 
“urged the consumption of everything from noodles to furniture to headache remedies to Coney 
Island excursions.”58
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 Ari Kelman suggests in his important history of Yiddish radio that the prevalence of 
Yiddish-language entertainment continued to build a community that existed as an alternative to 
the dominant culture, challenging the FCC’s Anglo-centric notion of the “public interest.” In 
addition, he demonstrates that WEVD in particular broadcast not only in Yiddish and English, 
but in a variety of other tongues spoken by working-class immigrants.59 Thus, WEVD helped to 
forging a space for interethnic cooperation and the CIO “culture of unity” on the air. But Kelman 
neglects to adequately discuss the political drive behind Yiddish radio, particularly WEVD. In 
his account, Jewish ethnicity and culture are largely detached from demands for radical social 
change in his study. While there were certainly Yiddish radio programs that existed as pure 
entertainment, WEVD stood as part of a larger political project aimed at social change. 
 WEVD and the Forward Association were quite comfortable with working within an 
advertising-driven broadcasting system, and operating under the logic of capitalism. This 
strategy was not new in the 1930s. It had been developed by Baruch Charney Vladeck, managing 
editor of the Forward newspaper immediately following World War One. In combination with 
staunch anti-Communism, Vladeck and the Forward sought to advance a moderate democratic 
socialism that was not at odds with the politics of consumption. In order to do this, Vladeck 
focused on developing editions outside of the Forward’s New York City base in order to attract 
national advertisers and produce new commodity audiences. While the contradictions of this 
strategy had cultural consequences, it also allowed the newspaper to maintain a broad readership 
through the 1920s and 30s, and keep WEVD alive through the New Deal era. Although the 
Forward was a conservative force within the Jewish labor movement, its presence allowed for 
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the maintenance of an increasingly influential progressive voice, leading towards the 
development of a historical bloc.   
 While the Socialists and the Forward were able to expand their reach in the 1920s, 
Yiddish-speaking Communists also helped to sustain radical activity and cultural production. 
Vilified by Vladeck and the Forward, and by much of the garment unions’ leadership, Di 
frayhayt—the Yiddish daily newspaper—was the widest circulating Communist publication in 
the U.S. While it began initially as a democratic challenge to the Forward after its more radical 
staff, including Jacob Salutsky, were expelled from the Socialist Party following World War One, 
Di frayhayt soon came under the control of the Communist Party. Under the editorship of 
Moyshe Olgin, the paper incorporated left-wing politics with poetry and literature, laying the 
groundwork for “the cultural front” described by Denning. 
 Frustrated with Di frayhayt’s Communist turn, Salutsky, who changed his name to J.B.S. 
Hardman, spent his life striving to create publications and forms of labor education that would 
promote a wide range of debate among working class people. As the Educational Director of the 
ACWA and the editor of its Advance newspaper, Hardman pursued the democratic ideal of 
communication dominated by neither partisan nor corporate interest. At the same time, Fannia 
Cohn, the Education Secretary of the ILGWU, worked to find new ways to draw workers, and 
particularly women, into union life through participatory culture.60 
 The combination of these four approaches to Yiddish left media—commercial, trade 
union democracy, feminist, and Communist—all helped to lay the foundation for a broad, multi-
ethnic “national popular” working-class culture in the late 1930s. As such, they had significant 
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implications for the quality of democracy in the United States. Thus, they deserve the attention of 
a systematic study within the field of communications.  
Counterpublics and Media Historiography
 The history of the Jewish working class and its media offers a case study in 
understanding the relationship between “counterpublics,” mass media, and the broader public 
sphere. This case study is of interest for both theoretical and historical reasons. Jewish 
immigration to, and labor activism within, the United States coincides historically with middle-
class concerns over the viability of a unified public sphere. During the late nineteenth century, 
U.S. and European intellectuals warned of the deterioration of the modern liberal order and the 
possibility of democratic rule. Theorists such as Gustave LeBon and Gabriel Tarde argued that an 
irrational, working-class, feminized “crowd” was replacing the middle-class, rational “public.” 
These fears culminated during World War I, with the U.S. government’s engaged in its first 
modern propaganda effort through the Committee on Public Information (CPI).61  
 Based in his experience with the CPI, former muckraker Walter Lippmann warned in his 
1922 classic Public Opinion that the modern world had become too complicated for the average 
citizen, and technocratic experts should govern “the pictures in their heads.”  In Lippmann’s 
formulation, democracy can only work if there is an “independent expert organization for 
making the unseen facts intelligible to those who have to make the decisions.”  Thus, there is 
little room for citizen participation.  Rather, the new expert class would have to replace the 
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public in the role of decision-makers, and would have to work to “manufacture consent” among 
the rest of the populous.62 
 Lippmann’s ideas spurred one of the great intellectual debates of the twentieth century.  
In response, American pragmatist John Dewey argued that education and participation among the 
public were necessary in order to maintain the viability of democracy. Dewey saw the roots of 
political democracy in the United States as grounded in the “genuine community life” of 
agricultural settings. Given the geographic expansion of the United States, the rise of the 
bureaucratic state, and the industrial revolution, this posed a problem, because although “we 
have inherited…local town-meeting practices and ideas…we live and act and have our being in a 
continental nation state.” Thus, it became imperative to transform the “Great Society” into the 
“Great Community,” where “the ever-expanding and intricately ramifying consequences of 
associated activities shall be known in the full sense of the word, so that an organized, articulate 
Public comes into being.”63      
 Communication scholars and intellectual historians have studied this debate, noting that it 
highlights a central problem in democratic theory. James Carey showed that Lippmann’s 
approach coincided purely with the ‘transmission model’ of communication while Dewey saw 
the ‘transmission’ and ‘ritual model’ working together. In the end, however, Dewey emphasized 
the ritual view because of its propensity to develop community.64 Thus, although Dewey 
disagreed with Lippmann’s prescription, he did agree, essentially, with the diagnosis. Both men 
saw challenges for “the public” in the twentieth century, which they conceived of as a single unit, 
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whose fragmentation was a burden for democracy. While Lippmann’s “Great Society” would be 
managed by experts, and Dewey’s “Great Community” involved high degrees of participation, 
both implicitly rejected the idea of what would come to be known as the counterpublic—the 
enclaved community, with its own forms of communication, speaking among itself, shaped by, 
but distinct from, a larger national dialogue. 
 Still, Dewey’s thinking provides a starting point to understand how social engagement 
and even opposition might be fostered in Lippmann’s world. This became necessary as the years 
following World War II brought even greater skepticism about the possibility for, and in some 
cases, even, the desirability of, a “social realm” that might be the locus of democratic discourse 
and action. The Frankfurt School demonstrated a loss of faith in the Enlightenment project, 
arguing that its logic led to human brutality and irrationality. Hannah Arendt saw the modern 
“social realm” as where the public and private realms “constantly flow into each other like waves 
in the never-resting stream of the life process itself.” Private economic concerns become public 
matters and vice-versa. Thus, modernity demands conformity, as “society expects from each of 
its members a certain kind of behavior, imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which 
tend to ‘normalize’ its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or 
outstanding achievement.”65  
 C. Wright Mills also critiqued this new “mass society,” arguing that changes in the class 
structure of the United States culminated with the dominance of the “power elite.”  The mass 
society is characterized by a disproportionate ratio of givers of opinion to receivers, a low 
possibility of answering back, a lack of realization of public opinion in social action, and a high 
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degree to which institutional authority penetrates the public. Mills offers a starting point to think 
about the political economy of mass communication in conjunction with the changing nature of 
democracy. More specifically, he indicates that the commercialization process and the decline of 
a multiplicity of publics are interlinked.  He writes, 
 In a public, discussion is the ascendant means of communication, and the mass media, if 
 they exist, simply enlarge and animate discussion, linking one primary public with the 
 discussions of another.  In a mass society, the dominant type of communication is the 
 formal media, and the publics become mere media markets: all those exposed to the 
 contents of given mass media.66 
 Thus, both Arendt and Mills saw that the mass society had devastating effects on 
democratic culture. Arendt, however, positioned her reading outside of a Marxist, structuralist 
framework, drawing on the phenomenology of Heidegger. Mills, drawing from Weber, 
demonstrated the ways in which new forms of class and new bureaucratic institutions had 
reshaped the relationship between the masses, the public, and the state-corporate nexus. Mills, 
then, provides a better starting point to begin thinking about the reworking of the public sphere 
through an approach based in social history, particularly one that pays attention to the importance 
of mass media.  This approach would be honed further by German social theorist Jurgen 
Habermas. 
Habermas and his Critics
 The central work on the public sphere drawing from a Marxist-Hegelian tradition has 
been Habermas’ Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Here, Habermas describes the 
public sphere as both a normative category and a historical ideal. Written in light of the problems 
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of the mass society understood by Adorno and Horkheimer, Arendt and Mills, Habermas pointed 
to the Enlightenment ideal as a way of explaining how spaces for democratic discourse might 
exist. Like Arendt, he defines the public sphere as the space between the private sphere and the 
state. According to Habermas, the bourgeois public sphere was centered in Europe’s coffee 
houses, salons, and taverns, and rose alongside the liberal state and capitalism. By the early 
twentieth century, however, the bourgeois public sphere had disintegrated, and fell with the birth 
of mass politics and a commercially-based media.67  
 While Habermas’ main concern is the bourgeois public sphere, he does provide some 
insight to help understand the relationship between the working class and democracy, working 
through Marx’s writings and draws out a theory of public, democratic discourse. In Marx’s 
“counter-model,” the classical relationship between the public sphere and the private was 
peculiarly reversed. However, Habermas notes that Marx’s expectation that the dialectical nature 
of the bourgeois public sphere would bring about a transformation where private persons would 
be private persons of a public, rather than a public of private persons, did not transpire. Instead, 
“liberalism argued against the socialist division in favor of conserving a relativized form of the 
bourgeois public sphere.  With liberalism, therefore, the bourgeois interpretation of the public 
sphere abandoned the form of a philosophy of history in favor of a commonsense meliorism—it 
became ‘realistic.’” Liberal efforts to expand the franchise were essentially reactionary, 
countering “the power of the idea of a critically debating public’s self-determination as soon as 
this public was subverted by the propertyless and uneducated masses.”68 Rather than retaining 
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the virtues of the bourgeois public sphere, democratic societies in the late nineteenth century 
began transforming from a “culture debating” to a “culture consuming.” Habermas argues, “The 
public sphere of the world of letters was replaced by the pseudo-public or sham-private world of 
culture consumption.” The public sphere’s expansion alongside modern capitalism brought its 
own collapse.69 
 Perhaps the greatest contribution made by Habermas’ Structural Transformation is that it 
helps us understand the relationship between democratic communication and power. As Nicholas 
Garnham notes, first, it links the institutions and practices of communication with those of 
democratic politics; second, it focuses on the “necessary material resource base of any public 
sphere”; and third, by positioning the public between the state and the market it demonstrates 
that threats to public discourse may emerge from both. Paul Starr has challenged these ideas 
from a traditionally liberal perspective, rejecting Habermas’ and the Frankfurt School’s Marxist 
approach and their assumption of the “class character of the early modern public sphere.” 
According to Starr, “In a dynamic sense, markets in liberal societies enrich the public sphere far 
more than they impoverish it… Our public life is a hybrid of capitalism and democracy, and we 
are better off for it, as long as the democratic side is able to keep the balance.” Thus, Starr 
focuses on the state’s role in making “constitutive choices” regarding the development of 
communications systems, but disregards the ways these choices are made alongside class 
struggle.70
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 Political economists, such as Robert W. McChesney, have adhered more closely to 
Habermas’ framework. McChesney illustrates the process by which corporate and state power 
gained control over radio broadcasting from “the public”—comprised of workers, educators and 
religious organizations—during the 1920s and 1930s. Thus, he offers a detailed history of one 
key moment in the “refeudalization” process of the twentieth century. More importantly, this 
process was not inevitable, but was contentious. The public sphere for McChesney is shaped 
during “critical junctures,” moments of political upheaval, rather than Starr’s “constitutive 
choices,” which are made by officials seemingly unshaped by conflict.71 
 While the political economy approach has brought marginalized perspectives into the 
view of communications history, most of the research in this tradition has focused on the 
structuring of the national public sphere. However, many of the critiques of Habermas’ book that 
emerged in the English-speaking world following its translation in 1989 pointed even more 
acutely for the need to conceive of multiple publics in democratic theory, arguing that Structural 
Transformation is highly problematic in its lack of attention to subaltern groups and its 
illustration of their relationship to the public sphere.  According to Habermas, the ideal public 
sphere of the eighteenth century (1) disregarded status; (2) centered on issues of “common 
concern”; and (3) was inclusive in principle and could never be “consolidated as a clique,” with 
everyone able to participate.  Nancy Fraser argues that Habermas not only “idealizes the liberal 
public sphere but also…fails to examine other, nonliberal, nonbourgeois, competing public 
spheres” through this formulation. “Or rather,” she says, “it is precisely because he fails to 
examine these other public spheres that he ends up idealizing the liberal public sphere.”72  
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 Fraser calls into question many of Habermas’ assumptions, including the belief that the 
proliferation of a multiplicity of competing publics is necessarily a step away from, rather than 
toward, greater democracy, and that a single, comprehensive public sphere is always preferable 
to a nexus of multiple publics. This is central to issues of social class and the distribution of 
wealth because “deliberative processes in public spheres will tend to operate to the advantage of 
dominant groups and to the disadvantage of subordinates.” Thus, “parallel discursive arenas 
where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses to 
formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests and needs,” or “subaltern 
counterpublics,” are essential to the maintenance of democracy. Fraser is careful not to 
romanticize subaltern counterpublics; she argues that they are not always virtuous, and may be 
undemocratic and antiegalitarian, but they “help expand discursive space. In principle, 
assumptions that were previously exempt from contestation will now have to be publicly argued 
out.”  This is essentially a “good thing in stratified societies.”73  
 Fraser’s essay offers a starting point to think about counterpublics, elaborated upon most 
usefully by Michael Warner. Counterpublics, according to Warner, are not necessarily 
“subaltern” but see themselves as “oppositional,” and therefore, are. “A counterpublic maintains 
at some level, conscious or not, an awareness of its subordinate status. The cultural horizon 
against which it marks itself off is not just a general or wider public but a dominant one.”74 Thus, 
contradictions are endemic to counterpublics and often lead to their ineffectiveness in pushing 
for social change.
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 Warner’s work emphasizes three important points: the relationship between 
counterpublics and publics, the relationship between counterpublics and social movements, and 
the relationship between counterpublics and media. First, Warner notes that counterpublics 
embody the “contradictions and perversities inherent in the organization of all publics” and 
“work by many of the same circular postulates.”75 Thus, a dialectical approach, as taken by 
Habermas, to understanding the relationship between public and counterpublic, and the dynamics 
within counterpublics might be the basis for historical investigation.    
 Also, Warner notes that Habermas’ public sphere environment is the context of modern 
social movements, including those which address “identity politics.” This poses a problem for 
counterpublics. Social movements take shape in civil society, often with an agenda of demands 
vis-à-vis the state. In order to become social movements, counterpublics must “acquire agency in 
relation to the state,” and seek to change policy by appealing to the broader public. This forces 
counterpublics to “cede the original hope of transforming not just policy but the space of public 
life itself.”76  This begs the question, under what conditions do critical social movements lose 
their transformative power, or in Habermas’ words, become “refeudalized”? 
 Finally, Warner points to the importance of media for counterpublics.  Counterpublics are 
“multicontextual space[s] of circulation, organized not by a place or an institution, but by the 
circulation of discourse.” Thus, “radical alternative media” (as well as the media of non-radical 
counterpublics) do not exist for the purpose of disseminating information. Rather, radical media 
become the very embodiment of counterpublics. They are the essence of, as John Downing notes, 
“popular culture.”  Radical media also do not exist within a vacuum. Instead, radical media 
42
75 Warner, Publics, 56. 
76 Warner, Publics, 124. 
“intertwines with commercialized mass culture and oppositional cultures.” They are “a mixed 
phenomenon, quite often free and radical in certain respects and not in others.”77 Such media 
therefore not only deserve scholarly attention because of their complexity and importance in 
counterpublics, but because they are partially constitutive of an entire process of shaping the 
total communications landscape.  
Habermas and History: Moving Towards the Fragments
 Despite some of its theoretical and historical flaws, Habermas’ work remains useful 
because it draws attention to the importance of the press in general in the development and 
maintenance of public spheres. While historians have criticized Habermas for describing an 
imaginary, normative category as a historical reality, the work of communication historians and 
theorists has shown that the press played a significant role in constructing public life throughout 
U.S. history. With greater attention to historical evidence, many of these works have suggested 
modification of Habermas’ original theory.    
 Michael Schudson rejects Habermas’ public sphere, arguing that a rational-critical public 
sphere never really existed.” Instead, “mid-nineteenth century Americans lived in island 
communities” defined by ethnic and religious make-up. Here, high participation in politics did 
not necessarily correlate with high levels of understanding. However, Schudson still confirms the 
importance of the press in shaping this political involvement between 1840 and 1900, not 
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because it facilitated rational-critical discussion, but because newspapers encouraged 
partisanship, offering simplistic understandings of politics.78  
 John Nerone has also challenged the existence of the ideal public sphere as a historical 
reality. He argues that for Habermas, public discourse required a “negation of self” to an extent 
that denies “sociological facts. At no point in history were speakers so anonymous, audiences so 
universal and discourse so rational.” However, Nerone believes that the key to understanding the 
public sphere’s existence is through its representation, “the press,” which marks a key difference 
between “Habermas’ public and George Gallup’s.” These representations have been shaped 
through violence by the state and by vigilantes who have sought public stability, pointing to a 
public sphere that has never been truly rational, and never free of state influence.79  
 The history of representations of the public sphere has been taken up further by other 
scholars in communications and literary studies. Nerone and Kevin Barnhurst have focused on 
the newspaper’s form—“the persisting visible structure of the newspaper”—linking the public 
sphere to the materiality of print culture, because “the form of news is never innocent or neutral,” 
as it “reenacts and reinforces patterns of deference” and “encodes a system of authority.”80 
Understanding the history of the public sphere through the forms of news, Nerone and Barnhurst 
offer an innovative conceptualization of the relationship between citizens, the media, and the 
state, but remain bound to notions of a unitary, national public.  
 Trish Loughran has further interrogated the public sphere’s material nature in her study of 
the “national book”—namely Common Sense and The Federalist Papers—“as both object and 
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ideology.” Loughran points towards a more localized and historically specific way of 
understanding the relationship between print, the public, and the nation.  Her approach “tells a 
different story about what kinds of communities were being imagined.” Loughran calls on us to 
turn our attention towards “the fragments” and understand the dangers of relying on one, 
totalizing theory of print and the public.81  
 Mary P. Ryan has explored such “fragments” within the context of urban environments. 
Ryan studies the municipalities of New York, San Francisco and New Orleans in the 1800s to 
understand “the associated democratic practices of specific places,” examining the social, 
cultural and political realms. She demonstrates that at the local level politics were contentious 
and factious. Those excluded from formal politics often took to the streets and engaged in violent 
action as a way to participate in the public. During the antebellum period, violent forms of 
political involvement were “not so much a breakdown of democratic process as its conduct by 
another means.” Between 1850 and the end of the Civil War, space opened up in urban 
environments for new voices, including women’s rights advocates, African Americans and 
radical, white working men. Following the war, “there was a narrowing of the range of public 
good and public possibility, an increasingly bureaucratized politics, a reliance on publicity more 
than public association, and a dualistic definition of the differences among the people” based in 
race and gender. 82   
 Ryan’s Deweyite, pragmatic conception of the public brings those excluded from the 
formal institutions of democracy into view. For her, the public is constituted by whoever 
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participates in it. Thus, she points to a single, but contentious public linked not to the nation but 
to the city. This is a useful historiographic intervention, but it does not adequately deal with the 
role media institutions play in structuring publics. Instead, Ryan turns to the newspaper not as an 
object of study with its own logic, but as a representational resource—although admittedly a 
flawed one—for understanding “the public.” 
 Scholarship that has examined later periods in U.S. history has also highlighted the 
importance of the local, the urban, and the working class, while offering critiques of Habermas’ 
conception of the refeudalized public sphere where consumption overtook politics. Miriam 
Hansen argues that the development of cinema in the early twentieth century did not work to 
destroy the public sphere, but rather created new forms of public life. She argues that exhibition 
standards lagged behind “the mass-cultural standards of production and distribution…providing 
the structural conditions for locally specific, collective formations of reception.” Thus, cinema 
“functioned as a potentially autonomous, alternative horizon of experience” for women and the 
immigrant working class.83 In other words, the cinema might have provided the basis for the 
formation of counterpublics. Other scholars have offered similar arguments, demonstrating the 
ways in which leisure activities and popular culture which emerged in urban environments laid 
the groundwork for new social formations among the marginalized.84 While this line of research 
opens up new avenues for exploring public life among subaltern groups, as well as for more 
contemporary histories, it does account for what political economists have taken to be Habermas’ 
greatest attribute—his structural analysis. The question therefore remains: what are the 
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structures of counterpublics? How do people marginalized by dominant institutions of power and 
discourse build and maintain them? In order to answer these questions, communications scholars 
much engage with working class history.
The “New Working-Class History” and its Problems 
 Like histories of the public sphere, the “new working-class history” that emerged in the 
1960s with the publication of E.P. Thompson’s Making of the English Working Class has paid 
inadequate attention to the structure of the organizations that shape working-class life.  
Thompson’s groundbreaking study offered the essential understanding that the working class 
“was present at its own making.” Class, for Thompson, “is a relationship, not a thing.” Class 
consciousness is not a defined, determined way of thinking, but something that emerges 
differently in each specific historical circumstance.85 This led to two important historiographic 
innovations. First, Thompson showed that the working class played an active role in its own 
making, in relation to other historical forces. Second, he demonstrated the importance of 
ideology and culture in the process of making class consciousness.  
 Thompson’s work, focusing on the development of a single working class has much in 
common with Habermas’ attention to the development of a unitary public sphere, and to 
Anderson’s work with its relation to the nation. This approach has posed problems in the 
development of the historiography of the working class in the United States, where concerns 
regarding immigration and regionalism have played key roles. As Ira Katznelson notes, 
Thompson’s national focus allows him to avoid arguing whether the English example serves as a 
47
85 E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), 9-14. 
model, or whether its experience is contingent. In order to make Thompson’s approach more 
applicable to the study of class formation, Katznelson outlines four levels of class, moving 
beyond the “class in itself-for itself” model. These levels include the structure of capitalist 
economic development, social organization both at and away from work, formed groups sharing 
dispositions, and collective action. Class formation is “concerned with the conditional (but not 
random) process of connection” between these levels, maintaining “the advantages of defining 
class formation in terms of outcomes while providing a more elaborated and variable object of 
comparative historical analysis.”86     
 Within the U.S. context, Herbert Gutman adopted Thompson’s approach, arguing against 
the “Commons school” of labor history which “encouraged labor historians to spin a cocoon 
around American workers, isolating them from their own particular subcultures and from the 
larger national culture.” Instead, Gutman placed “the culture of work” at the center of his 
analysis, and noted the importance of maintaining a distinction between culture and society. 
Drawing from anthropologist Sidney Mintz, Gutman argued that culture is “a kind of resource,” 
while society is “a kind of arena.” Thus, culture might be mobilized and utilized by particular 
groups within a broader context. This distinction, Gutman argues, allows for a greater 
understanding of the ways in which diverse groups of workers from different cultural 
backgrounds reshaped their social milieus in the modern, industrial setting. The making of an 
American working class, according to Gutman, involves “the changing composition of the 
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working population, the continued entry into the United States of nonindustrial people with 
distinctive cultures, and the changing structure of American society.”87           
 In order to understand the “making” of a singular American working class, historians 
have often turned their eyes to its fragments, noting the ways in which the parts have interacted 
with the whole. Lizabeth Cohen’s study of workers in Chicago during the interwar era shows that 
workers of various nationalities and races forged a distinct, unified class and consciousness 
within the institutions of everyday life, reaching their apex with the New Deal and the CIO. 
Thus, we might see Cohen’s work in conjunction with Habermas’, in that she suggests that New 
Deal culture was supported by a working-class public sphere comprised of a set of institutions, 
values and modes of expression that may be seen as paradigmatic.88         
  James Barrett points to the importance of historical generations in understanding the 
acculturation process. Working-class historians must look “between the generations...not simply 
telling the story of each group of ethnic workers” as the constant flows of migration yield not 
only “making” but persistent “remaking” of an American working-class. Understanding the 
“remaking” process means examining both formation and fragmentation. Rather than thinking of 
fragmentation as inevitable, Barrett conceives of it as “a problem to be explained with reference 
to a particular historical situation that shaped the process.” In Barrett’s narrative, the wave of 
migration to the United States from the late nineteenth century until World War I constituted a 
“remaking” of the working class, transitioning from the native born and old immigrant working-
class institutions and practices. New immigrant workers “create[d] viable working-class cultures 
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with distinct institutions, political ideas, forms of socialization, organization and strategies.” 
Attacks against workers during the depression that followed the war between 1919 and 1922 led 
to a fragmentation of the working-class, as politics and race were used to divide labor. This 
“devastated the immigrant-based movement that had provided a context for Americanization 
from the bottom up...” Instead, nativism supported by corporate and government entities took 
hold and labor unions and radical political parties came to define themselves in explicitly 
American terms. The second generation of the new immigrants, though, forged their own version 
of Americanism through working-class organizations, ultimately giving birth to the New Deal.89  
 While the ‘new social history’ has become the dominant framework for historical 
research on the working class, it has been critiqued from multiple perspectives. First, David 
Roediger has noted the importance of race in the acculturation process. Although Thompson and 
Gutman opened the door to exploring race, they failed to explain it, particularly the role of the 
white working class in perpetuating white supremacy, adequately. Whiteness, Roediger argues, 
has been central to the formation of the working class, as immigrant groups—most notably the 
Irish, and later Jews, Italians and eastern Europeans—sought the privileges of whiteness in 
response “to a fear of dependency on wage labor and to the necessities of capitalist work 
discipline.” Any examination of the transformation of a particular segment of the white working 
class must engage to some extent with the role in which race has been constructed by powerful 
forces, and if we are to take working-class agency seriously, the ways in which working class 
people struggled for racial privileges. Roediger points to discourse as a central battleground over 
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race.90  Thus, any study of working-class counterpublics must note the symbolic realm, and 
articulations of race and ethnicity.  
 John Bodnar has offered another critique of the new labor history, demanding that we 
reconcile the importance of studying the private lives of immigrant workers with the demands of 
a Marxist analysis aimed at understanding power relationships. He has argued for a Marxian 
understanding that connects the “pragmatic culture of everyday life” among immigrant workers 
to the capitalist system that produced it. He says immigrant workers “accepted the world for 
what it was and what it was becoming and yet ceaselessly resisted the inevitable at numerous 
points of contact in the workplace, the classroom, the political hall, the church, and even at 
home.” For Bodnar, the private sphere constituted an important realm where the immigrant 
working class struggled to gain control over their lives. In addition, familial concerns were the 
catalyst for social and political activism among the rank and file. The limitations of American 
radicalism in the 1930s, he argues, “may have emanated from the scope of family priorities 
which continued to direct the objectives of most workers.”91 
 Bodnar’s perspective severely understates the ways in which public activity and worker 
consciousness shape each other. James Barrett places a renewed emphasis on the more traditional 
institutions of the labor movement. While class formation does occur in social spaces—
dancehalls, movie theaters, and saloons, as noted by Cohen, Kathy Peiss and David Nasaw—
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Barrett pays particular attention to this process in more explicitly political spaces, such as labor 
unions, shop floors, and radical political parties.92 This is useful because it provides ways to 
conceptualize the working-class as a counterpublic. The re-emphasis on institutions allows us to 
study their role in producing culture explicated by the ‘new social history.’ This culture can be 
understood through the media created by working-class organizations, the “representations” of 
the counterpublic. A structural, Habermasian approach to working-class counterpublic history 
should examine the role of unions and radical political parties in creating media for their own 
constituents’ use and consumption.  
 These institutions emerged in relation to broader political economic shifts. David Gordon, 
Richard Edwards and Michael Reich argue that although the new social history has been useful 
in “emphasizing ethnic, religious and racial diversity in the American working class,” it has 
“[failed] to integrate adequately the analysis of workers’ cultural experiences with the evolution 
of the organization of work and labor market structure.” Instead, they advocate the examination 
of the organization of work, the structure of labor markets and the segmentation of labor. 
Gordon, et al., argue that U.S. labor history can be divided into three overlapping periods: initial 
proletarianization (1820-1890), homogenization (1870-1945), and segmentation (1920-1970). 
Homogenization tempered working-class protest by the end of the 1920s as corporations 
developed new management strategies to help maximize profits. Following World War I, 
however, the contradictions contained in these strategies spawned new social structures of 
accumulation, creating differentiated labor segments.93 The arrival of the “new immigrants,” 
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then, occurred during the transitions between initial proletarianization and homogenization, 
while segmentation began as the second generation entered the workforce. These forces certainly 
played a role shaping working-class counterpublics, structuring forms of industrial organization, 
workplace culture, and public resistance.  
 Taking these factors into account—class formation and fragmentation, acculturation and 
historical generations, and political ideology and conflict—I will trace the evolution of the 
Jewish working-class counterpublic during the first half of the twentieth century in the U.S. This 
counterpublic went through four phases: formation (1881-1916), fragmentation (1917-1932), 
feudalization (1933-1945), and disintegration (1946-1955). In this dissertation, I pay particular 
attention to the years 1918 to 1941. Between the two wars, a struggle to preserve what Karen 
Brodkin calls “hegemonic Jewishness” centered on socialism emerged within the Yiddish-
speaking community. Brodkin does not mean to suggest that all Jews in the U.S. were members 
of the Socialist Party. Rather, she argues that being Jewish generally meant being familiar with 
and oriented toward an anti-capitalist outlook. Jewishness constituted a non-discrete set of 
political and social values that challenged normative whiteness.94 The media system created by 
Jewish working class institutions, dominated by the Forward, maintained this alternative 
hegemony in the 1920s and 1930s, and made a significant impact on American politics and 
culture.  
 Organic intellectuals did not aim to maintain a particularly Jewish culture for its own 
sake. Rather, they mobilized ethnic and political identities in different ways based on ideology 
and historical circumstance in order to further the aims of labor. Many of the leaders within the 
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early years of the counterpublic understood themselves as Yiddish-speaking workers, not as 
Jews. But during the interwar years, the need to attract advertising revenue in Yiddish language 
newspapers and radio stations facilitated the development of a new Jewish identity that was at 
once comfortable with socialism and consumption. At the same time, labor unions founded by 
and led by Yiddish speaking immigrants used cultural tools to reach out beyond New York’s 
Jewish universe and help build a national movement. Thus, while hegemonic Jewishness shifted, 
it remained a progressive force in U.S. political culture through the first half of the twentieth 
century.  
 The maintenance of this distinct ethnopolitical identity suggests that the Jewish working 
class provides an interesting case for developing a way to understand how working class 
movements might act as counterpublics, and how historians and communications scholars may 
study them as such. First, the Jewish working class established and participated in a wide array 
of political institutions that were in conversation with each other. These included Yiddish-
language groups within the Socialist Labor Party (SLP), the Socialist Party (SP), and the 
Communist Party (CP);  trade unions such as the International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union 
(ILGWU) and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACWA); and mutual aid 
societies such as the Arbeter Ring, or Workmen’s Circle. These organizations expressed different 
positions in relation to the politics of class and Jewishness, and were often in conflict with each 
other. More importantly, they saw themselves as being in dialogue with each other regarding 
issues of central importance to themselves as members of a specific segment of a marginalized 
population. Thus, a wide range of left-centered political discourse existed within the Jewish 
immigrant and second-generation working class community.
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 A second reason that the Jewish working class might be studied as a counterpublic is that 
its institutions were particularly interested in using various forms of media and cultural 
production to foster itself and carryout political conversation. The Yiddish language press was 
the largest foreign language press in the country through the mid-twentieth century, and many of 
these newspapers had specifically left-oriented political agendas. In addition, Jewish left 
organizations used theater, motion pictures, and social gatherings to build a public culture in 
opposition to the dominant institutions and ideologies in American life. While other facets of the 
labor movement also made use of such techniques, many of them originated from within the 
garment unions, and were developed through other Jewish working-class institutions.  
 Finally, the dynamism within the Jewish working class during this period offers an 
avenue to understand how a counterpublic changes over time due to a variety of structural forces. 
Because shifts in politics, ideology and culture all occurred within the Jewish working class, it 
provides a template to understand how counterpublics evolve as a result of structural change. 
Like Habermas’ “refeudalization” of the public sphere and the rise of a mass culture, the eventual 
immersion of the Jewish working class into the dominant American culture suggests the need to 
investigate the tensions between publics and counterpublics.95 Understanding this problem 
speaks to issues of how we may build a multicultural society, a strong labor movement, and a 
democratic media system. 
  While much scholarship in the area of working-class culture and media history has been 
informed by Gramsci, the media within the Jewish labor movement have yet to be adequately 
theorized and studied as such. Gramsci’s attention to the role of organic intellectuals suggests 
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that we study not just how working-class people built their movements from the ground up, but 
the people and ideas that glued these movements together. History demonstrates that working-
class media, the products of organic intellectuals, can play a critical role in doing this work. In 
addition, Gramsci’s implication that we study ethnicity in conjunction with class suggests that we 
examine the intersection of Jewishness and working-class political organizations. In order to 
fully understand the development of the historical bloc during the New Deal period, an 
examination of the organic intellectuals and their media strategies within the Jewish labor 
movement is essential.
 This dissertation consists of eight chapters. The second and third chapters will focus on 
the efforts of Baruch Charney Vladeck, the manager of the Forward, to maintain a strong 
newspaper facing economic difficulty and political repression in the wake of the war. Chapter 
two provides context, explaining the role of the Forward in the pre-war period, and the 
challenges it faced from political economic forces, as well as exploring Vladeck’s early life. I 
examine how Vladeck’s politics—at once radical and pragmatic—shaped the direction of the 
Forward in the 1920s. Vladeck developed an intricate plan to rely on national advertising, and 
create local editions outside of New York in order to draw in more revenue. In addition, the 
Forward became increasingly anti-Communist in tone, mirroring the shifting politics of the 
Socialist Party. In chapter three, I discuss the ramifications of this plan on the internal operations 
of the newspaper, its politics, and the changing cultural dynamics within the Jewish working 
class, drawing from theories of commodification in the media studies.                                           
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 As I demonstrate in chapters four and five, the two major unions in the largely Jewish 
garment industry, the ACWA and the ILGWU, challenged Vladeck’s commercial approach. 
Jacob Salutstky, later known as J.B.S. Hardman, had been hoisted from the Forward for political 
reasons at the end of the war, and helped found the rival newspaper Di frayhayt. When Di 
frayhayt became a Communist Party organ, Hardman put his energy into democratizing the press 
at the ACWA, as the union’s Educational Director and editor. 
 Meanwhile, Fannia Cohn of the ILGWU advocated for the maintenance of labor 
publications—namely Justice and the Yiddish-language Gerechtigkeit—in conjunction with a 
broader agenda around labor education, culture and dramatics. Cohn, the union’s educational 
secretary, was the sole woman on ILGWU’s executive board and had emerged from the rank-
and-file. Her experience in the union’s early years was rooted largely in the night schools and 
recreational activities supported by it supported. She believed that these approaches were 
particularly important in drawing working women into union life. Cohn struggled to maintain 
these programs, while other leaders appropriated them towards efforts of mass persuasion.
 Chapters six and seven elucidate how the Jewish working class counterpublic became 
fragmented from growing radical movements, stymieing progressive change. In chapter six, I 
offer a history of the Socialist radio station WEVD. Rooted in the ideals of labor education that 
exemplified the Jewish labor movement, the station faced challenges from state regulators which 
compelled it to commercialize. In 1932, the Forward purchased the station to prevent its 
collapse. WEVD came to symbolize the New Deal coalition through a mix of commercial values, 
social democracy, and interethnic cooperation and representation. But the unique position of the  
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Jewish working class organizations prevented them from working with a broader national 
movement for non-commercial broadcasting.
 In chapter seven I explain how in the late 1930s and early 1940s, the new CIO union, the 
Newspaper Guild, came into conflict with the media institutions in the Jewish labor movement as 
they sought to organize their own workers. This story reveals the tensions that arise as a local, 
ethnic counterpublic becomes incorporated into the broader, national public sphere. In addition, 
it illustrates the contradictions embedded in the system of professional journalism that became 
solidified during the postwar era. Ultimately, as C. Wright Mills suggested, the coming of the 
mass society squandered the counterpublic’s democratic potential.
 My final chapter makes concluding historiographic arguments, and draws lessons from 
this history for the contemporary moment. The history of the Jewish working class counterpublic 
reveals the importance of alternative media in moments of political and economic crisis. It 
speaks to the need for social movements to consider the benefits and drawbacks of compromise. 
And it demonstrates the need for an academic analysis and a social praxis committed to 
conceptualizing the intersection of cultural identity, labor, and communication in order to 
theorize and enact a more perfect “actually existing democracy.”96 
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Chapter Two:
Digging in the Dark: 
B.C. Vladeck and Advertising Strategy at the Jewish Daily Forward
There is only one metropolitan newspaper which was founded neither for money nor the hope of 
making money nor the personal advancement of its owner. It has a circulation of more than a 
quarter million copies daily, is worth at least a million dollars, has given away about a million 
dollars, paid its scrubwomen $37 a week, encouraged genius and the arts, and once didn’t give a 
damn for advertising. This paper, one of the few non-commercial journals in the world, is the 
Jewish Daily Forward.-- George Seldes97
One admires William Lloyd Garrison, is overwhelmed by John Brown, is enthused by Wendell 
Phillips, but God gave Americans the courage to follow Lincoln-- for social order is deep-rooted 
and reenforced by a million props. The man who attempts to break it down by sheer force of will, 
by mere strength of dogma, may be magnificent and inspiring, he may call forth our deepest 
admiration and awe, but he will not break the old order...One must know how to go around 
obstacles...how to start digging in the dark without trumpets and flying banners.
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! --Baruch Charney Vladeck 98
! At the height of the New Deal, more than 4,000 people celebrated the Fortieth 
Anniversary of the Jewish Daily Forward with a banquet and performances at New York’s 
Carnegie Hall in April 1937. Although not in attendance, U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt sent 
a message of congratulations. FDR proclaimed that the newspaper offered “an example of the 
highest ideals of constructive journalism,” and was “the utmost champion of truth in the news, 
and as medium for the free discussion of all the problems which clamor for solution.”99 
 Such praise from the U.S. President marked a new experience for the Forward editors. 
For most of its forty years, the Yiddish language socialist publication had been a force of general 
opposition toward the establishment. Twenty years earlier, another Democratic administration 
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under Woodrow Wilson had threatened to shut down the newspaper, accusing it of sedition 
during the First World War. But while the left wing suffered tremendous losses during the 1920s, 
the Forward newspaper and its readership among the Jewish labor movement gained power vis a 
vis the dominant American culture and the state. The prestige the Forward enjoyed by the 
mid-1930s, and the manner in which it benefitted from the New Deal, was in large part due to the 
decisions its leaders made in the previous decade. 
 How did a Yiddish language newspaper devoted to the socialist cause become a force 
praised by the highest levels of the U.S. federal government? In order to understand this 
phenomenon, it is essential to look at the newspaper from an institutional perspective. While 
much of the history of the Jewish Daily Forward has focused on its role as an ideological 
barometer of the Jewish left, making Abraham Cahan, the newspaper’s long-term editor-in-chief, 
the central agent of the newspaper’s history, little effort has been spent attempting to understand 
the political economy of the Forward-- how it was financed, how it operated as a site of 
production, and how it interacted with other institutions of the labor movement and of capital. In 
order to answer these questions, it is important to turn attention towards another important 
individual in the history of Yiddish socialism, and its press-- Baruch Charney Vladeck, the 
Forward’s general business manager. 
 Like many Jewish immigrants of his generation, B.C. Vladeck emerged out of a radical 
background with high ideals and aspirations for himself and his new home, the United States. A 
former political prisoner from the Pale of Settlement-- the area designated for Jews in the 
western Russian empire-- Vladeck became involved in the tumultuous politics of his era at a 
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young age. As a devout socialist, he stood at odds with the dominant American political culture 
upon his arrival in the U.S. in 1908. 
 But Vladeck sought not only to change the United States, but to do so by adopting 
American values. Informed by the tradition of Jefferson and Lincoln as much as Marx and 
Engels, Vladeck helped to build a socialist movement within New York’s Jewish community that 
claimed liberal democracy as a key value. At the same time, Vladeck’s highly pragmatic 
approach led him to make decisions as the general manager of the Forward that bred criticism 
from multiple fronts. Thus, Vladeck’s pragmatism, had contradictory impacts on the Forward 
and the counterpublic it represented. On the one hand, it allowed for the perseverance of the 
newspaper, and ultimately, the Jewish labor movement, through the reactionary period of the 
1920s. At the same time, Vladeck’s willingness to compromise on important ideological issues 
such as the First World War, and the rise of Communism and Zionism, as well as relying on 
national brand advertising for revenue and operating the socialist daily with businesslike 
acumen, all worked to fundamentally rework the politics and structure of the Jewish working-
class counterpublic that had first emerged at the turn of the twentieth century.
 Vladeck came to the U.S. as Yiddish socialism reached its peak on New York’s Lower 
East Side, a lively cultural environment rife with political tension. Within a few short years, 
however, world war and the Russian Revolution placed this radical community, this 
counterpublic, in crisis. As the new general business manager of the Forward, Vladeck played a 
central role in shaping the political economy of the Yiddish press between the key years from 
1918 through his death in 1939, coincidently almost the entire interwar period. Vladeck not only 
influenced the ideology of the newspaper through his writing, but also by making important 
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business and personnel decisions that would shape the structure and representation of the Jewish 
working class counterpublic. 
 Ultimately, Vladeck helped turn the Forward Association into a progressive, not-for-profit  
media empire, maintaining liberal and Yiddish language broadcasting on radio station WEVD 
while providing a source of funding for other radical and liberal organizations. This system was 
integral to the development of the New Deal culture of the 1930s and 1940s, building an 
interethnic working class, enabling Jewish assimilation, and ultimately promoting a moderate, 
regulated American capitalism. In this chapter, I demonstrate that Vladeck should be understood 
as a pragmatic idealist. In chapter three, I argue that this perspective can be seen in Vladeck’s 
day to day management of the Forward, as he encountered criticisms and difficulties as a result 
of this philosophy. Later, in chapter five, I demonstrate how these contradictions shaped the 
development of the Forward Association’s broadcasting station, WEVD. While Vladeck’s 
pragmatism enabled the Forward to withstand the political tumult of the 1920s, it indebted the 
newspaper and the radio station to the whims of the market and political elites. By the New Deal 
period, the Forward would become largely integrated into the state-corporate nexus. 
The Lower East Side, 1881-1908: A Counterpublic in Formation
 The late nineteenth and early twentieth century saw a radical culture blossom among 
Jewish workers on New York’s Lower East Side. The mass exodus of Yiddish-speaking 
immigrants from the Pale of Settlement to the shores of North America began in 1881, following 
a series of pogroms in the wake of Czar Alexander II’s murder. Some scholars argue that many of 
these immigrants brought a radical culture with them, while others stress the importance of the 
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largely non-Jewish, German socialist movement that Russian Jewish intellectuals encountered on 
the East Side, who provided financial and organizational assistance during the early years of 
Jewish migration.100 Thus, external and internal influences helped create the context for 
organizing Jewish workers, as an increasing number of immigrants became contractors in the 
garment industry. Small shops were ubiquitous on the East Side, and contractors were forced into 
fierce competition with each other, creating tremendous pressure to underbid other contractors 
and keep wages low. Within a decade, the most competitive of these shops—“the moths of 
Division Street”—were as profitable as the more established operations—the “giants of 
Broadway.”101  
 It was not long before a counterpublic, represented by a nascent Yiddish labor press and 
manifest in a variety of other cultural and communicative practices, began to emerge. By 1885, 
in the midst of the nationwide fight for the eight-hour day, economic realities began to bond the 
Russian intellectual, socialist thinkers with the masses of Jewish workers in the garment industry, 
giving rise to the Yiddish labor press. The Jewish Workers’ Association (JWA) became the 
primary organization of the Yiddish-speaking left. The JWA organized the first Jewish printers’ 
union and raised funds to establish a Yiddish labor newspaper. The organization played a central 
role in Socialist Henry George’s mayoral campaign in 1886, but the campaign’s failure and the 
execution of the accused Haymarket bombers caused the JWA to split into anarchist and socialist 
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factions.102 These two ideological camps would develop institutions seeking to further their 
political goals by building a culture of Yiddish left-wing resistance. For both of these camps, 
however, being Jewish was less important than being workers. Yiddish was used by radical 
organizers and writers not because it was necessary to preserve a religious, or even an ethnic 
identity, but because it was simply what most Jewish workers spoke. For this generation of 
radicals, the Yiddish language was to serve as an instrument, rather than a product, or social 
change.   
 In 1886, the anarchists established the Pioneers of Liberty and other venues for public 
discourse among radical Jews, including debating clubs, educational societies, and youth groups. 
In the meantime, the socialists reconstituted themselves as an official part of the Socialist Labor 
Party (SLP) in New York and organized the United Hebrew Trades (UHT) in 1888. On 
December 25, 1889, the anarchists called for a conference with their socialist counterparts to 
launch a bi-party paper. The socialists, under the leadership of Louis Miller, Morris Hillquit, and 
Abraham Cahan, dominated the New York organizations and balked at the plan. Both camps 
soon began publishing separate weekly newspapers—the socialist Arbeiter Tseitung, and the 
anarchist Fraye Arbeter Shtime. The latter, however, would fail twice before beginning regular 
publication in 1899.103  
 Ultimately, socialism became the hegemonic political ideology on the East Side, with its 
Yiddish variant expressed through a print culture, as well as in social spaces. This cultural 
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activity boosted the organizing efforts of the UHT by fueling general strikes in the garment 
industry in 1890 and 1891. Michels offers several reasons for growth of the Yiddish press: the 
spike in immigration, the need for businesses to attract Yiddish speakers through advertising, the 
invention of the Linotype machine and the falling cost of newsprint, and popular demand. Not all 
the Yiddish newspapers were radical; the largest, Kasriel Sarasohn’s Yidishes Tageblat promoted 
religious unity over class conflict. But the Arbeter Tsaytung and by 1894, the daily Abend Blat 
“had brought socialism into the very center of the Yiddish newspaper market.”104 
 Der Forverts, or the Forward, the newspaper that would define the Jewish Left for 
decades to come, was established in 1897 after a split among the publishers of the Arbeter 
Tsaytung, reflecting a larger split in the SLP between supporters and detractors of party leader 
Daniel DeLeon. On January 7, Abraham Cahan, Louis Miller and fifty others broke from the 
publishing association of the Tsaytung and founded the Forverts Association taking the Yiddish 
press in a new direction, toward a “social democratic yellow journalism.”105 
 The Forward became the cornerstone of the Jewish working-class counterpublic, having 
a broad impact on social life in the ghetto. While the SLP and trade unions grew through the 
1890s, Tony Michels argues that “to appreciate socialism’s influence during the 1890s, one must 
look beyond the formal organizations into the wider public sphere, the social realm ‘where public 
opinion is formed.’”106  This “public sphere”—or counterpublic—was represented not only 
through the Yiddish press, but also social activities associated with it, lectures and speeches, and 
workers’ education societies. The emergence of a socialist Yiddish press gave rise to an entire 
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“newspaper culture” where thousands of workers attended “excursions, balls, literary evenings, 
and anniversary celebrations,” often with the purpose of raising money for the newspapers.107 
 Also of central importance was the Yiddish theater. New York’s first professional Yiddish 
theatrical production was staged in 1882 on the Bowery. The prevalence of such productions 
“filled the new psychological gap in immigrants’ lives,” acting as a meeting place, providing folk 
heroes, and representing loyalty to community.108 Yiddish theater was not monolithic, and 
offered its immigrant audiences a wide variety of theatrical experiences over its first decades in 
the United States. Aesthetic debates raged over the existence of shund, low-brow comedic 
theater, which had become the standard fare. However, movements led by socialists and 
community intellectuals to improve the quality of the Yiddish theater brought about a new wave 
of sophisticated drama.109  
 Live theater was not mere entertainment. It was deeply connected to the political life of 
the Jewish working-class community. Labor unions, mutual aid societies and landsmanshaftn 
(organizations of people from the same European shtetl or town) would often purchase blocks of 
tickets at discounted prices, and then sell tickets at full price back to their members, building a 
political economy based on the social consumption of culture. Playwright Jacob Gordin noted 
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that over six hundred organizations annually made use of such benefit performances. Thus, 
attending performances was an experience based consciously in class, Jewishness, and often 
politics. It was not an act of individual consumption, but a social activity that served to sustain 
radical East Side institutions. Benefit performances not only allowed working-class people to 
enjoy cultural events, but allowed the theaters to “spread risks and maximize attendance” on 
weekdays, while weekend performances attempted to maximize box office receipts, charging 
between 25 cents and a dollar.110        
 While the late nineteenth century saw the development of politically engaged cultural 
institutions, Irving Howe argues that a mass socialist movement did not truly exist among 
Yiddish-speaking workers. Although socialism was integrated into everyday life on the East 
Side, very few immigrant Jews actually joined and paid dues to the SLP or the SP, and many 
were pessimistic about political engagement, doubting their ability as outsiders to change the 
country as a whole.111 The arrival of a new generation of immigrants would change that. 
One of those immigrants would be Baruch Charney Vladeck. 
Baruch Charney: The Early Years
 B.C. Vladeck was born Baruch Charney in 1886 to a religious family in the provincial 
town of Dukor, Lithuania, 30 miles southeast of the growing industrial city of Minsk. It was a 
dynamic period in the shtetls of the Pale. The czar’s anti-Semitic policies combined with an 
expanding industrial economy, wreaked havoc on the livelihood of Jews in Eastern Europe. 
Baruch’s father died at a young age. His mother raised him and his brothers to adhere strictly to a 
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fading religious tradition, waiting to be saved from the misery of shtetl life by the coming of the 
Messiah. Although he noted later that his village had been barely touched by the modernization 
of the nineteenth century,112 many young Jews coming of age in this environment began to 
question traditional ways of life, abandoning religious practice for radical political engagement 
in both Marxist and Zionist incarnations.
 Charney joined the fray after leaving Dukor for Minsk to study at yeshiva, or a religious 
school. By his third year, he was far more excited by modern Russian literature than rabbinical 
texts. “God was dying in my heart,” he wrote, “and the masters of Russian literature were taking 
the place of the Holy Books.” Turning his his interest towards the likes of Pushkin, Dostoyevsky 
and Tolstoy, Charney came to understand the Jewish experience in a new, political context. “I 
was barely fifteen,” he wrote, “and I faced a new world without anything else but youth and a 
dim feeling that henceforth I would sail larger seas.”113
 In 1903, the Kishinev pogrom catalyzed a broader revolutionary zeitgeist. Vicious, 
bloody attacks on Jewish communities that Easter Sunday, during the Jewish Passover holiday, 
coincided with a growing animosity towards Czar Nicholas II. The radical Jewish organization, 
the Bund, which was first formed in 1897 began advocating “a socialist framework that gave 
scope to Jewish national culture” and providing collective security and self defense within the 
shtetls, reaching its height by 1905.114  
 Charney, already opening his eyes to the broader world around him, became swept up in 
the revolutionary fervor. “Radicalism was in the air then,” Vladeck said of the period late in his 
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life. “You felt that a tide was rising. I joined the movement as casually as a boy on the West Side 
in New York might join the Democratic party-- the alternatives for us were to emigrate or 
fight.”115 He had come to attain “a clear knowledge of universal oppression in which the 
persecution of the Jews was a bloody incident, perhaps the bloodiest.”116 At the age of 16, 
Charney was working as an assistant librarian, and leading discussion groups about radical 
economics. After returning home from one of these discussions, Charney was greeted by the 
police and taken under arrest for his dissident activities.117  
 The cell for political prisoners was filled, and young Charney was placed with twenty 
eight men who had been convicted of murder and sentenced to hard labor for life. As a 
“political,” he gained the respect of his cellmates, and quickly began to communicate with other 
radical prisoners-- conducting classes and leading reading groups-- when he discovered that, 
during the day, the cells weren’t locked. Intellectual conversation flourished, as “the days passed 
in endless discussions of party programs and platforms.”118 “Jail was something like a vacation,” 
he said. “It was an opportunity to study. Each time we were sentenced we brought in a book to 
build up the prison library. And when I came out-- well, I was a full fledged revolutionary. It’s 
like sending your kids to a reformatory-- they learn all the tricks.”119
 When he left prison in 1904, Charney traveled undercover with a bodyguard throughout 
the Pale as an organizer with the needle trades circuit of the Minsk Revolutionary Committee. He 
began editing an underground trade publication, The Bristle Worker, and quickly landed back in 
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prison after organizing Russia’s first strike for an eight hour day in Vilna. During this second 
prison term, he became enthralled not by Marx and Bakunin, but by Americans-- particularly 
Abraham Lincoln.120 Upon reading the Gettysburg Address, Vladeck said he “felt as if some 
unknown friend had taken me by the hand on a dark, uncertain road, saying gently: ‘Don’t doubt 
and don’t despair. This country has a soul and a purpose and if you so wish, you may love it 
without regrets.” He understood Lincoln as one who had “practical idealism, seriousness of 
purpose, patience, a sense of humor and a hatred of injustice.” Particularly, he admired the way 
Lincoln had positioned himself within the U.S. power structure, bringing change from the inside. 
“One must know how to go around obstacles,” he later wrote, “without arousing the suspicion of 
the foe, how to start digging in the dark without trumpets and flying banners.” 121   
 Charney spent nearly three years after his second prison sentence building the 
revolutionary movement in Russia, and developing oratory skills. He “could rise to a pathos that 
rang true; the lyrical poet was in every speech. His words, lively and hot, penetrated the hearts of 
his listeners.”122 By 1908, however, “the revolutionary epoch had subsided” and “what was left 
was a great pile of ashes with spies running around on the heap, busy as maggots.” Charney  
decided to join his two brothers, who had left Russia years before, in the United States.123 
 Upon his arrival in the U.S. on Thanksgiving Day, the Forward greeted him with a front 
page story and sent him on a nationwide speaking tour.124 He brought with him the revolutionary 
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spirit cultivated through the Bund and his time as a political prisoner. While at once more radical 
than earlier arrivals, the Bundists who came to the United States beginning around 1905 brought 
a “Jewish dimension” to the socialist struggle that the older generation lacked, injecting a 
politicized understanding of ethnic culture into socialist discourse, understanding that 
 when garment workers won strikes…this was a victory not merely for workers who 
 happened to be Jews but for Jewish workers. The class struggle pursued within the 
 Jewish community would be a means of enriching the life of the Jewish workers, while 
 enriching their life was a precondition for a successful pursuit of the class struggle.125 
At the same moment, this new wave of immigration also introduced Zionism into the United 
States, spurring further debate about the particular nature of Jewish working class identity and 
political goals. Thus, both Bundist and Zionist influences reinforced the self-consciousness of the 
Jewish working-class as a counterpublic, as a movement separate from but in dialogue with a 
broader public sphere. 
 Vladeck believed in the importance of maintaining that dialogue, of immigrant Jews 
contributing to the making of a new world in the United States. For him, the U.S. represented a 
place of change and possibility. He wrote that Europe was like chess-- “motionless people move 
dead figures around with a logic that has nothing to do with the needs of the body nor those of 
the spirit.” America, though, was like baseball, where “living men are constantly in motion 
around a continuing, living, moving problem-- the baseball... whether forward or backward, the 
spirit of the country will be moving.” 126  
! Vladeck held a left-wing interpretation of the American experiment throughout his life, 
and explicitly sought to link this to traditional Jewish culture. For example, as a member of the 
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New York City Board of Alderman in 1919, the patriotic radical declared his support for 
displaying tablets with the Ten Commandments and the Declaration of Independence in the 
Aldermanic Chamber “as a Bolshevik.” “The signers of the Declaration of Independence were 
Bolsheviki, pure and simple,” Vladeck proclaimed. As Melech Epstein wrote, “Vladeck was 
captivated by the political freedom of America, the absence of a caste system, and the vastness of 
the land... All contradictions and imperfections notwithstanding, the United States was to him a 
genuine expression of the democratic will.” 127
 Vladeck’s complicated mixture of American liberalism, socialism and Jewishness was not 
unique. Rather, as it was said following his death in 1938, he “was the most typical 
representative of the second period [of immigrants],” the first period having come to the U.S. in 
the 1880s. 
 His Socialism was not an acquired creed with him as with the older generation. He grew 
 up with it; it was ingrained in him and was part of his mental make-up. But it was a much 
 wider, profounder, and more refined Socialism than the simple almost crude faith of the 
 people of the eighties. It included literature, poetry, a longing for the beautiful, a search 
 for religio-philosophic truths and an esthetic refinement which the older Socialists who 
 confined themselves to economic and social problems did not know.128
Vladeck’s ideology- a broad outlook rather than a rigid, scientific method to understanding the  
world-- was flexible and thus, sustainable through shifting economic conditions and 
transportable across cultures and geographic boundaries. It is this aspect of Vladeck’s thinking-- 
and more broadly, the Yiddish socialism of that period-- that lends itself to a Gramscian analysis. 
It provided tools of resistance within multiple “wars of position”-- on the institutional, 
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ideological and cultural fronts. As such, it worked in concert with the contradictory nature of an 
emerging consumer society in the United States, and-- specifically through the Forward-- the 
commercial imperatives of newspaper publication in the twentieth century.
! Vladeck’s faith in the American project, and his embrace of his new country’s dynamic 
spirit coincided with the emerging Progressive movement for reform, as well as a changing 
media environment. This was the era of the muckraking journalism, as writers like Upton 
Sinclair, Ida Tarbell, and Lincoln Steffens worked to expose the unethical practices of big 
business for a middle-class audience, challenging the reactionary politics of the emerging 
newspaper chains run by the likes of William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer. It was also a 
moment of relative openness and competition within local newspaper markets, as newcomers 
could enter with limited capital. Although already dominated to a great extent by commercial 
logic, newspapers provided a wide array of perspectives and opinions in the early twentieth 
century. In 1910, the twelve largest cities in the U.S. had an average of seventeen daily 
newspapers each, including an average of seven foreign language, ethnic newspapers. Although 
newspaper chains would soon begin to dominate the media landscape, consolidation had not yet 
put a stranglehold on dissident or non-mainstream perspectives aired in the press.129 
  Combining Old World radicalism with American liberalism and pragmatism, Vladeck 
played a vital role in institutionalizing the Jewish working-class counterpublic within an 
otherwise shrinking marketplace of ideas during the 1920s. By the time the United States had 
entered World War One, Vladeck was already positioned with one foot inside his new country’s 
elite institutions, while keeping another firmly planted within the radical immigrant community. 
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In 1913, Vladeck enrolled as a student at Teacher’s College at the University of Pennsylvania 
and simultaneously began to contribute to Der Idisher Sozialis, (later renamed Di Naye Welt) the 
official organ of the Jewish Socialist Federation (JSF). At Penn, he studied the humanities, taking 
courses in literature, history, public speaking and English. While his records demonstrate 
excellent grades, an instructor commented that he seemed to “have difficulty expressing 
[himself] in English,” on a critical essay he wrote on Ralph Waldo Emerson.130   
 In the meantime, Vladeck was becoming well-known in Yiddish literary and political 
circles. A poet and playwright, he began to write for the Philadelphia edition of the Forward, and 
occasionally served as a lecturer and organizer within the Jewish socialist movement, helping to 
organize Philadelphia locals of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACWA). He 
was earning respect within the broader Jewish community as well. In 1914, for example, the 
Forward solicited his input on the viability of a non-political English-language Jewish magazine 
focused on literature and the arts that would contain “translations of the best Jewish sketches, 
criticisms of Jewish plays, and articles on all higher activities of the Jewish quarter.”131 As Hillel 
Rogoff noted in an interview years later, “Indeed, aside from such routine administrative tasks as 
the hiring of minor employees and the sale of advertising space, the principal obligation of his 
new job was that he participate in the activities of the various institutions that had the backing of 
the Forward Association, such as the Jewish unions, the Workmens’ Circle, and the Socialist 
Party.132 
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! Despite his humanities background and his appreciation of the arts, Vladeck’s ability to 
perform “routine administrative tasks” would prove, over the years, as equally important to 
maintaining a Yiddish socialist press as his role as a community organizer. In fact, they may have 
been Vladeck’s greatest skills. As one commentator noted after his death in 1938, Vladeck had a 
natural inclination for operating in the commercial realm. “The truth is that it was in this sphere 
that he truly found himself...for his position at the Forward not only afforded him a certain 
prestige which even established writers do not gain from certain people, but he was able to 
receive the training required for an executive. And he was an executive par 
excellence.”133 
 Vladeck easily adapted to the practical business decisions that had to be made in 
managing a newspaper. Unlike other radicals, he did not eschew mass culture as a total 
distraction from radical politics, as other Marxist activists and theorists, such as Theodor Adorno 
and Max Horkheimer, would. Criticizing the elitist attitudes of many radicals, Vladeck wrote,
!  The radical attitude has always been: If you don’t take my theory and my solution, there 
! is no hope for you either here or in the hereafter. If you read detective stories, you can’t 
! be a good Socialist. If you like jazz, you are no Socialist. If you are not serious-minded 
! on all occasions, you cannot be trusted with radical work. There is a certain feeling of 
! superiority in radical propaganda which hurts the radical movement very much. The truth 
! is a fellow may read Dostoievski and not know what he is reading about. A girl may 
! dance to jazz and use too much rouge and in time develop to a good worker in the 
! Socialist movement. These things are simply things. They are not important in the 
! movement.134
 In 1916, Vladeck left the Philadelphia edition of the Forward to replace Hillel Rogoff as 
the city editor at the flagship paper in New York. Abraham Cahan, the Forward’s high profile 
editor-in-chief, had turned the paper into one “for the masses.” A hot-headed and divisive figure, 
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Cahan had brought human interest stories and a writing style reminiscent of the yellow press to 
the socialist world. As “a strict realist,” Cahan was not a fan of Vladeck’s literary, poetic style, 
but Rogoff had also fallen out of Cahan’s favor, and he needed a replacement.135    
! By this time, several key ideological questions were being dealt with within the JSF. 
Vladeck was vocal within these debates, taking the side of the “old guard” against those of his 
own generation. First was the issue of cultural nationalism. Socialists debated building a 
distinctly ethnic culture as an end in itself, rather than as an instrument for developing class 
consciousness among Jewish workers. While many younger members of the JSF wanted to 
perpetuate the use of Yiddish and build on the Bund’s cultural nationalism, Vladeck and the 
Forward saw the Yiddish language as a necessary tool for the time being, but ultimately 
supported assimilation. “We carry on our work in Jewish,” wrote Vladeck, “not in order to hold 
up and develop the Jewish language, but only because those to whom we speak, speak 
Jewish.” 136 
!  The growth of the Zionist movement also sparked debate within the Jewish left. The 
Forward Association and the JSF both rejected Zionism and other forms of political nationalism 
as distractions from class struggle. Vladeck in particular saw collaboration between Socialists 
and Zionists as highly problematic. “In the real life of the Jews,” Vladeck wrote, “[Zionism] 
plays a reactionary and deadening role. We want the Jews to make American citizens....and we 
believe that the questions of American life are the most important.” 137 
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! This emphasis on participation within broader American structures became manifest in 
other ways during Vladeck’s early years in the U.S. He became enamored with electoral politics 
while working as a poll watcher on Election Day. He was committed to formal democracy 
despite the corruption in the system that systematically eliminated Socialist votes. Vladeck had 
also learned that the Socialists did poorly in immigrant-dense districts. “You must,” he wrote 
“give them a little more time and devotion because they are like children and they are not 
obliged to answer immediately to all your specifications.” For Vladeck, socialism would provide 
a path for foreign-born workers to begin to engage as citizens in their new homeland.138 As he 
explained in his article, “Ten Commandments of Campaigning,” he believed that Socialists 
needed to place less emphasis on abstract goals and appeal to practical issues-- “living questions 
as taxes, schools, parks and labor laws.” Calling for a move away from mass meetings and 
dramatic rhetoric, Vladeck saw a need to engage in the routine get-out-the-vote work on Election 
Day. Finally, he urged the Socialists to seek votes from the Jewish workers by appealing to them 
for loyalty to “their own [nominally socialist] organizations.” 139 
! Before long, Vladeck threw his own hat into the ring. In 1918, he was elected one of 
seven members of the SP to the Board of Alderman. Representing the Williamsburg section of 
Brooklyn, he captured the most attention of all his comrades. Having been engaged in “secret 
propaganda work, fighting Cossacks, building barricades, and trudging hundreds of miles over 
the steppes under military guard,” he was considered “the most interesting.” 140 His compelling 
story made headlines, and it was said that he was “prouder of his prison record” than “being a 
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city father.” “How does he like it?” asked one press account. “Dull,” he says, “but we may be 
able to start something yet.” 141  While his career on the Board would be short-lived. he would do 
just that through his position as the Forward’s general business manager. 
The Jewish Daily Forward and the Crisis of War
 B.C. Vladeck became the Forward’s general business manager in a moment of deep 
crisis for the newspaper, the left, and the Jewish immigrant community. The United States’ entry 
into World War I in April 1917, and the Russian Revolution that soon followed, brought with 
them a crackdown on free expression and civil liberties. Elites in the government, with support 
from corporate America, heightened and exploited ideological divisions over the war within the 
Left to their own advantage. Nine hundred people went to prison under the Espionage Act for 
speaking out against U.S. involvement in the war, including Socialist Party leader Eugene V. 
Debs, Jewish anarchists Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman, and over one hundred 
members of Industrial Workers of the World (IWW).142 The institutions and figureheads of 
Jewish radicalism were placed under attack by the state, sending a strong message to the Jewish 
working class: those who pledged themselves to patriotism would be hailed as model 
immigrants, while those who did not would be silenced or persecuted.  
The xenophobic and reactionary environment concerned publishers of the vibrant foreign 
language press. In order to ensure survival, foreign language newspapers would have to prove 
that they were worthwhile channels for advertisers, and sought to secure themselves financially 
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and politically. Early in the war, the Association of Foreign Language Newspapers (AFLN)—
comprised of 744 newspapers, including 52 Yiddish publications, of which the largest in the 
entire organization was the Jewish Daily Forward—gave a $5,000 contribution to be used by the 
National Advertising Advisory Board, “to assist the United States in placing before all readers in 
the shape of publicity of their duties as citizens of the greatest nation in the world,” thus showing 
loyalty both to the advertising industry and the propaganda effort. “As a good many of such 
citizens can only be reached through the foreign-language press, the aim of which has always 
been America first, this contribution is made to help your committee in defraying the expenses in 
that connection,” they wrote. The AFLN also sent a letter to President Woodrow Wilson 
promising that their collective readership of eighteen million people “cordially welcome the 
opportunity…to assist the enlightened citizenship of other nations in establishing more firmly 
throughout the world the great principles of democracy.”143  
Advertisers, however, were skeptical of the AFLN’s motivations. An article in the 
advertising trade publication Printer’s Ink argued that the AFLN’s actions reflected their fear that 
people believed “editors might use their influence in an unostentatious way to arouse and keep 
alive a feeling of hostility among their millions of readers that might cause much trouble later 
on.” The burden would be on newspaper publishers to prove that their readers constituted a 
desirable commodity audience who would remain loyal to the United States. Thus, immigrants 
had to be seen as both good consumers and good citizens.  
To some extent, this ideology was not antithetical to the perspective long held by the 
Jewish Daily Forward. From its inception, the Forward had a proclivity towards the commercial. 
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Early historians of the Forward argued that the newspaper took a proto-Leninist approach to 
organization and communication. The newspaper’s “moral foundation lay in its steadfast fidelity 
to the advancement of labor,” and it had a “self-imposed ban” on “anti-strike and political ads,” 
while acting as “the campaigner for the socialist candidates.” But while the newspaper did rely 
on advertising, contributions from readers provided the most important from of financial support. 
For example, in an early appeal to raise money for new linotypes, the Forward declared to its 
readership in an editorial:
 The Forward is yours. It is a child born, raised, and strengthened by your moral and 
 financial support. It is flesh of your flesh and blood of your blood. And therefore you 
 are all urged to participate in the important step which we are now  undertaking…The 
 paper is in the forefront of the fight of the advanced Jewish  proletariat.144  
More recent scholarship has examined the Forward as a key element in the cultural life of 
New York’s Jewish working class. Abraham Cahan had left the Forward soon after its founding 
in 1897, and spent the next five years working for English-language newspapers. He returned in 
1902 with an orientation towards human interest reporting and feature stories over essays on 
Marxist theory. This allowed for a greater ideological flexibility in the newspaper, and thus, a 
less sharply-defined brand of Yiddish socialism. Under Cahan’s editorship, the Forward 
encouraged Jewish assimilation through socialism by criticizing ‘American society by universal 
standards of justice and freedom.’145 This approach helped bolster the paper’s popularity. By 
1917, the Forward had become the largest foreign language publication in the United States, 
reaching 200,000 readers every day.  
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 While the Forward had always accepted advertising, typically from from small 
businesses in New York, as was typical of most local papers. A brief examination of 
advertisements, during one randomly chosen week in 1916, reveals that the most prominent 
national advertisers in the Forward tended to be manufacturers of tobacco and alcohol products. 
These included Piedmont cigarettes, Prince Albert tobacco by R.J. Reynolds, Budweiser beer, 
and California brandy. The bulk of the advertising, however, was for grocers, piano 
manufacturers, phonograph salesmen, clothiers and banks, often with Lower Manhattan 
addresses on Grand, Houston, or Canal Streets. Thus, the Forward helped sustain a locally-based 
immigrant economy and culture.146  
 The Forward also ran many paid announcements from supportive political organizations, 
such as the Arbeter Ring (or Workmen’s Circle), and for local lectures and courses that could 
develop community and support an oppositional culture. Ads for commercial motion pictures 
such as Birth of a Nation playing at local movie houses, as well as for performances of the 
Yiddish theater which played an integral role in supporting the labor movement through benefit 
performances, were also prevalent.147 While these advertisements promoted forms of 
consumption, they did so largely within the framework of a local Jewish economy and helped to 
maintain counter-hegemonic political institutions and social life.           
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 This began to change as the United States approached entry into the war. The American 
left, including the SP and the IWW, generally opposed the war from its start. In order to counter 
this opposition, the Forward, along with the rest of the Yiddish socialist press, became a prime 
target of the pro-war propaganda. Both the federal government’s Committee on Public 
Information (CPI) and the conservative American Federation of Labor’s (AFL) American 
Alliance for Labor and Democracy (AALD), aimed to sway the New York’s radical Jewish 
community towards support for U.S. policies through the Yiddish press.148 
 The Forward’s chief competitor, Der Tog, or the Day, was highly complicit with 
propaganda efforts from the beginning, and its editor William Edlin was a member of the AALD. 
As Edlin explained to CPI leader George Creel, in 1917, the Day was “leading the fight for the 
administrations [sic] policies among the Yiddish reading people of America.”149 For Edlin, there 
was complete compatibility between the struggle for socialism and support for the Allied cause. 
“I am not one of those,” he told Creel in 1918, “who is anxious to inject the Soclialistic elements 
that have broken loose from their own proposals of international brotherhood and are allowing 
themselves tools of Prussian Junkerism.”150 
 By the end of the war, the rewards for such cooperation had become clear. Edlin’s name 
was circulated as a potential candidate to serve on a commission to send aid to Russia following 
the revolution, having “contributed more than many people know to the brining about of a right 
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understanding as to the causes and purposes of this great war.” Into the postwar era, Edlin 
continued to work alongside the AALD to promote Americanization efforts.151           
 The Forward was more reluctant than the Day to embrace the war and participate in its 
propaganda efforts. Early on, it was quite successful at riling up anti-war sentiment. The 
newspaper was at the heart of the pacifist movement, which found its greatest strength among 
Jewish immigrants on the Lower East Side. Abraham Cahan met secretly with editors of the 
Socialist English-language publication The Call, and the German-language Volkszeitung at the 
office of Socialist leader Morris Hillquit, pledging financial support to the anti-war Peoples 
Council, and column space to anti-war propaganda in their newspapers. The Forward was of 
particular importance because it housed Council organizers at their East Side offices, presenting 
a serious challenge to AALD and CPI efforts at selling the war through Americanization. As 
Robert Maisel of the AALD warned AFL president Samuel Gompers, “The Forward crowd is 
reporting that even the government is afraid of them.” The pro-war Jewish Socialist League 
feared that pacifists might win over the entire East Side.152      
 However, ideologies of patriotism and the demands of the state-corporate nexus were 
beginning to shift the direction of the Forward. Although Abraham Cahan was stridently 
opposed to the war, B.C. Vladeck was at the forefront of this shift. While a student, Vladeck 
wrote of the European powers in a college essay in 1914, “God Almighty! Make Thy children  
see the futility and horror of their greed, and their conquests. Help their hearts grow even at the 
expense of their brains. But if humanity cannot come to itself without having bathed itself first in 
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blood and folly strike them all-- German and Russian, Englishman and Frenchman, Servian [sic] 
and Austrian.”153 But by 1918, his attitude had shifted dramatically. When the State Department 
alleged that Germany was attempting to draw Mexico and Japan into a war against the U.S., 
Vladeck-- still the city editor  wrote, “every citizen and every resident of the United States” 
should “fight to protect the great American Republic against an alliance of European and Asiatic 
monarchists and their associates.” As a result, Vladeck lost Leon Trotsky’s support and put the 
newspaper on a path towards a liberalism increasingly compatible with elite U.S. interests.154 
 That linkage would begin to serve the Forward, not only insulating it from political 
criticism, but helping it to remain financially solvent and attract advertising. During the first 
weeks of the war, in April 1917, the Forward began to stress the patriotism of its readership in 
search of advertising, linking notions of citizenship and consumption.155 The Forward placed a 
full-page solicitation in Printer’s Ink, seeking support for its upcoming one hundred-page, 
twentieth anniversary issue, from which proceeds were used to buy food and clothing for Jewish 
war sufferers. Highlighting its circulation and its loyal following, the Forward presented itself to 
the advertising community as a proper venue to reach potential consumers:  
What Dana, Greeley, Godkin and the other great American Editors were to their readers 
 Abraham Cahan is to the large body of intelligent Jews in America today.  Founder and 
 editor of the Forward, he is read, believed and followed with intense faith by over 
 200,000 daily paid subscribers concentrated in New York City.156 
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This was not enough, however, to insulate the Forward from state repression. Postmaster-
General Burleson noted to George Creel, head of the CPI, that the pacifist campaign created “a 
problem which appears to me serious in the extreme.”157 Burleson used his power to deny 
second-class postal rates to periodicals, thus barring most Socialist and radical publications from 
the mails. 
 Facing exclusion from the mails, Abraham Cahan and other left-wing publishers 
organized for a meeting with Burleson regarding the banning of at least a dozen publications. By 
October, Cahan was called to appear before Burleson and defend his paper.158 He argued that 
although the paper had initially opposed U.S. entry into the war, it was loyal to the United States, 
and “anti-Kaiser and anti-junker more vehemently than anyone else.” Seeing the crackdown on 
the Forward as part of the Post Office Department’s plan to “[close] up every Socialist paper,” 
Cahan stressed the paper’s hegemonic potential, rather than its oppositional politics, claiming 
that shutting down the Forward would be a “great historical error. The Forward is the great 
Americanizing influence on the East Side”159
 In order to maintain postal distribution, Cahan ultimately agreed to refrain from offering 
commentary on the war. He stated, 
 We will print the news of the war, but refrain from any discussion of it.  We do not agree 
 with the interpretation that the authorities have placed upon the law. We think we  have 
 always obeyed the statute, even when we did say that capitalism had a great deal to do 
 with the war... But since all this is declared to be unlawful and since thinking and having 
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 your own opinion without expressing it has not yet been considered unlawful, we will 
 just print war news without comment.160 
Before the war’s end, following a large propaganda campaign by the CPI and the AALD, the 
Forward had largely capitulated and declared its support for the United States and the Allies. “It 
is no longer a capitalist war, neither is it imperialistic or nationalistic,” stated the Forward. “It is 
a war for humanity.”161  
By this point, however, the left-wing press had been decimated. Between 1916 and 1920, 
137 daily and 2,268 weekly newspapers disappeared nationally. While many of these failures 
were the result of economic trends and wartime shortages, left-leaning papers were far more 
likely to fold. Although John Nerone notes these papers were frequently in smaller communities 
and towns, Jon Bekken’s study of the labor press demonstrates that foreign language newspapers 
in large cities like Chicago also saw sharp declines in numbers after 1920.162  
The Yiddish press, however, actually expanded during the decade following the war. As 
Dirk Hoerder shows, there was a general net growth in the number of Jewish-North American 
periodicals during the 1920s, reaching its all-time peak in 1927. The core of the Yiddish press 
also generally grew during this time, expanding from ten to fifteen in the first half of the 
decade.163 But even with an increase in the number of core publications, the Yiddish press was 
highly concentrated. In 1921, the Forward claimed to constitute 47 percent of the total 
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circulation of the Yiddish language press in the United States.164 By the middle of the decade, 
some like-minded organizations argued that the dominance of the Forward made it unnecessary 
for them to expand their own publications. The International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union 
(ILGWU) called for a reduction in spending on their publications because the Forward offered 
“a thorough and fair account” of union activities.165 The Forward’s influence within the Yiddish-
speaking community was at its peak in the 1920s, while it increasingly sought revenue from 
national brand advertisers. 
The move towards relying increasingly on national advertising was deeply informed by 
Baruch Charney Vladeck’s pragmatic philosophy of politics. Vladeck was elected general 
business manager and awarded a high weekly salary of 65 dollars in 1918, in the midst of the 
war, as he sat on the New York City Board of Aldermen.166 During the next two decades, 
Vladeck oversaw a strategy of expansion of the Forward into local markets and the 
professionalization of marketing services. While this strategy fundamentally changed the 
character of the Jewish labor movement and its flagship newspaper, it also allowed for the 
growth of its institutions at a moment when much of the labor movement was in retreat. As a 
non-profit organization maintaining itself as a profitable institution during a period of duress for 
the left, the Forward Association was able to contribute financially to the rest of the Jewish trade 
union movement using the revenues it brought in from the paper. Rather than collapsing, this 
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segment of the left remained vibrant, laying the groundwork for the revitalization of labor under 
the New Deal.      
The Forward and the Creation of the Jewish Market
 The Forward emerged from the war as a luminary among the faltering left wing press. 
Oswald Garrison Villard, editor of the liberal weekly journal The Nation, dubbed the Yiddish 
paper “America’s most interesting daily” in the pages of his own publication in 1922. Villard was 
struck by the Forward’s institutional structure, as well as its role within the Jewish community. 
“While others have talked and speculated on the present crass materialism of the American 
press... a band of men has worked out in New York a cooperative enterprise of much merit with 
amazing success.” Rather than being driven by profit, the Forward stood out in its ability to 
generate revenue and, at the same time, contribute back to organizations and causes it supported. 
“Often in enterprises like this the profit is distributed in large salaries and expenses; yet the 
editor-in-chief of this amazing publication... recently strenuously resisted his colleagues’ efforts 
to advance his salary to a figure which would be scorned by a city editor of any of our English-
language morning dailies.”167
 But by this point, the Forward had already started down the road towards 
commercialization, eventually angering others on the left. In 1935, Villard declared that “the 
Jewish Daily Forward is far from being a great newspaper. It is full of features that make the 
Hearst papers the rags they are... Its editorials are distinguished by their irrelevance and plausible 
ignorance, and its news columns are either too skimpy or poorly written or both. Its general 
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attitude on Russia has been one of prejudiced antagonism. Such is the paper that Mr. Cahan has 
edited for nearly forty years.”168 By the end of the decade, George Seldes-- journalist, press critic 
and founder of the Newspaper Guild-- noted that the editors of the Forward were expelled from 
the SP in 1936. “Liberals have long ago given up the Forward; radicals regard Cahan as a typical 
rich bourgeois renegade.”169     
 The transformation of the Forward in its form and politics by the 1930s must be 
understood in conjunction with changes in its structure during the 1920s. During the 1920s, the 
advertising industry became a significant force in the U.S. economy, as well as a dominant 
cultural institution. It had been central to the government’s propaganda efforts, including the 
Americanization movement. Populated by members of the Protestant middle class, and 
particularly exclusionary of Jews, the advertising industry of the 1920s rarely created images that 
depicted immigrants, people of color, or the working class. Roland Marchand argues that this 
sent a clear message: “only by complete fusion into the melting pot did one gain a place in the 
idealized American society of the advertising pages.”170
 Although Forward readers generally were not reflected in national advertising, the 
editors of the paper were determined to secure accounts with major brands. Reliance on 
advertising would serve a two-fold purpose. First, it would help bring revenue to the Forward at 
a moment when other progressive publications were struggling financially. Second, it would 
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demonstrate to political and corporate elites that the Forward and its readership were good 
Americans, and alleviate it of potential political repression. Following Vladeck’s pragmatic 
approach, the Forward developed a sophisticated strategy for attaining national advertising that 
would help sustain it through the following two decades. 
 The key to this strategy was to expand the number of local editions. By reaching Jewish 
readers in cities across the U.S. and Canada, the Forward would become a more attractive venue 
for national advertising. This was a double-edged sword though, because it also meant that 
national advertising would be increasingly necessary to sustain these papers. The Forward would 
offer its services to corporate America in helping them solve the ‘problem’ of the Jewish market, 
acting as a bridge between a minority audience and the dominant culture.        
 With B.C. Vladeck as the business manager, the Forward began to seek national 
advertisers aggressively by 1921. Within the first two-and-a-half months of the year, the Forward 
claimed it had offered its merchandising services to sixteen national advertisers, and had printed 
202,240 lines of national advertising, more than any other foreign language. Comparing figures 
from April 1920 and April 1921, the Forward increased its lineage from 284,680 to 492,668, 
nearly 75 percent.171 
 Up to this point, the Forward had largely relied on outside advertising agencies, 
particularly Joseph Jacobs’ Jewish Market. With his offices on the Bowery, Jacobs worked to 
secure accounts for all four of the major Yiddish papers in New York City: the Forward, the 
Day-Warheit, the Morning Journal, and the Daily News. Jacobs promised “sound and impartial 
advice on securing dealer co-operation and consumer prestige in the Jewish market.”172  
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 This changed when, in March 1921, the Morning Journal and the Day-Warheit 
announced the establishment of the Jewish Market Merchandising Service to Advertisers, and 
appointed Jacobs its managing director.173 This decision appears to have been part of an 
exclusive agreement. Jacobs was forbidden to “directly or indirectly engage in, or become 
connected with” efforts that “stimulate, promote, produce, create, encourage, induce, or secure 
advertising business for any publication other than” the Journal and the Day.174 The Forward 
would now have to compete more aggressively against the Morning Journal and the Day-
Warheit in order to attract advertising revenue. Rather than working with these other Yiddish 
newspapers under Jacobs’ umbrella service, solicitations in Printer’s Ink now compared the 
Forward’s circulation figures with those of the other Yiddish-language journals, demonstrating 
“the tremendous preponderance of the Forward circulation over its contemporaries.”175  
 In order to continue to grow, the Forward would have to explore new methods of 
acquiring advertising. Vladeck worked closely with the Forward’s advertising manager Henry 
Greenfield to develop a new strategy. Together, they called a two day meeting, the National 
Conference for Advertising Agents of the Jewish Daily Forward, August 1921 at their Lower 
East Side headquarters with representatives from the newspapers’ editions in Chicago, Detroit, 
Cleveland, Boston and Philadelphia. 
 Vladeck and Greenfield determined that advertising agents would work within a centrally 
operated network, attaining support from companies that could place their ads in all editions. 
They instructed all agents to “solicit business for the National Edition,” while keeping the main 
91
173 “Jewish Morning Journal and The Day-Warheit,” Printer’s Ink. March 10, 1921, 119.  
174 Agreement between the Journal News Corporation, the American Jewish Publishing Corporation, and Joseph 
Jacobs. January 15, 1931. Forward Association Papers. Box 3, Folder 39. YIVO Institute for Jewish Research.    
175 “An Interesting Comparison,” Jewish Daily Forward. June 1, 1922, 177.
offices in New York and Chicago aware of particular national accounts. “In general,” the 
conference report stated, “all the offices everywhere should work hand in hand in the interests of 
bigger business for the National Edition of the Jewish Daily Forward.” All local editions would 
be listed in future national advertising directories.176  
 Perhaps most importantly, though, the Forward sought to cut out the middlemen in their 
advertising operations, discouraging the use of foreign language agencies, and declaring that no 
commission would be paid to them. They determined that “the Secondary Agencies… perform 
no necessary function,” and that the Forward could not allow those that were “so solidly 
intrenched [sic]…to grow stronger at our expense.” Competing with the other Yiddish 
newspapers for advertising revenue, the Forward wanted to control its own accounts. In order to 
do this, it would rely on its large network of local editions. At the August conference, it was 
determined that “local offices were instructed to make every effort to get along without the help 
of the secondary agencies in their own cities.” In addition, the Forward determined to deny 
“complete Merchandising Service if the account comes to us through a secondary agency.”177
 Vladeck and Greenfield worked to turn the Forward into a one-stop shop for advertisers 
to reach Jewish consumers. To do this, they created a professional system of marketing that 
would interpret its ethnic, often radical readership, for corporate America. The merchandising 
services department-- first created in 1917-- had to “embrace every important city where the 
Forward has a local office.”178 With maximum efficiency in mind, the managers saw the need for 
a clear division of labor. Local agents were re-contacting major accounts for products such as 
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Yuban Coffee and Aunt Jemima pancake mix which had long been attained. “The work of 
soliciting accounts must be systematized,” Greenfield wrote. “It is essential that we know at all 
times the names of all the accounts on which the out-of-town agents work in order to avoid 
duplication of effort, etc…”179 Local offices were to compile complete lists of Jewish 
businesses-- delicatessens, hardware stores, groceries, drug stores-- in their respective cities, and 
mail these lists to the New York office. This system would allow Vladeck and Greenfield to keep 
operating expenses low, while helping them attain contracts for such a large fleet of papers. 
 Greenfield also wanted tight control over the Forward’s message to potential advertisers. 
He argued that there were ‘certain facts…of outstanding significance’ on which ‘every 
solicitation’ should be based. These facts were all meant to demonstrate why advertising in the 
Forward was a good investment, including the size, the organized nature, and the ideology of its 
readership. First, Greenfield noted that although there were twelve Yiddish-language daily 
publications, only the Forward, the Jewish Morning Journal, and the Day-Warheit (or Der Tog) 
were members of the Audit Bureau of Circulation, and could therefore provide advertisers with 
accurate information about their readership. Of these, the Forward was by far the most widely 
read, with circulation figures from October 1921 of 182,738. The Journal had reached only 
80,085, and the Day, 60,640. Regarding other Yiddish papers that were not affiliated with the 
ABC, Greenfield argued, “No one really knows the genuine circulation of the Zeit or the 
Tageblatt. Of course they are quite ‘liberal’ in their Post Office Statement, but no one takes the 
statements seriously.”180 
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 Second, Greenfield argued that the Forward’s influence within the labor movement made 
it a desirable place for advertisers to market their products. “The Forward is the organ of the 
organized Jewish Labor Movement,” wrote Greenfield. “It voices the sentiments of the tens of 
thousands of members of the ACWA, the ILGWU, the Workmen’s Circle, and of the scores of 
smaller labor unions and liberal organizations. The Forward is read by the masses.” Because the 
Forward was part of a larger social movement, advertisements in it would be trusted, and the 
brands promoted in it would have special meaning for readers.  He argued:  
 The readers of the Forward know that theirs is a paper which belongs to no 
 individual, which cannot be bought, which is unafraid, and which can afford to be 
 discriminating in the choice of advertisements. Our agents can proudly point to the fact 
 that no advertiser can buy space in the Forward unless we are persuaded that he is 
 telling the truth. No quack doctor can advertise his remedies in our paper. No 
 ‘package company’ is allowed to extract money from the pockets of our readers. No 
 political charlatans are permitted to bamboozle our readers. The National advertiser who 
 has a meritorious product to sell will be the first to realize the value of such an 
 independent, fearless paper as the Forward.181      
Thus, Greenfield turned the arguments against advertising in a left-wing publication on their 
head. The paper’s independent ownership structure, critical politics, and affiliation with labor 
organizations would not be a liability for advertisers, but would instead serve as a meaningful 
seal of approval of particular brands for nearly 200,000 socially conscious readers.  In addition, 
the central role that the Forward played in people’s lives as part of a closely knit ethnic 
community meant that products advertised in its pages would take on special meaning.  The 
Forward explained in Printer’s Ink that it was the Jewish immigrants’ “vehicle for expression, 
their guide in search of knowledge a leader in their  struggle for truth, a champion in their fight 
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for justice, an entertainer in their hours of recreation, a medium for their better understanding of 
American life, American ideas and ideals.”182  
 This countered the limited critique of advertising that organized labor was developing. In 
1922, Chester M. Wright of the American Federation of Labor praised the role of advertising in 
educating the public about the necessity of certain products, and bettering social conditions. 
“Advertising has set the styles and set the pace,” he wrote. “It has educated. A lot of persons who 
never heard of it in school know that uncleaned teeth are a menace to health and life. Even more, 
they know the reasons. They have been reading the advertisements.” However, advertising was 
thought to be problematic in its abstraction of labor conditions and the process by which 
advertised commodities are produced. Preceding the Consumers Union’s similar critique of 
advertising by nearly 15 years, Wright wrote, 
 Before me lies a two-color advertising page. There is harmony of line and tint, there is 
 apparent worth of product, and fairness of price. Back of that page there is a long trail 
 of arduous human effort, leading back to furnaces, mills, mines, railroads, forests, 
 steamships, foreign countries…The whole complexity of industry is back of that 
 page… I wonder how much advertising men and sales forces think about the welter 
 of work places that are back of the products of which they are in part the final 
 dispensers.183  
 
The Forward, then, would play the role of a trusted friend giving reliable information about 
products, while readers would operate under the assumption that they were produced under fair 
labor conditions because of the Forward’s politics. 
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 Third, Greenfield claimed that for those who wanted to reach Jewish consumers, the 
Forward’s socialist readership was likely to be the best consumers.  In contrast to the “Jewish 
bourgeoisie” who “does not read the Yiddish newspaper as a rule,” but instead, “reads the New 
York Times and the Herald,” the reader of The Morning Journal who is “looking for a job,” or 
“peddlers [and] small shop keepers who want to while away the time,” and the reader of  the 
Tageblatt who was “the old type Jew who spends his days in the synagogue and who is more 
concerned with the problems of the next world than with those of this ‘vale of tears,’” the 
Forward was read by a largely secular, politically aware, and employed demographic.     
           Thus, the Forward tried to demonstrate to advertisers that its form of Yiddish socialism 
was not antithetical to consumerism and Americanism. Solicitations placed regularly during this 
period in the trade press professed that Forward readers were good consumers, who had the 
“capacity for the absorption of meritorious food and grocery products, dry goods and drug 
articles,” and claimed its readership to be “Americanized immigrants—workingmen, business 
men, professional men—whose mother tongue is Yiddish.”184  It was argued that the Jewish 
readership was not particularly different than the rest of the population, and could be easily 
reached through advertising.  For example, a 1922 announcement in Printer’s Ink read:
What Kind of Goods Will Sell in the Jewish Market?
The Jewish Market will absorb any class of goods that finds favor in the general American 
Market.  Neither custom not social habit debar [sic] any class of merchandise, with exception of 
a few obvious food products that are debarred by religious scruples.  
Let The FORWARD, America’s largest Jewish Daily, tell you how to obtain the vast Jewish 
Market of more than 3,000,000 population, and how to do it efficiently and economically.  
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Five years of intelligent cooperative service to national advertisers of food, drug and dry goods 
articles have established a vast number of new products in the Jewish field.  
If the Jewish Market is your problem, we can solve it for you profitably.185  
 The Forward promised to “solve” this “problem” by supplying ‘detailed information’ 
collected by the merchandising services department. National advertisers could contract with the 
Forward for a “combination advertising-merchandising plan,” making use of what they claimed 
to be ‘the only paper with an established Merchandising Service Department and record of 
deeds.’186 The Forward argued that Jews were the most “compact market” who “concentrated in 
several distinct sections it is most easily and economically reached.”187 Jews in most major U.S. 
and Canadian cities would be easy to reach through advertising, and it would be easy to produce 
marketing information regarding them. Food companies, in particular, would be able to sell their 
products in these communities with information provided by the Forward’s merchandising 
services department, regarding retail food dealers in cities such as Boston, Newark, Philadelphia, 
Baltimore and Pittsburgh, and “every city where there is a Jewish community.”188 With the help 
of the Forward, Vladeck and Greenfield promised corporate America that they would be able to 
extend their reach into the lives of Jewish workers. The reactions from within the Jewish 
working class, the broader labor movement, and the Forward staff over the following two 
decades demonstrate that this pragmatic approach was not without consequences. 
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Conclusion
 Baruch Charney Vladeck’s idealistic pragmatism shaped the Forward’s strategy during 
and immediately following the First World War. Rather than collapsing, the Forward developed a 
sophisticated system of soliciting national advertising, while moving politically towards the 
center.  Aside from allowing the Forward to continue publication through sustaining revenue, 
advertising in the immigrant press-- and particularly the socialist immigrant press-- would have 
ideological consequences. As Americanization activist Frances Alice Kellor put it, advertising is 
‘the great Americanizer.’ Writing in the advertising trade press, she argued, “If American 
institutions want to combine business and patriotism, they should advertise products, industry 
and American institutions in the American Foreign Language press.”189 This practice could also 
serve as a mechanism to teach immigrants English, as advertisements were often printed twice 
next to each other, once in the original English and once in translation, simultaneously linking 
linguistic assimilation with the acquisition of brand-name products.190 Sociologist Robert Park 
pointed to this presence of national advertising as evidence that immigrants had the same desires 
as the native-born.  
 In examining the advertisements in the foreign-language press, we usually  discover that 
 the immigrant, in his own world, is behaving very much as we do in ours. He eats  and 
 drinks; looks for a job; goes to the theater; indulges in some highly prized luxury when 
 his purse permits; occasionally buys a book; and forgathers with his friends for 
 sociability. This is sometimes and in some cases a revelation.191
 But Vladeck was opposed to the top-down methods of the Americanization movement, 
and saw it as an essentially reactionary force. Invented by elites, the Americanization movement 
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as it stood was nothing more than one way to protect the status quo. As he explained to the 1920 
convention of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America,
 Their work of Americanization consists in inciting one nationality against another 
 under the American flag, one struggling immigrant group against another.  If any 
 Americanization work is being done in this country, it is being done by organizations 
 like the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, which is getting together all nationalities for 
 one purpose, to make life in America worth while for the American working class.192  
Reflecting Vladeck’s assimilationist politics and his pragmatic sensibility, the Forward’s 
merchandising services department came to play the role of the intermediary in the 1920s 
between the Jewish working-class counterpublic and the broader U.S. society, as represented by 
commercial interests. But Vladeck believed that, if put into context by a progressive force such 
as the Forward or a labor union, Americanism could be redefined in radical terms. 
 But as Vladeck worked to navigate these tensions, he pursued a policy of strict fiscal 
responsibility, sometimes at the expense of writers and advertising solicitors. At the same time, 
he came into conflict with members of the Jewish working class counterpublic and the broader 
left who objected, for a variety of reasons, to the paper’s advertising policies. By the end of 
Vladeck’s term as business manager in 1938, the Forward had been able to make significant 
contributions to the broader Jewish and labor communities, supporting the public it informed and 
represented. At the same time, the Forward’s had shifted, to create consensus around the 
emerging consumer society. In the following chapter, I explore these contradictions and tensions.
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Chapter Three:
     
Selling “Socialism”: 
Conflicts Over the Forward’s Business Strategy During the Interwar Era
Instead of educating the masses in a truly cultural manner, in a truly revolutionary way, to 
awaken in them the most beautiful and best feelings and aspirations, it stooped to their level, to 
their crude instincts... In the chase after material success, striving to become a man of substance 
with a ten-story brick-house, the Forverts did not become the organ of the conscious labor 
movement, but the street paper of the rabble, of the marketplace.-- Di frayhayt193
Let me say something about advertising. There is a baker’s union in New York City. This baker’s 
union is a small union, which was built up by the good will of the Jewish immigrants and 
workers in New York. This union can exist only if people buy bread manufactured by the union 
people.-- B.C. Vladeck194
 Under Baruch Charney Vladeck’s management from 1918 to 1938, the Forward became 
increasingly adept at attracting revenue from commercial sources. The Forward’s strategy to  
generate advertising revenue was a markedly different  from other immigrant and labor 
publications. While most radical and foreign language newspapers relied on community support 
from unions and other organizations, the Forward’s heavy reliance on advertising as a primary 
source of revenue allowed it to give donations back to the community.195 Through its prominent 
place in the Yiddish community, the Forward was central to sustaining the larger broader labor 
and progressive movement for decades. Although revenue from advertising was key to 
maintaining the Forward as an important organizing force, Jewish and left wing organizations 
criticized its commercialism and related shift in politics in the 1920s and during the Depression 
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years. In addition, Vladeck’s adoption of a corporate model of operation--low expenses and high 
returns-- bred discontent among Forward employees. On a day-to-day basis, Vladeck managed 
these tensions, while at once maintaining the Forward’s stream of revenue from advertisers. In 
this chapter, I use the process of commodification as an entry point to examine the 
condradictions that emerged from the Forward’s commercial and political agenda. The structural 
forces responsible for the Forward’s production, distribution, and exchange took on three 
commodity forms described by the political economy of communication: content, labor, and 
audiences.196 The resistance to this process from the Forward’s workers and readers illuminates 
the ways in which commodification, though powerful and persuasive, is not static, singular, or 
inevitable. 
 The dynamics stemming from the complex structural and ideological relationship 
between Yiddish radical media and advertisers deserve serious attention, as the role of 
advertising and the institutional practices of the Forward have been generally ignored by the 
political histories of the Jewish labor movement. The only major scholarly work on advertising 
in the Yiddish language press has been Andrew Heinze’s Adapting to Abundance.197 While this 
work is useful in reminding us that the Jewish press in the U.S. always had a commercial 
element, Heinze’s study is limited in a number of ways. First, while Heinze does discuss the role 
of advertising in the Forward to some extent, most of his research concentrates on the 
conservative, religious newspaper Tageblatt. The radical politics present within the Jewish 
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community, and within the Jewish press are not explored by Heinze, giving the impression that 
capitalism was, by and large, accepted among working class immigrant Jews.
 Second, Heinze works to refute Marxist critiques of consumption, and “avoid prejudices 
with which the American standard of consumption is often confronted.”198 This effort leads him 
to obscure the ways in which commodity audiences are produced, concluding that immigrant 
Jews were eager to participate in mass consumption. The point of this study, and political 
economy in general, is not to denigrate or celebrate the ideological impact of mass consumption, 
but instead to advance the understanding of the institutional relationships among advertisers, 
media and audiences. While Heinze may be right to steer clear of criticizing individuals’ 
consumption practices, his arguments do not consider the structures of production which support 
advertising and consumption.   
 Finally, Heinze’s  focus on the early twentieth century misses a critical moment in the 
formation of Jewish working class identity, and in the history of advertising and consumer 
culture—the 1920s and 1930s. While it is important to understand that the Yiddish press did not 
reject advertising in its formative years, the decades following the war brought a new emphasis 
on national advertising, and three important forms of commodification emerged in order to 
secure such accounts. 
 During the 1920s and 1930s, institutional and structural pressures fundamentally 
transformed the Jewish working class counterpublic, as commercial interests became more 
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important to the Forward’s business model. The economic downturn in the early 1930s placed 
new pressures on Vladeck’s organizational model, highlighting the contradictions embedded in a 
commercialized labor press. While the newspaper introduced its readers to new consumer 
products, it also took essentially mainstream political positions in the height of the New Deal. In 
1936, Vladeck and the Jewish Daily Forward helped to create the new American Labor Party 
with its endorsement of FDR’s re-election, and this represented a new, general acceptance by the 
Jewish working class counterpublic of welfare state capitalism. Two years later, Vladeck-- now 
the majority leader of the New York City Council-- passed away, leaving his newspaper in 
alliance with the Democratic Party. On one hand, Vladeck’s business model helped bolster 
Jewish and left-wing organizations, but on the other hand, the financial imperatives of the Jewish 
Daily Forward were met with criticism from its audiences and workers. This fundamental 
contradiction raises two important questions for a political economic analysis of alternative 
media: 1) to what extent do alternative media institutions produce their audiences as a 
counterpublic?, and 2) To what extent do they produce them as commodity? The following 
chapter will explore these questions by addressing the commodification process at work within 
the Jewish Daily Forward. The 1920s and early 1930s saw the Jewish working class 
counterpublic become increasingly commodified as commercial interests became more important 
to the Forward’s business model. While the political divisions of the 1920s within the left 
allowed for significant criticism of this process, the ideology of what Lizabeth Cohen calls “the 
Consumer’s Republic” ultimately won out.199 
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Commercialization and Content 
  Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky name advertising as one of five filters that move 
journalism away from its democratic mission and towards becoming propaganda in the service of 
elite interests.200 Others, such as Robert McChesney and Ben Bagdikian argue that advertising 
helps to breed a “dig here, not there” bias, whereby journalists rarely challenge corporate 
power.201 Advertisers therefore yield tremendous power in determining the nature of media 
content. Little research, though, has been done on the ideological impact of advertising within 
the alternative or labor press, and this represents a lacuna in communications scholarship. 
Herman and Chomsky argue that the shift towards market interests accomplished what legal and 
economic coercion could not: the curtailment of “alternative” or “radical” press and the 
establishment of dominant, mainstream press that legitimates the status-quo. Advertising put 
“working class and radical papers at a serious disadvantage” because their readership, having 
little expendable income, was not of interest to advertisers.202 The history of the Forward 
complicates this simple decline narrative. The Forward did not go out of business because it 
could not compete with commercial dailies; but rather, the newspaper’s editors made specific 
changes in order to curry favor with advertisers, and this decision corresponded with a general 
rightward trend in content. 
        As attracting national advertising became increasingly important¸ editors at the Forward 
considered more carefully the relationship between content and advertiser interests. For example, 
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in February 1923, the Forward launched a special Graphic Art section as a supplement to its 
Sunday issues—which were the most circulated—whose explicit purpose was to provide an 
advertiser-friendly forum. The section appeared “in all editions simultaneously,” and promised 
“an unusual opportunity by which to reach the greatest portion of the Yiddish reading public 
throughout the United States, as a low lineage cost, unparalleled in the domain of graphic space 
rates.”203 
 Reliance on advertising was not the only determining factor--it operated within a web of 
social forces that were reshaping the Jewish working-class counterpublic during the interwar 
period.  For example, the demand for advertising also coincided with the emergence of content 
geared towards women. Women were not imagined as political agents, however, but as 
consumers filling their roles within a gendered division of labor. The Forward promoted a 
gender ideology which saw it as women’s duty to help ‘Americanize’ the next generation through 
their roles as mothers, what Maxine Seller has called “socialist womanhood.” As the New York 
Times described, “Breaking down the indifference of Jewish women to newspaper reading was 
no easy task. It had been full of economics, socialism, talmudic disputes and other bromidic 
matter. There was little inducement for them to conquer the intricacies of printed Yiddish.” 
Abraham Cahan told the Times that the introduction of the advice column “A Bintl Briv” or “A 
Bundle of Letters,” in 1906 helped boost the paper’s circulation among women by about 30,000. 
The Forward’s women’s page portrayed the ideal socialist woman as a union activist, but “as 
equally heavily committed in the private sphere—as traditional and dutiful daughter, wife, 
mother, and homemaker.” While the Forward accepted women’s traditional domestic duties, it 
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advocated progressive ways for women to approach them, such as forming kitchen cooperatives 
with other women. In the early 1920s, Cahan frequently offered etiquette tips, urging, for 
example, that mothers provide their children with handkerchiefs. “And since when has socialism 
been opposed to clean noses?” he asked after receiving criticism from his readers for departing 
from strictly political discussion.204  
 These developments must be understood in conjunction with the Forward’s persistent 
search for advertising revenue. The Forward worked vigorously to sell its audience to advertisers 
in order to sustain itself and its community of readers. Market recognition, then, had 
contradictory impacts on the Jewish labor movement as national advertising introduced a wide 
variety of brands to the Forward’s pages in the 1920s. Advertisements promoted products that 
could be easily integrated into women’s domestic labor, such as packaged foods and cleaning 
products including Hellmann’s Mayonnaise, Johnson’s Baby Powder, Royal Baking Powder, 
Colgate Talc Powder, and Linit starch and Palmolive Soap, and often depicted women in the ads. 
Other advertisements in the 1920s sought to capitalize on working-class identity across gender 
lines. For example, a 1922 advertisement for Coca-Cola featured an image of workers leaving a 
factory. In Yiddish, it instructed readers to drink a bottle after work, hardly a socialist solution to 
a difficult day of labor. By the end of the 1930s, the Forward was using its content to promote its 
sponsors. Joseph Jacobs promised TWA, for example, that the paper would regularly run 
publicity articles.205
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 While advertisers were ambivalent about the Jewish (and typically female) consumer, it 
was still easier for them to market to an ethnic community rather than a political community. 
This is not to say that advertisers were particularly anxious to cater to Jewish consumers. Roland 
Marchand argues, in his study of the English-language advertising in the U.S., that ethnic and 
racial minorities were virtually invisible in the ads of the 1920s and 1930s. Although Charles 
McGovern also shows that advertisers used all-American imagery in advertising as a way of 
promoting national unity through consumption, he notes that immigrants “did not simply 
accommodate themselves to the American national market on its own terms,” but rather 
“compelled American businesses to adapt to preferences and traditions brought from their 
homelands...”206 
 This was not, however, simply the result of immigrants’ natural inclination towards mass 
culture. The Forward helped to bring the ideology of consumption to its readers as a matter of 
necessity in order to continue publication. As discussed in chapter two, the Forward and other 
Yiddish language publications solicited ads through venues such as Printer’s Ink, making 
advertisers increasingly interested in reaching the vast Jewish market. As early as 1922, major 
companies tried to understand how immigrants, and particularly Jews, used consumer goods in 
their everyday lives and were working to exploit that knowledge for marketing purposes. White 
Rose Tea, for example, studied the use of tea in Jewish home life in New York, and began to run 
Yiddish-language ads that declared their product to be “the drink of Jewish hospitality.”207
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 As the business manager, Vladeck pushed the paper in this direction, breeding conflict 
with Abraham Cahan, who resented Vladeck flexing his muscle. While the Forward began first 
and foremost as a political organ of the Socialist Party (SP) designed to organize the Jewish 
immigrant community, by the end of the 1930s it had morphed into a primarily ethnic publication 
that did political work. In 1934, one lecturer referred to Vladeck as “a captain of industry among 
Jewish labor organizations” working “to organize Jewish labor as much with respect to Jewish 
problems” in light of Hitler’s recent rise to power in Germany. As one critic within the Forward 
Association noted, “Vladeck said the fundamental policy of the Forward is not labor...His 
statement is correct. The Forward policy is a Jewish policy... Therein lies the danger. It is 
becoming a paper for the average Jewish reader who either by tradition or simply habit reads the 
Forward.” He continued, 
 I venture the opinion that if a survey should be undertaken as to the character and social 
 standing of the Forward readers a picture not quite pleasing from a labor and socialist 
 point of view will present itself. It is true we must have circulation but I wonder whether 
 the field of labor is not the most fertile ground for us to cultivate, not to the exclusion of 
 other spheres of course, and thus become a real labor paper.208 
 Vladeck was instrumental in moderating the Forward’s politics. With the rise of the 
Communist movement, he worked to distance the paper from being considered “radical.” On one 
occasion in 1936, the director of the New School for Social Research contacted Vladeck about 
giving a lecture on “The Radical Press.” Vladeck initially declined the offer. “I imagine that the 
radical press as represented by the Daily Worker or even by the New Republic and Nation would 
consider me a reactionary,” he responded. “Besides I think that the radical press is deficient in 
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many respects and not always constructive and if there is such a thing as radical press, it might 
claim that I have misrepresented it.”209    
 Aside from the women’s pages, graphic arts section, and advice columns, the Forward’s 
shift towards catering to and producing an ethnic identity increasingly stripped of explicitly 
Marxist politics was most apparent in its evolving attitude towards Zionism. Prior to the First 
World War, Vladeck and other Jewish socialists eschewed Zionism as a distraction from building 
a global worker movement. Vladeck believed that “Jewish workers could best promote the 
liberation of their people by standing shoulder to shoulder with workers and socialists of every 
nationality and religion.” Jewish nationalists, he argued, were aligned with “the most 
conservative elements in America,” and contended that those who emphasized a common culture 
were playing into the hands of “philistines and political bosses.” Nationalism, he believed, was 
harmful to the cause of socialism and to Jewish people overall.210 
 This began to change during the war as non-Jewish reactionary elites saw the political 
benefits of backing the Zionist movement. A British-led propaganda campaign attempted to 
garner Jewish support for the war through the Balfour Declaration, supporting the establishment 
of a Jewish state in Palestine. Britain’s Foreign Secretary, Lord Balfour believed that “all 
Bolshevism and disturbance of a like nature are already traceable to the Jews of the world.” 
Thus, he was sympathetic to putting “the best of them” in Palestine, and “hold[ing] them 
responsible for the rest of the Jews.” The Declaration gained U.S. support, functioning not only 
as foreign policy, but as propaganda. Some Jewish elites in the U.S.--such as Justice Louis 
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Brandeis-- saw the benefit of siding with such a position, in order to direct Jewish energy away 
from anti-capitalist activity. As Lord David Lloyd George wrote in his memoirs, the Declaration 
was due “to propagandist reasons…Public opinion in Russia and America played a great part, 
and we had every reason at that time to believe that in both countries the friendliness or hostility 
of the Jewish race might make a considerable difference.” Inadvertently highlighting the 
cynicism behind the propagandists’ project, H.C. Peterson wrote ominously in 1939 that the 
encouragement of Jewish nationalism and the Balfour Declaration, constituted a “final solution” 
to the Jewish problem.211  
 As Ehud Manor details, the Forward gradually became less overtly oppositional to 
Zionism, and “hopped on the bandwagon” once Cahan realized that the Balfour Declaration had 
been generally warmly received. Manor argues that the Forward’s opposition to Zionism was 
more of a reflection to its indebtedness to wealthy, anti-Zionist such as Jacob Schiff, than of a 
principled view that saw socialism and Zionism as antithetical to each other. Schiff and other 
Jewish conservatives believed that nationalism would hinder assimilation. As his adviser 
Maurice Fishberg noted, “If Jewish nationalism is spread among the masses, one may expect in 
short time that one will deal with Jews just as one now deals with the negro.”212 
 With official British and U.S. support, Jewish nationalism and American patriotism were 
no longer antithetical, but complementary. The U.S. labor movement as a whole, led by Samuel 
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Gompers of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), supported the Zionist cause in conjunction 
with the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy (AALD). Before the war’s end, the 
Forward was actively involved in garnering support for a Jewish state, both reflecting and 
shaping the shifting views of its readership. In April 1918, two hundred organizations met to 
form the Jewish Labor Conference for Palestine at the Forward’s headquarters. The International 
Ladies Garment Workers’ Union (ILGWU), the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union (ACWA) 
and the United Hebrew Trades (UHT) all announced their support for a Jewish homeland and 
began to buy war bonds. Soon, the Jewish Socialist Federation (JSF), the Workmen’s Circle, and 
the People’s Relief Committee also joined in supporting the war.213 
 Over the course of the 1920s, Vladeck’s views on Zionism changed dramatically. In 
1929, Vladeck went to Palestine for the Forward during a five week Arab strike against Jewish 
settlers. After his return to the U.S., he noted, 
 When the strike was declared, many Arabs brought their vegetables and dairy products to 
 the market for sale to the Jews as they would have in ordinary times, and behaved as if 
 they were in complete ignorance of the trouble. In Haifa and Jerusalem, many Arabs 
 continued to drive their taxis, shine shoes, and perform their daily tasks as they used to 
 before the strike. Common sense should have told the Jews to treat these Arab 
 strike- breakers in a friendly fashion, to be tolerant, to make them feel that they were 
 still appreciated. Not only would this have tended to keep the Arabs divided, but it would 
 have given an opportunity to demonstrate to the world that the Arab peasants and workers 
 were not in favor of the strike. But instead of buying from these friendly peasants, instead 
 of dealing with them as an encouragement to other Arabs to break the strike, the Jews 
 declared a retaliatory boycott  against them. A Jew who bought from an Arab or 
dealt with an Arab in any way was regarded as a traitor.214
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Thus, Vladeck had adopted a moderate Zionism that, while critical of antagonistic attitudes 
among Jews towards Arabs, placed support for a Jewish state above global worker solidarity. 
 Vladeck believed that the Forward’s evolving Zionist sympathies were good business. 
The Forward Association’s business department noted that the newspaper placed great emphasis 
on Palestine, in part to boost circulation, which, in turn, increased advertising rates. Critics 
charged that the Forward’s reporting on Palestine had transcended into the realm of the 
sensational. “In our Jewish policy, we very often go to the ridiculous and play up our headlines 
and stories to absurdity... This sort of stuff can be used and is being used by our competitors to 
much better advantage, and to boost their circulation further they are making inroads in the 
sphere of labor which should be our job and our job only.”215  
 By the mid-1930s, the Forward had won the approval of many Jewish Zionists. As one 
self-described “Zionist, without any suffix” wrote to Vladeck, “the Forward has kept me 
informed...of all the Jewish news that ‘is fit to print’...” In particular, the reader was impressed 
with the Forward’s coverage of Palestine. “[F]or years,” he wrote, “I have felt that although The 
Forward is a labor organ devoted primarily to labor interests, you have treated Zionism fairly. In 
some cases, your articles on the happenings in Palestine are closer to the truth than any articles 
appearing in other newspapers.”216 But not everyone was so enthusiastic.
 
Criticism: Left, Right and Popular
  Although anti-Zionism did overlap with some conservative views, it was the dominant 
position among the Jewish left until World War One. In the 1920s, however, the Forward became 
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the key opponent of anti-Zionist Jewish Communism during what has been termed labor’s “civil 
war,” constituting a shift towards the right.217 It would be reductive to argue that reliance on 
advertising directly caused a political transformation, but structural theories of the press suggest 
strong correlation between these phenomena. 
 Perhaps more importantly, the Forward’s commercialism prompted other intellectuals to 
found oppositional newspapers and to grow the Jewish Communist movement. Tony Michels has 
provided an excellent account of the origins of the civil war between Socialists and Communists 
and how it became manifest in the Yiddish press. In 1921, intellectuals within the Jewish 
Socialist Federation (JSF) left the Socialist Party because of its reformist politics. The Forward 
fired those writers who had split. Under the leadership of Jacob Salutsky and Moyshe Olgin, they  
were determined to start their own journal. They began publishing Di frayhayt, or Freedom, in 
April 1922 as an effort “to bring together two avant gardes: the political and the cultural.” The 
newspaper pledged “to bring about a revolution, not only in the economic, social and political 
concepts of Jewish workers, but also in their outlook toward questions of culture.”218 
 Positioning itself in direct opposition to the Forward, Di frayhayt critiqued its rival’s 
commercialism, albeit from an elitist perspective. The premier editorial of Di frayhayt declared, 
 Instead of educating the masses in a truly cultural manner, in a truly revolutionary way, 
 to awaken in them the most beautiful and best feelings and aspirations, it stooped to their 
 level, to their crude instincts... In the chase after material success, striving to become a 
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 man of substance with a ten-story brick-house, the Forverts did not become the organ of 
 the conscious labor movement, but the street paper of the rabble, of the marketplace.219
 Operating as the organ of the small Jewish Socialist Federation, Di frayhayt was in 
financial straits from its beginning. Although Salutsky warned against it, Olgin decided to 
affiliate the paper with the Communist Party. This did not completely preclude commercial 
interests from marketing to Frayhayt readers. As Dovid Katz writes, “[I]ts pages were full of 
lively advertisements for everything from kosher hotels to the latest movies to the best banks for 
working families.”220 But with funds from Moscow in addition to commercial interests, and a 
much smaller operation to sustain than the Forward had, Di frayhayt was able to offer a 
consistently radical alternative.  
 As a Communist paper, Di frayhayt became the major locus of opposition to the Socialist 
Forward. It not only criticized the Forward in its pages, but worked to counter its politics 
through direct action within the community. For example, as the Forward marked its thirtieth 
anniversary in April 1927 with speakers, an orchestra concert, and a performance of the 
Workmen’s Circle Chorus at the Century Theatre, Di frayhayt held three simultaneous meetings 
throughout Manhattan to protest the Forward’s attitude towards New York’s labor movement.221
 While Michels argues that the newspaper became more of a mouthpiece of the Soviet 
government than a reflection of popular Yiddish politics and culture in the U.S., others have 
called the paper “manifestly American...Despite the supposed ‘similar persuasion’ of the 
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Frayhayt, not one single page could ever be mistaken for one from a Soviet Yiddish newspaper.” 
Irving Howe has argued that Di frayhayt became the center of a new “network of culture” built 
by Jewish Communists. This network, like the older Socialist “newspaper culture” Michels 
describes during the prewar era, included theater troupes, choruses, and youth groups for the 
assimilated children of immigrants. As the Forward had done for years, Di frayhayt held large 
public events, bringing the community together. For example, 10,000 people turned out to the 
paper’s tenth anniversary celebration at Madison Square Garden, where “A thousand athletes and 
actors presented the ‘Red, Yellow and Black Pageant,” which depicted the struggles of the 
Communist forces against conservative and reactionary groups.” They also played an active role 
in organizing workers in Communist-led unions, particularly the Furrier’s Union, and their 
headquarters provided a space for left wing rallies and mass meetings. Despite the newspaper’s 
dogmatic tone-- an approach that the Forward had long since eschewed-- Di frayhayt reached 
22,000 readers in 1925 (still only one-tenth that of the Forward) and became the widest 
circulating Communist newspaper in the nation, more than even the English language Daily 
Worker.222 Thus, Di frayhayt helped to maintain critical discussion about the direction of Jewish 
labor through the 1920s (albeit under the direction of the Comintern), even as the Forward 
became an increasingly powerful force.  
 Although relatively successful through the 1920s, Di frayhayt’s circulation plummeted by 
the end of the decade alongside Jewish support for the Communist movement. In 1929, the 
newspaper found itself in a quandary over its attitude towards Zionism. As the Forward’s 
115
222 Michels ends his narrative of Yiddish socialism in New York in the early 1920s, as “The search for a radical, pro-
Yiddish alternative to the Forverts thus ended in failure” with the CP’s takeover of Di frayhayht (249); Katz, “A 
Union,” 7; Howe, World of Our Fathers, 341-7; “10,000 Honor Freiheit,” in New York Times. April 1, 1928, 37; 
“3,000 Fur Strikers Rally in Park,” in New York Times. June 26, 1927, 12; Howard Sachar, A History of Jews in 
America (New York: Vintage Press, 1993), 295; 432.
Palestine policy evolved in order to keep circulation numbers high, shield itself from elite 
criticism, and garner advertising revenue, the Communists maintained that the Zionist project 
was a bourgeois distraction from building an international worker movement and that Jewish 
nationalists were in cahoots with British imperialists. 
 Moscow showed its strength in shaping Di frayhayt’s editorial policy when the 
newspaper compared Arab riots to pogroms in Eastern Europe. The next day, the editors retracted 
the statement and published a new editorial, proclaiming support for Arab workers. The Jewish 
counterpublic reacted with hostility towards the paper, as four were arrested for attacking Di 
frayhayt’s Chicago office. Within weeks, a vote of 2,500 men and women condemned Di 
frayhayt for “maliciously falsified news” in a mock trial at Chicago’s Central Opera House. 
Three editors, who opposed the CP’s official interpretation of the events in Palestine, resigned 
and were dubbed “counter-revolutionaries.”223 While it is difficult to quantify public opinion on 
Zionism within the Yiddish community during this time, the attacks on Di frayhayt demonstrate 
that, by the end of the 1920s, expression of extreme anti-Zionist sentiment was outside the 
bounds of acceptable political discourse, placing new emphasis on ethnic and religious identity 
rather than on international working class struggle. 
 While Di frayhayt argued that the Forward was too embedded with powerful interests 
limiting the paper’s radical critique of capitalism and paving the way for low-brow content, more 
conservative publications criticized the Forward for paying less attention to religious and ethnic 
concerns than to building a socialist movement. This sometimes took the form of criticizing the 
Forward’s advertising policy. For example, the Jewish Courier, the Forward’s chief competitor 
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in the Chicago market pointed to ways in which market logic tended to cut against more 
traditional values of cultural solidarity, terming their rival the “Ford-ward” because of its 
decision to run ads for the Ford Motor Company at the same time that Henry Ford was 
publishing his anti-Semitic tracts in the Dearborn Independent. Like Di frayhayt, the Courier 
believed this crass commercialism bred sensational, low-brow journalism. “People read the 
Ford-Ward just as they read the Chicago Star,” the paper editorialized, “a pornographic sheet 
which reports scandalous stories that no decent newspaper would print. The Ford-Ward would go 
out of business in forty-eight hours if it ceased its pornographic activity.” Even more offensive, 
was that rather than using this money to contribute to charity, the Courier saw the Forward’s 
donations to Socialist-affiliated groups as ultimately self-serving. “The Ford-Ward thus gives 
charity to itself and it bluffs the people into believing that it gives charity to the poor and 
helpless. Henry Ford also gives such charity.”224 
 Another publication, Der groyser kundes, or The Big Prankster, offered an editorial 
cartoon weighing in on the Ford advertising controversy. The satirical weekly newspaper began 
in 1909 and continued through to 1927, offering criticism of Cahan, Vladeck, and the Forward. 
Published by Jacob Marinoff’s Jewish Publishing and Advertising Company, “for fun, humor and 
satire,” Der groyser kundes was clearly not absent of commercial imperatives. Although it 
contained no shortage of advertising, the small weekly offered an independent left critique of the 
Jewish Socialist leadership and its journal. While even the first issues caricatured Cahan and 
leaders of the SP, the cartoons through the 1920s offered consistent criticism of the Forward’s 
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ties to money and power. For example, in one cartoon from 1922, the paper depicted Vladeck 
dusting off the coat of the Forward, (represented as a fat, wealthy capitalist donning a hat 
resembling the Forward’s ten story building at 175 East Broadway, which at that time dominated 
the lower Manhattan skyline) and Cahan lighting its cigar, while two servants labeled “literature” 
and “socialism” were on their knees, polishing the Forward’s shoes. In another, the cartoonist 
depicted Abraham Cahan walking a tightrope between Hester Street, the Lower East Side’s 
commercial activity, and Wall Street.225 
 But Der groyser kundes did not only go after the “right.” It also mocked the ongoing 
battles between the Forward and Di frayhayt. For example, one 1927 cartoon showed the 
Forward and the Di frayhayt going through each other’s respective trash cans.226 Providing a 
critical voice through humor, Der groyser kundes helped to sustain democratic discourse within 
New York’s Jewish working class counterpublic as it was being feudalized by commercial 
interests, on the one hand, and the CP on the other.
Vladeck’s Ethical Defense 
 B.C. Vladeck was not blind to the irony of a socialist publication relying heavily on 
commercial funding. In order to rationalize the inherent contradictions, he worked to build an 
ethical approach to advertising and consumption that attempted to skirt the emerging tensions 
between labor, capital, and the working-class consumer. This strategy rested primarily on 
refusing advertising that promoted goods produced under excessively poor conditions by labor 
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unions. Instead of noting the inherent problems advertising poses within capitalist economies, 
Vladeck claimed to adhere to strict ethics in selling advertising space, refusing companies 
involved in labor disputes, and he wore this policy as a badge of pride. As he wrote to the 
socialist author George Bernard Shaw’s secretary, in an effort to garner a contribution for the 
paper’s 30th anniversary issue, “The Forward does not print any advertisement for concerns that 
are recorded as unfair to labour or rank patent medicines.”227 
 Vladeck took this a step further, though, in a way that linked the Jewish community’s 
ethnic concerns with broader critiques of global capitalism. In 1934, at the convention of the 
American Federation of Labor, Vladeck gave a rousing speech on the rise of fascism and anti-
Semitism. This speech provided the basis for the beginning of the Labor Chest which ultimately 
raised $100,000 to combat these forces.228 At the same time, Vladeck helped to form the Jewish 
Labor Committee (JLC), and became the Co-Chairman of the Joint Boycott Council, who 
promoted the boycott of German goods during the Third Reich. 
 This position put Vladeck at the forefront of defining a new left critique of consumption, 
at the height of the 1930s consumer’s movement. Consumers Research (CR) and their more 
radical offshoot Consumers Union (CU) were working towards the passage of the Tugwell Bill, 
which would have restricted advertising to providing truthful product information, and prohibited 
the use of insinuation. As Inger Stole notes, CU, formed by workers striking at CR, “sought to 
link consumer issues with broader social concerns and showed a strong desire to cooperate with 
labor interests.” In its premiere issue of Consumer Union Reports in May 1936, CU featured an 
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article, “Consumers’ Goods Makers Unfair to Labor,” which included a list of companies facing 
complaints from unions.229 
 Vladeck’s Jewish socialism encouraged him to push the CU towards considering labor 
issues within a global context in light of the anti-worker and anti-Semitic policies under the 
Third Reich. As he wrote to CU, 
 Last Saturday I paid twenty-five cents for a copy of Consumers Union reports for June 
 1937 at the Conference of the American Labor Party. I was flabbergasted to find that the 
 title page, featuring an exhibit of cameras and films, advertises Leica & Zeiss which are 
 being imported from Germany. There is also an advertisement for Agfa Films which are 
 manufactured in the United States, but according to our best information are controlled 
 by German interests. 
 I have always assumed that the Consumers Union considers itself, if not an integral part 
 of the Labor Movement, at least a sympathizer and co-worker. The American Labor 
 Movement has gone on record four times within the last four years in favor of the boycott 
 against German goods and services. So did the whole International Labor Movement. 
 I most emphatically protest against the Consumers Union not only breaking the boycott 
 by recommending to its members the purchase of Nazi manufactured goods, but actually 
 advertising these goods on the Title Page of its publication.230 
Charles McGovern argues that the consumer’s movement was flawed in part because it did not 
take “the symbolic aspect of goods” that the ethnic working classes valued into account.231 But 
here, the intersection of ethnicity and class prompted the Jewish labor movement to take a more 
proactive stance on advertising and consumer issues, while the CU’s insensitivity to Jewish 
concerns placed the mostly middle class movement at a distance from Yiddish speaking workers 
and their families. 
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 Like many within the consumer’s movement, however, Vladeck did not believe that 
advertising was necessarily misleading for consumers, or bad for workers and the economy. 
Rather, he argued that advertising was a way to help union workers by promoting products made 
by union labor. He explained to an unfriendly crowd in a 1932 debate on the merits of 
Communism, 
 Let me say something about advertising. There is a baker’s union in New York City. 
 This baker’s union is a small union, which was built up by the good will of the Jewish 
 immigrants and workers in New York. This union can exist only if people buy bread 
 manufactured by the union people...The Forward is the only newspaper that does not 
 carry non-union bread advertising.232
For the Forward, the battle between labor and capital was not a zero-sum game. Advertising 
could play an intermediary role, encouraging laborers to patronize union shops and companies, 
and build a worker identity through consumer practices. 
 Evidence suggests, however, that the Forward did not always adhere to this standard. 
Labor organizations sometimes registered their objections to ads in the paper. The Label 
Committee of the Allied Printing Trades, for example, wrote to Vladeck to call attention to ads 
for R.J. Reynolds’ Camel cigarettes. “This firm is opposed to organized labor, and has refused on 
several occasions to enter negotiations with officials from the Tobacco Workers Union.” The 
Tobacco Workers, in the meantime, were calling on trade unionists to purchase union made 
cigarettes only.233 In this instance, the Forward was obstructing union boycott efforts.
 In 1936, Vladeck wrote to James O’Neal of the socialist periodical The New Leader 
against charges that appeared in Der tog, or The Day. The rival publication had declared that “the 
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Forward ‘accepts advertising indiscriminately.’” Vladeck vociferously defended against these 
charges, and attacked the Day:
 Not a week passes during which the Forward does not refuse advertising amounting to 
 hundreds of dollars or thousands of dollars because there is some objection to it on the 
 part of organized labor...To my knowledge, the only advertising which The Day rejected 
 are those of May’s Department Store in Brooklyn-- the store which [Socialist leader 
 Norman] Thomas picketed. All the other scab advertising is appearing as usual.234     
  
 The most public criticism of the Forward’s practices in soliciting advertising came with 
the publication of George Seldes’ Lords of the Press (1939), published following Vladeck’s 
death. In his chapter on the Forward, Seldes alleged that the paper accepted ads from 
corporations whose workers were on strike. He wrote, “despite lip service to socialism, Cahan 
and his paper have taken the road to reaction...Worse yet, the Forward has been commercialized. 
It publishes the usual bad medicine ads and other advertising and it has accepted the ads of 
corporations whose union men were on strike.”235 
 Leon Arkin of the Forward’s Boston edition and a personal friend of Seldes’, wrote to the 
journalist asking for him to provide evidence of such transgressions. Seldes failed to substantiate 
the claims adequately, pointing only towards moments where the socialist publication had 
supported the more conservative elements of the labor movement. Arkin told Alexander Kahn, 
Vladeck’s successor as the Forward’s general manager, that Seldes was “trying to dodge the 
issue of the Forward accepting advertisements from Corporations whose Union Men were on 
strike. Together with his letter he sent me a copy of a report made to him by a research worker 
and you can very well identify that his research worker is a died-in-wool Communist.”236
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 That same year, Joseph Jacobs-- now under contract to provide all merchandising 
services at the Forward-- acted on behalf of the General Food Corporation when the Jewish 
Labor Committee threatened a boycott. The JLC believed the company was importing smoked 
fish from Nazi Germany. A representative of the company contacted Jacobs proclaiming 
innocence and asking for assistance. He wrote, 
 There is nothing to the complaint. We are not doing business with Germany. The 
 shipment of smoked fish referred to was sent over by the North Sea Fisheries, a branch of 
 an English company, Unilever, operating in Germany. It was their idea that we might be 
 able to handle smoked fish but they have been advised we are not interested.237  
Jacobs promptly wrote to Joseph Tenenbaum of the JLC, explaining that the General Foods 
Corporation was “a concern which has not only been advertising in the Jewish publications for 
more than twenty years, but which has also, on many occasions, manifested a sincere and 
decided friendliness towards the Jewish people.” It was not that the Committee was wrong to be 
upset were the allegations true, but Jacobs stood by his client, arguing that they were not. “The 
firm has nothing to conceal—nor would it want to,” Jacobs wrote. “The shipment to which you 
referred was something which was explained very definitely in Mr. Gibson’s letter to you. 
Naturally, you cannot prevent people from sending merchandise to you—nor can you control the 
manner in which they ship it.  I am quite sure you can see this matter in its true light.” After 
“thoroughly investigating” the matter, Tenenbaum declared that the company would not be 
boycotted.238 While the General Food Corporation may have rightly been vindicated, the 
importance of maintaining a positive relationship with a client was paramount. The Forward’s 
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role as a vehicle for the Jewish labor movement would have to strike a balance with the demands 
of national advertisers in a complex, global political economy.
 Vladeck’s and advertising manager Henry Greenfield’s approach to garnering advertising 
had, by the time of Vladeck’s death, institutionalized ad revenue at the Forward as absolutely 
essential. As the leading foreign language newspaper in the United States, the Forward helped to 
produce a consensus around the necessity of advertising throughout the Yiddish press. While the 
Forward increasingly relied on national advertising, its ideological competitors were also in 
search of revenue from commercial interests. In 1927, Di frayhayt claimed, “Thousands of 
prosperous Jewish-Americans depend on the Freiheit (sic) each day, with complete confidence, 
to direct them to Real Estate, Investments and Business Opportunities. These people represent 
the greatest concentrated wealth in Greater New York, with unlimited buying power.” While the 
New York Times assumed Socialist “exhilaration” over the Communist’s hypocrisy, they 
applauded Di frayhayt’s  pragmatism, ironically similar to Vladeck’s. 
 The ‘concentrated wealth’ of New York is perfectly willing to avail itself of a profitable 
 advertising medium even if it is one dedicated to the destruction of wealth. And the 
 Freiheit (sic) is willing to quote rates to concentrated wealth until such a time as 
 communism is ready to destroy all wealth. It would be absurd to suppose that one of the 
 inducements offered by the Freiheit (sic) is a guarantee of exemption to all its advertisers 
 against the time when the Communist State sets out to confiscate all private 
 possessions.239
 
 Some other newspapers also contained significantly higher volumes of advertising than 
the Forward. In March 1934, for example, the Forward had only approximately one-third the 
advertising lineage as the Day and the Morning Journal. Further, while the Forward dominated 
the Yiddish newspaper market in New York and in aggregate throughout North America, there 
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were particular cities where other newspapers enjoyed greater circulation, forcing local editions 
into a tough competition for advertising revenue. For example, Der tog was actually more 
popular than the Forward in Montreal, as “many people of the middle classes and even working 
classes, who [had] read before the Forward, [had] gone over to the Tag (sic).”240 
 While the Forward was widely criticized because of its commercial nature, it was not the 
most commercial of the Yiddish language papers, nor was it necessarily the most commercial of 
the Jewish left press. Commercialization in the Forward was the most controversial because the 
paper served as the primary representation of Jewish working class counterpublic. Across the 
board, those representations shifted due to commercial pressures. As Vladeck and the Forward 
leadership chose to bind the newspaper’s success to a strategy of relying on national advertising, 
Jewish-American life and the U.S. labor movement writ large became increasingly interwoven 
with the emerging consumer society. The labor at the newspaper produced this new ideology at 
the Forward, which increasingly became thought of as a commodity itself due to the capitalist 
logic of the Forward’s operations.
The Commodification of Labor at the Forward
 The labor force within the Yiddish press and other cultural institutions of New York’s 
Jewish working class counterpublic understood the productive nature of their work from their 
inception in the late 19th century. In fact, it might be argued that the Jewish labor movement in 
the U.S. was founded by culture industry workers-- the primary unions involved in starting the 
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United Hebrew Trades (UHT) was the Hebrew Typographical Workers’ Union, the Hebrew 
Actor’s Union, and the Hebrew Choral Singer’s Union.241 But as the institutions of the Jewish 
working class counterpublic changed, so did the nature of work within those institutions. In the 
case of the Forward, the advertising plan and increasingly complex business arrangements 
created new pressures for new kinds of workers. 
 The demands to attract advertising most directly affected the “out of town” agents. Even 
as the plan was relatively successful in the 1920s, these employees struggled with Vladeck over 
disputes regarding compensation. In 1927, one agent in Montreal secured an account for 50 
insertions of 30 lines each over the course of the year in the Sunday edition with the popular 
Zuckerman’s restaurant. “The Zuckerman’s restaurant is the oldest and most popular here in the 
center of the city,” he told Vladeck, “and all other restaurants will follow suit with ad’s (sic), I 
am sure, when they see Zuckerman’s in your paper.”242 
 The agent told Vladeck that he was “not encouraged” in his work for the paper, because 
they did not seem particularly interested in getting advertising from Montreal after the Forward 
had failed to give him his commission upfront. “How can you expect a man going around and 
wasting his time…without any remuneration, in the hope of being paid at some later date. I got 
my commission from the other papers right away: this is my only means of existence.” He 
demanded at least fifty percent of what he was owed immediately, or he would “have to look for 
something else to keep body and soul together…I am very sorry that my financial circumstances 
compel me to write you in this way: but I have to feed a wife and four children etc.” Vladeck did 
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not see the need to meet the agent’s demands. He responded, saying that it was “absolutely 
impossible for us to change our rules,” refusing “to pay commission before collection for reasons 
it would take too long to enumerate.”243                
 Similarly, a Boston classified solicitor wrote a lengthy, chutzpah--filled letter to Vladeck 
the next month, appealing to him “for fair play and justice.” The employee, claiming to have 
done excellent work, was earning 15 dollars per week. He had asked for an advance of five 
dollars, but received only three. Leon Arkin told him, “Your salary is based upon what you 
produce for the classified department.” The young man protested to Vladeck, 
 I am the only boy in the office (my age is 21) and it has been my duty to make myself 
 generally efficient and useful. I spent 65% of my time doing just that! When I called that 
 fact to Mr. Arkin’s attention he told me deliberately that there was always only one boy in 
 my place and that my predecessor accomplished much more than I.... That was not so! 
 The previous year there were two men on my job receiving, combined, $42.00 a 
 week...Together their total business did not exceed mine by more than 33 1/3%.
He went on to describe several hostile interactions with Arkin. “[H]e yells and froths at us as if 
we were dogs.” Asking Vladeck to intervene, the solicitor announced, “That is not fair and I 
object! I rebel! And I will fight, if necessary, with everything I have...and I intend to see this 
matter justified. Now-- do I get a square deal or don’t I?”244  
 It was, however, Arkin’s job to keep his office’s expenses low. In 1928, Vladeck 
congratulated Julius Levitt, Arkin’s equivalent in Los Angeles, on his “splendid” record for the 
first six months of the year after he achieved “an increase in over three thousand dollars in 
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advertising without an increase in expenses,” signaling an increase in worker productivity.245 Just 
as in the business world, managers were rewarded for cost-saving measures.   
 As the nation plunged into the Great Depression and advertising revenue dried up, the 
commodity nature of the Forward’s own labor force became more apparent. The economic 
downturn in the early 1930s sparked a crisis in the advertising industry, which had just enjoyed a 
decade of growth and prosperity. Advertisers began to tighten their belts, and there were 12 to 15 
percent decreases in advertising lineage and revenue between 1929 and 1930. By the 1932, U.S. 
advertising agencies were cutting staff, salaries and vacation time.246
 At the Forward ad revenues peaked in 1932, but Vladeck’s and Greenfield’s plan to rely 
on local editions was becoming less and less profitable. This added to the stress on the Forward’s 
local managers. Julius Levitt, the manager at the Los Angeles office, wrote to Vladeck with 
concern about the competition he would face as a new Jewish publication was starting in the city. 
“This will of course mean a more strenuous effort on my part to keep up the standing of this 
office. But where I can get the additional strength I do not know. I feel that my strength is on the 
verge of breaking.” He noted that he would be more successful if he had “proper additional help 
in the office.”247 
 The Chicago office, the center of the midwestern and western editions, in particular found 
itself in financial straits and became a burden on the entire enterprise. In 1932, the Chicago 
edition was bringing in $106,248.27 in net advertising revenues, with its Western counterparts 
attracting an additional $38,000. In combination with their circulation revenue, the Forward’s 
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enterprise in the West generated $377,417.22. But with operating expenses at these newspapers 
totaling $374,777.56, their excess was negligible at only about four thousand dollars.248 
 The advertising industry’s collapse hit the Chicago Forward hard. In 1932, Chicago’s 
payroll totaled $196,057.16. In 1933, it fell to $160,920.29. The deepest cuts occurred in the 
advertising department, which went from $8,318.28 to $4,837.90. A downward trend continued, 
as the entire national advertising industry suffered during the Depression decade. The Chicago 
edition ran at a financial loss to the Forward over the course of the 1930s, costing a total of 
$96,000. By 1940, the edition ran a deficit of $26,000 and faced a projected loss of more than 
$30,000 the following year.249 
 In November 1941, several years after Vladeck’s death and just prior to the U.S. entry 
into World War II, the Forward leadership stated that the Chicago edition was in a state of crisis. 
Advertising business was in decline across the Yiddish language press. In addition, the American 
Publishing Association had reported that advertising business had declined in the English 
language press by 40 percent since 1929, and that further declines were expected. Leaders 
proposed that the Chicago edition be printed in New York and shipped by train to the Western 
cities, dating the paper one day ahead, leading to significant layoffs, particularly in the 
mechanical department. They noted,  
we will not do them any favor if we hesitate and wait. The condition we are in is not a 
temporary one. We are suffering from a progressive ailment. We will be worse off next 
year and worse the year after. If you should not have the courage to face realities today 
you will do it a year later or two years later. But you will have to do it. I didn’t invent this 
plan and I didn’t bring it about. I...discussed it with Vladeck [years ago]. At that time we 
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did not have such losses, our disease was not so visible, so we waited. But now 
everybody can see it and two years from now you will be blaming your manager for 
delaying it. Then again, now there is a better chance for people to readjust themselves. 
Whatever they can do, they can do it better now. There is a shortage of labor. There is a 
chance in a small business. But when the war is over, the chances will be less. You will 
not do these men a favor by waiting and delaying.250
 This management approach did not only impact those in the “out of town” editions, but 
all workers within the Forward enterprise. Just prior to his death, Vladeck further streamlined the 
procurement of advertising and began cooperation with its rival papers. The Forward entered 
into a new contract with its former agent, Joseph Jacobs. Jacobs would work for the Forward 
through a joint venture with two of its competitors-- the Day and the Jewish Journal and Daily 
News. Jacobs, relieved of his merchandising duties, would be paid at a rate of 20 percent 
commission. By the time of the Jewish holidays that fall, Jacobs had attained nearly 90 percent 
of the national advertising for the paper. In 1939, with Alexander Kahan as the manager, Jacobs 
recommended major overhauls, creating a Merchandising and Promotional Department requiring 
a secretary, stenographer, two copy men, a translator, an office and errand boy, six merchandising 
men, and a Jewish artist. These positions were expected to mandate a payroll of $27,456 and 
incur further expenses of approximately $35,000 annually, to be shared by the three 
newspapers.251 
 With the Forward and its rivals facing difficulty, Jacobs was willing by 1940 to agree to a 
compensation package that paid him only for ads he secured in exchange for the exclusive 
handling of national advertising and merchandising, eliminating the work of the local agents and 
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giving him full authority over his staff. “True, the element of risk should not fall on me,” Jacobs 
told the publishers. “I should always be in the position of receiving compensation for work 
which I have done. Yet, appreciating your circumstances, I am willing to make an arrangement 
whereby there will be no risk to you whatsoever.”252  
 The advertising department wasn’t the only area that saw dramatic shifts in the 1930s. In 
late 1932, Vladeck wrote to the president of the Hebrew American Typographical Workers 
Union, which represented the printers, asking him to make concessions “with or without an 
official committee of the union, for the purposes of disseminating possible cooperation of the 
part of your union-- to sustain the Forward in a position of security.” The following month, 
Vladeck issued a notice that the Board found it necessary to reduce wages of some employees.253 
 The difficult economic conditions of the Depression era also placed considerable pressure 
on the Forward’s contracted distributors. Criticism of the Forward erupted as management 
worked to save as much money in distribution costs as possible. Newsdealers accused the 
Forward of hypocrisy, and for violating its self-proclaimed principles of socialism, as they were 
allowed only one out of the five cents for every copy sold, and then not were not allowed returns 
on unsold copies. 
 The Jewish Daily Forward, which should set an example to capitalistic publishers 
 because of its socialistic-- communistic leanings, does just the opposite. The paper would 
 increase its circulation materially if it would treat newsdealers as human beings-- as 
 workingmen! Newsdealers demand of the Jewish Daily Forward a three cent price for its 
 five cent Sunday edition and FULL RETURNS.254
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 Such demands began to interfere with readers’ access to the paper. One Forward reader in 
Philadelphia changed his subscription to receive the paper only on Sunday in 1934 “[d]ue to 
present business conditions.” Eventually he stopped receiving the paper altogether, because it 
was not profitable for the distributor to deliver the paper on Sundays only. He sent a letter to the 
Philadelphia office, which eventually made its way to Vladeck in New York, saying 
 The stores in our neighborhood do not sell the Jewish Daily Forward so naturally these 
 people can’t see their way clear to purchase the Forward every day must also do without 
 the Sunday edition because it isn’t profitable enough for the carrier to deliver the Sunday 
 edition...I think steps should be taken immediately to either replace this carrier or sell the 
 paper to the stores in the various neighborhoods and let the people who want to buy the 
 paper be able to do so.
Not surprisingly, then, Vladeck seems to have had little sympathy for the distribution companies 
or their employees. When the Forward office manager in Newark expressed concern about a 
potential strike at Metropolitan News Services, Vladeck determined not to get involved.255 
 By 1936, Vladeck sought to manage without these outside contractors. “[The 
Metropolitan’s] circulation can be taken care of by our delivery at no extra expense,” he argued, 
“giving us a net profit of over a hundred and fifty dollars a week. When added to our present 
income, it would insure the delivery against loss even under present circumstances and even at 
an average drop of circulation for the next two years.” As they did with their merchandising 
services, the Forward joined with the Day to create the Newspaper Sales Company “to establish 
and maintain an economical method of selling and delivering their newspapers to the dealers, 
newspaper stands and newspaper vendors” throughout the New York area.256 
132
255 Attention: Circulation Manager, January 15, 1934. Vladeck Papers Box Add 2, Folder 1; B. Cohen to Vladeck, 
Sept. 28, 1928; Vladeck to B. Cohen, Oct 3, 1928, Vladeck Papers. Reel 4, Employees Folder.
256 Pertaining to the Delivery, Vladeck Papers. Box Add 5, Folder 2; Agreement between the Forward Association 
and the Day, 1936. Vladeck Papers, Reel 4, Business Folder.
  The writers were not immune to the paper’s business operational logic. In 1934, Vladeck 
analyzed the Forward’s editorial staff, noting that they could reduce expenses by cutting the 
$20,000 annual budget spent on purchasing articles and features from outside sources. 
 “[T]his is the only amount which could be reduced by getting more production from 
 members of the regular staff. There is an opinion that at least 17 members of the staff are 
 not producing enough... 
 It is possible that by getting these members of the staff to be more productive that 
 contributors’ expense could be cut into half... 
 By introducing this rule and by managing assignments in such a manner as to keep the 
 members of the staff reasonably busy, between fifteen to eighteen thousand dollars could 
 be saved this year. On the basis of the editorial expense of 1933, with the suggestions 
 here given, the editorial budget for 1934 should be a little less than $230,000 or at the 
 rate of $19,000 a month.257  
 Vladeck’s income as a manager was also dependent on the willingness of businesses to 
buy ad space. Although Seldes argued that, during this time period, the wages of the big editors 
increased regularly, this was only half true. In 1922, Vladeck reported a gross income of $8,233 
to the Internal Revenue Service for the 1921-22 fiscal year, when his and Greenfield’s 
advertising strategy was first implemented. The following year, that figure increased by over 25 
percent to $10,406.50. By 1930-31, Vladeck was earning $13,780. Like other Forward 
employees, though, Vladeck’s salary decreased with advertising revenues. In 1934-35, Vladeck’s 
gross income was $10,511 gross income, and he netted only $6,436-- less than he made in 
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1922-23.258 Thus, Vladeck maintained, to some extent, a communal ethos in managing his non-
profit paper, never asking others to take a hit when he would not take one himself.
  This, however, was not enough for the Forward writers. In response to the 
commercialization of journalism throughout the country, and the disastrous impact of the 
Depression throughout the news industry, news workers throughout the country were joining the 
newly formed Newspaper Guild in the mid-1930s. The Forward staff were no exception. In 
1936, as one Forward worker wrote to Carl Randau of the Newspaper Guild of New York, 
expressing the inadequacies of labor representation through the Jewish Writers’ Union (JWU) at 
the paper. “Our situation,” wrote Randau, 
 is an uncomfortable one. We are members of a union-- and we are not in the real sense. 
 The union which is recognized in the Editorial Department does not have any official 
 relations with us, and in a sense we are step-children. The sooner this is settled, the better 
 for all concerned.   
 Further, the conditions under which we work require quite some improvement. We have 
 been patient in view of the previous situation. Now, we feel that not a moment ought to 
 be lost.259 
 By May 1938, workers had won representation through the Guild, officially becoming 
part of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), the movement that was remaking 
working class politics nationwide. The Forward now operated within a new social and 
institutional milieu. No longer the voice of an ethnic labor movement, Forward writers were 
ethnic workers within a diverse, national historical bloc. These conditions were produced, in part, 
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by the contradictions embedded in a commercialized labor press. At the same time, the Forward 
had produced its working class readership as a commodity audience, while also helping to 
sustain it as a vibrant, political community.  
Commodity or Community?
 One of the major developments in mass media, as theorized by Dallas Smythe, has been 
the commodification of audiences in conjunction with the rise of the advertising industry. 
Smythe argued that television content, and commercial content generally since the 19th century, 
acts as “free lunch,” luring viewers to their screens and readers to their papers. Audiences and 
readerships are therefore simultaneously produced as commodities to be sold to advertisers, 
while doing the labor of making advertising time valuable. Media firms use programming to 
construct audiences, while advertisers pay media companies to access those audiences. As 
Vincent Mosco explains it, “The process of commodification thoroughly integrates the media 
industries into the total capitalist economy not primarily by creating ideologically saturated 
products but by producing audiences, en masse and in specific demographically desirable forms, 
for advertisers.”260 
 This requires the production of “immanent commodities,” commodities that grow out of 
the need to produce other commodities. A prime example is gathering data on audience 
characteristics, exemplified by Eileen Meehan’s study of the A.C. Nielsen ratings. The 
commodification process in the media-advertiser-audience relationship requires measurement 
techniques, monitoring, and ratings systems. Thus, the rise of marketing research accompanied 
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the rise of mass media. Through the 1920s, advertising agencies in the U.S. employed techniques 
of basic market research, compiling indexes of buying power in various areas and quantifying 
brand preferences at retail stores. In order to better target advertising to consumer preferences, 
researchers segmented audiences by class and occupation, but did not generally “explore the 
subjective qualities of the masses.”261  
 This strategy worked well with the Forward’s specialized audience, and the Forward 
adopted these emerging methods, studying the reading and buying habits of the Jewish working 
class. Under Vladeck’s management, the Forward gathered information about its readership and 
produced them as a valuable commodity. While they did not discuss psychological motivations, 
as would become common in advertising research in the postwar decades, the Forward did 
introduce to national advertisers ideas of particularity around culture, paving the way for 
“narrowcasting” and market segmentation that would come to define advertising beginning in the 
1960s.262  
 The Audit Bureau of Circulation’s (ABC) figures were used to set advertising rates and 
deduct circulation numbers for unpaid subscriptions. Vladeck understood the importance of 
maintaining high circulation data in the ABC. In August 1928, for example, Vladeck claimed that 
the circulation numbers should have been 2,000 higher than those reported. “Every subscriber 
should be paid in advance,” he wrote, “and it should be the business of our agents to watch out 
for delinquencies.” In order to assume greater authority over the circulation figures, Vladeck 
petitioned the body to include one representative of the foreign language press on its board of 
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directors. “[Y]ou always have in mind the different fields of activity in which the press and 
advertising profession exert their activities,” he noted. “Is not the foreign language press a 
distinct field?”263
 Circulation data was just the tip of the iceberg. As Oscar Gandy notes, the production of 
these commodities often depends on the formation of racial identities through the use of 
‘geodemographics,’ locating commodity audiences at the nexus of race and space.
The Forward began to do its own research on the Jewish market during the Depression years, 
offering more specific data to potential clients. In 1931, the Forward issued a detailed report on 
the consumption patterns within New York’s Jewish population for use by advertisers. According 
to the report, the Jewish Daily Forward would provide an excellent venue for advertisers for 
multiple reasons. First, there was the substantial Jewish population. With a map of the New York 
metropolitan area detailing the Jewish populations of 32 communities, the report noted that “in 
many of those sections the Jews are concentrated and are the dominant majority, both as 
consumers and store owners. In others the percentage varies from 2% to 53% of the total.” 
Second, the Forward demonstrated that Jews represented 30 percent of the market share of all 
food expenditures in the region, spending over $300 million. Third, the organized nature of the 
Jewish community, and particularly Jewish cultural life, was seen as a reason that the Forward 
would be a good place to advertise. “The progressive element of the Jewish community has built 
up the most active cultural life to be found anywhere in America. The Forward carries the 
advertising and reviews of all important plays along Broadway, concerts, recitals, dance recitals, 
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readings, etc. The large percentage of Jewish patronage of all cultural events is a well known 
feature of New York life.”264
 This culture, according to the report, had helped to build the basis for a population of 
reliable consumers. “There are approximately 750,000 Jewish men and women gainfully 
employed in New York City...The vast majority of Jewish workers are unionized.” They noted, 
 The large majority of the approximately 2,000,000 Jews in the Metropolitan area are in 
 the skilled labor class, in wholesale or retail trade and in the professional classes. Family 
 expenditures in a population so diversified vary according to residence districts, ranging 
 from $1,500 per family per year in one district to $12,000 per family in another.
In order to meet the needs of advertisers, the Forward incorporated sophisticated methods for 
gathering marketing information, including the state of the given product in the Jewish field, the 
potential competition, the dealer and jobber attitude, the consumer attitude, possible sales 
resistance, and whether or not the product would need to be adapted for the Jewish market, 
before recommending a merchandising plan.265 
 As the Forward’s budget tightened, the newspaper continued such efforts under the 
direction of Joseph Jacobs following Vladeck’s death. Jacobs was particularly concerned with the 
consumption habits of Jewish women in order to provide the best marketing information to their 
advertisers. In order to bolster ad buys for issues during the beginning of the week, the 
advertising manager explained, “The Jewish housewife does a lot of shopping in the beginning 
of the week. This is especially true since grocery stores have been forced to close at 11 o’clock 
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on Sunday morning. The meals at the end of the week are much more likely to be festive and 
thus require fewer canned products.”266
 By the end of 1939, the Forward had commissioned Ross Federal Research Corporation 
(RFRC) to undertake an extensive study of the paper’s readership for nearly $1500. RFRC hired 
Yiddish-speaking men to conduct field work at newsstands selling the Jewish Daily Forward and 
interview those who purchased the journal. The firm determined to survey 3,000 readers, or three 
percent of the paper’s circulation in order to get statistically accurate data. “In allocating the 
interviews, consideration will be given to the breakdown of your circulation by the five New 
York City Boroughs, as outlined in your most recent ABC statement.” The company developed a 
questionnaire in order to determine the effectiveness of newsstand sale; frequency of readership; 
readership of other Jewish and English language papers; employment status and income; and 
other information. The data was to be “prepared for machine tabulation,” and maps were to be 
created showing where readers live, block by block.267 
 With the help of this increasingly sophisticated data, the Forward would further its 
merchandising services, explaining the nature of the Jewish market to advertisers. In 1940, 
Joseph Jacobs produced a pamphlet for food and grocery marketers, explaining Jewish dietary 
laws and practices and offering the Yiddish press as a viable advertising vehicle. As they had 
been in the early 1920s, advertisers were assured that “The Yiddish press is dedicated to and 
serves those Jews who have established themselves in this new homeland and who today give 
undivided allegiance to the United States.”268  
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 The commodification of the Forward’s readership was an internal contradiction for the 
newspaper, as it continued its role as a community-building institution. At the 1922 convention 
of the ACWA, Abraham Cahan spoke of his newspaper and its relationship to the people it 
served. “We mean to help every bona fide trade union organization…That is the object of the 
Forward. It was established with the pennies and the rings and the watches of workmen and 
working girls. It is not a private industry any more than your bank is a private industry. It belongs 
to the working people.”269 Changes within the business and advertising departments by this 
point, though, had severely altered the relationship between the Forward and its readers. Rather 
than maintaining operating costs through contributions, the Forward ran on advertising dollars. 
This allowed the Forward Association to continue to give substantial contributions back to labor 
and community organizations, as well as other progressive publications. Like labor conditions at 
the Forward, the budget for these contributions were largely dependent on fluctuations within the 
advertising industry.   
 The Forward’s primary beneficiary was the SP, “including all its branches, activities and 
auxiliaries.” However, they continued to spend the most within New York. In 1936, the Forward 
Association proposed that $20,000 of its $30,000 budget for donations go to the SP. In 1935, 
Vladeck reminded SP leader Norman Thomas, “If you check up on the Socialist vote in New 
York City by districts, you’ll find that the Forward is still the backbone of the Socialist vote. It 
would be hard to state a percentage but my conservative is that at least 65% of the Socialist 
strength on Election Day comes from the Forward.”270 While Vladeck often presented his paper 
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as a Jewish rather than a labor paper to advertisers, he made sure that Thomas understood the 
importance of his journal to the party, until it endorsed of FDR through the American Labor 
Party (ALP) in 1936.
 In addition to aiding the SP, the Forward used its advertising revenue to support striking 
workers. Through the 1920s and into the 1930s, the newspaper maintained a unique relationship 
to its readership and the broader community. Rather than simply providing information, the 
Forward was an important institution in the lives of thousands of working class people, not only 
within New York’s Jewish community, but throughout the country. Vladeck claimed that, 
between 1921 and 1926, the Forward Association had contributed over $500,000 to labor and 
socialist causes, including $5,000 towards relief for miners and their families during a 1926 
strike.271   
 The Forward’s dependence on advertising revenue, however, meant that this community 
support was contingent on the well being of the business community and the capitalist economy.  
The early years of the Depression, prior to the New Deal, witnessed a significant drop in the 
Forward’s ability to assist other organizations. As advertising money dried up and unions found 
themselves in dire straits, the ethnic and labor press were hit harshly. Interestingly, English-
language Socialist publications, such as the New Leader, turned to the Forward for financial 
support, even though the Yiddish publication would reach an ostensibly smaller market. 
 The unions indebted to us are down and out, and can give us nothing. Most of the 
 Forward appropriation went to the printer as soon as it came in, but we were so far 
 behind in our account with him previously, that he is absolutely justified in making his 
 demand. 
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 Last summer the International Madison Bank was still in existence. To help tide us over 
 the summer months we managed to borrow over $1000.00 from them. This year we no 
 longer have the International Bank to call upon for assistance. Although our 
 circulation income has been comparatively good, our advertising and contribution income 
 has been deplorably low...
 
 We are counting on you as our last resort. Please do not fail us.272
Other publications, such as The New Era, the official publication of the SP in Los Angeles, 
sought the support of the Forward in order to continue. Asking for a donation, the editor wrote to 
Vladeck in 1931, explaining,
! The New Era is the only Socialist newspaper on the coast. It has played and must play a 
! big part in building up a powerful Socialist movement in California. But unless we get 
! financial aid at once we will have to discontinue the paper...
!
! We hope that the Forward Association will be able to help us with a five hundred dollar 
! donation, which will clean up the remainder of the deficit and will leave us a little sum to 
! work on...We cannot build a movement without a paper and unless we receive help we 
! will be forced to suspend publication.273
 Vladeck, in this instance though, was unable to extend the largesse of his organization, calling 
such a donation “completely out of the question.” “Because of the reduced budget,” he wrote, 
“and also because of the increased demands for support, we find our budget completely 
exhausted...”274
 Difficulty continued in the following year, and contributions to organizations continued 
to suffer. Vladeck wrote to the head of the Philadelphia Labor Institute, denying the organization 
a thousand dollars that it had been counting on, “As the budget this year is only two-thirds of 
what it was last year, there was nothing left in the Emergency Fund, and there isn’t a thing that 
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can be done this year. I cannot tell you how sorry I am but I really see no way out of it.”  In 
1933, the Forward cut its budget of contributions by 50 percent from the previous year.275
 This did not fully prevent the Forward from doing important work within New York or 
other cities, particularly as organizing efforts ratcheted up through the Roosevelt years. The 
Forward used its space to promote labor causes, helping to raise funds for charitable causes and 
promote benefit events. In one instance, the Forward offered free publicity for the Hebrew-
American Typographical Union’s theater benefit, allowing them to raise “a substantial sum for 
our Emergency Fund to relieve our needy unemployed.” The Forward also worked with 
numerous unions, including the American Federation of Musicians Local 802 and the Hebrew 
Actors Union to raise money through performances to send poor children to summer camp in 
New York each year.276 
 The Forward could also help provide other forms of support for struggling workers. In 
1935, for instance, the Boston office of the Forward ordered food for the relief of 1400 strikers 
at Colt Patent Firearms. As one leader noted in a letter to Vladeck, the donation was instrumental 
in saving the strike after workers had been out for seven weeks and all other organizations had 
exhausted their funds. The Forward could also use its political capital, urging, for example, AFL 
President William Green to meet with a committee of the Taxi Cab Drivers Union of Greater 
New York and grant them a charter.277 
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 But despite the Forward’s venture into serving many of the major cities outside of New 
York, the Big Apple remained its priority. The local editions existed primarily for commercial 
purposes. This became clear when, in 1933, Vladeck told the Jewish Labor Central Council in 
Toronto that its entire limited budget for contributions that year had to go to socialist and labor 
efforts within the paper’s home city. The prioritization of New York garnered some criticism. For 
example, in 1931 the Forward raised money for the unemployed in Boston, but that money was 
allegedly redirected back to New York. As a representative of the Associated Jewish 
Philanthropies wrote, “In view of our own serious problem, there is very little justification for 
turning over funds raised here to relieve people in New York... It would seem to me from the 
point of view of the Forward, it would strengthen your local prestige if you announced on your 
Boston page that a certain proportion of the funds would be expanded for the relief of the 
unemployed in this community.”278 
 Local communities found relying on content from New York and Chicago insufficient. 
For example, one representative of the Los Angeles Forward Association Auxiliary told Vladeck, 
“We are working hard on the 25th anniversary of the [Workmen’s Circle] in Los Angeles. 
Publicity is necessary for big doings to stimulate interest among the members and to wind up a 
very poor membership campaign. We can read news from New York theaters, Chicago... doings, 
a quarter page house ad... besides the “regular” full page ad, etc. The copy for a history making 
two weeks, does not go in-- but one notice out of so many.”279  
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 Still, readers preferred content from other cities to a large number of ads, the primary 
reason they had local editions at all. The business manager of the Los Angeles’ Bakery and 
Confectionary Workers Local 453 wrote, “For many years we have been receiving a six page 
paper, and we did not expect much news in a six page paper, but lately since we are getting an 
eight page paper, we feel that instead of the advertisements appearing of mid-Western summer 
resorts appearing day in and day out, that the paper should be devoted to reprinting labor news 
from the New York City edition.”280 
 These demands went beyond the capacity of the newspaper. Vladeck had always seen 
local editions as potential revenue streams first and movement centers second. Although helpful, 
Forward money and representation could not build a national labor movement alone. The role of 
labor unions-- particularly the ACWA and the ILGWU-- would be far more central to developing 
cultural and educational programs, bringing working class people together and providing a 
critical framework for understanding their social and political environment. These efforts will be 
the subject of the following chapter.   
Conclusion: Commercialism and its Limits
 By the time of his death, Vladeck had overseen the transformation of the internal business  
at the Jewish Daily Forward. Guided by the principles of socialism and a philosophy of 
pragmatism, the newspaper was able to survive and, at points, thrive in the turbulent interwar 
decades. Unlike many other left-wing publications, the Forward was able to brave the economic 
crisis and political repression that immediately followed World War One, and withstand the 
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downturn that came with the Great Depression by 1932. Through these transformations, 
however, Jewish socialism came to take on a very different meaning. While in the early twentieth 
century, the Forward was a workers’ paper written in Yiddish, it had become, by the New Deal 
era, a Yiddish language, Jewish paper that was sympathetic to workers. 
 This change was not solely due to the Forward’s need to produce a commodity audience. 
Other important political and social changes were happening that brought Jewish identity to the 
fore, becoming more salient in the lives of many working class Jews than their proletarian status 
(which, by the Second World War, was also beginning to shift). The rise of Nazism and the 
Hitler-Stalin pact prompted organizations like Vladeck’s Jewish Labor Committee to consider 
issues increasingly through a Jewish lens, even as they became integrated into a broader worker 
movement. 
 Some might argue that the spread of totalitarianism necessitated a more radical, not a 
more tempered response. In 1935, the anarchist Emma Goldman wrote ominously to Vladeck 
from exile in Toronto, after having been denied permission to return to the U.S, 
 The final news as regards Washington was a more poignant blow than I had thought it 
 would be. Perhaps it is because Europe is in such an unsettled state and my chances there 
 for any activity absolutely nil... After all my case is but one in the tens of thousands of 
 political refugees who are nowheres wanted and nowheres permitted to earn a livelihood. 
 Did we ever dream in our wildest dreams that the world would retard and be turned into a 
 vast prison? We were naive, weren’t we? We thought that the wonderful things we were 
 talking about were around the corner. We had but to dedicate ourselves more earnestly 
 and they would be realized. Now they are farther away than ever.281 
 When Vladeck died of a heart attack at the age of 52 in October 1938, writers commented 
that he had never lost his passion for justice. As City Council President Newbold Morris said, 
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 His mind was big enough to comprehend great problems. His wisdom was 
 inexhaustible. His heart was big enough for all mankind. His voice made articulate the 
 aspirations of millions of people. His vision was of the world free from tyranny, brutality 
 and hatred, and secure for all who love freedom.282
But despite this idealism, Vladeck was not, as Goldman suggested, naive. He may have dreamed 
big, but he spent his daily life managing budgets, signing contracts, denying raises and attracting 
advertising. Ultimately, the Forward came in many respects to resemble other facets of the 
commercial press, breeding critiques of advertising and worker discontent.
 Vladeck’s reliance on advertising coincided with a new emphasis at the Forward on 
Jewish rather than worker concerns. Thus, the Forward worked to produce a commodified 
Jewishness through the interwar era. It did not, however, completely lose sight of its original 
purpose-- to help build a broad-based working class movement. The Forward continued to 
function as an important institution in the Jewish working class community, providing important 
resources to the labor movement moments of crisis. This continued commitment bred an 
environment where the Forward was still read within a broadly socialist milieu, sparking 
criticism and discussion about its role in American Jewish society and the labor movement. The 
Forward’s ability to make financial contributions, however, was increasingly dependent on 
market forces-- particularly the advertising market. The experience of the Forward in the 1920s 
and 1930s demonstrates the difficulty in maintaining a powerful alternative press under 
capitalism, and the contradictory nature of Vladeck’s pragmatic approach.
 While controversy around the Forward demonstrated anything but a full-scale acceptance 
of the ideology of consumption among Jews in the U.S.,Vladeck knew that such work had to be 
done in order to sustain a publication like the Forward. Although Di frayhayt relied less on 
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advertising, it reached far fewer people and was far from an independent, democratic voice. The 
Forward’s commercial strategy extended a socialist-centered hegemonic Jewishness beyond 
World War One, for another generation through the New Deal. Criticism of Vladeck’s approach 
generated further public discourse about the nature of working class, Yiddish language 
newspapers. While the Forward was the central media institution of the Jewish labor movement, 
it by no means exerted total control. Rather, it kept discussion within the counterpublic going far 
longer, and with greater political impact, than might otherwise have happened.
 But, under Vladeck’s supervision, the Jewish working class counterpublic did change. In 
1936, the Forward’s endorsement of FDR marked a decisive shift, as “the goal of transforming 
American society gave way to reforming it.”283 That same year,Vladeck assumed the office of 
majority leader on the New York City Council. No longer a threat to the status quo, the Forward 
was an integral part of a new hegemonic bloc, representing one important segment of a new 
American public. As the New Deal reached its apex, and as the CIO built a new social contract, 
Vladeck and the Forward played a significant role in the remaking of the American public 
sphere. As I argue in chapters four and five, this could not have been done without the spread of 
community through the trade union movement, and the work of two important organic 
intellectuals, J.B.S Hardman and Fania Cohn. Respectively, they offered alternatives to the 
Forward’s highly commercial approach with acute attention to union democracy and gender 
equality.
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Chapter Four:
J.B.S. Hardman and the Search for Radical Democracy:
The ACWA and the Labor Press
“A writer in the lay Catholic magazine, Commonweal, some time ago analyzed ‘the scope of a 
Catholic paper,’ suggesting that the aims and objects of that press are ‘the enlightenment (of the 
readers) by telling...things which (they) need to know....or telling or reminding of things which 
are...worth knowing, enrichment, by wise comment or information about any matters not 
necessarily formally religious, which play a part in our lives; confirmation in our faith and our 
determination to live by it, by careful...exposition and explanation of principles or practice under 
attack...’
It is a good ‘scope’: enlightenment, enrichment, confirmation. The union press might inscribe 
that on its masthead. But although unionism, not unlike religion, is an admixture of a faith, of an 
art, of a way of life, and of an institutionalism, there is nothing in it that is taken on faith. All 
things in unionism must prove themselves.” 
      -- J.B.S. Hardman284
! State propaganda, a commercial media system, and anxieties of revolution raised new 
concerns about the role of the public and the potential for democracy among the “American 
intelligentsia in the wake of World War One. “Nervous liberals,” such as the former muckraker 
and CPI official Walter Lippmann, believed that the modern world had become too complicated 
for average citizens, and technocratic experts should govern ‘‘the pictures in their heads.’’ In 
Lippmann’s formulation, democracy can only work if there is an ‘‘independent expert 
organization for making the unseen facts intelligible to those who have to make the decisions.’’ 
There is little room for civic participation. Rather, the new expert class would have to replace the 
public in their role of decision makers, ‘‘manufacturing consent’’ among the rest of the 
populous.285 
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 As a counterpoint, education advocate and philosopher John Dewey argued that experts 
needed to “help provide the public with the information necessary to perform its functions,” and 
“facilitate the democratic dialogue” necessary to “create a shared political consciousness and a 
shared set of interests.” The ‘‘eclipse of the public” that Lippmann bemoaned, made it imperative 
to transform the ‘‘Great Society’’ into the ‘‘Great Community,’’ rooted in direct associational 
bonds. In the Great Community, ‘‘the ever-expanding and intricately ramifying consequences of 
associated activities shall be known in the full sense of the word, so that an organized, articulate 
Public comes into being.”286 
 Leaders within the Jewish labor movement echoed the famous Lippmann-Dewey debate, 
as the need for an informed and participatory union membership contradicted democracy’s 
apparent threat to organizational viability. Fannia Cohn, the Education Secretary of the 
International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) remarked, “The Great War signaled the 
beginning of the crumbling of our civilization. The question arose as to who would be the builder 
of the new system. Progressive minded elements in society looked to the labor movement to be 
that social force and were ready to throw their lot in with it.” While budget crises and political 
divisions consumed time, energy and resources away from productive organizing within the 
heavily Jewish garment industry during the 1920s, struggles within industry unions helped to 
build what Dan Katz terms “social unionism.”287 
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 As the Forward commercialized during the interwar period, and defined itself 
increasingly in relation to Jewishness rather than labor, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of 
America (ACWA) and the ILGWU helped maintain a class-based identity among Jewish workers 
through their publications and educational activities during the 1920s. Within these institutions, 
leaders debated the role of the press, the importance of culture and entertainment, and the limits 
of modern democracy. Carrying the banner of worker education, organic intellectuals fought for 
a participatory labor movement in the midst of commercialization, political infighting, and 
partisan rhetoric. These efforts provided a basis for national mass organization in the 1930s.
 Here, and in chapter five, I explore the efforts of two particular organic intellectuals-- 
J.B.S. Hardman, the Educational Director of the ACWA, and Fannia Cohn, the secretary of the 
Education Department of the ILGWU. These individuals made media and culture central 
components within the Jewish trade union movement during the interwar years. In this chapter, I 
trace Hardman’s career within the Yiddish press and the labor movement. Born Jacob Salutsky, 
J.B.S. Hardman was one of the the Jewish labor movement’s most strident voice for true 
democracy. He dedicated his life to creating a working-class public sphere. As advertisers’ 
demands increasingly shaped the Forward’s politics, and as the Jewish labor movement became 
mired in factional ideological and partisan battles, Hardman sought to make the ACWA home to 
a truly independent, free democratic discussion about working class politics that was beholden to 
neither commercial interests nor party influence. Under ACWA President Sidney Hillman, the 
union became intertwined with the state-corporate nexus of the New Deal. As an eternal critic, 
Hardman often found himself further removed from the seat of power. But because of his efforts, 
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he helped to build a movement culture that made the New Deal possible, with influence 
extending into the postwar era.
The ACWA and the Worker Education Movement
 New York’s garment industry was the major site of employment for eastern European 
Jewish immigrants in the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In 1900, 40 percent of all 
“Russian-born” (meaning, by and large, Jewish) women, and 20 percent of men worked in the 
industry. Karen Brodkin argues that although Jews came to the U.S. as a skilled workforce in a 
variety of trades, they found themselves “concentrated in one of the most de-skilled and low-paid 
industries in the United States.” Jews faced occupational restrictions upon arrival, and were 
barred from entering the craft unions of the American Federation of Labor (AFL). Although they 
made up the bulk of the skilled hat makers, furriers and tailors, the influx of immigrant labor 
allowed manufactures to re-organize the industry for mass production. By 1914, New York’s 
garment industry employed 510,000 workers in 15,000 shops, earning an annual payroll of $326 
million and producing over $1 billion in value.288 
 Sweatshops were the locus of production not only of garments, but also of “racial 
darkening.” While the industry grew, Jewish immigrants saw their jobs de-skilled. Craft unions 
in other occupations, however, helped govern industry growth. Brodkin writes, “The freedom of 
craft autonomy in the construction of work was a prerogative of whiteness. It stood in contrast to 
the ‘servility’ of the nonwhite assembly line.”289 Thus, organization within the needle trades 
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challenged managerial logic, as well as the conservative institutions of labor that helped to 
construct an ideal notion of the free white worker.   
 Within the men’s clothing industry, the ACWA formed as a response to this severe 
exploitation. It was a site of independence and radical democracy from its inception. The union 
first developed as an oppositional group within the conservative United Garment Workers 
(UGW), which was out of synch with its foreign-born membership who largely adhered to some 
form of socialism. Rather than serving all in the industry, the UGW favored the craft 
organization of cutters and corruptly sold the union label to manufacturers in order to grow its 
treasury. Sidney Hillman, radicalized by the 1910 general strike in Chicago, led an insurgency 
against the UGW at its 1914 convention, and ultimately founded the new organization in 
December at a meeting at New York’s Webster Hall in Greenwich Village. 
 But despite the fact that the ACWA had the support of the AFL-affiliated ILGWU, the 
AFL would not recognize the new 30,000 member organization. As an independent union, the 
ACWA expanded beyond Chicago’s Hart, Schaffner, Marx factory. Through industrial 
organizing, it secured wage increases and a forty-four hour work week eventually to full 
unionization of the local market, and national prominence by 1918.290 
! During the following decade, Hillman embraced “industrial democracy” over more 
revolutionary forms of social organization. This approach “recognized the need for autonomous 
vehicles of working-class representation, but also sought to incorporate such institutions within a 
broader collaborative program premised on expanded and efficient production and mass 
consumption.” This “new unionism” won the support of middle-class progressives, and garnered 
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praise for introducing mediation and arbitration in the workplace alongside “unemployment 
insurance, cooperative housing, labor banking, and consumer cooperatives.”291 The “new 
unionism” had both radical and conservative tendencies. While it went beyond the limitations of 
AFL craft unionism by building alternative institutions, it also further entrenched the union 
within the broader structures of the state and of capitalism.
  The most significant scholarly work on the ACWA is Steven Fraser’s Labor Will Rule, an 
in-depth biography of Sidney Hillman. Against the backdrop of the emergence of New Deal 
liberalism and a bureaucratic, national labor movement, Fraser traces Hillman’s life as a Jewish 
socialist immigrant through his union presidency, to his role as an advisor to President Roosevelt. 
Fraser credits Hillman’s “drive to succeed and to other equally compelling traits of character” 
with allowing him “to recognize and seize his historic opportunity” and “enter a far wider 
universe of national influence and power.”292 
 But, as the ACWA’s Education Director, J.B.S. Hardman was also of crucial importance 
to the organization’s success. The worker education movement of the 1920s maintained the ethos 
of social unionism from the prewar era and paved the way for the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (CIO) and their wave of organizing and strikes in the next decade. Representing a 
departure from the “bread and butter” unionism of Samuel Gompers and the AFL, worker 
education, according to Gloria Garrett Samson, “kept the movement for industrial unionism alive 
in the ‘lean years’ of the 1920s. Labor progressives who found ideological support in workers’ 
educational institutions contributed to the advances made in the ‘turbulent years’ of the 1930s.” 
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Hardmans’s staunch commitment to union democracy, and particularly, a democratic labor press 
were also important factors catapulting Hillman and the ACWA into the ranks of national 
political influence during the New Deal.293 
 If, as Fraser argues, Hillman was the labor movement’s Machiavelli, then Hardman was 
its Rousseau. As Hillman and Vladeck operated strategically, Hardman thought deeply about the 
ideal role of the labor press and its relationship to the trade union movement. This independent 
spirit fit well at the ACWA, at least for a period. With its leadership emerging from Chicago, the 
ACWA was somewhat removed from the left-right split that plagued the New York labor 
movement after World War One.294 The leadership took a more inclusive attitude, which was 
both shaped by and reflected in Hardman’s union newspaper, the Advance, and its Yiddish 
companion, the Fortschritt. Rather than using the press as a propaganda tool, Hardman believed 
union newspapers should encourage free expression and provide members with access to a wide 
range of debate. He understood that the quality of the movement press was inextricably linked to 
the quality of democracy within the movement. Vibrant newspapers were essential in order to 
build a broad, democratic trade union movement that could provide the basis for a new social 
order.
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Jacob Salutsky and the Search for Radical Democracy, 1921-1924
 Like B.C. Vladeck, J.B.S Hardman’s experiences as a young activist in Russia were 
formative in shaping his political trajectory. Still going by the name of Jacob Salutsky, he arrived 
in the United States in 1909 at the age of 27, having cut his teeth on radical politics in the Bund. 
Although he was the son of a businessman, Salutsky was attracted to Marxism in the midst of the 
political and cultural ferment in the Russian Pale. As a young man he became a seasoned 
political dissident in the trade union movement. After his third arrest he was exiled for two years. 
He spent one year in Paris and then left for the U.S. as an intermediary between French 
syndicalist leader Jean Juares and American socialists Daniel De Leon and Eugene Debs. 
Although his visit was initially supposed to be temporary, Salutsky decided to stay in New York 
as conditions in Russia worsened. 
 Salutsky quickly became a luminary in New York’s Jewish political circles. He enrolled 
at Columbia University’s Graduate School of Political and Social Science in 1910, and began to 
write for the Yiddish press and work as the head of the ILGWU’s Research Department. By 
1912, Salutsky was the national secretary of the Jewish Socialist Federation (JSF), the organized 
opposition to the Forward and the older generation of Jewish socialist leadership, and editor of  
the comparatively high-brow journal Di naye velt (The New World). To counter “the lively, 
heated, somewhat hoarse shout of the marketplace” at the Forward, Salutsky ensured that Di 
naye velt was committed to a “guiding principle” of “free discussion.” In opposition to the 
Forward’s stifled discourse, fellow Bundists struggled to place the Forward under direct party 
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control in order to protect its commitment to socialism and isolate it from commercial 
influence.295
 Tensions between the JSF and the Forward compounded as Forward editor Abraham 
Cahan and Vladeck increasingly bent to the will of the state-corporate nexus during World War 
One and following the Russian Revolution. In 1919, the Socialist Party (SP) split over its support 
for the Bolsheviks, and then split again, “by those,” according to Salutsky, “who wanted a 
Communist Party speaking in the American language without a Russian accent, which was 
entirely intolerable to the Communist Party.” Initially Salutsky stayed with the SP, but tensions 
continued to build over the next two years. In the fall of 1921, under his and Moishye Olgin’s 
leadership, the majority of the JSF left. In retaliation, the Forward fired the writers who 
supported the JSF and evicted the organization from its East Broadway building.296 
 Salutsky did not see the Bolshevik question as a black-and-white issue. On the one hand, 
he believed the SP was far too moderate and had become a party of “bourgeois sympathizers and 
half-socialist petty bourgeois elements.” At the same time, he disapproved of the Communist 
Party’s (CP) underground structure, and its insistence that revolution was just around the corner. 
Salutsky wanted to cooperate with the broader revolutionary movement, but was turned off by 
those who blindly followed Bolshevik mantras and models. He understood this tendency as more 
of an emotionally driven nationalism, held by people who had left the Russian empire rather than 
part of a well-conceived revolutionary strategy. “[R]evolutionary parties,” he said, “do not thrive 
in an unrevolutionary environment and if anyone expects an American revolution to happen, he 
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would have to have a long life before he sees it happen.” What Salutsky longed for was a “broad, 
proletarian mass party” that would speak to the needs of the American worker.297      
 Salutsky believed that the most important aim of the labor movement was to build 
democracy. In turn, a labor movement could only be successful if it was democratic. He told the 
ACWA’s 1918 convention in Baltimore,
 We are now going through a very grave crisis-- possibly the gravest so far in human 
 history, possibly the most important in the whole trend of civilization. Democracy itself is 
 being subjected to the acid test of reality...[I]t behooves a body of representatives of a 
 large labor organization assembled together... to deal with this particular problem. It 
 seems to be that if the problem is ever solved it will not be solved by English Professors; 
 by people with nice manners and still nicer words. It seems to be that the solution  might 
 emanate from here.
 
For Salutsky, the labor movement needed to show “a real democratic spirit” in order to “hold its 
grip on its membership,” demonstrating that each worker had a true stake and say in their 
union.298 
 As president of the fledgling ACWA, Sidney Hillman believed that Salutsky’s unrelenting 
demand for a democratic movement would be an asset to his union. The ACWA was on the outs 
not only with the national labor leadership, but with many of the luminaries of Yiddish socialism 
as well. Although Cahan and UHT leader Abraham Shiplacoff initially endorsed forming the 
organization, the ACWA ultimately had to withdraw from the UHT because of the latter’s 
affiliation with the AFL. The Forward and the UHT together “continued to float propositions that 
would have seriously compromised the autonomy and authority of the fledgling ACW.”299 
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Distanced from the hegemony of the Forward, the ACWA was well positioned to develop an 
independent and democratic Jewish labor culture. 
 By the time Salutsky took his position with the ACWA in 1920, educational efforts were 
underway locally in Chicago, Rochester, and New York, but there was no national coordination. 
Through worker education, Salutsky believed union members would come to take ownership 
over their own organization. “You have been kicked out of the ‘regular’ labor movement to 
become a real movement,” he told the convention. “You have been kicked out to learn what the 
labor movement of this country has not succeeded in learning in the course of a quarter of a 
century, that the labor movement is something far bigger than merely a combination of labor 
organizations.”300   
 Worker education would bring dynamism to the working class. Different from those who 
advocated programs for “moral uplift” and teaching bourgeois manners to proletarian 
immigrants, Salutsky put forth a radical vision. “Workers education,” he wrote, “... is not a 
polishing proposition. It is not a charitable undertaking of those ‘better situated’ to help the 
‘minor brethren.’...It is not a ‘thing in itself,’ independent of the union. Just to the contrary. It is 
part and parcel of the life of the union. Such it ought to be, or there is no reason why it should be 
at all.” For Salutsky, education and organization were synonymous, and therefore had to reach 
workers in every aspect of their lives. As he explained, 
 The union is not a political party, and workers’ education must not be partisan in any 
 narrow sense, though it cannot in the nature of things be impartial as the union itself is 
 not. It must be fair and accurate. But it is workers’ education, and education that will 
 enable the workers, individually and collectively, to make a successful stand for what is 
 theirs. That is not a narrow program. In fact, it is all-embracing. It demands the inclusion 
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 of the sciences and the arts, and of the knowledge of technique and industrial mechanics 
 and management, in the plan of workers’ education.301 
Through such a process, Salutsky hoped not only to rework economic relationships but to 
address political inequality as well. Attuned to the intellectual debates of the day, he proclaimed, 
“It is not the question of cooperation between the three factions, the employers, the employees 
and the public. There is only one public worthy of its name and they are the employees.”302 
 Salutsky began to implement this vision in the midst of an economic crisis in 1920-1. 
Employers in New York took advantage of the post-war recession and attempted to break the 
unions, locking out 60,000 clothing workers. The union was in a defensive position, “engaged in 
a war for its life.” The General Executive Board (GEB) called upon the new Education 
Department “to put itself on a war-time basis” and develop an information bureau and 
intelligence service; boost morale among locked out workers through education and recreation 
activities; coordinate activities for workers’ families such as a children’s New Year party; and 
create a curriculum for the Amalgamated Labor College. These efforts would build community, 
dispel anti-union myths among members, and through the College, offer “systematic study” to 
locked out workers of the history of civilization, public speaking, working-class movements, and 
economics.303 
 Despite the union’s successful utilization of these methods during the lockout, the GEB 
reported that the struggle “consumed all the energy of the organization” and hindered the 
development of the Education Department nationally. It was not until the fall of 1921 that 
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Salutsky began to coordinate with national officers and outside educators-- including Educational 
Committee members such as Professor Charles Beard, Scott Nearing of the Rand School, and 
Alvin Johnson of the New Republic, to develop a program and secure funding for “a speaker’s 
service, a reference service that would furnish materials wanted by local groups, a weekly news 
letter of significant current events, a leaflet service giving brief outlines of important questions, 
moving picture films and stereopticon slides for the illustration of lectures.” For Salutsky, worker 
education would require a diversity of tactics and approaches in order to reach all the members 
of the union, in a growing number of cities who spoke thirty different languages and represented 
an array of “racial varieties.”304  
 The early educational programs put tremendous emphasis on what Steven Fraser calls “a 
democratic variant of [high] culture.” Offering lectures on political philosophy and literature, 
discussions of current events, classical music and dance performances, the educational agenda 
Salutsky developed contained “a tacitly understood political subtext...: To appreciate a 
Shakespeare tragedy or a Beethoven symphony was simultaneously to disdain the inherent 
shoddiness and vulgarity of the marketplace.” It would replace “the multiplicity of cultural 
agendas articulated by each ethnic constituency with a homogenous set of values, beliefs and 
motivations,” making the union the bearer of modernity.305 
 But while Salutsky certainly believed these unmediated activities were important, he did 
not pay nearly as much attention to them as his ILGWU counterpart, Fannia Cohn, did.306 
Instead, Salutsky was most concerned with the role of publication. Although the Education 
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Department strove to enable autonomy, allowing locals “to advise or suggest, but not prescribe” 
particular activities, Salutsky understood that printing union literature was so central to the 
Amalgamated’s organizing efforts that it was “the one field where the Education Department is 
free to take the initiative and has every opportunity to develop an interesting and fruitful 
activity.” In its first year, the ACWA printed 23,000 copies of five pamphlets, which sold for 10-
cents each, arousing “great interest” and generating “a constant stream of letters” from the 
membership. The union also took innovative steps, publishing almanacs and, as Theodore Debs 
described it, a “very beautiful and finely illustrated calendar” for 1922. The calendar offered a 
brief record of events that occurred each month in labor history, quotations from writers, poems 
and pictures. With “the cold facts on the one side, the embodiment of an ideal on the other,” the 
calendar, according to the New York Evening Post, “presented with dignity and with the esthetic 
sense that the department is trying to instill in the workers.”307 
 Such projects were possible because the large number of members in the union-- 150,000 
“and probably double their number of dependents”--offered the Department a guaranteed 
“market.” This allowed the union to offer publications at incredibly low prices, making books 
accessible to the lowest earner. “It is no idle dream,” Salutsky said, “to speak of the union 
actually being able to develop its own literature...”308  
 Despite his grand vision, Salutsky-- now known as Hardman-- declared his educational 
efforts to be a failure by the end of the 1920s. Reflecting on it years later, he explained that “the 
deterioration in the general union field,” the result of harsh employer strategies, and unfriendly 
federal government, and massive political infighting between Socialists and Communists, 
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“toward the end of the twenties made it practically a dead affair.”309 Hardman, though, remained 
dedicated to one aspect of worker education throughout his life-- newspaper publishing. 
Conflict at Di Frayhayt
 While the Educational Department’s publications were decidedly centralized and aimed 
to offer members information, Salutsky saw the role of the union press as quite distinct. Rather 
than directly mold public opinion, Salutsky believed that the union press should enable 
conversation among members, helping them come to their own understandings. Thus, while 
Fraser argues that worker education in this era was intended to impose cultural uniformity, the 
press as Salutsky conceived it was meant to inspire critical reflection. 
 The most important aspect of this effort, for Salutsky, was the development of working 
class newspapers. He spent the first several years of his tenure as the ACWA’s Educational 
Director more dedicated to other projects outside of the union. He found himself mired in 
political battles, caught between the Communist Left and the Socialist Right during the early 
1920s, in fights centered around the Yiddish press. 
 The split within the JSF in 1921 caused Salutsky a great deal of personal anxiety. He 
worried that he would be forced to leave his union position “as a result of possible unpleasant 
notoriety in connection with the convention.” The following month he told his wife Hannah 
Salutsky, a committed labor activist in her own right, “No new developments except that the 
demand for my head in the Amalgamated has become quite popular. The Forwardists went to the 
locals, resolutions are being framed, the ‘people’ are called in, and it is rather jolly.”310 
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 With little sense of security, Salutsky and Olgin sought a political home for the JSF. Late 
in 1921, the Comintern urged the CP to establish an aboveground party, and to incorporate the 
JSF into its structure. While Salutsky expressed much trepidation about such a merger, the 
majority of the JSF went along with the plans. In the end, they helped to form the Workers’ Party 
(WP)-- dedicated to building a “workers’ republic” and utilizing the legitimated political process 
in the U.S.-- under the assumption that it would have a large degree of autonomy from the CP 
and Moscow.311 
  Salutsky and Olgin founded a new journal, Di frayhayt (Freedom), as a new Yiddish-
language daily with the support of the WP in 1922. Salutsky wanted Di frayhayt to provide a 
space for truly open dialogue regarding Jewish socialist politics and culture, declaring publicly 
that he hoped it would destroy the Forward.312 But Salutsky’s idealism and constant state of 
dissatisfaction ultimately got in the way of his relationship to the journal. From the outset, he 
was frustrated with the management of the newspaper and its tendency towards dogmatism. As 
Hannah Salutsky told him, 
 I am not bothered much about the approach of financial difficulties but I fear your 
 condition of a fallen general. If you could stick to some group it would not be so bad. I 
 see they announce you as speaker to some meetings which shows that you are not entirely 
 out of it. But your keeping away from the paper altogether makes the paper so pale and I 
 doubt whether it makes you any happier...It would seem that keeping up an influence in 
 their work would make it more possible to accomplish something in the long 
 run....Hatred is a very fine thing, but when it becomes one’s only activity it does endanger 
 one’s spiritual self. 
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Before the first issue was published, she said, “So the world is safe for demagogy again and the 
Freiheit (sic) is really going to appear. I hope the fellows do give up their demagogic tone...How 
much of a better job you could make of it than the entire CP taken together.”313 
 By the journal’s premiere, Salutsky was disheartened and socially isolated from his 
comrades. He wrote in his diary, that he “spent the evening wandering” and “took in 30 cents 
worth of movies.” While Salutsky understood the Frayhayt to have been largely his own project, 
he came to feel quite dissatisfied with the outcome and the decisions others made.   
  What culminated today in the [Frayhayt] I started 10 years ago. No one believed it 
 possible. I forced it to the front, cultivated the belief in the possibility to realize it, a daily 
 challenge to the [Forward’s] editorial rule of vulgarity. That paper is now in fact. I 
 thought the paper should not have been started just now, without money and with a 
 house divided against itself. They would not take my advice. I left them. Was I right? 
 Somehow I think often of the problem of leadership embodied in the story of Moses 
 withdrawal on the verge of Israel entering the Land of Promise. If it is true that a new era 
 in the movement starts, new leadership is the only hope. Unfortunately, the caliber of 
 people around the [Frayhayt]  is low, as bad as the [Forward] crowd. Not as corrupt in the 
 material sense but mentally no less dishonest.314 
 With the paper facing financial problems immediately, discussion turned towards relying 
on the Comintern’s support. Although in Tony Michels’ assessment there is little chance that the 
paper could have survived without Moscow’s assistance, Salutsky believed the new journal could 
remain independent, financially solvent and compete with the Forward. In order to cut their 
weekly deficit of $3000 in half, he suggested that the paper “be reduced to four pages, the staff 
editorial and management cut to an absolute minimum, the price not to be raised.” He would 
“write off [his] fingers” in order to make up for having a small staff. Olgin told Salutsky 
privately that he approved of this plan, but he did not support it in official meetings. At this 
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point, Salutsky formally cut ties with Di frayhayt. They ultimately raised the price of the paper, 
which Salutsky feared would lead to a drop in circulation, which had already declined from 
40,000 to 18,000. He explained to Hannah Salutsky, “I am not prejudiced when I take the paper 
to be dull, incapable of a fight of any kind. They killed a grand thing by starting it in a wrong 
time, in a wrong way.  Well, that is after all as much as our “involvement” is worth.315
 The experience with Di frayhayt prompted Salutsky to leave the field of Yiddish-
language journalism. He set his sights on developing an English language magazine that would 
adhere to his vision for an independent, democratic forum. He wrote in his diary that his new 
periodical, American Labor Monthly, would be “a new center of gravitation in the American 
labor movement. I will see that the magazine idea, an honest to goodness solid magazine...be 
materialized.”316
 Salutsky and others started the magazine as an independent enterprise, each contributing 
25 dollars a month to the effort. Once again, Salutsky hoped to provide the labor movement with 
a forum for critical self-reflection, intelligent analysis, and empirical claims. Its editorial 
statement read explained that it did “not set out to compete with any of the existing labor 
journals” which too often thrived “on manifestoes and ‘statements’”...[dealing] in canned party 
goods only. Authoritative and competent dispenser of canonized truth, the official press rightfully  
assumes to speak for the ‘organization.’” Instead, the ALM would offer “an analytical review of 
the affairs of labor in this world.” Rather than operating as propaganda, the magazine would help 
workers makes sense of the complex world around them.  
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 The greatest need the worker in the labor movement experiences today, more at this time 
 than at any other, is that of clear orientation. Finding one’s way amidst the most 
 amazingly riotous array of conflicting judgment and mutually exclusive proposals, 
 coming from the same source, is a task becoming more urgent and complicated with 
 every day that passes. A searching analysis of the heretofore accepted ‘facts’ and ‘truth’ 
 of the movement is in the order of business. So many ‘facts’ have reversed themselves 
 and truth has become a ‘thing’ even more relative in these days of doubt and test.317
While ALM represented a necessary ideal, the political conditions of the moment made it 
seemingly impossible to realize. Max Weinzweig, the education leader of the ACWA’s New York 
Joint Board, found the proposition “a bit worrisome,” but believed it would help meet a pressing 
need. He wrote,
 The terrible dearth of  clear-sightedness, of plans for action or even reasons for action so 
 far as these are apparent in the consciousness of the so-called leadership in the American 
 movement becomes sharper and clearer day by day. If the magazine will not make for a 
 noticeable change in the immediate present, it will at least prepare the ground for definite 
 attempts in the present or future.318 
Olgin was even more skeptical about how Salutsky would approach ALM. “In view of your 
changed attitude towards the Workers’ Party which was supposed to be the foundation of all the 
discussion in the magazine you are planning,” he wrote, “I would rather wait till the first issue of 
the magazine appeares before I definitely decide on participating in it. I am sure it will be o.k., 
yet I wish to know the tone in which you will attack the ticklish problems [emphasis in 
original].”319
 Ultimately, ALM created more political trouble for Salutsky, leading to his expulsion 
from the WP. Although he insisted that the magazine was “not out to fight any particular set of 
people” and was meant to serve a completely different purpose than party publications, therefore 
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posing no threat, the WP brought Salutsky up on charges for his public criticisms of the party and 
his personal financing of an outside publication. The WP wanted to merge the ALM with its own 
publication, the Liberator, but Salutsky would only allow this if they would commit the 
magazine to “an analytical study of American problems of life and labor” that was both “free and 
unhampered” and “friendly and constructive.” The WP never agreed to these terms, and Salutsky 
was expelled from the organization.320 
 Once again, Salutsky’s attempts to create a space for independent, critical reflection 
within the movement had been thwarted by strict partisan politics and ideological orthodoxy.  
By the end of 1923, Salutsky was “politically homeless.” Estranged from his one-time comrade 
Moiyshe Olgin, Salutsky argued in the Fortschritt for “the right of a revolutionist to make a 
revolution against his own revolutionary party.” Olgin claimed that Salutsky’s “bitterness had led 
him astray.” But, from Salutsky’s perspective, it was the WP that had failed to make good on its 
promise to be a radical party representing the broad interests of U.S. labor.321 
 By 1924 it was clear that there was no longer a chance for an independent, radical 
Yiddish publication to succeed. In October, Salutsky anglicized his name. As J.B.S. Hardman, he 
would commit himself not to Yiddish radicalism, but to democratic, American trade unionism 
through his editorship of the ACWA’s weekly, the Advance. While Sidney Hillman became 
increasingly concerned with reaching the higher echelons of power, Hardman retained his 
commitment to independence and democracy as the union came increasingly under the 
Forward’s sphere of influence.
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Visions for a Union Press, 1924-1932
 Between 1924 and the dawn of the New Deal, J.B.S. Hardman struggled to bring the 
ideological independence he had tried to create within the world of Yiddish radical politics into 
the world of trade unionism. As the Advance editor, he carved out a democratic space while the 
Forward became increasingly influenced by market pressures. His effort helped to sustain some 
semblance not just of labor unions, but of a labor movement, until the New Deal provided the 
appropriate context for an explosion of organizing and working class cultural activity.
 The garment unions in New York were ground zero for divisive fights between 
Communists and Socialists during the 1920s. In the midst of a severe economic downturn in 
1920 and 1921, employers collectively determined to reduce wages, reestablish piecework, and 
increase workforce flexibility. The number of small contracting shops in New York grew, while 
larger factories moved to smaller towns, diminishing union power in its stronghold while 
creating a demand for organizing in new places. As new industry strategies put the ACWA on the 
defensive in the early years of the decade, the CP and its affiliates offered workers a means to 
resist management’s postwar onslaught. William Z. Foster’s Trade Union Educational League 
(TUEL) was instrumental in helping the rank-and-file members fight for control over their 
unions under these adversarial circumstances, while labor leaders on the right sought to limit this 
influence.322
  Melech Epstein argues that the civil war “sapped the vitality of Jewish labor,” but Steven 
Fraser notes that unlike the ILGWU, the ACWA exited the 1920s “relatively unscathed” by the 
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conflicts.323 While Hillman undoubtedly managed these conflicts with considerable diplomatic 
skill, Fraser overlooks the high opportunity cost that the conflicts had on the union’s education 
programs and press. Hardman, who despised rigid partisanship, became increasingly 
marginalized as Hillman sought to curry favor with the Forward in the latter half of the decade. 
 Early in the 1920s, Sidney Hillman and the Amalgamated leadership entered into a 
“strange alliance” with the CP and the TUEL in order to avoid a rank-and-file revolt. Hillman 
gained the Left’s support ensuring that he would not have to face united factional opposition, 
while the Soviet leadership garnered the union’s support, material aid, and an agreement to help 
reconstruct the Russian clothing industry. As a result, they became isolated from Cahan, Vladeck 
and the anti-Communist Forward leaders. While Salutsky battled the Forward from outside the 
union, the Forward attacked the ACWA. They attempted to get members of some locals to stop 
paying their dues, and supporters of the right physically attacked left-wing union members and 
leaders.
But by the middle of the decade, the ACWA’s tenuous relationship with the CP had fallen 
apart. The union’s decision to support Robert La Follette’s 1924 independent presidential 
campaign finally broke the ACWA’s ties with the Communists, as La Follette dubbed the CP “the 
mortal enemy of the Progressive movement and democratic ideals.”324 ACWA officials 
understood that the press would play an important role in articulating its positions to members, 
leaders of other factions and the public. But the harsh anti-worker environment that characterized 
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the decade had taken its toll, creating a severe obstacle for publishing journals at the moment 
they were most essential. 
The union published its first newspaper, the Yiddish-language weekly Fortschritt, in 
April 1915 and soon followed it with Lavoro for the its Italian members. The English-language 
Advance premiered in March 1917, along with bi-weekly publications for Polish and Bohemian 
workers. Originally edited by the union’s general secretary, Joseph Schlossberg, the Advance 
began as an eight-page weekly dedicated to correcting the “misrepresentation and 
misunderstanding, and often unfounded accusation” levied against the union. As a motion 
towards moving beyond its ethnic enclaves, the Advance was to “[fill] that gap” to speak to 
English speaking members, and the rest of the American labor movement. 325
 “We are part of the general labor movement in America,” Jacob Panken declared on the 
front page of the Advance’s first issue. “More than that, we are cutting the pathway in the 
wilderness of confusion that exists in the American Labor Movement, leading toward the final 
goal to which the movement strives.” The Advance pledged to “criticize and analyze the doings 
in the American Labor Movement, but always in the spirit of friendliness, always in a spirit of 
helpfulness; therefore accurately and truthfully.”326
 In the midst of the battles between the Forward and Di frayhayt in 1922, the GEB 
committed itself to developing a newspaper that would divorce itself from divisive politics and 
advocate in the interest of the organization and its members. At that point, one board member 
commented, “Advance is not like a labor paper. There is no feeling in the Advance. We should 
definitely decide to get an editor that will write Amalgamated news to make it interesting for our 
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membership. We need a pro-Amalgamated policy.” Sidney Hillman declared, “The Forward and 
the Freiheit (sic) have a right to do anything they consider to be of advantage to them, and we 
cannot be the judge of either.”327 
 But by 1924, while the Forward was becoming increasingly profitable, the ACWA was 
running significant deficits. Salutsky assumed the role of editor for a short while in order to 
improve the distribution and circulation of the journals, but he resigned from this duty in May 
after claiming to have fixed the problems. The journals, however, continued to operate at a loss 
of $50,000 a year. Hillman called for a committee to find a way to save $15,000 to $20,000 a 
month. They formed an editorial board, who reported back to the GEB that reducing publication 
of the Advance to bi-weekly would save the union $15,000. As fiscal problems persisted, and the 
union found itself on the outs with both sides of the civil war, the GEB again requested 
Salutsky’s help. He soon took on the editorship of the ACWA’s seven publications. Three of them 
were in languages of which he said he “couldn’t read a line or understand any.”328 Ironically, the 
flame-throwing founder of and refugee from Di frayhayt would be the best candidate to assume 
the editor’s role in what was presumably to be a neutral environment.
 Thus, as the Forward increasingly concentrated on particularly Jewish issues, meeting the 
demands of advertisers, the demands of the American trade union-- to bring together working 
people from across ethnic and linguistic backgrounds-- provided an impetus for the largely 
Jewish ACWA to draw on the Yiddish socialist “newspaper culture” of the prewar era, and build 
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a multicultural, multiethnic, multilingual movement through its press.329 Hardman’s vision for a 
democratic trade union press and his dissatisfaction with the Forward’s politics and rhetoric 
combined to make the ACWA a home for a new kind of labor publication, corresponding to his 
ideas of worker education. 
 Hardman not only adopted this perspective; he developed it into a sophisticated theory, 
and his personal lifetime pursuit at the Amalgamated, and later, within the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (CIO). Union newspapers, he believed, should provide a forum for the voices of 
average members to be heard, rather than simply the party leadership and intellectuals. In 1928, 
he wrote in his edited volume, American Labor Dynamics, 
 Editors should encourage and stimulate discussion of union problems. The usual fear 
 that the outside may learn of what is happening in the union may be safely overlooked. 
 The ‘outside’ is almost always well informed and knows more about the union than the 
 editors and the presidents of the union will ever tell their members, and perhaps more 
 than is known to them. Secrecy to that end is of no avail, whereas on the other hand a 
 membership ignorant of union matters is a source of weakness. Ignorance breeds 
 indifference.
This, however, did not mean that the union should represent a complete free-for-all of baseless 
opinion. He argued, “Union papers should be more than disseminators of dry and distorted 
information. They should aim at feeding the mind and imagination of their readers. Veracity and 
exactness of statement should likewise be their concern. Their news, of necessity, must be 
spirited. Their editorials must be based on facts.” Reflecting the tensions of the interwar moment, 
Hardman believed that the press had to provide “analysis of policy and problems” and 
173
329 The term, “newspaper culture,” is borrowed from Michels, A Fire in Their Hearts, 105-6, as discussed in chapters 
one and two of this dissertation. 
“continuous frank discussion of any and all issues of importance” to ensure that public opinion 
be “intelligent.”330
 Thus, union newspapers had to engage readers in rational discussion. The editor would 
serve as a guiding force, shaping discussion, not dictating public opinion. Introducing his volume 
with a quote from John Dewey, Hardman sought to make the ACWA and its publications into 
sites of experimentation in radical democracy, producing workers as union citizens.331 
 The union citizen, however, was not a uniform subject. From his experience in the Bund, 
Hardman understood that members represented a multiplicity of cultural backgrounds and 
viewpoints. This translated into a proto-multiculturalism. Hardman believed in the principle of 
Jewish cultural autonomy, that “no national majority should have a legal right to suppress their 
language and their cultural aspirations.” This freedom could only be protected though creating 
“legally recognized institutions representing the national minorities and authorized to manage the 
educational and cultural affairs of their constituents.”332 Rather than seeking homogeneity and 
consensus, democracy necessitated the protection of diversity among cultural groups, as well as 
political opinion.  
 This vision of robust debate, functioning in conjunction with the worker education 
movement, presented a threat to the Forward’s dominance. As Hardman understood it, the 
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Forward was part of “the general labor press,” which represented “a more of less clearly-defined 
philosophy or ideology and is concerned with the advocacy of a distinctive ism... As the 
mouthpiece of the groups behind it, the labor press approaches the present from the viewpoint of 
the future, where its ideal resides.” It was the job of the union press to reverse this tendency, to 
build the future based on ideas members generated in their actual lived experiences, without 
being limited to the tenets of a preconceived ideology. Hardman believed that workers were 
disengaged from the theoretical arguments within the Left-- “this dialectical bunk about this 
thing and that thing, when the revolution will come; they are sick of it.”333 Union newspapers 
would have to be relevant, realistic, and connected to the needs of the rank-and-file. 
Informed by his experiences in the JSF, Hardman held firm that the union should be 
dependent on neither the left nor the right. By 1926, he concluded, “The Amalgamated will have 
to break away from seeking the patronage of either the Forward or the Freiheit (sic)... A way 
must be found to talk to the members directly rather than through the papers. A trade union 
undoubtedly needs the support of outside papers but it can not possibly depend upon that solely.” 
Acknowledging the importance of the TUEL’s perspective, Hardman called on the union press to 
“carry on a full intelligent discussion of current problems” rather than being “a society 
column.”334 
Hardman believed that the best way to deal with conflict was democratic discussion. As 
his first order of business, he approached the union’s split with the CP by expanding the role of 
the press. Hardman suggested that the paper allow members to offer 
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an airing of views and opinions...You may not think that a LaFollette administration will 
 be anything like a labor administration, and you are free to express yourself according to 
 your opinions and convictions or feeling in the matter. Not to exceed one hundred fifty 
 words-- the shorter the better.335
He consistently worked and reworked the Advance in order to best meet the needs of the ACWA 
membership. As he wrote to Potofsky in 1925, 
I want to get a clearly formulated statement of ‘What kind of a paper the Advance  should 
 be’ from a number of active and leading citizens of the Amalgamated, somewhat 
 oligarchically represented. I have asked Brother Bellanca, Frank Rosenblum and Samuel 
 Levin to answer questions along the same line. Statements in reply to this request will 
 make up a series of articles in the Advance and I am sure will be read carefully by many 
 active and interested members of the organization. It goes without saying that you will be 
 give freedom of expression, within, of course, the limits residing in you.336                                
Indeed, Salutsky believed that open dialogue was the only way union democracy could be 
maintained. He feared that the battles between the left and the right would spread from New York 
and completely consume the union. But he argued, “If, however, the unity is to be kept by means 
of policing, the value of that unity must be questioned.”337
 In spite of budgetary constraints, such discussion had to be ongoing and pervasive. 
Through the 1920s, the GEB consistently toyed with the idea of cutting the frequency of 
publications, but Hardman believed that this was a dangerous path. In 1925, he insisted that the 
Advance maintain its weekly schedule, with eight pages three times per month, and twelve pages 
once a month, rather than being reduced to a longer biweekly. Highlighting the crucial 
importance of the journals, Potofsky suggested that they would be able to pay for the 
publications if they laid off two organizers.338 
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 As budget concerns continued, the union considered merging the foreign language papers. 
In 1926, Hillman argued that separate langauge papers should be phased out, because growing 
numbers of members spoke English and it would reduce divison among nationalities within the 
union. But the consolidation of the Bohemian, Lithuanian and Polish papers upset many 
members, particularly in Chicago. Hardman spoke against this consolidation and advocated 
going back to the previous system because the decision had been made undemocratically, 
without consulting the concerned communities. To him, economy was “of secondary 
importance.” The ideological role of the foreign language papers, and particularly, the Yiddish 
Fortschritt, was paramount, because they helped maintain allegiance to the union in the midst of 
the factious wars between left and right. But by 1928, the ACWA budget had a 30 percent deficit, 
with ten percent of its expenditures going towards its publications.339 The coming of the 
Depression the following year led to the eventual suspension of the foreign language papers, at 
least on a temporary basis.
 Through the second half of the 1920s, the union drifted increasingly into the Forward’s 
camp, much to Hardman’s chagrin. As Di frayhayt continued to attack the union from the Left, 
Hillman began to repair his relationship with the Forward on the Right. In 1925, Abraham 
Beckerman, a Forward loyalist held a seat on the GEB. He advocated “strongarm methods” and 
had connections to underworld leader Louis “Lepke” Buchalter, who was penetrating 
strategically important locals. In February, the GEB determined to suspend members of the 
executive board of New York’s Local 5 for engaging in attacks on the organization through a 
series of circulars and articles in Di frayhayt. Just one year into his tenure as editor, Hardman 
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threatened to resign from his post because of the union’s growing allegiance with the Forward 
and influence of Lepke. He recorded the bitter conversation that ensued between him and Sidney 
Hillman in his diary. “Understand it, J.B.,” Hillman told him, “if you will quit it will be because 
you want it not because we want you to quit. You say our politics don’t interest you, we don’t 
want you to be interested. So it means you are (sic) resigned because you are restless and don’t 
appreciate your own work as worthwhile.”340 
 Although he stayed in his position until 1944, Hardman began to lose enthusiasm for his 
work on the Advance and sought other venues for developing a democratic working class public 
sphere. Operating out of the ACWA’s Union Square headquarters, Salutsky served as the 
chairman of the American Labor Publishing Association (ALPA). Working alongside public 
opinion expert Harold Lasswell, Hardman sought to have “a discussion... as thorough going and 
as far reaching as it can possibly be” regarding the problems of labor through scientific surveys. 
The ALPA adhered to an editorial policy “of inquiry and friendly interest toward all contending 
progressive factions and groups within the organized labor movement” and “of activist laborism, 
of service to the labor movement in all its endeavors to raise labor to a commanding position in 
social society.” Detached from factious politics, the ALPA was a fresh, welcome change from the 
rivalries within the radical parties and the garment unions. As he told his wife in 1928, he had 
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derived much more gratification from his work with the ALPA than he did with the ACWA.341   
With the emergence of the New Deal, though, the labor movement would eventually realize the 
importance of shaping public opinion.
Hardman and the New Deal
 The 1930s saw the dissoltion of rivalries within the Jewish labor movement, and the 
consolidation of political support around the New Deal. First, many Jews fled the CP in 1929, 
amidst the controversy over the Hebron riots, diminishing Di frayhayt’s position within the 
counterpublic. Second, while the Forward experienced economic troubles with the coming of the 
Depression, its ability to attract advertising helped it maintain its prominence within the Yiddish-
speaking portion of the movement while acting as a benefactor to trade unions writ large. Third, 
the Forward’s endorsement of FDR in the 1936 election, alongside the ACWA and the ILGWU 
placed the old institutions of Yiddish socialism at the center of American politics. Finally, the 
CP’s popular front strategy between 1937 and 1939 quelled tensions between the left and the 
right, uniting a broad progressive movement behind the U.S. government. In many ways, 
Hardman’s dream had become a reality. 
Thus, after spending the 1920s trying to build radical democracy on the East Side, 
Hardman became quite comfortable with the task of molding public opinion in the 1930s, in 
order to protect the New Deal coalition against the fascist threat. As the chairman of the New 
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York State Congress of Industrial Organizations’ (CIO) Radio, Press, and Education Committee, 
Hardman suggested that publicity should “clarify the public mind” and “seek to offset 
unfavorable impressions created by misrepresentations of the CIO.” By the late 1930s, this was 
of dire importance. As he explained to the New York State Conference of Public School 
Principals and Superintendents, “The battle between democracy and anti-democracy is the very 
essence of what life centers around today.” Neutrality was 
intellectually untenable... Non-partisan as we are, as a group, and it is altogether right 
 that we should be, towards schools of thought within democracy, we are anything but 
 impartial toward the question of the day: democracy or fascism... We cannot practice 
 impartiality in this matter of liberty and democracy without, in effect, pouring water on 
 the mills of the other side. The fascists do not pretend to be impartial. They are in dead 
 earnest about destroying democracy whether they choose to say so openly, as abroad, or 
 they veil their intentions as their spokesmen and imitators do in the U.S.A.... We want to 
 organize brains for democratic defense.342
In this context, Hardman understood the centrality of a free press, not just among the left, 
but at the national level. In December 1940, he received a letter from Secretary of the Interior 
Harold Ickes. Ickes observed that, in the previous three presidential elections, “the great majority 
of most newspapers advocated one thing; the people did the opposite.” This, Ickes believed, 
“showed an unprecedented and progressively dangerous situation in a democracy,” with the press 
representing the interests of big business rather than “the general public.” He asked Hardman to 
contribute to the volume Freedom of the Press Today, discussing and debating the status of press 
freedom along with over two dozen other intellectuals.343
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In his essay, Hardman pointed towards the need for federal regulation to protect the First 
Amendment. He suggested the formation of a public agency, the Free Press Authority (FPA), in 
order to stop “the encroaching of the newspaper industry over the Bill of Rights.” Hardman 
believed that such an agency should create a system of licensing or registry in order to assure the 
free expression of opinions that differ from those of newspaper publishers. The FPA would 
determine “by the use of appropriate, dependable yardsticks,” the diversity of opinion in the 
news and, though a court of appeals, act on complaints of violations by publishers. Ultimately, in 
Hardman’s vision, the FPA would be able to revoke the license under which a newspaper is 
issued through due process.344
“Regulation,” said Hardman, “is intended not to limit the freedom of the many but to 
check the abuses of the powers of the few. The newspaper industry cannot, with justice, claim 
that it isn’t an industry in which the public has a vital stake.” Indeed, by this point he had greater 
faith in the New Deal bureaucracy to maintain a vibrant public sphere than he did in the 
democratic potential of organized labor.  “[A]dherence to the principle that freedom is the 
prerogative of ownership or ‘special interest’ in a publication isn’t the exclusive characteristic of 
pecuniary business enterprise,” he wrote. “Religious publications, the labor press, organs of 
political groups or parties, or of theoretic or creedal groups and expressions, all operate from the 
same conception that only he or they who pay the piper have the right to call the tune.”345 
True democratic discourse had become less possible as unions sought to use the methods 
of mass culture to persuade rather than discuss, to organize public opinion. This was a necessary 
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strategy, as the need to grow membership went beyond the Yiddish-speaking base in New York 
and effective mass education became necessary in order to build a movement. That movement, in 
turn, became increasingly linked to state bureaucracy and with policies strategically set by the 
top-tier leadership. While Hardman had hoped during the 1920s that the ACWA’s newspapers 
would provide an alternative to the commercialized, increasingly conservative Forward and the 
stridently dogmatic Di frayhayt, political demands forced the union to ultimately align itself-- 
along with both of Hardman’s rival newspapers-- alongside the New Deal during the Popular 
Front period. 
Conclusion
When J.B.S. Hardman turned sixty years old in 1942, the ACWA passed a lengthy 
“resolution.” It stated that, “Whereas: It is generally recognized that independent thinking has no 
place in the theory and practice of trade unionism as we know it, and that ideas, as such, are not 
only weakening but downright dangerous to the existing trade union structure.” Hardman had 
“stubbornly and recklessly insisted upon introducing ideas into trade union discussion,” while 
clinging “to the false dogma of labor education.” Thus, the clever roast sentenced Hardman to 
“sixty more years of hard labor in the cause of the labor movement.”346 Hardman had made his 
concern for worker education and union democracy known. But while this resolution was written 
in playful jest, Hardman had ruffled more than a few feathers during his life’s work in the Jewish 
labor movement. 
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Two years later, Hardman finally made good on his repeated threats, and left his post 
(now titled the Director of the Department of Cultural Activities) at the ACWA, frustrated with 
Sidney Hillman’s prioritizing political power at the expense of democratic principles. The last 
straw though, was not Hillman’s role within the New Deal government, but rather his continued 
collaboration with Communists. As Hardman understood it, this was not based in ideology but 
rather strategic maneuvering, the kind of motivation that he had always found distasteful in left 
politics. “Hillman was no more a Communist than the man in the moon,” said Hardman, “but the 
measure of Sidney Hillman’s approach to things was: Do you gain power? Does it bring 
power?”347
After his departure from the ACWA, Hardman founded the publication Labor and Nation, 
yet another attempt at providing independent, left-centered analysis. There, he published some of 
the early works of social theorist C. Wright Mills, one of the foremost critics of the mass society. 
Mills described Hardman as someone “in revolt against boredom in the labor movement.”348 
Mills dedicated his 1948 monograph, The New Men of Power, to Hardman. There, he 
argued that labor leaders were “strategic actors: they lead the only organizations capable of 
stopping the main drift towards war and slump.” Upon reviewing the manuscript, Hardman told 
Mills that while he still supported the idea of a labor party, “I don’t want a trade union owned or 
controlled party.” Within the next few years, Mills came to understand unions as “a vested 
interest” and could not believe that they would be able to play a role in significant social 
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change.349 Thus, Hardman’s critique of labor bureaucracy and his concern for democracy set the 
precedent for the mass culture critiques of the postwar period providing a bridge between the Old 
Left and the New Left. 
! The “drift,” though, brought upon by the integration of labor, business and the state, had 
begun in the previous decades. Through the 1920s, J.B.S. Hardman did his best to stop it. In the 
process, he brought elements of participatory democracy to an increasingly centralized 
movement. By widening the scope of discussion within the labor movement, he extended the life 
of hegemonic Jewishness, at once strengthening the organization of Jewish workers and bringing 
their movement into the center of American political life.  
 Hardman’s commitment to what Habermas would understand as “rational-critical debate” 
through print could not build a movement culture on its own.350 Fannia Cohn of the ILGWU 
understood the important role of aestehtics and cultural production in building worker 
consciousness. Although she conceptualized this in participatory terms, her understanding of 
worker education had to negotiate with the forces of bureaucratization, anti-Communism and 
sexism. With her influence, the ILGWU had adopted her methods to become the most significant  
producer of popular culture in the labor movement. As I show in chapter five, Cohn’s efforts in 
the field of worker education complemented Hardman’s. Similarly, though, they became largely 
integrated into the new bureaucracy of the New Deal period and reflected the transformation 
towards the mass society. 
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Chapter Five:
Singing a Song of Social Significance:
 Fannia Cohn’s Fight for Participatory Culture in the ILGWU 
It is said that no country can exist without its songs. The labor movement, too, must have its 
songs, its pageantry, its theatre, in order to inspire the workers in their daily struggle, and fill 
them with pride in the achievements of their local union, their International or National, and with 
the larger movement as a whole, and finally inspire them to work for a still better America for 
all.         -- Fannia M. Cohn, 1934351 
 In March 1938, a troupe of actors originating from New York’s garment factories gave “a 
command performance” of a musical revue at the White House for the President of the United 
States. Featuring numbers such as “Sing Me a Song with Social Significance,” “Chain Store 
Daisy,” and “One Big Union for Two,” Pins and Needles celebrated industrial unionism and 
satirized commercial culture. At the same time, it participated in commercial culture’s most 
popular forms-- the Tin Pan Alley song and the Broadway-style revue. The talented members of 
the International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) performed selections from the 
musical privately for Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt and a few friends, before giving another 
show at a banquet celebration honoring the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Department of 
Labor.352 
 Michael Denning argues that Pins and Needles represented “the reclaiming of leisure and 
entertainment from the leisured class, and the celebration of the common pleasures and ordinary 
songs of working-class life.”353 But its performance in Washington also suggests the ascendence 
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of a bureaucratic labor movement, the cementing of mass culture as part of American politics, 
and the transformation of a Jewish working class counterpublic into part of a new hegemonic 
bloc-- the New Deal. With a cast recording on Decca Records, and songs garnering commercial 
radio airplay, Frankfurt School theorist Theodor Adorno commented that Pins and Needles 
served as an example of the total domination of capitalism’s logic in the cultural realm. 
“Impulse, subjectivity and profanation, the old adversaries of materialistic alienation, now 
succumb to it,” he wrote. “In capitalist times, the traditional anti-mythological ferments of music 
conspire against freedom, as whose allies they once proscribed. The representatives of the 
opposition to the authoritarian schema become witnesses to the authority of commercial 
success.”354
 Indeed, Pins and Needles became the longest running Broadway show until the success 
of Oklahoma! in the 1940s.355 Although thousands of union members and working class people 
saw the play, it was sustained by middle class audiences. Thus, it represented the culmination of 
the worker education movement that had its roots in the Yiddish-speaking unions of the early 
twentieth century, while it also marked the domination of the culture industries and their 
commodofiable forms. Pins and Needles embodied both the possibilities and the limitations of 
the New Deal. 
 The ways in which these contradictions played out emerged from a struggle within the 
ILGWU during the previous decade. Representing workers in the women’s clothing industry, the 
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ILGWU exemplified “social unionism.” As “an outgrowth of Russian Jewish revolutionary 
concepts of national autonomy,” Dan Katz notes that social unionism oriented itself towards 
feminist and interracial inclusivity with an emphasis on cultural activity.356 This provided an 
explicitly political and non-commercial alternative to mass culture, particularly important as the 
Forward became increasingly intent on soliciting advertising and producing a valuable audience 
commodity. Thus, Jewish and other ethnic workers operated within a complex ideological 
matrix, as the imperatives of modern consumerism overlapped with the communal bonds created 
through trade unionism. As Elizabeth Ewen writes, “If the new culture preached independence, 
mobility and modernity, the economic context conspired with strong Old World custom to forge 
an urban ethnic working class culture that sustained family, community and organization over 
time.”357 
 More than any other individual, Fannia Cohn fought within the ILGWU to develop and 
preserve the basis of these social bonds through educational programs. Cohn was part of the 
founding generation of the ILGWU, and the only woman on its executive board despite the fact 
that its membership was mostly female. She understood firsthand the need for cultural activities 
to develop a union identity and build community. In the face of a growing bureaucracy 
committed to anti-Communism and steeped in patriarchy, Cohn aimed to broaden the scope of 
the labor movement, bringing the union into the everyday lives of women workers and male 
worker’s wives. 
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 Under Cohn’s influence as secretary of the Education Department, the ILGWU 
maintained its night schools, lectures, theater and choral groups, field trips, athletics and 
newspapers during the politically tumultuous 1920s. While the male leadership conceptualized 
these programs as propaganda tools, used largely to fight Communist elements within the union, 
Cohn’s vision was rooted in what Annelise Orleck calls “industrial feminism.”358 Industrial 
feminism grew out of the experiences of immigrant women working in Lower East Side 
sweatshops, as they sought to meet their economic and social needs through the gendered, 
working class spaces they inhabited and communities they created. As such, it provided a major 
impetus to organizing and bolstered a socialist-centered “hegemonic Jewishness.”
 While the Forward shifted its focus from class to ethnicity and increasingly hailed its 
readership as consumers, the ILGWU continued to foster the development of a working class 
identity through the 1920s and 1930s among and beyond the Jewish population. Cohn’s efforts 
became increasingly important as manufacturers moved out of New York during the Great 
Depression, and the industry came to rely more on non-Jewish workers throughout the country.  
By the mid-1930s, labor education took on new proportions and importance as newly passed 
labor legislation opened new organizing possibilities. Although by this point the union leadership  
had marginalized Cohn, her longstanding interest in drama as a form of pedagogy laid the 
groundwork for Pins and Needles. Moving past its origins of the small night courses on the 
Lower East Side, Pins and Needles brought the “residual culture” of Yiddishkayt into an 
“emergent culture” around a national labor movement, and ultimately a middle class public.359 
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 While J.B.S. Hardman emphasized rational political discourse within the union press at 
the ACWA, Cohn hoped to combine attention to facts with aestheticized forms of culture in order 
to build community, particularly among women workers. Despite the enormous impact that these 
programs had, budget concerns, political factions, and sexism, worked to marginalize Cohn 
among the union leadership. Although the ILGWU’s worker education movement during the 
New Deal indebted itself to, and often worked alongside John Dewey, it operated largely within a 
Lippmannesque framework.360 Rather than focusing on building a “Great Community,” labor 
leaders sought to influence public opinion not through rational argument but through aesthetic 
and emotional appeal. 
 In this chapter, I chronicle Fannia Cohn’s career, experiences, and evolving perspectives 
on worker education and culture. As an organic intellectual committed to the democratic 
expression of ideas and the expansion of movement participation, she helped carry elements of 
the pre-war Jewish working class counterpublic through the 1920s. This was essential for 
building a mass labor movement during the Depression era. That movement, however, was wed 
to political power and a media logic committed to persuasion over participation. This narrative 
demonstrates the important role that feminist voices play in developing democratic movement 
cultures, and they ways in which these cultural efforts can be subsumed by hegemonic power.  
 
The Garment Workers: Intersectionality and the Production of Movement Culture 
 The ILGWU’s history demonstrates how class, gender and ethnicity work together to 
shape the nature and direction of social movements. Labor historians have paid considerable 
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attention to New York’s garment workers since they first organized their unions at the turn of the 
twentieth century. This was due, to some extent, to those unions’ own education and public 
relations efforts. The telling and re-telling of the history of the ILGWU served as a way to 
educate new members about the history of their organizations and build institutional allegiance. 
Thus, the first history of the ILGWU, Louis Levine’s The Women Garment Workers, was 
published in 1924 with the union’s support.361 
 The industrial hardships Jewish immigrants encountered at the turn of the twentieth 
century in the U.S. gave rise to the garment unions. The ILGWU first organized in 1901, and 
rose to prominence through the 1909-10 “rising of the twenty thousand” shirtwaist makers strike, 
and the 1910 cloak maker’s strike in New York. The resulting “Protocols of Peace” instituted 
significant reforms in the industry, including wages, hours and safety provisions, but also 
suspended class conflict within the garment industry, angering more radical rank-and-file and 
provoking dissidence. The tragedy of the 1911 Triangle fire, which took the lives of 146 workers 
at one of the few factories that did not agree to union demands, demonstrated the importance of 
organized labor as a check on industrial abuse to a broad public at the height of the Progressive 
era.  
! Subsequent scholars inserted the stories of the ILGWU into broader historical narratives 
about Jewish politics and culture in America. Nora Levin, Melech Epstein, and Irving Howe 
demonstrate that the garment unions were important institutions within a much larger framework 
of Yiddish socialism. Both Epstein and Howe detail the ways in which the union became a 
battleground between warring factions of Socialists and Communists in the 1920s. Howe writes, 
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“in the actual experience of the leaders of the garment unions, nothing was more damaging to 
their earlier visions that the struggle with the Communists in the twenties.” The CP-supported 
Trade Union Education League (TUEL) “had one of the strongest bases inside the ILGWU, and 
also some of its most sophisticated opponents.” Calls for democratization from the shop floor 
challenged the authority of bureaucratic leaders, culminating in the International leadership 
splitting the radical Local 25 union in 1925, and an unsuccessful six-month, Communist-led 
strike in 1926.362 
 But while earlier scholarship focused largely on the union leadership, it paid little 
attention to the rank-and-file. This constituted a significant gender bias because the ILGWU’s 
leadership was mostly male, while its members were mostly women. Karen Brodkin notes that, 
“If the [garment] industry was important for Jewish men, it was even more important for women, 
as it was their chief form of waged labor.” Bosses paid young, unmarried women less than men, 
and believed they were less likely to organize because they viewed their work as temporary until 
they would return to the domestic sphere upon marriage. Thus, with the turn towards “new social 
history” in the 1980s and 1990s, scholarship moved away from explaining the institutional 
politics of the unions and placed emphasis on the every day lives of garment workers, with keen 
attention to the role of gender. Susan Glenn, Elizabeth Ewen, and Nan Enstad highlight the 
important role of culture among Jewish women garment workers in fostering opposition in the 
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workplace, the domestic realm and the public sphere. However, they do not adequately explain 
how this culture was structured by the unions themselves.363 
 Annelise Orleck, however, offers an excellent account of how four women leaders of 
Jewish labor movement (Cohn, Pauline Newman, Rose Schneiderman, and Clara Lemlich 
Shavelson) developed a culture of “industrial feminism” within the ILGWU. Industrial feminists 
challenged Gompers’ “bread and butter unionism,” arguing that unions should do more than 
negotiate wages and hours, but offer education, cultural activities, health care and recreation. 
Between 1920 and 1945, these women “labored to institutionalize many of the industrial feminist 
goals first articulated in their young years on the shop floor” as “they were forced to navigate 
obstacles of class, gender, and ethnicity that obscured their contributions even as they were 
making them.”364
 As J.B.S. Hardman did at the ACWA, Fannia Cohn tried to create a democratic labor 
movement that included as many voices as possible. As one of the few female leaders in a union 
comprised mostly of women, Cohn believed that the best way to do this was to build community 
not through traditional public discourse, but through cultural activities. While the union’s male 
leadership increasingly marginalized her, they appropriated her ideas but largely stripped them of 
their democratic spirit, placing the into the context of mass culture.   
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Fannia Cohn and the International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union
 Like J.B.S. Hardman, who came to the trade union movement as an intellectual outsider, 
Fannia Cohn was born into a middle class cosmopolitan family of merchants in Minsk in 1885. 
Unlike many of the poor Jewish girls of eastern Europe, her parents emphasized the importance 
of education as a mark of sophistication and worldliness. Cohn learned Russian, and put her 
knowledge towards revolutionary activities, joining the Bund at the age of 16. When her brother 
was nearly killed in a 1904 pogrom, she left the Pale for New York. But while Hardman and 
Vladeck continued their studies in the United States, paving the way towards movement 
leadership, Cohn gave up her bourgeois privileges. She declined family offers to finance her 
education and went to work in the “white goods” trade-- making underwear, kimonos, and 
robes-- which used immigrant girls from a wide range of backgrounds in small sweatshops, 
rather than large factories, to do very specified low-skill tasks. She became seen as a leader 
among the young girls in the shop (at the age of twenty years, Cohn was among the older women 
in the industry) and taught them how to read, write and speak in public. Her efforts became part 
of a broader organizing movement that led to a three hundred worker strike with the assistance of 
the Women’s Trade Union League (WTUL) in 1908.365
 The white goods strike was a precursor to a massive wave of resistance among working 
women in the garment industry that commenced with the 1909 “Uprising of the Twenty 
Thousand” in New York, breathing life into the fledgling ILGWU over the next decade. Growing 
the ILGWU meant not only organizing thousands of new members, from New York to Chicago 
to Kalamazoo, but radicalizing the agenda and pushing for reforms inside the organization. 
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According to Philip Foner, “union women...[expressed] their grievances, demanding internal 
reforms and a greater role in the functioning of the unions, and participating in the events that 
ultimately provided them with a greater share in the organizations they had helped create,” 
critiquing the increasingly conservative, male-dominated union bureaucracy and the comfortable 
relationship it had forged with management through the 1910 Protocols of Peace.366 
 As part of this broader critique, members agitated at the local level for educational 
programs. Worker education came to the ILGWU from the bottom up. In 1913, ILGWU Local 
25-- New York’s shirtwaist makers-- instituted courses in trade union instruction, as well as the 
English language, under the direction of Barnard Professor Juliet Poyntz. The local also rented a 
vacation center for its members in the Catskill Mountains, allowing members a place for 
relaxation and community development. “More than anything else, the women’s labor movement 
had done,” writes Orleck, “the education program of Local 25 embodied the spirit of bread and 
roses.”  
 Worker education programs expanded within the ILGWU over the next several years. In 
1914, delegates to the International convention encouraged President Benjamin Schlessinger to 
arrange for courses with the Rand School of Social Sciences. At the 1916 convention, the 
International established the Educational Department, providing it with a five thousand dollar 
budget. Poyntz was named the department’s director, and Cohn-- who had been elected an 
International Vice President following her organizing work at Local 44 in Chicago-- was made 
its organizing secretary. While the garment industry shared in wartime prosperity, the ILGWU 
optimistically expanded its operations within New York, working alongside the city’s Board of 
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Education to establish Unity Centers, offering classes in labor history and immigrant 
naturalization.367 
 The movement quickly spread to other cities including Philadelphia, Chicago and Boston. 
By 1919, ten thousand students-- mostly immigrant women-- were enrolled in classes. Union-
sponsored cultural activities such as plays, concerts and lectures drew another 7,000 people. 
“From its very first days,” Cohn , “[the department] had taken an active interest not only on the 
economic problems but the health, educational, and recreational life of its members.”368 
 But this did not happen without a struggle. Despite the success of the programs, the 
ILGWU General Executive Board (GEB) remained ambivalent towards them. Since women 
constituted the majority of students, and many courses focused on literature and art, they 
believed that the program distracted workers from real “union business.” After only two years, 
Poyntz resigned from her position because the leadership believed she was too radical. Cohn 
continued to fight hard to secure funds for education programs, but the leaders denied her the 
directorship. Rather than hire another woman, Cohn worked under a series of male directors, 
remaining the the Education Department’s Executive Secretary, as the GEB intended to relegate 
her to administrative duties.369 
 As early as 1921, Cohn was left the lone defender of worker education among the union’s 
vice presidents. She regularly countered complaints that attendance at classes were low and 
suggestions that the union could not afford such “luxuries.” While educational work helped to 
bolster union membership up to 110,000 in 1923, the ILGWU found itself in dire financial straits 
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by the mid-1920s. They paid their officers next to nothing. At one point, things were so bad that 
the union could not pay its electric bill and had to shut down the elevator at their six-story 
headquarters.370 
 With few available resources at the ILGWU, Cohn ventured outside the union’s bounds in 
order to further the cause of worker education. She played a leading role in creating the Workers 
Education Bureau, an agency affiliated with the American Federation of Labor (AFL) aimed at 
developing programs throughout the trade union movement; in establishing Brookwood Labor 
College, a residential workers’ training school in Kanotah, New York; and served as a delegate to 
the first International Workers‘ Education Conference in Brussels. However, Cohn’s commitment 
to the ILGWU prompted her to stick with the organization despite consistent disappointment, 
setback and marginalization.371
The Dramatic Aesthetics of Worker Education
 Fannia Cohn, like J.B.S. Hardman, was deeply committed to free expression within the 
trade union movement. Although Cohn was at once skeptical of Communist insurgents within 
particular locals, she refused to bar them from the Education Department. She argued that 
discourse within the union should be “colored by one bias-- that in favor of labor.” Worker 
education was to provide “enlightenment so as to be more capable of using...radicalism.” Rather 
than being a “mutual admiration society,” she believed that unions should encourage debate so 
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that members could “[argue] out their ideas with people who disagree with them,” rather than 
strictly adhering to “any particular ism.”372 
 Despite this idealism, Cohn understood the pragmatic problems that emerged within 
democratic institutions. Echoing Lippmann, Cohn noted that a union “has only a small active 
citizenry; most people do not take advantage of the democratic machinery which has been 
established. It is therefore of the utmost importance that the union keep its members informed of 
its affairs, since even the passive group, by its power of suffrage, can, if it is left uninformed, 
destroy all the constructive plans of the organization.”373 
 The labor press would have to play a central role in that process. Newspapers, Cohn 
argued, were “the most effective means of reaching the minds of the multitudes.” However, the 
transformation of newspapers into major business dependent on advertising dollars, she argued, 
made “editorial independence...less and less noticeable.” This created a demand for labor papers 
that relied on mandatory subscription dollars rather than advertising revenue.374 Labor papers 
could therefore provide an antidote to the ideological assault of the business class.
 Like the ACWA, the ILGWU had been involved in this endeavor for quite some time by 
the 1920s. The union began publishing newspapers during the prewar era, with the Ladies 
Garment Worker in 1914. Four years later, in 1918, the union replaced the Worker with the 
weekly English-language Justice, the Yiddish-language Gerechtigkeit, and the Italian-language 
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Giustizia. Although Cohn never assumed the role of editor, as Hardman did, the Education 
Department of the ILGWU was responsible for publications. Throughout her long tenure, Cohn 
fought to maintain union publications where “the problems, policy and programs of our Union 
are discussed and an analysis made of our current economic, social, labor, and cultural problems 
as they affect our members as organized workers and citizens.” In order to compete with the 
commercial press for members’ attention, the union “spared neither time, money, nor energy in 
planning and publishing an attractive, interesting newspaper.” While Cohn held onto the belief 
that the newspaper was first and foremost a space for discussion of issues, she knew this was not 
enough. Cohn also wanted the union press to draw people together. The single page of the 
weekly newspapers devoted to the Educational Department informed members of other 
educational activities in which they could participate and worked to link the newspaper to the 
broader social movement, helping to continue the tradition of the Lower East Side’s prewar 
“newspaper culture.”375    
 But the maturation of the culture industry prompted Cohn to develop a keen sense of the 
importance of aesthetics. In order to be effective, she thought that labor papers had to look 
polished. The covers of most labor magazines, she said, were “unattractive; there is too much 
vague matter printed on the cover. The type is small, the paper is thin, there are no margins, the 
eye tires looking at it.” Further, the contents had to appeal to the workers‘ “mind, heart, and 
ambition” and address the needs and interests of all members of the family through “the tragic, 
the dramatic, the comic.” Reflecting a broader interest in the use of drama to draw new members 
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into union life, these approaches had deeply democratic possibilities. Cohn expected they would 
help organize working women, male workers’ wives, and young people.376 
 Central to this strategy was Cohn’s belief that democracy needed to transcend gender 
lines. Alongside other women in the garment unions-- Rose Schiederman, Rose Pesotta, Dorothy 
Bellanca, Pauline Newman, and Bessie Abramowitz Hillman-- Cohn worked to construct the 
“New Womanhood,” of the 1910s and 1920s, which Susan Glenn argues had its own 
particularities among Jewish working women. Different from the “social housekeeping” of 
middle class Progressive women such as Jane Addams, who argued that women were morally 
superior to men and thus were positioned to “cleanse urban industrial life of waste, greed, and 
corruption,” Jewish women in the garment unions based their claims to civic participation on 
their equality with men as wage earners and as members of a vulnerable ethnic community.377 
 In 1918, Cohn wrote in support of a women’s suffrage from a trade unionist perspective. 
“You, our brothers, will be called on to decide whether we are intelligent enough to participate in 
the political life of the land, whether we can help you solve economic and social problems which 
press on women workers no less than on laboring men. If you make a difference between men 
and women politically employers, too, make a difference between them on the economic field... 
It enables him to cause competition between men and women in the shops.” Cohn’s view of 
women’s political participation went beyond the ballot box. For her, the labor movement was the 
locus for democratic action, to be realized through educational programs. “Only when working 
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women will assume responsible positions, join in the study of trade union problems and help to 
solve them, only then will they receive recognition,” she argued.378 
 Further, Cohn challenged many of the prevalent stereotypes about ignorance, irrationality 
and proclivity towards style over substance that presumably prohibited working women from 
being good union citizens. Such sexism created a real crisis for the working-class movement as a 
whole. Female membership in the ILGWU declined dramatically between 1920 and 1924, as 
male membership increased slightly, yielding a net loss of 17,000 members. Male leaders were 
little concerned, and insisted that women were, by and large, unorganizable despite the fact that 
at one point they had comprised 75 percent of the union.379  
 Nan Enstad demonstrates that the middle-class progressive reformers of the Women’s 
Trade Union League (WTUL) and leaders within the ILGWU during the 1909 uprising viewed 
female garment workers as too enamored with the trappings of commercial culture and fashion to 
be taken seriously. Rather than letting working women speak for themselves, they constructed 
and image of the “rational striker” in the press in order to conform to the ideals of masculine, 
middle class discourse. Though J.B.S. Hardman believed that women should be active in their 
unions, Karen Pastorello notes that he blamed them for their own exclusion from union 
activity.380 Thus, Cohn’s approach to gender politics was quite radical compared to other worker 
education advocates. Cohn not only understood the necessity of working women and men having 
equal rights and protections; she also believed that union leaders had to bring women into the 
200
378 Fannia Cohn, “Vote for Woman Suffrage!,” 1918. Fannia Cohn Papers, NYPL, Reel 7; “Complete Equality 
Between Men and Women,” From ‘The Ladies’ Garment Worker,’ December 1917. Fannia Cohn Papers, NYPL, 
Reel 5.
379 Orleck, 183.
380 Enstad, Ladies of Labor, 84-118; Pastorello, A Power Among Them, 65.
movement on their own terms. She sought to dispel the myths that “women... stay in industry 
only a short time and never look forward to remaining in it,” and that “their confinement to their 
home and their limited expertise in the social world have made them more individualistic and 
self-centered.” Cohn challenged the labor movement to give women a “fair trial” and think of 
creative ways to bring them into union life.381 
 Organizers had to address young female workers in engaging ways that respected their 
perspectives and experiences. While working women demanded educational programs, they also 
wanted to be approached in an engaging and entertaining way. Speaking in Yiddish, one female 
delegate told the International convention in 1925 that union lectures tended to be “too highbrow 
and abstract” and should be “of a more proletarian character which workers would understand.” 
Another woman, who believed education programs did not emphasize a clear enough ideological 
position, stressed the necessity for “mass education, and mass education only,” as opposed to 
“small group education,” in order to “bring the message of unionism to the great mass of 
workers.” Concerned that efforts to “intellectualize” members would turn them away, she echoed 
Lippmann’s skepticism about the interest and ability among the public to make democratic 
decisions.
 When mass education is very well developed then you can give the individual members 
 who desire it the higher and more technical education. But you cannot have workers who 
 work a whole day and a whole week come in on a Saturday morning and listen to a dry 
 lecture and have them concentrate on it. You cannot inspire them properly and have them 
 take it seriously. 
Thus, Cohn sought a middle ground that would build an inclusive movement through both 
education and entertainment. As she wrote some years later, 
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 It is inconceivable to think how much printed material workers are asked to read and 
 digest, ranging from books to the daily press... to subway advertisements. All these media 
 of the printed word are constantly competing for the workers’ attention. Fortunately, even 
 in a world where dictators rule over large masses of people, no one has yet devised a 
 means of compelling us to read material which has little or no appeal. Because of this 
 psychological approach to the problem of the labor press, our International has spared 
 neither time, money, nor energy in planning and publishing an attractive, suggestive 
 newspaper.382
 The GEB noted this problem in 1924. The union had to compete with the amusements 
and distractions of the modern world for member attention and involvement.383 In order to do 
this, Cohn worked to develop a style of union publication that marked a departure from the 
didactic, ideologically driven essays or dull “information” about union happenings, or 
educational events that went beyond lengthy lectures on historical materialism. Instead, worker 
education would have to comport with the mass culture environment.
 For example, Cohn put forth ideas for trying to organize “the flapper.” A woman’s 
participation in frivolous forms of consumption and mass culture did not preclude the possibility 
that she could engage in radical political thought and action. Rather, Cohn understood the need to 
seize upon the contradictions in working people’s modern lives and use them to bring them into 
the union. She argued,   
 While it is true that she is easy-going and responsive to the frivolities of life and does not 
 want to be burdened, seemingly, with problems, it is also true that she has fewer 
 prejudices. And I believe that she can respond to ideologies no less than the preceding 
 generation-- but these ideologies must not bore her. We must not paint gloomy pictures of 
 her present life. No exaggeration of conditions was ever successful in a general 
 organizing campaign and it is especially repulsive and fatal with the modern flapper... 
 The most effective approach in presenting industrial conditions is to point out their 
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 defects to convince the flapper as to the necessity of changing them and to stimulate 
 confidence in her ability to achieve it.384
 
Male workers’ wives, also, needed to be brought into the movement through educational activity 
in auxiliaries, helping them to bring politics into the domestic sphere. Women were expected to 
support their husbands’ political activities as informed partners, and educate their children 
regarding the benefits of trade unionism. This conception reified women’s place in the home, but 
it also politicized the private sphere. The labor movement could permeate working class 
women’s everyday lives, setting the stage for “labor feminism” to emerge in later decades.385 
 In addition to writing essays exploring these ideas, Cohn published dramatic narratives 
that highlighted the importance of women’s involvement in the labor movement. For example, in 
“Mrs. Martin Sees a Light: Concerning Education and the Workers’ Wife,” Cohn offered a short, 
two-page dialogue published in Labor Age. Mrs. Reese explains to Mrs. Martin why she should 
have been at the previous night’s auxiliary meeting, where a labor educator, Miss Manning, 
spoke. At the meeting, Mrs. Reese learned how women could “help in organizing women 
workers into unions, how we can get more leisure by helping to make electricity prices cheaper 
so that we can use more electric appliances in our homes and how we can use our leisure time to 
learn about our problems.” Overcoming her initial skepticism about the utility of the auxiliary, 
Mrs. Martin says “I think I’ll be there at the meetings after this and see if we can’t make our 
lodge really do something.”386 
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 Cohn hoped to draw people into conversation, particularly young workers, “[stimulating] 
in them an interest to reveal their minds in our press.” Those with more experience in the 
movement would be able to respond, and participate in an intergenerational discussion. 
“Guidance based on free discussion is always effective,” she said. “Our labor press can become a 
great, educational medium, only when it will cease repeating the accepted conventional 
economic, political formulae and conclusions.”387 
 This approach was at the root of Cohn’s interest in labor drama. As she wrote in Workers’ 
Education Quarterly in 1934, labor’s against against capital was inherently dramatic. Events in 
labor history, such as the Uprising of the 20,000 lent themselves to be “fully exploited for the 
stage.” Social dramas, she suggested, should be written for both dramatic groups within local 
unions, and for the professional stage. They needed to render union history interesting and 
accessible to new members, include humor and satire, and make use of song and dance, while 
addressing immediate worker concerns. “Of all the arts,” Cohn wrote, “the drama makes the 
greatest appeal to man. It is the best medium for making people think, because it is a creative 
interpretation of their own experience. In a few hours it can enlighten and make the workers 
conscious of social and economic conditions which would require volumes to explain.”388 On the 
one hand, drama engaged; on the other hand, it simplified.
 The ILGWU, however, had to strike a balance between the need for democracy and the 
need for institutional authority; between the mass appeal of aestheticized politics and the 
corporate regimentation they tended to symbolize. As Steven Fraser makes clear, grassroots 
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democracy and labor bureaucracy in the 1920s became two sides of the same coin. He writes, “If 
the bureaucracy was a cage of invisible iron, it was by no means one erected by outsiders but 
rather a more organic outgrowth of the mass movement itself, including especially its most 
democratic impulses.”389 But the marginalization of labor education advocates through the 1920s 
demonstrates that real tensions existed between the ambitions and interests of union officials and 
the potential power of the rank-and-file. Like Hardman at the ACWA, Cohn struggled to 
maintain a democratic ethos within educational activities against a tide of centralization, political 
maneuvering and severe budget constraints, but her orientation towards a participatory labor 
culture set the scene for a new act on the national stage in the mid-1930s.
The ILGWU, Anti-Communism and the Growth of Propaganda
 In the midst of the civil war between the Socialists and the CP, ILGWU presidents 
Benjamin Schlessinger and Morris Sigman implemented anti-TUEL measures. The GEB 
declared the organization a dual union and expelled left-wingers, including a majority of the 
executive board of Local 22. The Communists eventually formed the Joint Action Committee 
(JAC) and began collecting dues from ILGWU members. Rather than Bolshevism, they claimed 
democracy as the fundamental aim of their movement. In order to put an end to the internal strife 
and the CP’s “boring from within” strategy, President Sigman, Morris Hillquit, and Forward 
editor Abraham Cahan created a Joint Board of the ILGWU in New York in 1925. The plan, 
however, backfired. The Left briefly gained control over the Board in the midst of the disastrous 
1926 strike. The CP members, however, refused to settle and eventually lost power. The union 
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emerged from the strike near collapse, with a two million dollar debt, low worker morale and 
diminished work standards in the industry.390 
 Through this ordeal, Cohn’s resistance to the union leadership and her lack of venom 
towards the Left led her to pursue policies of ideological openness within the union. But at the 
same time, the anti-Communist union leadership sought to use its press to curtail the rise of 
radicalism within its ranks. By 1925, the ILGWU journals were confronted with the “frequently 
galling and annoying burden of mailing the slanders and the attacks which the enemies of our 
Union have day in and day out hurled against it and its leaders in a most unconscionable 
manner,” while “attempting to remain on the level of decent and honest controversy.” Like J.B.S. 
Hardman, Cohn fell out of favor with the union leadership because of her commitment to 
democracy. Although Cohn remained in her position as education secretary, Mollie Friedman, an 
education advocate of a less adversarial nature with close ties to President Sigman, replaced her 
on the GEB.391 
 With Cohn isolated, she had little sway over union policy. There was a severe anti-left 
backlash in the wake of the strike, particularly apparent regarding the role of publications and 
free expression within the union. Maintaining the voice of authority and objectivity, the GEB 
noted in 1928 that the newspapers set “forth all issues fairly and squarely,” while “the 
Communist leadership of the Joint Board carried out its work of disruption and treachery.”392  
 Some locals went even further in their recommendations for dealing with Communist 
propaganda than the International did. For example, Local 80 in Boston offered a resolution 
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condemning Communist propaganda at the 1929 convention, recommending that “the ILGWU 
appoint a committee to visit various ladies’ garment centers, study the facts and sources of this 
propaganda, and report their findings to the General Executive Board.” The Committee at the 
convention voted against the resolution, arguing that “it might be interpreted as an infringement 
on the right to free speech,” but “appreciate[d] expressed sentiment.” Instead, they argued that 
they continue their “campaign of education and enlightenment…until the last vestiges of the 
evils brought about by Communist slander and misinformation are eradicated.”393  
By the 1932 convention, the New York-based Local 10 offered a resolution to suspend 
those who distributed “slanderous propaganda” about the Union, as, according to the resolution 
“certain elements [had] adopted, for the purpose of obtaining political power, a method of 
propaganda which in reality is noting short of the most shameful kind of slander as exemplified 
by the leaflets distributed in many cloak and dress centers.” While the Committee on Groups of 
the General Executive Board did not amend the constitution, they offered “certain measures to 
regulate the activities” of groups viewed as “detrimental to the very life and existence” of locals. 
Centralizing control over communication within the union, the Committee recommended that 
none of the issues involved in local elections could be discussed outside of the official press and 
meetings of the union, and called for a special committee of the General Executive Board to be 
created to mediate disputes regarding the language and expression used in election 
programs.394 
 The war with the CP put the union deep into the red. In order to address financial 
concerns, ILGWU leaders determined to decrease the volume of media they produced. “[A]s a 
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matter of economy,” the GEB shrank the size of its journals by four pages in 1925. They 
recommended the change be permanent. As a remedy, they suggested reliance on “mass 
education” activities, which would yield a greater return on investment. Three years later, they 
called for further reduction on spending on journals, which cost the union $70,000 a year. Rather 
than publish these newspapers and offer a unique perspective, the GEB argued that since other 
publications, particularly the Forward, offered a “thorough and fair account” of union activities, 
Justice, Gerechtikgkeit, and Giustizia were less important, their role replicating the work of other 
publications.395  
 Following the 1926 strike, fiscal constraints forced the Educational Department to limit 
its activities. Cohn noted years later that during “these trying times the teachers, devoted to the 
ideals of workers’ education, considered the functioning of the Department so important that they  
continued to render their services without compensation.” She herself was no exception. In spite 
of a shrinking budget and limited political influence, Cohn never gave up on the ILGWU’s 
educational work. At times she tried to put a positive spin on her difficult situation. Writing to 
one friend, she noted, “At a time when the minds of many of our people are poisoned and there is 
hatred towards anything official, I find that I am more effective and more useful in our 
organization because I am not responsible for an administration policy. This makes it easier for 
me to enlighten our members on their imaginary notions about the organization and to convince 
them where they are wrong.”396 
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 But this came at a price. By the late 1920s, Cohn suffered from severe depression and 
experienced mental and physical breakdowns. She was working long hours and paying many 
union expenses out of her own pocket, likely with the assistance of her well-to-do family. She 
explained to one correspondent, 
 You realize that when one has to do the administrative work with one assistant, and has 
 to carry on all the work of our Educational Department, there is not much time left at 
 one’s disposal for writing. I used to write my own articles, but I am not doing this any 
 longer. I have not enough time or a calm enough disposition for it now. Lately, I invite a 
 young lady to come in several hours a week and I dictate the article to her. You know how 
 I like to discuss the subject matter with a person who responds before I write an article. I 
 pay for this myself, although I realize as you and many others do that it really is and 
 should be a part of our educational activities. I do it for two reasons, first because the 
 International is not in a position to make additional expenses. Secondly, I am influenced 
 by my interest in this subject, and I am willing to go to this expense, although it is hard 
 on me.397
 Following the Hebron riots in 1929, however, the CP exercised relatively little power 
within Jewish labor circles. Di frayhayt did not reflect the counterpublic’s emerging sympathy 
towards the Zionist cause, keeping in line with CP doctrine and spurring protests at the 
newspaper’s headquarters. Thus, Communism become increasingly marginalized as the Forward 
had secured its dominance within the counterpublic through its successful soliciting of 
advertising. Further, the ILGWU “slid toward dissolution as membership and financing withered 
away.” Cohn’s calls to keep alive the union’s “soul” seemed frivolous to leaders who saw 
educational work as tangential to the organization’s core mission. This changed in 1933, when 
the New Deal spurred renewed demand for educational programs. While Cohn continued to be 
marginalized within the International, her interest in dramatics culminated in the production of 
Pins and Needles. But rather than emphasizing member participation and community, labor’s 
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cultural activities through the 1930s and into the 1940s increasingly took on the characteristics of 
mass culture. This transformation was intertwined with growing concerns about the role of 
public opinion in democratic societies.
The New Deal and the Battle for Public Opinion
During the New Deal era, the ILGWU aimed to extend worker education far beyond its 
roots in New York’s Yiddish-speaking communities, putting it in the service of mass organizing 
at the national level. The growth of the union bureaucracy in the 1920s placed the garment union 
leaders in excellent positions with Roosevelt’s 1932 election. FDR had established positive 
relationships with the ILGWU as governor of New York, and Eleanor Roosevelt had been a long 
time supporter of progressive reforms that helped working women. The president’s appointment 
of Women’s Trade Union League (WTUL) leader Frances Perkins to Secretary of Labor, and of 
Sidney Hillman to the National Industrial Recovery Board indicated a possibility working people 
to have a real influence on the national agenda, as labor leaders “drew closer to the inner 
sanctum of the new regime.”398
Early New Deal legislation aimed to save industry and provide new worker protections. 
The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) offered a great hope to unions, creating the 
National Recovery Administration (NRA) to regulate industry and granting federal collective 
bargaining rights to workers in 1933. The law’s passage enabled tremendous growth in trade 
union organizing. The garment unions took particular advantage of the new law. The ILGWU led 
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a strike throughout the northeast that year. By 1938, it had grown fourfold to 225,000 
members.399 
 “The NRA,” Cohn wrote, “was a bright sun on the horizon, signaling the dawn of a new 
era in the history of the International. Fired by a new enthusiasm, the young workers swarmed to 
the banners of unionism.” But despite the unprecedented access labor leaders enjoyed to the new 
administration, Cohn understood that legislation would not do the work of organizing alone. 
Organizing possibilities produced anxieties for long time leaders. New unionists, “NRA Babies,” 
needed to be educated in the history and practices of their organizations. Cohn argued that while 
legislation could, at best, assure rights, labor education was more important than ever given the 
“rapid growth in membership.” “The raw recruits,” she claimed,  
 frequently do not know how to conduct a meeting, or how to draw up demands to begin 
 to bargain. They are ignorant of the history of their union and of the movement as a 
 whole, and their knowledge of the theories behind the movement is so elementary that 
 they may be a prey to propaganda of employers or even fascistic groups.”400
Indeed, the NRA raised labor’s hopes, other events of 1933 raised the specter of fear. 
With Hitler’s rise to power in Germany, and the popularity of right-wing populists such as Father 
Coughlin in the United States, unionists understood that the stakes were high. This was 
particularly true of Jewish labor leaders, who believed that the failure of the labor movement 
could mean a sharp turn towards anti-Semitism. While the new membership of the garment 
unions was mostly non-Jewish and American-born, Cohn believed it was important that Jews 
continue “to fight for social justice, for the necessary changes in our economic and social 
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structure, which will prevent a clash between the social forces which will bring about fascism in 
this country. The Jews will be the first to suffer no matter under what name they are known or in 
what industry they are engaged.”401 Thus, rather than focusing on building community, the 
garment unions saw the need to speak to the public writ large. This meant communicating within 
the dominant media and framing issues in such a way that they would resonate with non-union 
members and the middle class.
But attention towards the general public came at the expense of developing an 
independent union culture, Jewish or otherwise. In 1928, as the ILGWU decreased the size of 
their own newspapers, it also appointed Paul Dembitzer, a former lecturer of the Workmen’s 
Circle to direct a propaganda department and Richard Rohman, to promote the union in the 
English-language press. By the time of the New Deal, the ILGWU had founded its Publicity 
Department, helping it become “one of the best known labor organizations in America.” Through 
cooperation with “leading writers in the preparation of articles and photographic displays for 
many heading journals of opinion and illustrated magazines,” it helped “remove prejudices and 
antagonisms in some communities where labor unions in the past [had been] treated with either 
suspicion or open enmity.”402 
Despite her general proclivities toward local education, Cohn had long believed that the 
union needed to counter conservatives’ claims, playing a defensive game in the national court of 
public opinion. “These publicity men,” she wrote in the 1920s, “using inaccurate figures if 
accurate ones will not do, point out to the public the increased production made possible under 
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the company union system. They attack the trade unions for curtailing production and though 
they base their attacks on mere guesses, their brisk talk impresses the public mind.” In order to 
mitigate the harm done, Cohn advocated reliance on “the facts about labor movement 
achievements, policies, problems, aims. The facts exist, we must assemble them and make them 
widely known that trade unions and the public may know the truth and organizers and active 
members be armed against the poisonous propaganda carried on by company union 
advocates.”403
Ultimately, though, Cohn maintained that true democracy arose from its enactment in 
communal spaces. Disgusted with the “age of publicity,” Cohn was concerned about the 
disregard for verifiable information. “Gradually the policy ‘the public be damned’ has been 
superseded by the policy ‘It is not enough to be right. We must also seem right.’” Polling data, 
Cohn argued, hampered the democratic process and obfuscated “the factors that influence the 
making of public opinion.” She wrote, 
There is something not only pathetic but indicative of a basic weakness in polls’ 
 conception of democracy in the stories of those who tell interviewers they could give a 
 ‘better answer’ to the question if only they had time to read up a bit or think things over. 
 It is precisely the reading up and thinking over which are the essence of political 
 participation and which makes politics and educational experience play almost no part in 
 the process.404                
           
Thus, Cohn was always most passionate about the humanistic elements of worker 
education. She hoped that the new organizing environment would bring her greater recognition 
and inclusion of her perspectives. Although David Dubinsky, the new ILGWU president elected 
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in 1932, was thought to be a departure from his predecessors in his support of worker education, 
he placed Mark Starr, a British minister’s son who had been an instructor at Brookwood Labor 
College, in charge of the union’s educational efforts. Disappointed with Dubinsky’s decision, 
Cohn wrote to a friend, “Cooperation is the first and most important principle of the labor 
movement. Not only is it easy for me to cooperate with people but I cannot work otherwise...I 
never treated the union as my personal property. Furthermore there are so many problems to be 
solved in the Educational Department, which can best be done by two persons.”405 
 Starr did oversee the Department’s expansion, but in a different manner than Cohn might 
have hoped. As the number of organized workers grew rapidly from 3 million in 1936 to 7 
million in 1938, Starr noted that worker education had “made an even greater proportionate 
increase because the CIO unions have seen the need for it more clearly than did the old-line 
unions and have made provision accordingly.” The ILGWU programs, in particular, had grown 
to include 20,000 students in 553 classes and groups throughout the country, and educational 
directors at twenty five locals. The emphasis here, however, was on “programs of mass 
education.” Starr expected these programs-- including movies, radio shows, and live dramatic 
performances, to reach 265,000 members in 1938. In addition, the union restored publication of 
pamphlets in full force, producing 40 new items of which 145,000 copies were sold and 
distributed from 1934 and 1936.406
 The rise of top-down organization and communication methods were anathema to the 
early Jewish working class counterpublic’s intimate community building. Cohn, though, was 
simply not at home in the New Deal environment. As Leon Stein, one of the editors of Justice, 
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noted, she was frustrated by the turn away from East Side intellectualism. “The emphasis now 
became more on Pennsylvania than New York...Fannia couldn’t handle it.”407 As the ILGWU 
made greater strides towards building a national labor culture, Cohn found herself at the margins 
of her own union.   
The Labor Stage and Mass Media in the New Deal
 Despite her dissatisfaction with Starr’s approach, Cohn continued to design educational 
programs that reflected her love of the arts. During the 1930s, she wrote plays that could be 
produced by local unions and enacted by amateur talent drawn from the membership. These 
efforts were quite successful. ILGWU Players’ groups formed and presented her play “All for 
One,” throughout the country, from Camden, New Jersey to Decatur, Illinois to San Francisco. A 
Spanish translation of the play was also performed on the radio in Los Angeles. Cohn eagerly 
sent scripts to local presidents, telling them to expect more plays in the future. Continuing to 
emphasize industrial feminist themes, “All for One” dealt 
 with the life of a working woman who at the time of her marriage was intellectually 
 superior to the man. She was the “smarter” of the two, according to their friends. Both 
 continued to work. But the husband had a measure of leisure and devoted some of it to 
 his union, through which he functioned. This helped him in his development. But the 
 wife, after a day’s work in the factory, began her second shift at home. She could not 
 spare the time for personal development. As a consequence, they did not share in each 
 other’s experience and no companionship developed between them.
Of course, the discovery of worker education transforms the woman’s life. Cohn crafted her 
plays with predictability and clarity. She and her co-author, Irwin Swerdlow, commented,  
 In writing our plays, we were faced with the following questions: whether these were 
 to be for a sophisticated audience, who was already convinced; or whether we were 
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 to consider the new recruits of our union-- the many tens of thousands throughout  the 
 country, who had no previous experience in the labor movement and of course, did 
 not , as yet, know anything about labor dramatics-- in a word, workers who needed 
 a new orientation. We decided upon the latter.408
 Cohn insisted that labor plays use “short sentences” and “effective language.” Eschewing 
abstraction, she claimed, “A play should be so clear that one coming late into a theatre may take 
up the thread of the action. What the author knows he should be able to tell clearly and simply. 
No well written play is above the understanding of the boy in the gallery.” This, however, did not 
make the plays any less meaningful.
The idea is held by many writers that the purpose of the drama is merely entertainment. 
 A drama must certainly entertain, or it fails; but it is a shallow assumption that proclaims 
 as its only function. The drama should appeal to the heart and to the mind. If all there 
 was to the drama was amusement, then we should have clowns instead of actors. A 
 serious and entertaining drama cannot be otherwise but instructive. It is a supplement to 
 life. Its potentialities are immense. Its influence need not be examined but it exists. We 
 know that it can affect the moral and political life of a nation. The drama can preach and 
 teach.
 Although Cohn emphasized that the union needed to “believe in playing and singing,” 
this was always with a highly strategic purpose of member education. Under Starr’s direction, 
the strategy shifted towards gaining public influence as he became the chairman of the artistic 
center of the labor movement during the late 1930s-- the ILGWU’s Labor Stage. The idea for the 
Labor Stage emerged in 1935. Max Danish, editor of Justice, expressed to Sidney Hillman the 
need for “a genuine labor theatre” that was neither commercial nor influenced by “political 
groups.” By November the leaders of garment worker movement had formed a board of directors 
under Julius Hochman of the ILGWU. “Labor Stage marks the entrance of Organized Labor into 
the American Theatre,” proclaimed Hochman. “For the first time in its history labor will 
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endeavor to create and maintain a theatre and develop a Drama as part of its general social and 
cultural movement to express the aims and ideals of organized workers.”409
But the project was also the product of a new and tenuous alliance between organized 
labor and the state. Labor Stage received funding, in part, through the Works Progress 
Administration’s (WPA) Federal Theater Project (FTP). A controversial New Deal program that 
faced tremendous battles until it was cut in 1939, the FTP employed approximately ten thousand 
theatrical workers in twenty states by 1937, including four thousand in New York. Existing for 
the duel purposes of creating employed in the theater industry and bringing affordable 
entertainment to the working class, the FTP funded a diverse array of theatrical productions, 
from the dramatic to the comedic, from vaudeville to the avant garde.410 
In December 1936, the Labor Stage debuted with a New York production of John 
Wexley’s Steel, a play depicting the efforts of the Steel Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC). 
The cast was comprised of amateurs, members of ILGWU Local 10 who had rehearsed for six 
months. Labor Stage guaranteed a “professional aspect” by hiring professional directors and set 
designers. At the request of Clinton Golden, the SWOC Northeastern Regional Director, Starr 
began to plan a tour of the production through the steel towns early in 1937. Starr noted that the 
ILGWU had spent a “considerable sum” on the New York production, and needed to raise money  
“to bring the tour into the centers where thousands of steel workers will see it, and where it 
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rightfully belongs.” In Starr’s view, the play would serve a highly pragmatic end, sharing 
“labor’s point of view” with workers in the midst of a massive organizing drive.411 
The committee scheduled performances in 32 cities throughout Pennsylvania, Ohio and 
the industrial midwest, on a budget of $10,450, projecting losses of $5200. Although they agreed 
to do the production on a non-professional basis, they sought the sanction of Actors’ Equity and 
the Stagehands Union, and developed a promotional strategy for the play. Wexeley suggested 
that important columnists such as Newspaper Guild founder Heywood Broun be invited to the 
production in order to generate popular interest.412 
But while the union’s focus with Steel was to build support for the CIO’s organizing 
campaign, the Labor Stage’s follow-up, Pins and Needles, was less tied to a specific organizing 
goal and more towards shaping the general public’s view of the ILGWU, the labor movement 
and the broad New Deal agenda. Premiering in November 1937, Starr dubbed the play “a horse 
of another color.” Although the union prided itself on the fact that “every member of the cast was 
recruited from behind a sewing machine, a shipping cart, or a cutting table,” Pins and Needles 
marked a new emphasis away from developing relationships among union members, and towards 
swaying public opinion.  As performances moved from being weekend only to nightly, and as the 
production gained critical acclaim, the audience composition shifted towards the middle class. 
Spurring two companies that went on the road for four years, the play ran until May 1941. World 
events then prompted a reworking resulting in New Pins and Needles, marking labor’s support 
for the war effort. The New York production ran for 1200 performances and raised $1.5 million 
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in box office receipts. Its success made clear to Dubinsky that it was critical for labor unions to 
cultivate “sound public relations.”413
Rather than creating drama based in fact that could both inform and entertain, Pins and 
Needles fostered an affective relationship with its audience. Using parody and satire, the play 
poked fun at the far right, fascist dictators, corporate America, and consumer culture. On the one 
hand, as Michael Denning suggests, this reflected the broad progressive agenda of the Popular 
Front, solidifying interclass alliances within the new hegemonic bloc. But it also marked a 
departure from Cohn’s commitment to using drama to communicate factual information. 
Showing favor for the dramatic at the expense of the empirical, Mark Starr noted, “[the song] 
‘Nobody Makes a Pass at Me’...is more effective in debunking the ads claiming to give ‘it’ than a 
whole volume of Consumer’s Union research reports.” Rather than engaging in worker education 
in any traditional sense, Pins and Needles “was fundamentally a song cycle about working-class 
romance, a gentle parody of ‘moon songs and June songs’ and their place in working-class life,” 
combining vaudeville with experimental Brechtian theater.414 
As Pins and Needles garnered success, its producers compromised much of the show’s 
critique. Composer Harold Rome insisted to NBC that the show’s most successful song, “Sunday 
in the Park,” was completely apolitical, despite the fact that Michael Denning argues that it 
embodies a class critique. Further, the recordings of some songs had to be altered in order to 
garner airplay.415 Rather than promoting the labor movement through historical dramatization, or 
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realistic portrayals of everyday situations of workers, the ILGWU aimed to build positive public 
perception through a politically acceptable medium.
For director Louis Schaffer, this meant minimizing the Jewishness of its cast, in an effort 
to demonstrate the union’s true Americanness. According to Dan Katz, through the show’s 
national tour, Schaffer weeded out actors with thick Jewish accents, replaced “Jewish-looking” 
performers with those who appeared more Northern European, and told some actresses that they 
needed to get nose jobs. In the meantime, the play’s two African-American cast members 
experienced discrimination on the road and were asked to perform demeaning “mammy” 
stereotypes onstage. By participating in a performance of whiteness, the ILGWU portrayed itself 
“as suited for an allied relationship with the state: critical but not militant, and certainly not 
radical.”416 
Marginalized from the Labor Stage community, Cohn was a point person for the FTP’s 
Jewish branch and helped to promote Yiddish language productions through ILGWU locals 
throughout the New York, New Jersey and Philadelphia areas. Shortly after its inception, though, 
the FTP’s budget came under attack, and its Jewish division was one of the first to be threatened 
with cuts. Cohn protested this move, noting the project’s “great cultural value to the Jewish 
people of America,” bringing “a new audience to theatre-- those who could formerly only afford 
a movie in a neighborhood house.”417 Cohn’s passion lay in preserving the elements of the early 
Jewish working class counterpublic which had built her union, as the rest of the organization’s 
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leadership moved towards representing itself as part of a white, all-American national labor 
movement.
Conclusion
 As an emerging mass communications scholar, Joseph T. Klapper came to the 
Educational Department of the ILGWU in the fall of 1938. Cohn suggested to Klapper that 
before he embark on his study of the union’s educational activities, he “acquaint himself with the 
history” of the organization. Within a few weeks, though, Klapper found himself dissatisfied, 
immersed in what he believed was organizational propaganda. 
 “Of course, it is for you to decide how you can best learn of the labor movement,” Cohn 
told Klapper. “I thought, when I suggested that you attend a few sessions of one of our classes, 
that you would have an opportunity to get the viewpoints of workers fresh from the shops, whose 
discussions reflect their struggles and their aspirations.” For Cohn, workers created meaning 
through ritual participation in labor education programs. For Klapper, the elite attempted to 
transmit meaning to the masses, albeit with limited effects dulled by social relationships, as he 
would later argue in his seminal work, The Effects of Mass Communication. Ironically, these very 
social spaces helped position workers outside of the dominant bourgeois culture, offering an 
immediate environment more central to developing individuals’ political attitudes than top-down 
mediated messages, as Klapper and would ultimately conclude.418 
 By this point, however, the ILGWU leadership also conceived of the union publicity 
efforts within the framework James Carey calls the “transmission model,” the model of Walter 
221
418 Fannia Cohn to Joseph T. Klapper; See Joseph Klapper, The Effects of Mass Communication (New York: Free 
Press, 1960).
Lippmann. The point of media was no longer to build community, but to build consensus. This 
conception held within the ILGWU into the Cold War period. In 1950, the ILGWU produced the 
film With These Hands. This large “Hollywood-type undertaking” dramatized the union’s 
establishment fifty years earlier. It was translated into twelve languages and given distribution 
through union locals, schools, and universities. The film garnered television time, and the U.S. 
Information Service used it as part of its anti-Communist efforts overseas. As Nathan Godfried 
argues, the film depicted “a sanitized version” of ILGWU history that “reflected... the union’s 
overwhelmingly male, Jewish, and by the late-1940s Cold War liberal leadership.”419 
 The ILGWU also moved towards working alongside the broader culture industry to shape 
public attitudes. In 1957, the union had offered assistance on the film, The Garment Jungle, a 
Columbia Pictures production. By the end of the decade, the ILGWU had initiated its famous 
“Look for the Union Label” promotional campaign, with the assistance of the up-and-coming 
advertising firm Doyle Dane Bernbach, Inc. (DDB), linking union loyalty to consumer 
behavior.420
Like J.B.S. Hardman, Fannia Cohn continued to advocate for labor education and 
alternative approaches to cultural production outside of the commercial system. In order to 
promote her agenda, she placed emphasis outside of the union. For example, as a delegate to the 
1946 planning meeting in London that created the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Cohn sought to use media and education to “further mutual 
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understanding and good will among the peoples of the world.” While mass media had become 
solidified as a hegemonic component of industrial societies, Cohn still hoped to use it towards 
democratic ends. “It was realized that these media of mass communication and entertainment 
may prove a greater influence in making our planet ‘one world,’ than the airplane. While the 
airplane is within the reach of the few, the movies and radio can be made available to all.” Thus, 
Cohn’s efforts in the 1920s and 1930s helped to contribute to a global liberalism based not solely  
on state actors, but on the development of civil society in the Cold War period.421  
Unlike Hardman, though, Cohn remained fiercely loyal to the ILGWU, even when its 
leaders showed little respect for her or her ideas. In 1962 at the age of seventy-seven, Cohn was 
forced into retirement. She continued, however, to come to the international office every day 
“furiously writing ideas for new programs that her union would never fund,” until David 
Dubinsky ordered her desk and papers removed. A few months later, Cohn suffered a stroke and 
died alone in her apartment.422 
For Cohn, civil society needed the arts. Dramatics emerged from the gendered, ethnic 
communities of the Lower East Side sweatshops. They helped to build relationships among 
Jewish, and between Jewish and non-Jewish, working class women, producing new forms of 
public expression. At the same time, Cohn did not abandon the modernist project of public 
enlightenment. She understood that drama did not mean a lack of concern for historical facts. 
Garment workers’ lives and their stories of struggle were inherently theatrical. While Cohn 
advocated using drama in a simplistic way, its strategic purpose was twofold: it gave information 
and created a bond between workers and their organization through action. Those who saw 
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greater value in public persuasion than in community appropriated Cohn’s emphasis on the arts. 
They injected proletarian values into forms mass media while making working people primarily 
consumers rather than producers of American culture.
The most immediate impact of worker education from within the Jewish labor movement, 
though, came with the emergence of radio broadcasting. While U.S. progressives heralded the 
democratic potential of this new technology, particularly in the realm of popular education, the 
rise of commercial broadcasting interests during the late 1920s ultimately shaped the policies 
governing the medium. By the CIO era, the commercial broadcasting system was firmly in place 
in the U.S. This did not happen without resistance, and the emergence of significant alternatives 
to the for-profit format. In New York, the Socialist Party’s radio station, WEVD, aimed to offer 
worker education and democratic culture to its audience. But as chapter six details, the political 
and economic strength of the Forward pulled the station in the direction of commercialism, 
helping to orient its listeners towards an the emerging mass society.
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Chapter Six:
A New Deal on the Air:
The Production of Ethnicity and Public Service Broadcasting on WEVD 
“It is fitting that this most modern medium for the interchange of ideas should be dedicated to 
the causes of all forward looking and progressive movements... The Debs Memorial Radio Fund 
is operating Station WEVD in memory of Eugene V. Debs, who was imprisoned because he 
believed in peace and opposed war. WEVD, however, will not be devoted to any particular or 
partisan “ism” It is our intention to make this station a forum for Labor, Peace and Progress.”
         -- G. August Gerber, 1927423 
             
“I wonder what Eugene V. Debs, if he were alive, would say about a Debs radio which gives any 
amount of time to those who were advocating the election of candidates of a capitalist party but 
which gave practically no chance for candidates of the Socialist party to present their message.”
        -- Harry Laidler, 1936424
! Morris Novik, a twenty-nine year old Jewish socialist, arrived at his first day of work at 
Station WEVD in the fall of 1932. Housed at the Hotel Claridge in midtown Manhattan, WEVD 
had one year to prove itself to the Federal Radio Commission (FRC) that it could operate “in the 
public interest.” The station stood as a living memorial to the recently deceased Socialist Party 
(SP) leader, Eugene V. Debs, founded in 1926 at the zenith of non-commercial broadcasting. 
Before its on-air debut, though, federal regulators had forced WEVD, like many other non-profit 
stations, to share time with three other broadcasters on the same frequency, while it awarded 
“clear channels”-- frequencies on which no one else in the entire nation could broadcast-- to the 
new corporate-run networks, NBC and CBS, and the Chicago Tribune’s station, WGN. 
 As the new programming director, Novik was to ensure WEVD’s survival. Forward 
manager B.C. Vladeck had convinced him to leave his position as the associate manager of the 
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International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union’s (ILGWU) Unity House resort in the Pocono 
Mountains. His new job was to help breathe new life into the embattled radio station to serve the 
interests of working-class listeners. When the labor leader arrived at the Hotel Claridge, he 
encountered a picket line. 
 “The pickets were opposed to the station because it was practicing discrimination,” said 
Novik in an interview in 1978. “Well, that just didn’t make sense to me. It took a half hour to 
find out what was going on, although all you had to do was look at the people and you realized 
that what they wanted to do was to stop the station from going on the air or at least embarrass the 
new station.” According to Novik, the picketers were Communists who had “picked up on a little 
technicality. It was an old hotel with two elevators in the lobby and one freight elevator. 
Everybody who went up to the radio station with any kind of an instrument larger than a fiddle 
had to go through the basement to take the freight elevator.”425 
 The high number of African American musicians playing on the air prompted the 
Socialists’ left opposition, quite literally, to raise a red flag. While Novik was quite dismissive of 
the Communists’ accusations, there is some evidence that the previous programming director, 
George Maynard, may have resigned because the station did not challenge the hotel’s 
discriminatory practices. Novik, however, took no such action. Instead, in an effort to keep the 
station’s new studio space and detract from political criticism, he sought to delegitimize the 
protesters. “I knew Walter White,” he explained,
 who was head of the NAACP. He certainly knew John Dewey, he knew Vladeck, he 
 knew all of these people...I went after Arthur Garfield Hays, who was the attorney, and 
 Morris Ernst, who was the attorney for the Civil Liberties Union, and told them about us. 
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 They said, ‘What do you want us to do?’ I said, ‘Very simple, we can organize a counter 
 picket line.’426 
The next day, Novik organized a counter-demonstration  which said simply ‘This is not a 
legitimate picket line. This is a Communist infiltrated picket line.’ Well, you know, when you put  
the two of them together, it was obvious. That picket line within a few hours dissipated and we 
started the station.”427 The tactics Novik employed on his first day at work were not isolated. 
Instead, they were part of a broad, long term strategy employed by WEVD throughout its 
formative period from 1927 through 1938 to build alliances with both liberal and reactionary 
forces in politics and business in the name of self-preservation and sometimes at the expense of 
larger progressive aims. 
 WEVD has been studied under two different lenses-- first, as a Socialist station, and 
second, as a staple within Jewish American culture from the 1930s into the postwar era. In order 
to understand WEVD more accurately, these lenses must be brought together. From its 
beginning, WEVD was woven into the institutional and ideological fabric of the Jewish working 
class counterpublic. The station was to function as part of an effort to organize beyond the SPs 
Yiddish-speaking base in New York, and grow a working class movement through mass media 
and education. As had happened with the Forward newspaper following World War One, 
regulatory forces prompted WEVD to rely increasingly on advertising dollars by 1932. WEVD 
worked to create programming that could attract commercial sponsorship, namely programs 
targeted at “foreign language” speakers. 
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 WEVD’s efforts at self-preservation had varying consequences for the future of the 
Jewish working class counterpublic and the rise of the U.S. commercial media system. As Robert  
W. McChesney shows, “Elements of education, labor, religion, the press, civic groups, and the 
intelligentsia created the opposition and reflected a general social dissatisfaction with the 
contours of the emerging commercial system” between 1928 and 1935, and fought for legislation 
to ensure a continued presence for non-commercial broadcasting on the air.428 Despite its 
connections to some of the most progressive elements of the labor movement, WEVD remained 
at the margins of this movement. The leadership at WEVD did not fit the model of the policy 
reformers such as Edward Nockels of the Chicago Federation of Labor, or Joy Elmer Morgan of 
the National Coalition for Education by Radio (NCER). Rather than seeking to remake the 
broadcasting system in the face of a state-assisted capitalist takeover, the station’s first manager, 
G. August Gerber, and later B.C. Vladeck and Morris Novik, worked to preserve WEVD within 
the framework put forth by corporate elites and federal regulators.  .     
 Thomas Streeter minimizes the importance of this grassroots movement, and argues that 
the corporate structure of American broadcasting was already determined by 1922-- that is to say, 
by the time broadcasting began-- because of the emergence of corporate liberalism as a dominant 
ideology by the end of World War One.429 What Streeter ignores, though, is the way in which the 
rise of broadcasting fundamentally changed the nature of wireless, prompting a host of interests 
from across the political spectrum who believed that a medium with such strong consequences 
for democracy ought to remain a non-commercial endeavor. Thus, WEVD played an important 
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role in solidifying corporate liberalism at a moment when it was being called into question. 
  According to Nathan Godfried, the SP’s arguments to keep the license for WEVD during 
crucial FRC hearings in the late 1920s and early 1930s legitimated commercial broadcasting.430 
However, Paul F. Gullifor and Brady Carlson suggest that the station’s arguments before the 
FRC, and their on-air practices, paved the way for an understanding of the “public interest” in 
broadcasting policy that went beyond technical superiority and took the importance of content 
into consideration. As early as the 1920s, then, WEVD was setting the stage for what Victor 
Pickard has termed “the postwar settlement” for U.S. broadcasting and media, which contained 
both radical and conservative elements.431 WEVD’s leaders did this by actively pursuing 
institutional and personal relationships with corporate and policy insiders. As one of the best 
representations of the political left on the air, this strategy was a key factor in the failure of the 
broader movement for non-commercial broadcasting. 
 Instead, WEVD incorporated working-class Jews as part of a broader, multiethnic public 
sphere by producing Jewishness as a commodity and fracturing the ethno-political identity of 
Yiddish socialism. As B.C. Vladeck had done as part of his advertising strategy at the Forward, 
Jewishness became increasingly central on WEVD through the 1930s. Yiddish-language 
programming grew alongside other entertainment shows designed to attract advertising aimed at 
eastern and southern European immigrants and their families. These shows allowed the station to 
generate enough revenue to broadcast English-language, educational programming. With enough 
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backing from advertisers to maintain WEVD as a self-sustaining business, and educational 
programs that gave the station credibility with policy elites, WEVD’s continued presence helped 
to shape the contradictory contours of the postwar liberal culture both by bringing Jews and other 
“white ethnics” into a consumer society, but also by speaking to them as citizens and workers-- 
as members of a public.
Vladeck, Sarnoff and the National Broadcasting Corporation
 As noted in chapter one, broadcasting began as a grassroots-oriented medium in the wake 
of World War One. The proliferation of amateur stations between 1919 and 1921, and the success 
of Westinghouse’s Pittsburgh-based station, KDKA, demonstrated that a lucrative market for 
RCA-manufactured radio receivers could be exploited. Like the rest of the American public, 
immigrant communities were captivated by broadcasting at the emergence of the medium in the 
early 1920s. Liz Cohen demonstrates that in Chicago, “Almost from the start, ethnic groups saw 
radio as a way of keeping their countrymen and women in touch with native culture.” Rather 
than isolating workers, early broadcasting devoted to ethnic, religious and labor concerns 
brought immigrant workers together, creating communities of listeners and helping to unify 
people from different backgrounds. Within the Jewish community specifically, Ari Kelman 
shows that even though Yiddish broadcasting did not begin until 1926, Jewish immigrants 
eagerly participated in radio culture in the early years of the decade. According to Kelman, “the 
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language barrier did not exist. Jewish immigrants embraced radio and participated in it as an 
English-language medium.”432 
 Despite broadcasting’s popularity among rank-and-file workers, much of the left’s 
leadership-- particularly the editors of the SP’s newspaper The New Leader-- thought that 
constructing and maintaining a radio station was too expensive to be anything other than a tool of 
the capitalist class. But broadcasting excited Baruch Charney Vladeck. He believed that the new 
medium was the future of communication, and that it would be necessary for the Forward to 
have a radio station of its own. While some commercial newspapers were using radio as a way to 
promote their print editions, Vladeck thought it might become necessary to rely heavily on the 
airwaves. As his son, Stephen Vladeck, noted, “My father thought that the circulation then... 
would wane and therefore the Forward needed some other way of communication.”433 
 Vladeck saw broadcasting as an essential component for building working class culture 
and labor education. “Morris, you’re old enough to know this business,” Novik said Vladeck told 
him, when he asked him to take over the management at WEVD in 1932. “What you’re doing is 
going to go out of business with radio coming in. People are not going to spend money to go to 
Town Hall and Carnegie Hall to listen.” Radio would replace the lively community and 
educational institutions that had been central features of the Jewish labor movement. “I know 
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how you feel, but I think you ought to give up your Discussion Guild,” he told Novik, “because 
radio is giving it away free.”434  
 Vladeck, however, was a pragmatist and intent on proving the Forward to be a patriotic 
institution. Thus, he saw no reason not to work alongside radio industrialists while using the new 
medium as a tool for the Socialist cause. Never shy about his ambitions, the former radical 
political prisoner cultivated his interest in radio through a friendship with David Sarnoff, vice 
president and general manager of RCA. Although some have characterized this as a “marriage of 
opposites” between the one-time revolutionary political prisoner and the consummate immigrant-
turned-entrepreneur, the comfort with commercialism that Vladeck displayed at the Forward and 
his own pursuit of political power indicate that this may not have been such an odd pairing after 
all. While Vladeck was reconfiguring the Forward’s business model and seeking national 
advertising for the journal, he and Sarnoff developed a friendship. On several occasions, Vladeck 
made unannounced visits to Sarnoff’s midtown offices, and the two men arranged for meetings 
between their wives.435  
 In 1923, Vladeck told Sarnoff that he was interested in moving the Forward into the 
broadcasting arena, with plans to erect a radio antenna at the top of the paper’s headquarters at 
175 East Broadway. Vladeck sought advice from Sarnoff about how to attain a broadcasting 
permit. “I would also ask you to get me in touch with men in your organization who could give 
me figures on the possible costs and possible types of a station on the Forward,” he wrote.436 
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  While Vladeck had been a force in developing Yiddish socialist culture, Sarnoff was, to 
some extent a product of it. Like Vladeck, Sarnoff was born near Minsk in the Russian Pale of 
Settlement, and was turned off by the religious life of the shtetl. Sarnoff immigrated to New York 
in 1900 at the age of 9, and came of age on the Lower East Side. He enrolled in classes at the 
progressive Educational Alliance at the Cooper Union, and earned money for his family by 
selling Yiddish-language newspapers, including the Forward.437 
 Vladeck, the newspaperman, wanted to get into radio, but Sarnoff had long been attracted 
to the press. Tasked with being his family’s primary breadwinner by the age of 15, Sarnoff was 
motivated by the values of capitalism and sought a career in journalism. Biographer Kenneth 
Bilby writes, “Ultimately he envisaged himself as an editor or publisher, a successor to William 
Randolph Hearst or the flamboyant James Gordon Bennett...He would craft editorials that 
influenced or even shaped the course of national policy.” According to the Horatio Alger myth 
perpetuated in multiple biographies, Sarnoff went to ask for a job at the New York Herald, and 
accidentally walked into the Commercial Cable Company’s offices, housed on the ground floor 
of the newspaper’s building. Sarnoff was given a job as a telegraph messenger. He mastered 
Morse code, but was fired when he asked to have the High Holidays off. Sarnoff quickly found 
employment at American Marconi, where he would work his way up the corporate ladder from 
the bottom rung to the very top.438 
 American Marconi, though, would soon undergo dramatic transformations, placing 
Sarnoff at the head of a new corporate structure that would be key in shaping the future of U.S. 
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broadcasting. A coalition of corporate managers, military representatives and members of the 
Wilson administration organized the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) in 1919, bringing 
together the assets of the dismantled American Marconi, General Electric, and the patents the 
Navy acquired from the Federal Telegraph Company. For Thomas Streeter, the formation of 
RCA symbolized the crystalizing of corporate liberalism within communications, as companies 
that had worked willingly alongside the government during the war benefited handsomely.439 
 The RCA patent pool did not, however, solidify the commercial future of broadcasting. 
Between 1919 and 1926, RCA sought to profit primarily from the sale of radio sets, not from 
station ownership and advertising revenue. Sarnoff placed great emphasis on radio’s democratic 
and educational potential. As he commented later in his life, he wanted to avoid the medium 
being dominated by a “damn bunch of hucksters, who let the advertisers run things.”440
 In 1924, Sarnoff shared his Congressional testimony with Vladeck, where he had been on 
his “feet for four hours and fifteen minutes talking about this infant Radio.” Sarnoff explained to 
Congress his idea to create “the superpower station,” a national network that would offer high 
quality entertainment to the masses to preserve “that element of the broadcast situation which 
makes it possible for grand opera to go to the slums...everywhere in the world and without any 
charge” within a for-profit model. “It is my firm conviction,” Sarnoff said, “that broadcasting can 
be made commercially practicable without any means being found for collecting from the 
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consumer.” In the event that stations charged those who wanted access to the air, Sarnoff 
suggested that these stations act as common carriers and be highly regulated as public utilities.441
 Sarnoff also argued that broadcasting must allow a multiplicity of voices to be heard, 
echoing the liberal sentiments of the Jewish labor movement. Broadcasting stations should be 
regarded, he said, “as a new entertainment and educational facility for the public as a whole, and 
as a expression of leaders of worthy causes. No political, religious, racial or color lines should be 
drawn.” The businessman went on to tell Congress, 
 Any candidate for the Presidency of the United States, or other high office, whether he 
 be the candidate of the Republican, Democratic, Progressive, Farm-Labor, Socialist, 
 Prohibition, or any other lawfully organized party should, by the very fact of his 
 nomination by a considerable group establish himself as of sufficient interest to a 
 sufficient group to warrant a hearing.442
   
 Sarnoff’s liberalism helped cultivate a positive working relationship between his 
company and elements within the Jewish labor movement and the Socialist Party. Thus, when 
RCA changed its business model upon acquiring AT&T’s “toll broadcasting” station WEAF in 
1926 and made it the cornerstone of the new National Broadcasting Corporation’s (NBC) Red 
network, Vladeck and other progressives saw the network as a potential ally in getting their 
message out to a broad national audience.443 Already comfortable with advertising from his 
experience at the Forward, Vladeck and Socialist Party leader Norman Thomas would begin 
working with NBC through the 1920s to get their viewpoints on the air.
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Laboring for the Air
 Although the age of commercial broadcasting had begun, its dominance of the airwaves 
was far from settled. Plans for two non-profit radio stations were underway to represent labor 
and left-liberal perspectives. The first of these was radio station WCFL. Based in Chicago and 
operated by the Chicago Federation of Labor (CFL), WCFL was the brainchild of the 
Federation’s secretary Edward Nockels. Nockels and CFL President John Fitzpatrick had taken a 
uniquely progressive position within the American Federation of Labor (AFL) that emphasized 
democratic unionism and emphasized the importance of independent publications. Nockels saw 
broadcasting as having “revolutionary” implications, but would fall far short of its promise if 
dominated by capitalist interests. Afraid that such a system would ignore the interests of workers, 
Nockels was quick to advocate for a labor station in Chicago, and was unafraid of challenging 
the powers that be in order to see his vision take root. When the Department of Commerce 
denied a license to WCFL, Nockels questioned why WEAF, still owned by AT&T, was allowed 
one frequency for the entire country, but the CFL could not be afforded any space on the dial. 
Following the Justice Department’s determination that “the commerce secretary could not refuse 
a license, assign hours, limit power, or specify and restrict wavelengths” under the Radio Act of 
1912, Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover determined that his office would now “issue 
licenses only for stations which are fully equipped and ready to operate.” The Department 
granted WCFL the right to broadcast at 610 kilocycles-- WEAF’s frequency-- from Tuesday 
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through Saturday, from 6:00 PM to 10:00 PM, at one thousand watts of power, beginning on July 
27, 1926.444
 WCFL provided an opportunity to begin rebuilding a national progressive labor 
movement in the midst of a reactionary period. During its early years, the Chicago station 
received a good deal of support in a number of forms from the New York-based garment unions. 
They understood that radio could be used to help build their strength nationally. With their long 
histories of educational programs, broadcasting was a natural fit, and they were eager to utilize 
and help develop the station. Sam Levin of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America 
(ACWA) was an original member of the station’s board, and the union, which was not in the AFL 
or CFL, contributed $10,000 to Nockels’ effort.445 
 Other support came from the ILGWU, who were affiliated with the conservative AFL, 
and whose Chicago locals were part of the CFL. President Morris Sigman offered to support the 
station through notices in Justice, and Vice President Mollie Friedman congratulated Nockels on 
the station, writing, “May your spiritual child blaze the trail for a large family of labor 
broadcasting stations, through which labor’s message may be carried into every home of our 
nation.” By July 1927, the ILGWU was utilizing WCFL to air its dramatized history of the 
union.446 WCFL provided an opportunity to begin rebuilding a national progressive labor 
movement in the midst of a reactionary period.     
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 But New York’s labor movement needed a station of its own. WEVD had its genesis 
when the Socialist Party created the Debs Memorial Fund in order to start a radio station in 
honor of its great leader, with the proposed call letters WDEBS. Although Godfried notes that the 
SP’s popularity and strength nationwide had dwindled through the 1920s, its base remained 
within New York’s Yiddish speaking community. WEVD’s founders-- many with links to the 
institutions of the Jewish working class counterpublic-- sought to use radio to reinvigorate a 
progressive movement at the nadir of radical activism in the U.S.447 
 The station would be “a militant voice of the American labor movement to give 
expression to the aspirations of the millions of men and women who toil for a living.” Rather 
than partisan propaganda, WEVD would represent a coalition of interests across progressive 
spectrum, a forerunner to the Popular Front politics of the 1930s. As such, the Fund’s officers-- 
SP leader Norman Thomas, Morris Hillquit, and G. August Gerber-- chose trustees from 
numerous organizations and perspectives, including Roger Baldwin of the ACLU, A. Philip 
Randolph of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, as well as leaders from within the Jewish 
labor circles-- B.C. Vladeck and Forward editor Abraham Cahan, Abraham Baroff of the 
ILGWU, and Sidney Hillman of the ACWA.448 
 Like the left-wing Yiddish press in earlier decades, the Forward sought to use radio not to 
develop Yiddish culture, but to grow a political movement. Although the Forward’s readership 
was exclusively Jewish, WEVD offered the paper the opportunity to organize beyond the 
Yiddish-speaking immigrant community, and reach the American public writ large. In addition to 
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Vladeck’s attempts to build a relationships with RCA and NBC, the Forward sought other 
avenues throughout the mid- to late-1920s to get on the air. For example, as Kelman shows, the 
Forward organized a radio concert aired over New York City’s municipal station, WNYC in May 
1926, and promoted it within its own pages to Yiddish readers, and in the New York Times to the 
broader population.449 Thus, the Forward unsurprisingly became involved with WEVD from the 
beginning, planting the seed of a relationship that would grow in importance over the next 
several years.
 The garment unions also gave a tremendous amount of support to the project. Most 
significantly, the ILGWU offered WEVD free use of the sixth floor of its New York headquarters 
at 3 West Sixteenth Street, near Union Square. Within two weeks, the space was “converted into 
studios and reception rooms, with every possible arrangement for handling varied musical and 
artistic programs” before its scheduled inaugural date. The union worked to garner support from 
other organizations, attending “several conferences to bring about widespread patronage of the 
system by the workers of this country.” Morris Sigman noted that his union was “acutely aware 
of the importance of radio in the lives of the masses of American workers and accordingly in the 
lives of our own members,” said Morris Sigman. In a joint statement to the press, WEVD 
officials noted “Labor is becoming more and more articulate and the radio is one of the most 
powerful means of expression at its service.” 450 
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 From its inception, the Debs Memorial Fund sought to create a forum for democratic 
discourse rather than partisan propaganda. Ultimately, this would serve the interests of the 
American working-class, countering the elite interests that were quickly gaining control of the 
air. G. August Gerber, the Fund’s secretary and the station’s manager, was by far the most 
invested in building the station and creating a vision for its mission. “With radio as now privately 
owned,” said Gerber, “a station like WDEBS is the only cry in the wilderness. But WDEBS 
assures to the American labor movement and to all the forces of progress a rallying ground from 
which to capture the imagination of the American public.” Gerber promised that WEVD would 
be “a unique station” as “a radio extension university,” offering a curriculum including English, 
civics, citizenship, history, politics and other subjects.”451 Thus, WEVD would largely mirror the 
educational programs that had been developed through the Jewish garment unions in the 
previous decades, bringing them to a wider audience.
 WEVD, however, was just a tad too late to establish itself before Congress passed the 
Radio Act of 1927 as emergency legislation, creating the Federal Radio Commission (FRC). The 
proliferation of radio stations and lax licensing system under the Department of Commerce 
highlighted the problem of scarcity on the airwaves. As a temporary body, the FRC would be 
charged with creating a new spectrum allocation plan that would serve “the public interest, 
convenience and necessity.” 
 Edward Nockels understood that this was a potential disaster for broadcasting as a 
democratic medium. In an appeal to assist WCFL in attaining a license to broadcast on an 
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exclusive frequency at maximum power, Nockels and John Fitzpatrick informed Secretary-
Treasurer Abraham Baroff of the ILGWU in May 1927 that the FRC 
 has power to control and limit all broadcasting stations. The Capital-owned stations are 
 now seeking to monopolize the air. They are inducing influential persons and thousands 
 of listeners to write to the Commission, urging greater power and latitude to their 
 stations, and the reduction of power and latitude to Labor’s one station, WCFL.
The Chicago contingent saw the writing on the wall. “Unless we can convince the Radio 
Commission that Labor and its allied interests are interested in this Station, and that it is 
rendering a real public service of national significance, the Commission may so limit it in power 
and time as to almost destroy its usefulness.”452 
 New York-based labor leaders, such as Sigman, did comply with Nockels’ request for 
solidarity, signaling the possibility of developing a national, working-class movement for non-
commercial broadcasting. But the emerging regulatory environment put WEVD at an incredible 
disadvantage by the time it had the chance to get off the ground. The Debs Memorial Fund began 
broadcasting over the foundering station WSOM, owned and operated by Broadway 
Broadcasters, Inc. with a transmitter located in the Woodhaven section of Queens, in order to 
garner opposition to the pending executions of Sacco and Vanzetti. Gerber filed the application 
for the station’s own license on August 18. By offering programs with “music and entertainment 
of real value and possibly, too, of popular appeal” as well as “a means for educational work, 
consonant with the composition and purposes of the operating group,” the Debs Memorial Fund 
promised to operate “in the public convenience, interest and necessity” by making “articulate the 
needs and desires, the purposes and aims of the labor, liberal, progressive, socialist and affiliated 
groups. We believe these opinions necessary to properly leaven public viewpoints and attitudes.” 
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While Gerber said that the station would sell time “if feasible,” he indicated that the station 
would be supported primarily “by voluntary contributions.”453 
 On August 27, the FRC transferred WSOM’s license to the Debs Memorial Fund, 
effective October 1, awarding it the call letters WEVD and the right to broadcast at 1220 
kilocycles. But by this point, the FRC had already begun lowering the hours and power of non-
profit broadcasters to the benefit of the emerging commercial networks. Thus, WEVD would 
have to share time with stations WAAT of Jersey City, and WGBB of Freeport, Long Island, 
breeding logistical difficulty in agreeing on a schedule and delaying their official launch by 
several weeks until October 20.454 
 As had happened to the Forward during World War One, the state put WEVD in an 
extremely precarious position. Although the station was used in important labor struggles in its 
early months, assisting the Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees and the AFL in 
their dispute with the Interborough Rapid Transit (IRT) and Brooklyn-Manhattan Transit (BMT) 
Companies, and was used to build community by broadcasting speeches and a musical program 
to celebrate the 80th anniversary of the Communist Manifesto, the station quickly found itself in 
a perpetual fight for its existence.455 While WEVD’s founders cared deeply about building an 
educational, non-commercial station for workers, some SP and Forward leaders were also 
hesitant to challenge the emerging networks.
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Cooperation or Co-Optation?
 Rather than placing all their eggs in one basket, the Socialists and the Forward 
collaborated with their friends at NBC during WEVD’s formative years, hoping to ensure that 
left-liberal opinion would still be heard on commercial stations. NBC’s executives provided a 
relatively comfortable environment for SP leaders. While David Sarnoff took as liberal a view as 
one could expect from a corporate leader (so long as it did not interfere with his bottom line), 
NBC President Merlin Aylesworth was particularly concerned about insulating the network from 
radical criticism. He hoped to accommodate progressive voices, particularly the Socialists as 
they drifted closer towards the center through the “civil war” of the 1920s. 
 SP leader Norman Thomas came to be known as the network’s “pet radical.” During the 
1926 election cycle, RCA, General Electric and Westinghouse entered into contract with NBC 
for program service “to broadcast all shades of political opinion.” They hoped this would help 
dispel “the fear manifested in some quarters that the radio would be monopolized by special 
interests and open to the propaganda of such interests only,” limiting skepticism towards the 
commercial network and garnering popular support. As Sidney Hertzberg of the Bronx wrote to 
Aylesworth after hearing Norman Thomas on the air, 
 If the radio is to become a force and a factor in American life; if radio is to become more 
 than a passing fad; if radio is to become an institution with a sound basis, then 
 broadcasting stations will have to offer more substantial programs. I should like to see the 
 microphone brought to the debating rostrum more often. I should like to hear the voices 
 of men whom I am only familiar with by their writings. I should like to hear less of lyric 
 sopranos and of dance orchestras. 
 You are in a position to make radio the standby of the man interested in the world’s 
 affairs, in what people are doing and what they are thinking. You can break the monopoly 
 that music hounds (not Lovers) and jazz hounds have over radio and make the public 
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 strive to correctly appreciate a radio program, in this way lifting the people to the 
 standard of radio instead of dragging radio to the standard of the people.456
 But cooperating with the networks quickly posed problems for the Socialists. In April 
1927-- as WEVD’s license was pending-- Herbert Merrill, the State Secretary of the New York 
State Committee of the SP arranged for NBC to broadcast a speech to be given by Ramsey 
McDonald, the leader of the Opposition in the British House of Commons, at the Forward’s 
Thirtieth Anniversary celebration at the Century Theater. Ramsey, however, was unable to make 
the event due to health problems and his daughter spoke in his place. Following her speech, the 
Socialist Congressman Victor Berger of Wisconsin said on air that “the American radio, the 
church and the press were ‘capitalist controlled,’” and quickly had his microphone pulled 
away.457 
 It is unclear exactly what motivated this action. While newspaper reports indicated that 
this was a clear act of censorship, NBC claimed that it was a misunderstanding due, in part, to 
confusion in the schedule and, in part, a lack of “brain power” used by the young man who 
moved the microphone in the middle of Berger’s address. Strikingly, SP and Forward leaders 
took great pains to defend NBC and repair any damaged relationships. Vladeck told Aylesworth, 
“I happened to be in the office of the theatre at that time and I didn’t hear that remark myself. I 
have explained later to Mr. Berger that this was not the case and I wish to take this opportunity to 
thank you and the National Broadcasting Company for the manner in which you served us at the 
celebration.” Merrill told the NBC President that he understood that the allocated time had been 
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exhausted, and the cut microphone was “no reflection on the fairness” of NBC, and defended the 
network in letters to locals and members of the SP of New York State.458 Ultimately, the Socialist 
leaders strove to vindicate NBC of any allegations of wrong doing, and both parties saw mutual 
benefit in maintaining a positive, non-antagonistic relationship.
 The incident did not deter Vladeck from collaborating with the emerging network, as its 
executives tried to demonstrate to the Socialists that commercialization and open political 
dialogue were not mutually exclusive. By 1929, Vladeck began to negotiate with Aylesworth for 
NBC to carry a weekly Forward program. Aylesworth offered Vladeck a half hour of time each 
week for a year on either WJZ or WEAF for over $8,000.459  Thus, Vladeck sought to use the 
commercial media to promote a progressive agenda, and to build-- as newspapers had done in the 
previous decades-- a movement culture integrated into a commercial framework. 
 In the meantime, it became blatantly obvious that commercial interests did not have a 
serious commitment to free expression on the air. In one instance, two New York radio stations 
denied Frederick Libby of the National Prevention of War the right to speak on air. August 
Gerber wrote to potential supporters of WEVD in the pacifist community, 
 Such censorship makes imperative that the members of minority groups and persons of 
 dissident opinion band together to maintain a broadcast station of their own control. It is 
 fitting that this most modern medium for the interchange of ideas should be dedicated to 
 the cause of all forward looking and progressive movements.460
Further, the FRC was clearly working against the interests of labor broadcasting, defending 
commercial interests. Vladeck’s and Thomas’ cooperation with commercial broadcasters did not 
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protect WEVD from the FRC’s bullying in the name of the “public interest.” Regulators spent 
several years hounding the fledgling station about its technical problems, pushing the non-profit 
station to spend large amounts of money to meet its demands, and preventing it from developing 
itself into a strong political force. This bred a relationship of dependency between WEVD and 
NBC. For example, Norman Thomas spent weeks trying to secure time for the 1928 SP 
convention. After explaining to Aylesworth that WEVD might be suspended during the 
convention, “pending an appeal for more funds for the special purpose of improving its 
equipment,” Thomas received no response from the network, prompting him to write just four 
days before the start of the meeting, 
 Obviously your long delay in answering my first inquiry has made it impracticable to 
 arrange for broadcasting this session. It would appear that by the simply expedient of 
 delay the National Broadcasting Company has evaded the intent of the law and denied us 
 even the opportunity to consider terms on which the Socialist Party might use the 
 facilities of the company. The fact that we may be able to use WEVD to a limited extent 
 does not, as you well know, solve the problem. While it may be too late even to consider 
 arrangement for this convention it is not too late to make for the third time a request for a 
 definite statement of the policy of the National Broadcasting Company during the coming 
 campaign.461
Thomas understood this was not an ideal situation, but believed it was “inevitable.” Testifying in 
1931 before the FRC, the SP leader said,  
 I have been called...Mr. Merlin Aylesworth’s pet radical...With all due respect to them 
 and my relation with them, I may say I am a pet radical, always properly guarded when I 
 appear so that the facilities for doing harm when I appear are exceedingly limited and the 
 maximum of benefit accrues to the company for its great liberality in my appearance. Of 
 this I do not complain.462
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 Less than a year after WEVD’s first broadcasts, the Federal Radio Commission issued 
General Order No. 32 on May 25, 1928. The order placed the burden of proof on WEVD and 
over 160 other stations to “show cause why their license should not be revoked” at a hearing 
scheduled for July 9, or face deletion as of August 1. The SP argued that denying WEVD their 
license amounted to the suppression of minority rights to free speech. According to Nathan 
Godfried, this argument linked working class interests with being “dissident” rather than 
majoritarian, positioning itself as relatively marginal, and thus not a threat to the emerging 
commercial structure of radio.463 Despite this significant limitation, however, WEVD and the 
Socialists were for a moment at the forefront of the movement for democracy on the air. 
 Of all the threatened stations, WEVD attracted the most attention. The New York Times 
reported that while it was questionable whether or not many of the stations would challenge the 
FRC’s actions, but it was “taken as a foregone conclusion that Station WEVD will put up a 
fight.” G. August Gerber announced that labor unions, liberal groups, and other organizations 
would register complaints with the Commission. The earliest responses came from the Jewish 
socialist community organization, the Workmen’s Circle. At its National Executive Committee 
meeting at the Forward headquarters, the mutual aid society committed to support the station. 
Others were also quick to voice opposition to the FRC. The Society of Friends, for example, said 
“it would be a disaster to free speech if the station were to be closed.” Far outside the reach of 
WEVD’s signal, the General Committee of California Progressives passed a resolution in support 
of WEVD.464
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 Several members of Congress also voiced their oppoistion to the FRC’s order in support 
of WEVD. They framed the issue as a need for diversity of opinion and the maintenance of 
democratic institutions. Agreeing to appear before the Commission’s hearing, Rep. Emanuel 
Celler of Brooklyn noted that there are liberal newspapers, there should be liberal radio stations. 
“Take WEVD off the air and you have no liberal station,” he said. Rep. Andrew Somers of 
Brooklyn said, “revocation of WEVD’s license might not hurt the Socialist Party, but that it 
would gravely injure the cause of good government.”465 
 By the end of June 1928, Gerber and the Debs Memorial Fund had built broad support for 
WEVD. The Social Justice committee of the Community Church at 34th Street and Park Avenue 
arranged for a mass meeting in preparation for the scheduled hearing. Gerber noted, “Tens of 
thousands of individuals have volunteered to give the Commission the cause they ask for,” to 
show why the station should remain on the air. The sheer number of supporters demonstrated, 
according to Gerber, that “the maintenance of the station is, to our mind, sufficient proof that the 
public interest will be served by relicensing this station.”466   
 Although 107 of the threatened stations protested the FRC’s actions, the press dubbed 
WEVD as “the most militant” among them.467 Norman Thomas went before the Commission and 
explained that the station had to remain on the in order to discuss critical political issues. 
Deleting the station would, for Thomas, constitute censorship. “If WEVD is taken off the air and, 
in fact, is not treated on a parity with others who are richer and more influential,” said Thomas, 
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“the people of this nation can truly recognize that radio, which might be such a splendid force for 
the honest clash of ideas, is nothing but a tool to be used by the powerful against any form of 
disagreement or any species of protest.” Thomas and Gerber presented the FRC with petitions 
from 29 organiations, representating 850,000 persons, insisting that the station remain on the air. 
In addition, Gerber read a telegram sent by American Federation of Labor President William 
Green to the Commission. 
  Gerber and Thomas both understood that the Commission was doing the bidding of 
commercial interests. Gerber noted that, since the creation of the FRC, the total number of 
stations operated by business interests had gone from 58 to 75 percent. When the Commission 
called in representatives from all stations to Washington on one day “for docketing purposes,” 
while representatives of small stations believed their cases would be heard then and there, 
Thomas suggested that the agency might have been trying to “tire out” the smaller stations. “This 
procedure,” he said, “entails an almost impossible expense for smaller stations to be required to 
come all the way to Washington only to be told when the hearing will actually be held.”468 
 The lengthy hearing process allowed the stations slotted for deletion to continue 
broadcating through September 1. One week prior to the new expiration date, the Commission 
announced that WEVD could retain its license. Gerber, Thomas and their thousands of supporters 
had made the case that the station was being operated in the public interest. According to the 
New York Times, “The commission announced that it will not draw the line on any station doing 
an altruistic work or which is the mouthpiece of a substantial political or religious minority, bur 
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such a station must comply with the law and must be conducted with due regard for the opinions 
of others.” The FRC determined that WEVD pursued, “a very satisfactory policy.”469
 The commercial system being advanced by the FRC, however, remained intact. On the 
same day that WEVD claimed victory, the Commission denied the Chicago-based Radio 
Protective Association’s petition asking for the annulment of licenses for stations owned or 
operated by NBC, General Electric, RCA, and Westinghouse. Louis G. Caldwell, the FRC’s 
general counsel and attorney for the right-wing Chicago Tribune’s WGN station, argued that 
concerns about concentrated ownership of high power stations were unwarranted. “These 
charges,” he said, “are difficult to follow. They are, of course, based upon misunderstanding of 
the effect of high power, and represent the view of those who are not familiar with principles of 
engineering.”470 
 Through the next several years, WEVD struggled to compete in the emerging 
environment of commercial broadcasting. While a national movement that targeted the 
connections between the broadcasting networks (NBC and CBS) and the radio trust (GE, RCA, 
AT&T and Westinghouse) emerged, the Socialists remained cautious about attacking the 
corporate giants, even as the Hoover administration pursued anittrust action against RCA.471 
While Gerber and Thomas criticized the FRC, they stopped short of criticizing the commercial 
interests they served. Within the next few years, WEVD’s interests would be protected by a 
seemingly unlikely candidate, Louis G. Caldwell.
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General Order 40 and the Politics of Strange Bedfellows
 While WEVD had already organized a successful campaign to keep its license, the FRC’s 
failure to enforce General Order 32 led the body to call on the assistance of Louis Caldwell to 
draft a new reallocation plan. The result, General Order 40, was issued on August 30, 1928, and 
enacted that Novemeber. The plan created 40 exclusive clear channels, (37 of which went to the 
NBC and CBS- owned or affiliated stations), 34 regional channels, and gave the remaining 
frequencies to be shared at low-power local channels to be shared by 30 broadcasters in each 
zone. Aside from greatly empowering the commercial broadcasters, the order did two things that 
would greatly shape the future of WEVD over the next several years. First, it equated the public 
interest with technical sophistication. On the one hand, the FRC stated that “broadcasting 
stations are not given these great privileges by the United States government for the primary 
benefit of advertisers,” and admitted that “advertising is usually offensive to the listening 
public.” On the other hand, the need for up-to-date radio equipment and engineers put significant  
financial demands on non-commercial and non-profit stations. Thus, the FRC masked the 
ideological bias in its approach “to the public interest” by assuming the neutrality of the 
technology. Second, the FRC allowed any broadcaster to challenge an existing broadcaster for its 
frequency assignment at the end of its three-month license. This made it very difficult for 
stations given few hours to prove their worth, attract funding and stay on the air. Within a year of 
the implementation of General Order 40, 100 stations had been forced off the air.472
 The order was a starting gun for the emergence of a nationwide media reform movement 
that bridged the ideological spectrum. While many of the those involved had an elitist bias 
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against mass culture, Edward Nockels at WCFL combined a critique of the commercial media 
system and of class power. A month following the implementation of General Order 40, Nockels 
began to seek “clear channel” for his labor station. In December 1928, Nockels wrote to Abe 
Baroff, again requesting support for WCFL in the face of a state-corporate attack. Stressing the 
need for solidarity before a hearing scheduled for the following month to determine whether or 
not WCFL would receive its own exclusive frequency, Nockels explained the situation to Baroff 
with stunning clarity.   
 This is a Battle of the Giants. On one side are the Radio Trust, the great corporate 
 interests, the powerful metropolitan newspapers and all those who are seeking to 
 monopolize the air-- the last great public domain-- for private commercial profit. On the 
 other side stands Organized Labor, and to a considerable extent, organized Farmers, 
 battling to maintain some measure of freedom of the air and freedom of speech. Never 
 has there been a struggle of more far-reaching importance to the working men and 
 women of our land. The newspapers of the country are being rapidly reduced in number 
 by consolidation and are almost wholly dominated by capitalistic interests. The telegraph 
 and telephone systems are complete monopolies. Now comes this new and 
 marvelous means of communication by Radio, far outreaching all other means of 
 influencing public opinion, and it is being seized body and soul by the same 
 capitalistic group that already has a strange hold on all other effective means of 
 communication. 
 There are 89 wave lengths available for broadcasting in the United  States. Organized 
 Labor, representing not only 5,000,000 of actual members, but also the many other 
 millions of men and women who toil, has asked for only one of these 89 channels, and 
 has been kicked down stairs. It is unbelievable.473 
 Socialist leaders, however, took a different approach. Rather than pushing the FRC to 
give WEVD its own frequency, August Gerber worked to meet the Commission’s technical 
demands. In September 1928, before General Order 40 even went into effect, Gerber applied for 
permission to move the station from Woodhaven to the basement of a residence in the Forest 
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Hills neighborhood, just a short distance away.474 But without ever receiving notification from 
the FRC, they proceeded to do so.    
 On January 31, 1929, FRC Commissioner O.H. Caldwell-- of no relation to Louis 
Caldwell-- informed the Debs Memorial Fund that they had never received permission to 
broadcast from the “crowded area.” Caldwell suggested that the station lease another transmitter 
that broadcast at the same frequency during the hours that station was off the air. August Gerber 
listened to the Commissioner’s suggestion, and wrote to the Department of Commerce in 
February 1929 inquiring for permission to broadcast over a transmitter in Carlstadt, New Jersey. 
The transmitter was licensed to station WHAP, operated by the Defenders of Truth Society, a 
Christian organization with which WEVD shared its frequency. Franklin Ford, the Society’s 
leader, had agreed to the arrangement, and Gerber informed the Department of Commerce, in 
accordance with a recommendation and suggestion made by Federal Radio Commissioner O. H. 
Caldwell.475 
 Gerber became even more mired in red tape as he attempted to navigate the evolving 
bureaucratic structures. Despite Caldwell’s recommendation, Department of Commerce officials 
informed Gerber that sharing frequency was only allowed when there was “a bona-fide 
consolidation of two or more stations.” Gerber then took the matter to the district radio inspector, 
Arthur Batcheller. “Should any difficulties arise,” Gerber ensured, 
 in the arrangement between the Debs Memorial Radio Fund, Inc. and the Defenders of 
 Truth Society, Inc., or in the event that the WHAP management refuse to continue the 
 arrangements which make possible the utilization of their transmitter by the management 
 of WEVD, or, if the terms upon which they are willing to continue be such that the Debs 
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 Memorial Radio Fund, Inc. cannot accept them, then the Debs Memorial Radio Fund, 
 Inc. desires to retain its present right to erect or acquire and maintain and operate its own 
 transmitting plant.
 
Batcheller then conveyed this information to the FRC by mid-March. By this point, though, 
WEVD’s license was days away from expiration. The Commission renewed it with permission to 
broadcast from the Forest Hills location, so WEVD did not have to pursue its plan to share 
WHAP’s transmitter.476 
 The Commission and its team of engineers, however, did not stop monitoring the station. 
They repeatedly issued warnings for technical mishaps and violations. On April 10, the FRC 
noted that WEVD was broadcasting at 1300.6 kilocycles, 600 cycles off its assigned frequency. 
Gerber explained to Henry Bogardus, the U.S. Supervisor of Radio, that they were in the process 
of reconstructing their transmitter. “Our crystal control was not delivered to us until Thursday, 
the 11th of the month, so that our check by crystal control will not be working until toward the 
end of the week.” Technical problems, however, persisted. On November 29 and 30, WEVD 
went off-frequency again when it was discovered that its crystal was slightly chipped. The FRC 
recorded further violations in December. Al Waring, WEVD’s chief engineer explained to 
Batcheller that the control crystal had fractured immediately upon installation, and requiring the 
station to rely on its initial crystal that needed replacement.477 
 By this point, the United States had plunged into the Depression creating a paradox for 
the labor movement. While organizing was more essential than ever, union budgets were getting 
tighter, making it difficult to carry out such work. In March 1930, the ILGWU told Gerber that it 
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could no longer afford the electricity used by WEVD, and the station would have to arrange for a 
separate meter or lose its power supply. Gerber agreed to leave the premises within six to seven 
weeks, in part because the move required authorization from the FRC, and requested that the 
power supply be continued until that point. Ultimately, the station remained at the union 
headquarters until the following January when the ILGWU required the space for a Records 
Department. By this point, the relationship between Gerber and ILGWU Secretary-Treasurer 
David Dubinsky had soured. Insisting that WEVD evacuate after the move had been pending for 
a year, Dubinsky wrote “Shall you fail to comply with our request, we will be obliged to place 
the furniture necessary for the Department and the stenographers in that office...After the 
removal of the Station we will have an expense of approximately a thousand dollars to repair this 
office.”478
 It was clear that WEVD was in dire need of assistance. The institutions of the Jewish 
labor movement were instrumental in breathing life into the station. In May 1930, representatives 
of the Forward, the SP, the Joint Board of the Cloak Markers’ Unions, the Furriers, the 
Leathergoods Workers and other organizations met in Morris Hillquit’s office and decided to call 
a conference “to consider the possibility of building up the broadcasting station WEVD into an 
effective and powerful weapon for the service of these movements.” Like Nockels, the leadership 
of these organizations understood the potential for radio broadcasting in building a strong, 
progressive movement. As Hillquit told ILGWU President Ben Schlessinger, 
 Station WEVD has a very valuable franchise in the form of a permit from the Federal 
 Radio Commission which authorizes it to increase its power. This franchise will become 
 more valuable as time goes on and as radio broadcasting becomes the established and 
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 favorite medium of publicity. In many respects a good radio station can be as effective as 
 a large metropolitan daily. 
 
 Unfortunately, Station WEVD has not had the means or facilities to make the necessary 
 mechanical improvements, and the Labor and Liberal movements have not shown the 
 interest in the enterprise which its possibilities merit. 
 Reports of competent radio engineers are now being prepared and will be submitted to 
 the conference so as to enable it to determine whether the present station is susceptible of 
 substantial improvements and the cost of such improvements. If it is found that the 
 station has the possibilities which are claimed for it, the conference will then consider the 
 advisability of creating a permanent organization representative of the most important 
 labor and progressive movements of the city to operate and manage the station for the 
 benefit of all such movements. I sincerely hope that your organization can find it possible 
 to elect a representative to the conference and to cooperate in this effort to create a new 
 powerful instrument for the cause of labor and progress.479
Unlike Nockels, however, the leadership at WEVD was less interested in creating a democratic 
system of broadcasting regulation, and solely invested in furthering their own station.
 In his crusade for a clear channel station, Nockels’ great white whale was the Chicago 
Tribune, its radio station WGN, and perhaps chiefly, their attorney Louis Caldwell. Nathan 
Godfried writes that Nockels “may well have become obsessed with Caldwell.” In September 
1930, Nockels applied for a license to broadcast on WGN’s frequency of 720 kilocycles with 
unlimited time and fifty thousand watts of power. According to Godfried, “The fact that the 
station was represented by an attorney whose use of the revolving door between the government 
and business sectors raised ethical questions-- at least in the eyes of Nockels-- made WGN an 
even more attractive target.”480 
 By 1932, Nockels had convinced the conservative AFL leadership to advocate for a clear 
channel station for labor. There was no doubt that this station would be run by WCFL. Although 
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the CFL had a somewhat adversarial relationship with the broader AFL structure, the SP had long 
been opposed to the AFL leadership and the Jewish unions in the United Hebrew Trades (UHT) 
often butted heads with Samuel Gompers in prior decades. The AFL had little reason to promote 
the interests of a station that was dedicated to the memory of one of its most prominent critics. It 
is somewhat ironic, then, that WEVD’s leadership-- by any conventional standard of ideological 
measurement in U.S. politics-- was to the left of the CFL and certainly the AFL. However, in 
terms of their analysis of the broadcasting situation, Nockels was the only major player in the 
labor or broadcasting reform movements who understood the battle for the airwaves as a major 
front in the class war, wresting precious public resources away from the hands of corporations 
and putting them to use in the service of labor.   
 Rather than attacking the property rights of specific private interests, WEVD and the 
Socialists sought only to defend their station within the corporate-liberal framework advanced by  
the FRC. As such, they were able to attain the legal services of the architect of that very 
framework, Louis Caldwell himself. On the one hand, this was a brilliant strategy on the part of 
the Debs Memorial Fund. In 1930 and 1931, WEVD was repeatedly threatened with deletion 
because of its technical violations. Caldwell filed persistent appeals through these years. WEVD 
stood before the FRC on October 14, 1930 after they could not determine whether the public 
interest would be served by granting the station its license. The FRC’s Special Examiner Elmer 
Pratt recommended denial of the license on December 11, 1930. Caldwell appealed the denial 
and requested an oral argument. A new hearing was scheduled for March 3, 1931, but the license 
was denied again. After a new round of appeals, a third hearing before the Commission was set 
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for September 26, 1931, where the FRC finally determined that the application for renewal of 
WEVD’s licesne be granted.481 
 At this hearing, Caldwell demonstrated that he had absolultely no qualms about 
defending the Socialists on their own terms in their battle to keep their license. He was a hired 
gun par excellence. While Caldwell’s General Order 40 had placed emphasis on the necessity of 
technical supremacy, as WEVD’s lawyer he indicated that these matters were not a true 
indication of how well a station served the public. He said, “There are regulations and 
regulations; and, there are violations and violations. Some violations have a serious public 
significance; others do not. It is my contention that the evidence of violations must be such as to 
give them some public significance some importance to for the public...”482 
 Thus, WEVD stood out as an exceptional case. Caldwell explained that WEVD’s service 
to the public interest was rooted in its mission, its content and its unique strucutre. “[W]here you 
are considering refusing to renew a licensee because of alleged violations,” said Caldwell,
 you must take into account the program service rendered by the station. You can easliy 
 imagine two cases in which exactly the same violations are charged against two 
 different stations. In one case the station may be rendering a mediocre service which 
 is duplicated or bettered by other station in the same community, and there will be 
 no serious loss to the public if it is eliminated. In the second case the station may be 
 rendering an outstancing srvice in entertainment or education. In such a case the public 
 would suffer a loss if the station were eliminated. Surely you will agree that you should 
 take these matters into account.483 
 Caldwell did not argue against the rights of corporate broadcasters, but for protecting the rights 
of non-commercial broadcasters. His argument was not restricted, though, in terms of negative 
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liberty, of the government not interfering with the socialist station’s right to broadcast. Instead, 
Caldwell articulated a vision where WEVD functioned towards a greater communal good, where 
the notion of a “free press” was as much a social right as an individual right. He told the FRC,  
 WEVD is giving practical application to the time-honored principle which forms part of 
 the ground work of our civilization-- freedom of speech, and of the press. The influence 
 of this policy cannot be measured solely in terms of the advantanges it offers to 
 minorities. There is something more, intangible but important, the influence of its policy 
 on other stations and on the press. The fact that there is such a station as WEVD in 
 operation in our largest metropolis necessarily has an effect, unconscious though it may 
 be, on the policies of other broadcasting stations and newspapers. They know that when 
 they reject a speaker or a writer who desires to address the public, that speaker or writer 
 may go to WEVD to get an audience. Who can say how much this knowledge 
 contributes, in fact, has already contributed, to the building of higher standards among 
 other stations?484
In the marketplace of ideas, WEVD would create competition and would encourage democratic 
conversation within a broadly commercialized environment. Ultimately, the corporate lawyer 
passionately embraced, at least in part, the vision of the SP. 
 WEVD is a monument to a great leader. It was built from the small wages of people in 
 poor circunstances who loved him. So far as I know, it is the only monument of this kind. 
 Instead of an imposing pile of marble, the followers of Gene Debs chose to honor him 
 with the construction of a marvelous instrument of modern sciences through which the 
 voice of men can reach the homes and hearts of thousands. I beg of you to think long and 
 carefully before you lay destroying hands on this monument.485
WEVD’s strategy was successful, in terms of self-preservation. As Norman Thomas made clear, 
the station meant absolutely no malice towards the commercial institutions. According to 
Thomas, the Debs Fund deserved its license because no other radio station was or could “be 
expected to be, primarily concerned with a fair presentation of...minority opinion...It is in the 
present unsettled state of world affairs and world opinion, of extraordinary significance that there 
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should be an orderly process of expressing this opinion.” The SP leader went to great lengths to 
demonstrate that he was not attacking 
 existing radio stations. There was a time when I have attacked existing radio stations. 
 There was a time, which some of you gentleman know about, when I had a very 
 extraordinary experience in being invited to go on the air, and then barred from the air 
 without any adequate reason...If and when we have the money, we can get a limited 
 amount of time, but the charges necessarily are high.486
Thus, Thomas positioned the commercial dominance of radio as flawed but inevitable. This was 
a poor analysis at best, and an opportunistic strategy at worst. At the very moment that Louis 
Caldwell was defending the memory of Euguene V. Debs, he was hell bent on ensuring that 
WCFL would be taken off the air. As the Federation News reported, Caldwell argued before the 
FRC that WCFL “is not a labor station. It broadcasts cheap financial quackery and is an insult to 
the honest labor people of Chicago. It does not give fifteen minutes a day to labor.” WCFL’s 
effort to obtain a clear channel through an act of Congress was dubbed “a vicious piece of class 
legislation.”487 
 This must have produced irreconcileable, but seemingly unspoken, tension between 
WEVD and WCFL. On the very same page that they reported on Caldwell’s attacks on WCFL, 
the Federation News described an incident where after “[f]our days of bitter conflict in hearings”  
the unnamed lawyer for WEVD nearly got into a fistfight with the representative of station 
WFOX. “Manager Gerber and the attorney for WEVD fought every inch of the way, knowing 
that if once the Socilaist station were shut off the air it would never be allowed back again under 
a Republican regime, due to prejudice in the commission against radicalism of any degree.”488
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 While WCFL did not sabotage WEVD’s efforts to stay on the air, Norman Thomas played  
a critical role in hindering WCFL. In the fall of 1931, Caldwell, as chair of the American Bar 
Association’s Standing Committee on Communications, denounced all legislative efforts that 
would set aside a fixed percentage of the dial to special interests. While WCFL sent the 
progressive lawyer Frank Walsh to warn against the dangers of monopoly in broadcasting, at the 
committee’s meeting at the ABA convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey, Gerber went to offer 
support to Caldwell. He testified that Caldwell was a man of integrity, and that the report did not 
reflect a conflict of interest.489 Thus, Caldwell successfully divided the labor movement against 
itself in their attempts to provide alternatives to the commercial broadcasters.   
 The impact went beyond creating a rift between the New York socialists and Chicago 
labor. WEVD and the SP organized massive numbers of groups and individuals from across the 
country and the ideological spectrum to support their cause. Despite the limitations of their 
critique of the radio trust, their organizing efforts were impressive. However, without 
coordination between labor’s radio efforts, the movement was significantly weaker.  
 WEVD solicited money, resolutions, and petition signatures to show the FRC that the 
station served the public interest. Gerber testified in March 1931 that, 
 the financial ability and capitacity of WEVD cannot be measured by the yardstick  which 
 you would apply to the ordinary commercial station. We have something that is richer 
 and more lasting, the faith, confidence, and support of liberal people and their 
 organizations, a moral asset upon which we can rely for funds as long as we do our job 
 well.
While WEVD projected that they would raise approximately $68,000 that year from selling time, 
the Debs Memorial Fund had raised $70,000 to date through contributions 
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 by more than five thousand individuals, groups and organizations in sums ranging from 
 10 cents upwards. For the past several months a definite movement has been afoot, and 
 has made satisfactory progress, sponsored by a large number of labor unions, civic and 
 peace organizations, liberal newspapers and publications, to raise a very substantial fund 
 and to provide for adequate periodical and continuous contributions to enable WEVD to 
 operate on a plane and scope more adequate to its purpose.490
Submitting a list of one hundred organizations that would sponsor and support the station as 
evidence to the FRC, Gerber noted that a unanimous resolution was passed at a meeting of 
friends of the station, committed to raising $50,000 to erect a new transmitter and make technical 
improvements. Although such support served as evidence of the station’s public importance, 
Gerber noted, 
 I do not know whatever WEVD, with its limited time, can hope to be self-supporting 
 from the sale of time and still serve its purpose as an American forum. I hope and believe 
 that it can. But if it cannot, we do not propose to sacrifice our primary mission for the 
 sake of advertising accounts. As long as we serve our proper mission, I know that we can 
 confidently rely on our great moral asset, the support of liberals everywhere, for any 
 funds we need.491
 In order to raise these funds, the station made particular efforts were made to garner 
support for the station within the Jewish labor movement. Mary Fox of the League for Industrial 
Democracy asked ILGWU President Benjamin Schlessinger to do three things:  
 (1) Immediately send a wire or letter to the FRC at Washington, (2) Despite the 
 depression and hard times recommend that your organization buy as many shares of 
 preferred stock as possible in order to firmly establish the Debs Memorial Station as a 
 university of the air for minority movements. It is understood that the money for 
 preferred stock shall not be accepted unless the $40,000-$50,000 necessary for the 
 proper operation of the station has been pledged. (3) That your union will plan one 
 or two courses in trade unionism or allied subjects to be given over the station next 
 year.492 
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 In addition to pledging money, many organizations filed affadavits with and sent 
resolutions to the FRC, including local unions, churches, and educational groups. In April 1931, 
WEVD recorded 223 passed resolutions supporting the station, representing over one million 
members of different organizations. Support did not just come from traditional left-wing 
organizations. The Social Service Committee of the New York East Conference of the Methodist 
Episcopal Church, which made frequent use of WEVD, recieved praise from taking such a stand. 
As one individual wrote to Rev. Paul DuBois, “Am mighty glad you are taking hold of this 
matter. In the present unrest so unjust an act against WEVD might be a spark in the powder-keg. 
Capitalism must be purged of its arrogance if it is to survive.” The Long Island Interscholastic 
Debating Society, comprised of seventeen Long Island secondary schools also defended the 
station, saying “from our own experience in the use of Station WEVD we were accorded every 
courtesy without suggestion or hint of restriction or censorship and were allowed complete 
expression of opinion.”493 If they had not segregated themselves from other broadcasting 
reformers, WEVD could have brought a tremendous amount of power to the legislative efforts 
that Nockels purused. 
 Gerber urged readers of the socialist publication The New Leader to cut out a petition 
heading printed in the publication, attach a sheet of white paper to it, collect signatures, and send 
the sheets to WEVD’s offices. The petition read: “To the Federal Radio Commission: We the 
undersigned, citizens of the United States, respectfully request the continuance of the broadcast 
license of station WEVD, a station dedicated to the dissemination of minority opinion.”
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The petition drive yielded 6,767 petitions with over one million signatures from 33 states and 
Canada.494 
 In September 1931, Caldwell submitted as evidence four “huge documents”-- a list of 
organizations who have sponsored WEVD; a list of speakers who have spoken over the station; a 
list of subject matters presented; and a record of talks over the station. Caldwell said,  
 You will find every school of thought is represented among the speakers, including 
 representatives of organizations with which the Socialist party is constantly at war. You 
 will find every worthy movement of civic, charitable, or philanthropic nature furthered 
 and encouraged by this station.495
 Ultimately, though, it was B.C. Vladeck and the Jewish Daily Forward who made the 
necessary contibution in order to prove to the FRC that the station would have the resources it 
needed manage WEVD in a professional way and adhere to strict technical requirements. 
Caldwell explained at the September 1931 hearing that one week before, the Forward 
contributed $70,000 to the station. “The organization has,” Caldwell explained,  
 in addition, agreed to underwrite a fund of at least $200,000 for the operation of WEVD 
 and will use its best endeavors to collect it within three years from the other organizations 
 supporting WEVD. In case it should not succeed in getting all the money from the 
 other organizations, it will appropriate its own money up to $200,000. This, it seems 
 to me, should remove all doubt on the question of finance. I am sorry that it has seemed 
 to loom so large with the Examiner, and that the moral assets of the station, its good will 
 and support among many reputable organizations, have counted for so little.496 
As Vladeck stated in an affidavit, “The Jewish Daily Forward has at all times aided the WEVD 
Station because it maintained a free and open Forum which we believe was beneficial to the 
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community. We would like to see the Station continue and prosper and are ready, willing and 
able to  help it.”497  
 Finally, in October 1931, the FRC agreed to renew WEVD’s license. Although the 
chairman of the Commission dissented, claiming that “there is no reason to believe that the 
physical conditions at this station, or the lack of supervision by responsible officers of the 
licensee, will be corrected,” a majority of members believed that Caldwell and Gerber had 
demonstrated that WEVD rendered a public service and that they were “making dilligent effort 
to secure modern transmitting equipment which is in compliance with Commission regulations 
and modern engineering standards.” Given the Jewish Daily Forward’s financial bailout, 
however, the station would undergo dramatic transformations during the New Deal period. 
Having revived the Forward through the previous decade by relying on advertising, Vladeck 
applied similar techniques in the radio arena. As WEVD grew into a powerful cultural force 
through the 1930s, it moved away from its original socialist mission, rearticulating its identity 
along the lines of community and ethnicity.498  
Moving “Forward”?: WEVD and Commodified Ethnicity
 In 1932, Vladeck, now chairman of the board of the Debs Memorial Fund, approached 
Morris Novik about becoming the station’s progamming manager. “I was very close to Mr. 
Vladeck,” said Novik in an interview. “He was a great orator. I admired the man actually for 
years. He was closer than my own father. We had something in common although he was older 
than I was. He was, as I say, one of my gods.” According to Ari Kelman, Novik would only take 
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the position after Vladeck assured him that Abraham Cahan and the Forward newspaper would 
exercise no control over the station.499 Thus, WEVD maintained formal independence from the 
Forward although Vladeck’s business decisions and strategies reshaped both insitutions in 
similar ways.  
Vladeck and Novik committed to establishing WEVD on a self-sustaining basis. Within 
two years, the station went from running losses of approximately 64 percent in 1933, to profits of 
nearly 22 percent in 1935. By 1938, the station was earning profits of nearly 47 percent. They 
accomplished this through the same strategy that Vladeck had used at the Forward-- bringing in 
advertising revenue. Although the station’s expenses also increased, WEVD’s income grew by 69 
percent from 1933 to 1934. In September 1934, the station raised advertising rates, leading to 
projected increases in income for 1935. “The first month of the new year started off with a good 
stride,” reported the WEVD Board of Directors in 1935. “The charges for advertising in January 
will probably be double that of a year ago... Our income for the first four months will be large 
enough to offset any precipitate drop which we cannot now foresee. On the other hand, 
conditions may improve and present opportunities for greater accomplishments.”500 
Vladeck and Novik worked to create what Kelman terms “a two-tiered station.” On the 
one hand, they aimed to meet their public interest requirements and garner the respect of elites 
through English-language, educational programming. At the same time, they could only do this 
through broadcasting highly commercialized foreign-language content. Both of these genres, 
though, helped to preserve a space on the air where labor unions could work with the station to 
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develop programming. Thus, WEVD constructed a new public on the air for the CIO era, where 
ethnic identity was at once reinforced through commercial programming, and shed in the name 
of building a multiethnic trade union movement. 
In the 1930s, WEVD derived most of its financing from and devoted most of its 
programming to ethnic audiences, delivering non-English language programs. While, as business 
manager of the Forward, Vladeck had become increasingly concerned with producing not simply  
a Yiddish-language, but a Jewish publication. Similarly, WEVD increasingly turned towards 
representing ethnicity on the air in order to meet advertiser demands. Yiddish entertainment, in 
particular, according to Nathan Godfried, “urged the consumption of everything from noodles to 
furniture to headache remedies to Coney Island excursions.”501 
The attainment of these sponsored programs was most certainly linked to the station’s 
affiliation with the Forward, already branded by this point as a gateway to New York’s vast 
Jewish market, and the work of two advertising agencies-- the Joseph Jacobs Company and the 
Advertisers Broadcast Company (ABC). Joseph Jacobs, which would re-contract with the 
Forward and the Day by 1938, and ABC took on the task of “not only selling airtime and 
managing contracts but also producing and transcribing programs that it could distribute to 
stations that signed up for their service.” While the first Yiddish radio ads were, by and large, for 
companies such as Manischewitz, that specialized in Jewish foods, by the end of the 1930s major 
brands like Maxwell House and Carnation Milk were marketing themselves to audiences through 
sponsored Yiddish programs.502 While Yiddish-language speakers had been listening to English-
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language programming for years, Yiddish language programming on WEVD helped to produce a 
commodity audience to sell products to a niche market. 
This attention towards commercially viable ethnic programming was not out of desire, 
but out of necessity. “Let it not be assumed,” the WEVD’s board reported,
 ...that the absence of English commercials on WEVD is due to any lack of effort on the 
 part of the management and its staff. The limited time schedule, the broken up time, as 
 well as keen competitive conditions prevalent among local stations that cater to English 
 commercials, render any progress in that direction difficult. Several English sponsors 
 who tried out our English language time found it sadly unproductive. From all 
 indications, our English audience at night is very small compared with our foreign 
 language audience during the day.
In addition to Yiddish, other languages were also represented on WEVD through sponsored 
programs. Kelman argues that “the reason for this was simple. No station could earn enough 
income from advertising solely to the Jewish community, so they carried whatever programs they 
could in whatever languages would garner the support of sponsors.”503 
 As the station’s board of directors noted in 1935, “Our income, as in the past, is almost 
entirely derived from foreign language commercials confined to the daytime hours, with the 
exception of Saturday night. Our operations now extend, in addition to English, three foreign 
languages-- Yiddish, Italian, Polish.”During the week of January 21, 1934, for example, WEVD 
carried 11 hours of Yiddish language, 12 hours of Italian language, and 3 hours of Polish 
language commercial programming, 70 percent of which was commercially sponsored. While 
nearly half of all programming, 24 of 50 total hours, was in English, 16.5 of those hours were 
sustaining programs.504 Thus, the revenues from Yiddish and Italian language advertising 
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allowed WEVD to remain afloat so that it could continue to broadcast English language, 
educational programs.
 As the Forward had done, WEVD articulated Jewishness, consumerism and socialism in 
such a way that they were not necessarily at odds with each other. Demonstrating the continuity 
of political identity that could be maintained through light entertainment programming, one 
social worker living in Brooklyn wrote to Vladeck asking the station to rebroadcast “the Jewish 
wedding between the Socialist and his bride, which we had been eagerly looking forward to 
hearing,” after she and her family had tuned in to the station too late. “Your Jewish hours are 
indeed educational, progressive and entertaining not only to ‘old world Jews’ but also to 
American Jews such as me and my own little family.”505
 Still, the new centrality that Jewishness occupied did cause some political stalwarts 
alarm. One friend wrote to Vladeck in 1936 after tuning in to WEVD and hearing “a familiar 
voice” wish listeners “a guten Kosheren Pesach,” or a good, kosher Passover. 
Having definitely decided who it was since it could be no other, something happened 
 which to me was astounding. The fact itself was simple enough but its implications to one 
 who had been brought up on the East Side in the neighborhood of 175 East Broadway 
 were truly revolutionary. I have not yet decided whether I should consider it was an 
 expression of liberalism or one of the signs of surrender of the revolutionary spirit.506
Kelman argues that Yiddish radio programs produced an “aesthetic of intimacy” and 
reinforced communal bonds.507 In prior decades, though, the Yiddish vaudeville theater, for 
example, also provided light entertainment while providing the opportunity to build political and 
social institutions through benefit performances. Yiddish radio, then, allowed major corporations 
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to capitalize on what had previously been non-commercial cultural forms. Thus, Yiddish 
language commercial broadcasting allowed WEVD to remain a presence within the Jewish 
community, but had contradictory implications for the maintenance of a broad Jewish working-
class counterpublic.   
Educational Broadcasting and the Decline of Socialism
 While Yiddish-language programming, by and large, lacked an explicitly political edge, 
the educational programming that had been the cornerstone of WEVD prior to 1932 became 
increasingly, through the decade, more reflective of a vaguely liberal politics. As Vladeck had 
insisted that the Forward was no longer a labor paper but a Jewish paper, Novik determined to 
play down the station’s socialist origins. “We had given up the original direction,” said Novik, 
“and become community oriented. At WEVD we broadcast debates of all sorts.”508 To some 
extent, this was a continuation of the station’s long held policy that it would be a forum for 
discussion from a broad range of viewpoints. But Vladeck and Novik did not discuss this 
practice as reflective of a broader socialist perspective as the previous leadership (and even Louis 
Caldwell) had done before the FRC. Rather, WEVD sought to represent themselves as an 
educational station free of political bias.  
! This was, in part, because the FRC and later, the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC), failed to recognize non-English programming as serving “the public interest.” This was 
not predicated on the highly commercial nature of most of this programming, but rather on the 
understanding that the public interest would be better served by “Americanization.” Yiddish-
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language broadcasters other than WEVD all argued on behalf of serving their distinct 
communities, while regulators identified the “public interest” in national terms. In 1933, when 
Gerber served as the attorney for WBBC, one of four Brooklyn stations threatened with deletion, 
the former WEVD director argued that broadcasters serving areas with large immigrant 
populations were compelled to air programs in native languages in order to bring “foreign 
elements... into sympathy and consonance with the American scene, purposes and ideals...”509   
! Despite the high volume of foreign language content on WEVD, the station successfully 
avoided such scrutiny by touting its educational programming. While federal regulators were 
responsible for the commercialization of the airwaves, non-network stations were held to a 
higher standard than their corporate counterparts, having to meet public interest requirements 
that conflicted with sponsors’ interests. Stuck between a rock and a hard place, Vladeck and 
Novik tried to raise enough revenue as an independent station through foreign language 
entertainment while highlighting their educational program. For example, University of the Air 
began broadcasting in 1932 when Novik arrived at the station. John Dewey and Hendrik Willem 
Van Loon were enlisted as deans. Fannie Hurst gave a series of lectures on literature, and 
Sigmund Spaeth, “the Tune Detective,” did a series on popular music. “Ultimately,” explained 
Novik, “we were hoping to be able to break through where one of the schools of learning would 
take on this business.” Before leaving the station in 1936, Novik was in conversation with New 
York University to get them to air their courses over the station.510 
The program was not a particularly novel idea. Universities were among the first 
institutions to make use of broadcasting technology, and education advocates, such as Joy Elmer 
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Morgan of the National Committee on Education by Radio (NCER), were among the staunchest 
opponents of broadcasting’s commercialization. In addition, the National Advisory Council on 
Radio in Education (NACRE), supported by network executives such as Merlin Aylesworth, 
worked strategically to divert attention and resources away from NCER while advocating for 
educational broadcasting within a commercial system.511 The University of the Air, then, 
functioned to insulate the commercial broadcasting system from criticism, moving WEVD’s 
image away from its SP roots and reorienting it towards association with a liberal elite.
 The focus on educational programming functioned strategically in its battles with the 
FCC. Between 1934 and 1938, WEVD attempted to secure more time, not only to give the 
station a greater presence on the air, but also to make it more attractive to advertisers. In 1934, 
Alexander Kahn, Vice President of the Debs Memorial Fund and Vladeck’s second-in-command 
at the Forward, filed an application for unlimited time, requesting that it be given “the facilities 
of Stations WBBC, WLTH, WARD, and WFOX,” and that the stations that it shared time with be 
moved to the 1400 kilocycle frequency. “This change,” Kahn argued, “will remove the time 
restriction now burdening applicant in the conduct of its policy of maintaining a free and open 
forum for the discussion of political, social, economic and educational questions and will thereby 
enable it to render a more complete public service than is possible with its present time 
limitations.”512 
 At the hearing before the FCC, WEVD once again went up against seemingly natural 
allies. This time, though, Louis Caldwell and others from his Chicago-based law firm, Kirkland, 
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Fleming, Green and Martin, faced off against WEVD’s former leader, G. August Gerber. Gerber 
provided counsel to WBBC, also arguing for the right to unlimited time at 1400 kilocycles. 
According to the FCC Examiner’s Report, between 30 and 50 percent of the programming on 
WBBC was commercial, “20 to 30% educational, religious and fraternal and about 30% to 
musical entertainment sustaining programs.” The station broadcast in a wide variety of 
languages, and offered its facilities to a wide array of community organizations at no charge.513 
 WEVD did not have a significantly different schedule. However the Examiner’s Report 
described them as offering 33% of their time to sponsored, and 67% to sustained programs-- 
seemingly skewed numbers based on WEVD Board of Directors’ reports. Making no mention, 
either of the station’s foreign-language programs, the Examiner noted the “outstanding regular 
educational features such as the ‘University of the Air’ in which groups of authorities on 
particular subjects are invited to participate in well organized and planned adult educational 
programming.” WEVD suggested to the Commission that, if granted the license modification, 
they would “devote the additional evening hours after 6 p.m. to an extension of its educational 
and cultural broadcasts.” Thus, WEVD argued that programming on WBBC and the other 
Brooklyn-based stations broadcasting at 1400 kilocycles offered fare that was “generally of poor 
quality and insufficiently meritorious to warrant their continued operation” in contrast to WEVD 
which claimed to offer “high-grade educational and cultural service of vital interest to the New 
York metropolitan area.”514
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 In an attempt to get unlimited time, Vladeck solicited the support of First Lady Eleanor 
Roosevelt. Vladeck wrote to her in 1935 as a member of the New York City Housing Authority,   
May I be permitted to thank you for the graciousness of your reception this morning. I 
 don’t know what is the greater honor-- to meet the First Lady of the Land, or to meet a 
 First Lady of any land. Irrespective of whatever happens to the application of WEVD for 
 the extension of time now pending before the Federal Communications Commission, I 
 shall remain, always and humbly, yours... 
Mrs. Roosevelt’s office made several attempts, at least, to inquire into the FCC’s proceedings 
around WEVD’s application, and expressed regret that the results were “unfavorable.”515
 Red-baiting and political discrimination threatened these potential political alliances, and 
thus, the station’s existential future. In 1934, when the FCC increased WEVD’s power from 500 
to 1000 watts, right-wing attacks prompted Eleanor Roosevelt and Secretary of Labor Frances 
Perkins to deny any knowledge of the station’s existence, let alone helping the station secure a 
higher power allocation. In 1937, Vladeck defended against allegations of being “some kind of 
Communist outfit.”  [W]e are a decent lot,” Vladeck said, 
 and...in fact we are more conservative than we should be... I don’t know whether these 
 gentlemen know anything about the Forward and the radio station we operate. But you 
 can tell them about the Forward and as for Station WEVD, if they look up some of the 
 reports of the Federal Communications Commission, they will see for themselves that we 
 are rated the best of the smaller stations in the Metropolitan area.516
As such, Vladeck made sure that his enemies on the Left did not use the station in a way that 
would jeopardize his relationships with those in positions of political power. On one occasion, 
for example, Vladeck tried to dissuade the ILGWU from meeting in City Hall Plaza, after it had 
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already been announced on WEVD. The announcement put Vladeck in an uncomfortable 
position with New York Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia. Vladeck denied knowledge of the meeting, 
and explained to the union that LaGuardia could not permit the event “because it would open the 
door to Communists and others...”517
 Vladeck tried to protect the station from appearing to be too left wing, and jeopardizing 
its license and relationships with advertisers. Under Vladeck’s and Novik’s management, 
representatives of the SP were asked repeatedly to yield their time scheduled time on the station 
in order to leave room for sponsored programs. Discourse on the educational programs moved 
increasingly towards the center. At some points, this upset several key allies. In 1935, for 
example, Judge Charles Colden went on the air on station WEVD, despite the fact that Colden 
had presided over the case of Athos Torzani, an Italian anti-fascist who had been charged with 
murder. Liberal and radical organizations had formed a defense committee to garner support for 
Torzani. As Norman Thomas said, “There is no requirement in justice or in tactics that compels 
WEVD to give recognition to a man who so thoroughly has proved himself an enemy of justice 
as Colden, unless possibly a debate might show up his actions.”518 
 In another scenario, Judge Jacob Panken, a prominent socialist, told Vladeck that 
although he enjoyed the musical portion of the evening, he was “heartsore” that he had not been 
included on a University of the Air panel at a WEVD party. “I overheard several remarks 
commentatory of the fact that no Socialist was in the University of the Air, excepting, of course, 
yourself which probably resulted because you could not easily be eliminated.” By 1936, when 
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Vladeck and the leaders of the garment unions formed the American Labor Party in order to 
endorse FDR and the New Deal without defecting all the way to the Democratic Party, the 
Forward and WEVD were no longer officially affiliated with the Socialist Party. As Henry 
Laidler wrote, 
 I wonder what Eugene V. Debs, if he were alive, would say about a Debs radio which 
 gives any amount of time to those who were advocating the election of candidates of a 
 capitalist party but which gave practically no chance for candidates of the Socialist party 
 to present their message.519 
But despite the station’s loosening ties to its SP roots, Morris Novik helped WEVD reignite trade 
unionism in the 1930s as the engine of the New Deal.
Morris Novik and The Labor Education Tradition
 Although the garment unions had given institutional support to WEVD through its early 
years, it wasn’t until the Forward’s takeover of the station in 1932 that they began to play a 
greater role in developing programming. While WEVD developed light entertainment in foreign 
languages to pay the bills, and educational programs to demonstrate their commitment to the 
public interest, the station, under Novik, provided a space for labor programming that developed 
union culture during the New Deal period. 
  As the associate manager at the ILGWU’s Unity House, prior to taking his position at 
WEVD, Novik forged “links between the labor movement and cultural organizations of artists 
and intellectuals.” This was part of a broader strategy to remake these institutions in response to 
the shifting demographics and political demands of the moment. Novik had changed “the 
concept” of the hotel, in order to bring in growing numbers of workers from outside of the 
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needletrades. He worked to bring prominent artists to entertain the resort’s working-class guests 
and changed the language of the programming and the signs from Yiddish and Russian to 
English.520 Similarly, although Novik oversaw the ethnicization of programming at WEVD in 
order to attract advertising revenue, he also continued the work he had started at Unity House of 
building a multiethnic, American labor movement that spoke to a broad audience in English. 
 Radio broadcasting became increasingly important to meet the national organizing 
demands spurred by the Great Depression, and the opportunities that opened with National 
Recovery Act (NRA) and the Wagner Act. Labor programs combined “live classical music, 
sketches, and prominent political and labor speakers,” bridging the worlds of high culture, 
popular culture and politics. Dramatized histories, speeches by labor leaders, and information 
about industrial struggles worked to educate new members about the labor movement, and draw 
them in to union life, bolstering a massive wave of organizing.521 
 Novik’s home union, the ILGWU and its locals, took advantage of the possibilities of 
broadcasting more than any other union. While WEVD provided a base for these operations, 
Novik worked with labor leaders to develop programs that they could sponsor on commercial 
stations throughout the country. Thus, Novik and the ILGWU used radio to bring the cultural 
approaches that had been cultivated for decades within the Jewish working-class counterpublic to 
a broad, national audience.  
 In order to reach smaller cities, Novik recommended to ILGWU President David 
Dubinsky that they connect previously recorded programs to local leaders, such as a “mayor, 
head of N.R.A, or an outstanding Rabbi... Any particular message that might be necessary in the 
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specific community in which the record is used, can be covered by a script sent to the local 
station announcer or to the organizer if he is qualified.” In larger cities, like Chicago, Cleveland 
and St. Louis, Novik recommended soliciting the assistance of “the most prominent men and 
women who are associated with the general movement” in order to maximize publicity for the 
project. In the summer of 1935, a series of six broadcasts dramatizing the history of the union 
aired on WEVD on Wednesdays from 10 to 10:15 pm. The broacasts were electrically 
transcribed so that they could be “reproduced in other localities so that union members 
throughout the country” could hear them.522 
 WEVD also provided a space for relatively broad range of debate about labor politics, all 
be it within the bounds of the non-Communist trade union movement. For example, in 1934, 
Charles Zimmerman of ILGWU Local 22 argued on air against the conservative approach AFL 
President William Green took towards the San Francisco General Strike. But during the 
following year, Vladeck told William Green that he was “very proud both of the militancy and 
lucidity” of his recent speech “coming over thru WEVD- a non-profit radio [station] devoted 
entirely to the interests of American Labor.”523
 Perhaps most importantly, Novik and Vladeck hoped to ensure that the labor movement 
would remain a staunch anti-fascist force in the 1930s, rather than dividing along ethnic lines. 
The program The Voice of Local 89, was aimed at the Italian workers of ILGWU Local 89 led by  
Luigi Anotini, and worked to educate the large numbers of new members, “NRA babies.” Novik 
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suggested to Antonini to develop a radio program rather than having regular mass meeetings at 
Madison Square Garden in order to accomodate the union’s 30,000 members. 
 Of course, the Fascists were opposed to it. WEVD lost every Italian account. Every 
 Italian commercial merchant got off the station because of the pressure by the Italian 
 Consulate and the Government of Italy. But that didn’t make a damn bit of difference to 
 us. We lost $20,000 in income. Vladeck said, “Don’t worry about it. If we have to we can 
 go out and beg $20,000.”524
But while Vladeck and Novik were quite comfortable losing revenue from fascist sympathizers, 
they actively sought to bring in as much revenue as possible from labor programs. From the 
beginning of Novik’s tenure, it was the station’s policy to urge labor unions to pay for air time 
when possible.  
 Corporate sponsorship of labor programming, however, was the ultimate goal, directly 
providing resources, rather than relying on the unions themselves, to help maintain the station. In 
1937, for example, Novik “had Avalon Cigarettes convinced that we had an audience” for the 
American Federation of Labor convention “and they were going to sponsor the broadcast. The 
station was just beginning to get public recognition and commercial recognition...”525 As 
Vladeck had done at the Forward, the advertising practices at WEVD demonstrated that trade 
unionism and consumerism were not mutually exclusive, laying the groundwork for the postwar 
consumer society.
Conclusion
 In 1938, WEVD’s long quest for a full time license came to an end when the FCC 
allowed Fifth Avenue Broadcasting to sell WFAB, which had also specialized in foreign 
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language programming, and all of the station’s “real and personal property to the Debs Memorial 
Radio Fund for $85,000”-- the balance of the pledge the Forward Association still owed the Fund 
at that point. Proposing to use the new time for 20 percent commercial and 80 percent sustained 
programming, WEVD claimed that the allocation of the new station would allow for an 
expansion of the University of the Air and other public services, such as a regular period to air 
WPA Adult Education courses, of “special interset for housewives and foreign-born, on 
elementary subjects.” As Novik told the FCC “there have been less broadcasts from public 
functions in the evening during 1937 than any year before, and that holds for the whole 
industry.”526 Certainly, the need for this brand of programming was greater than ever given the 
widespread commercialization of the medium that had taken place by this point. 
 Never, though, during the previous decade did the leadership at WEVD work in any 
fundamental way to stop the onslaught of commercialism that ultimately constrained the station. 
While the Socialists received a massive showing of support for WEVD from Jewish labor 
organizations and a wide coalition of other progressive interests as early as 1928, they chose not 
to work alongside the broader labor movement and other broadcasting reformers to build radio 
broadcasting as a non-commercial medium. While Edward Nockels fought in the early 1930s for 
legislation that would guarantee a space for working-class voices on the air, the Socialists 
cultivated comfortable relationships with David Sarnoff, Merlin Aylesworth, and perhaps most 
importantly, Louis Caldwell. After 1932, under the direction of B.C. Vladeck, WEVD turned 
against other small stations, similar to itself, that had been badly injured by the FRC’s General 
Order 40 in order to attain its own license for unlimited time. 
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 Although Gerber, Thomas, Vladeck and Novik failed to demonstrate a strong 
committment to the principles of solidarity in their struggles with federal regulators and the 
commercial broadcasting industry, they were able to produce new forms of solidarity on the air. 
Labor programming in the 1930s helped to educate new members of the ILGWU about their 
union’s history, and brought them into the union’s culture. In particular, The Voice of Local 89 
worked to hold union members together despite divisive international politics. Although labor 
programming was subject to the pressures of commercialism, its continued presence set the stage 
for a boom in union broadcasting in the late 1940s spearheaded by Novik, the ILGWU and the 
United Auto Workers, in their quest for a FM station, WFDR.527  
 WEVD’s sustained, educational programming also provided a public service with 
important residual effects. Distinct from political programming, the University of the Air brought 
non-commercial programming to a broadly defined public. Rather than advocating particular 
candidates or political positions, educational programming on WEVD often included discussion 
regarding controversial issues without taking an explicit side. This model of broadcasting, along 
with WEVD’s arguments in defense of its license, embodied notions of the “public interest” that 
would become in encoded in later years in the FCC’s “fairness doctrine.”528  
 Novik’s development of educational programs at WEVD also helped to define the nature 
of “public broadcasting” that would emerge over the next several decades. He left the station in 
1938 at the request of Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia to serve as the Commissioner of 
281
527 Novik interview; Elizabeth Fones-Wolf, Waves of Opposition: Labor and the Struggle for Democratic Radio. 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2006); Michael Stamm, “Anti-Semitism, Prior Restraint, and the Politics of 
Post-WWII Broadcasting In New York City.” Presented at the American Journalism Historians Association Annual 
Meeting, Seattle, WA, October 2008.
528 Before the Federal Communications Commission, March 1, 1938, 55; Gullifor and Carlson, 213-4.
Communincations of the City of New York and as programming director at the municipal station 
WNYC where he first coined the term “public broadcasting.” He said, 
 Our programs were constantly an expansion of the fertile minds of young people as to 
 how to serve people best, or how to serve them most. When you have that opportunity in 
 a place like New York, or for that matter, anywhere, it’s your vision, it’s your brain that 
 can think up programs that will permit other people to share their talent with you and 
 with the station.
Although Novik continued to serve the labor movement throughout his life, he saw his work at 
WNYC as part of a more important commitment to democracy in the broadest sense, solidified 
by Hitler’s move into Czecheslovakia.529 As a staunch anti-Communist and anti-fascist, Novik 
developed public broadcasting as a uniquely liberal enterprise, theoretically free of commercial 
and state influence or of explicit party ideology. Public broadcasting would thus attempt to 
represent and produce a Habermasian space of rational public discourse as commercialism 
encroached on the bulk of American social life. 
 By the 1980s, however, Novik was quite critical of how public broadcasting had 
developed. “[M]any of those who are now running the public stations really aren’t aware of the 
history and the public consciousness...” said Novik. 
 I can see it in the operation of Channel 13 [New York’s WPBS]. When you start getting 
 into an operation which has $15,000,000- $16,000,000 a year you fall into all sorts of 
 traps, because you’re looking for perfection of a product that will win you awards and 
 that will get you recognition... so that you may become a vice president of something 
 else, not just maybe staying with your station.530
To some extent though, this course had been set by WEVD. The compromises that Vladeck, 
Thomas, Gerber and Novik made at the get go helped to ensure the dominance of a commercial 
media system. Rather than working with Nockels and other media policy reformers to ensure that 
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non-commercial broadcasting would play a significant role in the broad media landscape, 
WEVD’s founders-- having already become comfortable with advertising through their 
relationship to the Forward and developing relationships with leaders in the radio trust-- helped 
to create a situation where public broadcasting in the U.S. would not be the standard in the U.S., 
but would be relegated to ameliorating the externalities produced by a for-profit system.531 
 Although WEVD claimed publicly to be most interested in developing educational 
programs, the economic realities brought by the pressures of operating within a commercial 
system compelled the station to devote large portions of its schedule to foreign languange, 
sponsored entertainment. This trend continued beyond WEVD’s attainment of a full time license  
and acquisition of WFAB, despite the fact that its rationale for being allowed the extra time was 
to increase educational programming. While this did happen, the 1939 Board of Directors Report 
demonstrates that commercial broadcasting also increased. “The thirty-six acquired new hours 
made possible a reallocation and expansion of our foreign language programs, giving us a larger 
block of time in each language for more advantageous commercial exploitation,” yielding higher 
income figures for the last quarter of 1938. “There remains a good portion of timne for 
commercial purposes,” the report declared, “and every effort is now devoted toward building and 
promoting programs that would attract and maintain new commercial sponsors. In 1938, WEVD 
earned over $85,000 in net profits, a far cry from its early days where it was consistently in the 
red. Ironically, as Nathan Godfried notes, the new programming director George Field had to rely 
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increasingly on sponsored programs after the purchase of WFAB in order to fill its schedule, 
limiting the time that could be devoted to labor programs.532 
 Foreign language programming on WEVD had contradictory implications, both breaking 
down and solidifying social barriers. While labor programming addressed immigrants and their 
families as workers, sponsored foreign language entertainment served to rearticulate the 
importance of ethnic community. By positioning different ethnic groups alongside each other on 
the air-- Jewish, Italian, Polish-- WEVD’s commercial imperatives yielded a representation of 
the emerging coalition of “white ethnic” workers. Thus, WEVD helped to construct a multiethnic 
public of “hyphenated Americans.” Reflecting the tensions at the Hotel Claridge, however, the 
formation of this new identity through ethnic radio, as Derek Vaillant suggests, worked to 
solidify racial hierarchies at the expense of African Americans, mirroring many of the New 
Deal’s limitations.533 
 In addition, WEVD’s distinctions between foreign language entertainment and labor 
programming, served to segment the politics of ethnicity from the politics of labor. Rather than 
being identified with oppositional politics as it was in the early decades of the Jewish working 
class counterpublic, ethnicity as represented on WEVD, was becoming a consumer identity. 
Thus, in helping to build a national labor movement, the Jewish-led trade unions were 
instrumental in building an institution that ultimately fragmented the ethno-political identity that 
was central to the early counterpublic. By the late 1930s and early 1940s, the tensions would 
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become more apparent as the Newspaper Guild came into conflict with the old unions within the 
Yiddish newspaper industry. 
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Chapter Seven:
Organizing the Organizers: 
The Newspaper Guild and Jewish Working Class Media in the CIO Era
Sometimes I think I may be as good a tailor in the Newspaper Guild as I am sure I am a writer in 
the tailor’s union.-- J.B.S. Hardman534
Before the ‘Guild’ came into existence, the newspaper writer and other employees were among 
the most exploited and suppressed of the so-called ‘white collar’ workers... We are talking here 
about the American newspaper professions, not of the Yiddish, because in the Jewish newspaper 
world there exists a union of writers for over a quarter of a century, widely known as the I.L. 
Peretz Writer Verein. The union of Yiddish writers raised the journalistic profession to the 
highest level, and it was no other than the founder of the Newspaper Guild Heywood Broun that 
stated at one of the ‘Guild’ conventions that the Yiddish Writers Union should serve as an 
example to the American newspaperman. In passing, it will not be superfluous to recall that the 
Yiddish Writers Union helped materially and in other ways the ‘Newspaper Guild’ when it was 
still young and was not standing firm on its feet. How the ‘Newspaper Guild’ expressed its 
thanks to the Yiddish Writers Union is a chapter that we don’t wish to go into.535
 In an emerging atmosphere of red-baiting and anti-Communism, tensions emerged during 
the lead up to the Second World War between the institutions of the Jewish working-class 
counterpublic and the new unions of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). In 1941, the 
Newspaper Guild of New York brought eleven members of the International Ladies’ Garment 
Workers’ Union’s newspaper staff to trial. As Guild members, workers at the ILGWU’s Justice 
had objected to their union’s decision to call a strike at the Yiddish language newspaper, Der tog, 
or the Day. In their mind, the Guild was raiding an already standing union, the I.L. Peretz Verein, 
or Jewish Writers Union (JWU). While Guild organizers deemed  the JWU a “company union,” 
JWU supporters at Justice claimed that the Guild was raiding the organization and trying to take 
over Der tog in the service of Moscow. 
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 This conflict between the old institutions of Yiddish socialism and the Guild should be 
understood within the context of the changing dynamics of the media industry and the politics of 
the Popular Front era. Michael Denning locates the Newspaper Guild’s formation within a 
broader context of proletarianization at sites of cultural production. He argues that rank-and-file 
workers in the culture industry became “largely responsible for the Popular Front’s influence on 
mass culture” as artists “saw their work cut, cropped, and censored.” Industry unions, such as the 
Screen Actor’s Guild (SAG), the American Federation of Radio Artists (AFRA), and the 
National Association of Broadcast Engineers and Technicians (NABET) emerged in Hollywood 
and New York in response to the consolidation of an oligopolistic mass media system amidst the 
organizing drives of the New Deal era. This “laboring” of culture helped to produce “socially 
significant” films and radio programs through the commercial system, leading ultimately to 
Congress’ suspicion of the entertainment industry in the early years of the Cold War and the 
crackdown on the left by the film studios and union leaders.536 
 While workers in the entertainment industry gained, if only for a brief while, a relatively 
high level of creative agency through union activism, the American Newspaper Guild (ANG) 
was the union most overtly concerned with the role of the public in a democracy. Ben Scott 
argues that news workers played an important role in shaping the future of journalism at a 
“critical juncture” in both the media system and the broader political economy. Between 1933 
and 1941, the ANG became a tenacious component of the CIO movement, presenting a threat to 
the economic order of the newsroom and challenging the ideology and conventions of 
professional journalism that had evolved over the previous several decades. Its leaders 
287
536 Michael Denning, The Cultural Front. (New York: Verso, 1997), 85-90. 
understood the First Amendment as a public rather than a private right.537 But unlike individuals 
such as B.C. Vladeck, J.B.S. Hardman, Fannia Cohn, and Morris Novik, who worked to build 
media institutions for a working class public, the ANG approached the fight for a democratic 
public sphere from inside the belly of the beast-- the commercial newspaper industry, or what is 
commonly referred to today as “the mainstream media.”
 “[L]abor’s fight with the newspapers in the 1930s,” Scott writes, “was an attempt to win 
back the reigns of power over political communication for the public, in pursuit of a majoritarian 
view of the First Amendment.” The Guild’s aim was to restore balance in the power relationship 
between workers and owners in the newsrooms of the commercial press. The rise of the CIO in 
the 1930s allowed working people to imagine themselves as the public itself, and allowed the 
broader public to identify themselves alongside labor through a “broad vision of one-big-union 
with a transformative social vision was a powerful unifying force rooted in public power over 
labor and democratic discourse.”538
 In essence, the Guild resisted what Habermas called the refeudalization of the public 
sphere-- the creation of a “pseudo-public or sham-private world of culture consumption” by a 
minority class interest. Poor working conditions in newsrooms, and the political hegemony of 
moguls like William Randolph Hearst exposed professionalism as a myth during the 1930s. But 
early Guild leaders believed that through unionization they could, on behalf of the public, 
decentralize the power of the publishers “by distributing some of it to an economically 
autonomous, unionized newsroom...[insisting that publishers and workers alike] had a role to 
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play in a balance of positive and negative speech rights that best served the public interest.” Far 
from a full rejection of the notion of professionalism, Guild members wanted “to be reporters of 
impartial integrity representing all classes and interests in the society.”539 
 This claim to professional authority and ability to represent “all classes and interests” 
begs the question, what is the role, in such a system, of a labor press? What should be the 
relationship between the public sphere and counterpublics, between dominant and alternative 
media? The actions of the radical organizers at the Newspaper Guild of New York demonstrate a 
severe blind spot in their ideology of professionalism. They did not comprehend the importance 
of the labor and ethnic press to maintaining a broader, democratic public sphere, nor did they 
take into account the ethnic bonds that remained in tact after years of building a Jewish working 
class movement. 
 Jewish working class institutions-- the Forward, the garment unions, and WEVD-- had 
helped to build a national labor movement, embodied by the CIO. This national movement 
ultimately supplanted the community orientation that had characterized Jewish labor’s early 
history. But by the 1940s, these institutions no longer represented the vanguard of the U.S. labor. 
Bogged down in political divisions and ideological debates that no longer had resonance, and 
unable or unwilling to come to grips with the commodification processes that had taken hold 
within the Yiddish press, the leaders within the Jewish working class counterpublic had become 
in many respects a force of conservatism. As they had set the stage for the rise of the New Deal 
and the CIO in the 1920s, they now set the stage for the Cold War backlash against the left. 
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 In this chapter, I offer a denouement to my longer narrative by focusing on the debates 
around the Newspaper Guild’s strike at Der tog in 1941. This history helps to illustrate the 
collapse of the Jewish working class media system in the years just prior to World War Two. As 
professional newspaper workers came to think of themselves as stewards of the national public 
interest through the Newspaper Guild, they demonstrated a lack of appreciation for the important  
role of community media, of counterpublics, of the working-class press itself. While the 
commodification processes that had occurred throughout the previous two decades within the 
Jewish left press, the political turmoil within the garment unions, and the institutionalization of 
WEVD as an essentially commercial broadcaster had all helped to breed a national labor 
movement, they also worked to normalize the prevalence of commercial media institutions and 
forms. Thus, the Guild’s efforts to organize workers within the Jewish labor press shows the final 
struggles around the dissolution of the early Yiddish newspaper culture into the general 
commercial U.S. media system, and the dissolution of a hegemonic Jewishness centered on 
socialism, into a broader working-class American public committed to liberal anti-Communism.
The Newspaper Guild and the Peretz Verein
 The ANG first organized in 1933 in response to the increasingly tight control that owners 
exerted over newspapers and their workers, and the possibilities opened up by New Deal 
legislation. Uncertain whether they were a true labor union or a professional organization, Guild 
leaders initially sought to have a voice in the development of a Newspaper Code through the 
National Recovery Administration (NRA) to regulate their industry. Under the leadership of 
columnist Heywood Broun and other core organizers in New York, they argued for a code that 
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would mandate basic wage and hour protections. Although the publishers won this initial fight 
using the First Amendment as a shield against any interference, the nascent Guild introduced 
important debates regarding the role of the press, the government, and labor and was radicalized 
by the experience.540
 By the time of the ANG’s first convention in St. Paul, Minnesota in 1934, there were 70 
local guilds representing more than 7000 journalists, and they had won their first contract at the 
Philadelphia Record. The delegates passed resolutions that intimately linked the struggle for 
labor with the struggle for a democratic press and fair, responsible journalism. Although many 
Guild members still saw themselves as in a privileged position as white collar workers, this 
began to change with the Supreme Court’s 1935 ruling that the NRA was unconstitutional. At 
Broun’s urging, the Guild became a bona fide part of the labor movement, and affiliated with the 
AFL at their second annual convention in Cleveland.541  
 According to Scott, the Guild reached its apex of radicalism between 1936 and 1938. This 
was constituted not only by a commitment to industrial organizing and affiliation with the CIO, 
but through a broader social vision that it articulated regarding the role of the press. Attorney 
Morris Ernst exemplified this vision in an amicus curiae brief submitted to the Supreme Court in 
the case AP vs. NLRB. In defense of Morris Watson, “a conscious and calculated martyr” who 
had been fired from the Associated Press due to his Guild activism, Ernst argued that labor law 
and the First Amendment were intimately intertwined, that a free press was impossible if 
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journalists did not have the right to organize. As they understood it, the First Amendment was for 
the public, not for the publishers.542 
 Not surprisingly, many within the Jewish socialist and labor press were attracted to the 
Guild’s vision. The Guild’s commitment to the values of a free press and democracy especially 
resonated within the Amalgamated Clothing Workers. In 1936, the ACWA passed a resolution at 
their convention supporting the Guild’s ongoing strike at Hearst’s Milwaukee newspapers, and 
pledged funding to assist them. Charles Ervin, an Advance writer, said, 
 I have been spared to see over five thousand of my craft, the newspaper men of 
 America, organize a labor union. At first, most of them thought that they were different 
 from the ordinary workers...but before many months went on... they were being banged 
 up by the police and sent to the station house the same as some of you have been, in 
 strikes, in the Amalgamated... We now know that we are part of the struggle. We now 
 know that we are just workers.543
 But Jewish labor’s interest in the Guild went beyond a shared ideology. The material 
conditions workers faced within the Yiddish press by the mid-1930s necessitated an organized 
response. The vast changes that had taken place at the Forward, in particular, under B.C. 
Vladeck’s management had bred significant discontent, prompting writers to consider the need 
for organized response. What’s more, the shared contract between the Forward, the Day and the 
Morning Journal with the Joseph Jacobs Advertising Agency meant that these three 
‘competitors’ were linked to each other, not only politically and culturally, but economically as 
well. In this context, the Guild’s industrial organizing and collective bargaining had a lot to offer. 
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Beginning in 1937, the Guild established contracts with the three Yiddish papers covering more 
than 100 workers.544 
 Editorial workers, however, could not join the Guild, because they were already members 
of the I.L. Peretz Verein, or the Jewish Writers Union (JWU). While the JWU did negotiate 
working conditions, it functioned quite differently than the ANG and the emerging industrial 
unions, as more of a professional literary society than a trade union. In addition, the organization 
consisted of members who were not regularly employed at a newspaper, but were in other 
professions who might have, at one point, made a brief contribution to one of the journals. The 
JWU did not reflect the adversarial relationship that characterized CIO unions with their 
employers, but rather a communal mentality that understood both workers and employers as 
being joined together through a commitment to a political-cultural movement. But the expansion 
of commodification processes at the newspapers had made the JWU, in the minds of some 
members, outdated and ineffectual. As one Forward writer told an official from the Newspaper 
Guild of New York, “We are members of a union-- and we are not in the real sense. The union 
which is recognized in the Editorial Department does not have any official relations with us and 
in a sense we are step-children.”545 
 By October 1936, the Guild Executive Committee had drawn up a plan to bring the 
Jewish Writers Union into the Newspaper Guild of New York. The Guild Executive Committee 
recognized the “pioneering” work of the JWU “in the organization of editorial departments,” and 
“in the establishment of minimum wages, security of employment and in participating in the 
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cultural life of the community.” But it was the organization’s role within the community that 
particularly caused a problem for the emerging Guild. Although the Guild noted that it  had “no 
objection to preserving the integrity of the Peretz Verein as an organization carrying on, as in the 
past, its cultural work and in maintaining its system of relief to the unemployed,” doing so 
“would entail... changes in the constitution of the Peretz Verein” in order to comply with that of 
the ANG.546
 Although it allowed unit members to play the role of observers during negotiations, the 
Guild’s constitution gave negotiating power to the Executive Committee. Some JWU members 
feared that this would mean a decline in their working conditions. Despite problems in the 
Yiddish newspaper field, workers were generally better treated and better paid than in the general 
English language press. Guild leaders refuted such concerns:
 The Newspaper Guild does not hold to the view that affiliation of the Newspaper Guild 
 will jeopardize the higher standards of employment now enjoyed by the Yiddish language 
 newspaper workers. On the contrary, we are convinced that joining organizationally with 
 the majority of newspaper editorial employees in NYC and thus entering the ranks of an 
 increasingly important national organization of newspapermen and women will serves as 
 a further guarantee that such standards as have been achieved will be preserved and 
 improved. On the one hand improving the general conditions of employment on all 
 newspapers remove gradually the threat to the higher-paid; on the other hand, the unity of 
 all newspapermen will safeguard the gain that have been made.547
 The JWU did not respond to the Guild until December. At that point, they explained that 
since his union was in negotiations with all publishers at that point, they were not prepared to 
make a decision. Writers at the Forward, however, had already begun to affiliate with the Guild, 
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leading to the prospect of joint collaboration.548 It seemed as though the media system that 
sustained Yiddish socialist culture and politics was becoming integrated into the broader labor 
movement, and the broader public sphere. This process, however, was disrupted by several 
ideological fractures. 
Anti-Communism and Warring Factions in the Late 1930s
 By the end of 1938, the Guild’s radicalism was being tempered by an onslaught by right-
wing publishers, conservative AFL leaders, and allegations of Communist affiliations. During a 
critical strike at Hearst’s Herald-Examiner and Evening American in Chicago, AFL-affiliated 
printers broke the Guild strike, and the Federation created company unions at the two 
newspapers, helping Hearst to break the CIO union. The enormous defeat paved the way for the 
magnification of internal political divisions. Patriotism became increasingly central to political 
discourse as Roosevelt abandoned his left-wing base and concentrated on preparing for war. The 
Dies Committee in Congress began investigations of Communism within the New Deal 
bureaucracy. By 1940, the Guild’s radical leadership in New York had come under fire with red-
baiting and charges of un-Americanism.549 
 The Jewish labor movement, and particularly the garment unions, had longstanding 
complex relationships with the AFL and the CIO. On the one hand, the garment unions had 
always had been in tension with the AFL, dating back to the early 1910s and Gompers’ 
involvement in propagandizing the East Side during World War One. The Amalgamated Clothing 
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Workers had been founded in direct opposition to the Federation- backed United Garment 
Workers in Chicago. But despite the fact that their organizational approach, their social 
unionism, and their use of culture all became highly influential within the broader CIO, President 
David Dubinsky of the ILGWU decided to remain with the AFL after John Lewis of the United 
Mine Workers determined that the CIO unions should make a full break in 1936.550 Although 
Sidney Hillman and the ACWA remained with the CIO, they retained a strong relationship with 
their sister union.  
 Like the AFL leaders, Dubinsky had been in long-standing opposition to Communist 
Party collaboration. Within the context of the highly combative Jewish labor movement, though, 
this anti-Communism had a different valance. The old Socialists, the Yiddish “right,” had 
established its antipathy towards the CP during the Communists’ stridently uncompromising 
“third period.” Indeed, the Forward, the ACWA, and the ILGWU had all been critical of 
Communism’s tendency towards ideological orthodoxy that stifles a broad discussion among the 
left. This frustration existed not only among the top bureaucrats, but among those most genuinely  
concerned for union democracy as well-- J.B.S. Hardman and Fannia Cohn among them. By 
1937, however, the Comintern had developed its Popular Front strategy, encouraging 
Communists to work with liberal movements in order to combat the rise of fascism. In the 
United States, the new CP’s mantra that “Communism is twentieth century Americanism” 
signaled a new fluidity within left-- a sense that liberalism, trade unionism, socialism and 
Communism were all in relatively friendly conversation with each other.551 
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 The spirit of social unionism that the Jewish working class counterpublic had pioneered 
was now at the core of the national left. But the hostility towards the CP that had developed 
among the socialist leaders placed the Jewish labor organizations at the margins of the movement 
that so closely represented itself. In 1939, the formation of the Hitler-Stalin Pact and the collapse 
of the Popular Front legitimated anti-Communist sentiment, particularly among Jewish workers. 
Since Hitler’s rise to power, the garment unions, Jewish labor leaders, and the Yiddish socialist 
press had been at the forefront of pressing for American intervention against fascism. Through 
B.C. Vladeck’s Jewish Labor Committee (JLC), founded in 1934, they called for boycotts of 
German goods and gave aid to victims in Europe. Unlike the onset of the First World War, by the 
time the Pearl Harbor was bombed, the “entire Jewish population vigorously responded to every 
call to strengthen the country’s hand in the war against Nazism.” Large numbers of Jewish 
unionists enlisted or supported the war effort from the home front.552 While the government had 
to persuade Jewish labor to support war in 1917, Jewish labor leaders had been seeking greater 
government intervention in Europe for years by 1941.  
 The unholy alliance between Nazis and Soviets, and the subsequent invasion of Poland 
demanded that Communists cast the war not as a struggle between fascism and democracy, but as 
merely another squabble between imperialist powers. Roosevelt’s support of Britain through the 
lend-lease program drew comparisons between him and Hitler. By and large, the Jewish left--
Communist, Socialist, and New Deal-- objected to these politics. Melech Epstein of the Yiddish 
Communist paper Di frayhayt organized a group of Jewish defectors to leave the CP. Jewish 
membership in the Party plummeted, destroying Earl Browder’s chances in his 1940 
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congressional campaign to represent the Lower East Side. Meanwhile, radicals in the labor 
movement, decried the political influence of the “Dubinsky-Hillman war-mongering 
machine.”553
 By the time the war had begun in Europe, the Jewish labor movement saw itself as 
committed to American liberal values, and was more skeptical than ever of other labor 
organizations’ ties to, or sympathies towards, Moscow. This fueled a new consensus with some 
of the most conservative aspects of the labor movement around the politics of anti-Communism. 
At the ANG, Heywood Broun’s death late in 1939 created a leadership vacuum. A conservative 
minority challenged the Guild leadership, and put forth anti-radical, patriotic resolutions at the 
1940 convention in Memphis. At the New York Newspaper Guild, a slate of “Progressive” 
insurgents campaigned to become delegates to the convention against those supported by the 
New York’s more radical Representative Assembly. The slate signaled an odd alliance between 
some well-paid reactionary journalists and Max Danish of Justice, Harry Lopatin of the 
Forward, and Victor Riesel of the English-language Socialist journal, The New Leader. The Old 
Guard of the Guild accused the progressives of attempting to disrupt and break the Guild so that 
it could come under the control of David Dubinsky and the ILGWU. They alleged that Dubinsky 
had done this a few years earlier at the Union of Office and Professional Workers, Local 16, 
where ILGWU office staff were members.554
 Despite these efforts, the radicals retained control of the international offices. Donal 
Sullivan, a 29 year-old Boston lawyer won the presidency by a close vote. But conservative 
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forces continued to gain power, passing anti-Communist resolutions at the local level. By 1941, 
they would be positioned to take over the Guild.555 This transformation at the ANG would be 
shaped by, and would provide the context for, battles between the Guild and the Jewish unions 
and newspapers in New York. 
Trouble at the Labor Press and Der Tog
 The complex political relationships became a source of severe controversy and division. 
The New York Newspaper Guild, the bastion of radicalism within the broader ANG, looked to 
organize workers at the ILGWU and ACWA publications. As Nat Einhorn, the New York Guild’s 
executive secretary, wrote to David Dubinsky and Sidney Hillman late in 1939, “Our purpose is 
to equalize as nearly as possible conditions at trade union papers in New York City. We look 
forward to those conferences as a natural and logical consequence of the cordial and fraternal 
relations which have existed between organized labor and the Newspaper Guild of New York and 
its members.”556 
 Despite the rapid organization of members at these two unions, they were quickly marked 
as dissidents. Max Danish wanted to break from the Labor Press Unit and function as an 
independent unit with thirteen members in good standing. As such, the ILGWU staff would have 
their own delegate at the Guild’s Representative Assembly, and would be able to present a 
challenge to the political leadership. Danish’s motion was initially rejected by the Labor Press 
Unit, as well as the New York Representative Assembly. By May, however, the members from 
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the ILGWU had appealed the decision, and the ANG’s International Executive Board, finding 
itself under growing scrutiny from conservatives within and outside of the Guild, approved the 
change.557 
 Hostilities between the Newspaper Guild of New York and the Jewish labor organizations 
compounded as the Guild continued its organizing drives and brought about a jurisdictional 
battle. The Guild continued to try to bring the editorial writers at the Yiddish papers into its 
ranks. At Der tog, according to the Guild, the Jewish Writers Union were unable to protect the 
staff writers’ interests, agreeing to pay cuts and reductions in staff, contrary to a membership 
vote. This undemocratic action prompted ten members of the paper’s staff to join the Guild in 
December 1940.
 The JWU did not look kindly upon this action. The organization’s leadership suspended 
the writers for “dual unionism.” In part reflecting the Socialists’ history of struggles with 
Communist infiltration in the 1920s, and in part the editor’s own economic interests, the 
Forward, the Morning Journal and Der tog accused the Guild of subversively trying to take over 
the Yiddish press as part of a broader Communist strategy. 
 The New York Guild shot back, turning the published charges over to attorneys in order 
to pursue a libel case. Guild organizer John T. Ryan, said, “The charge that the Guild is 
conspiring to take over the Yiddish Press on behalf of Moscow is fantastic and is being used to 
cover up the real facts which the authors of the statement are afraid to face publicly.” Lawyers 
demanded that the members be reinstated, noting that the only constitutional grounds for 
expulsion from the JWU was non-payment of dues, and moved towards getting an injunction 
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from the New York State Supreme Court. The editors of the Yiddish papers were also accused of 
defamation of character.558 
 Up to this point, it seems that the leaders at the three newspapers were working together 
to defend their own power against industrial unionism, not so differently than they might have in 
the general English-language commercial press. On February 14, the Guild called a strike at Der 
tog. It lasted for six months, until August 18. While only between 33 and 65 workers participated 
in the strike (the Day employed 140 people, but the majority of these were “mechanical” 
workers, ineligible for Guild membership), the conflict resulted in approximately two dozen 
arrests, division and animosity.559
 The Guild claimed that the Day had fired six members and cut the pay of seven others, 
ranging between 10 and 55 percent; that the Guild made every effort to avoid a strike including 
going to arbitration; and that the aims of the strike were to simply reinstate the laid off workers, 
restore pay cuts, and settle grievances. Editor Sam Margoshes disputed these claims in the New 
York Times. 
 We dismissed three, one of them B.Z. Goldberg, former managing editor, and two  others, 
 who had been doing part-time work and were no longer necessary to the paper. There 
 were 4 or 5 others, who had been receiving $83 a week each and whose salaries were 
 readjusted to $35, for the reason that they had been unable to perform any work for a long 
 time. They were really pensioned off with the understanding that they would contribute 
 an occasional article.560 
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In the meantime, striking writers created their own strike newspaper, Der tog shtreyker, with 
columns printed in Yiddish and in English to inform the community about their struggle and 
refute the claims of management. Responding to charges of Communist infiltration to destroy the 
newspaper for political reasons, they wrote that such accusations were
 ridiculous to any thinking person on the face of it. It implies that the striking workers 
 are seeking to commit economic suicide by destroying their own source of livelihood... If 
 the Guild is Communist, then so are such members as Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Lewis 
 Gannett of the New York Herald-Tribune, F.P.A. of the New York Post, and countless 
 other newspapermen and women working for papers in every part of the country.
Pointing to the outdated function of the JWU, the strikers embraced the virtues of bona fide 
modern trade unionism, saying:
 The Peretz Verein is not a union. You will find it listed in the telephone book as “Jewish 
 Writers’ Club... The Peretz Verein has no affiliation with any representative organization 
 of labor-- neither with the AFL or CIO. We are cognizant of the contributions the Peretz 
 Verein made in the early years of its existence towards raising and maintaining the 
 standards of Yiddish newspaper writers. But it no longer fulfills that function. It has 
 degenerated to the position of a management-dominated organization, unable and 
 unwilling to protect Yiddish writers against wage cuts and other management action.561 
 This perspective propelled the Guild towards a massive failure. After half a year, Guild 
members had to go back to work, renounce their membership, and reapply for membership in the 
JWU. The Guild agreed as part of the settlement terms that they would only represent members 
in the office and commercial departments of Der tog, and that the editorial department was the 
sole jurisdiction of the Jewish Writers Union. Further, they agreed to a reduction in payroll of 
$3650.562 
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 The strike did not generate solidarity between the Guild and the Jewish labor movement. 
Over 1700 delegates from the various unions with their roots in the Jewish community, including 
the CIO-affiliated ACWA, convened a conference to support the JWU and condemn the strike. 
Members of the Guild at the Forward and at the ILGWU publications also condemned the 
action, labeling the industrial organizers as union busters and CP stooges. The Guild’s Jewish 
Daily Forward Unit went on record opposing the strike as the Guild’s “attempt to break the 
Peretz Verein and to trespass upon the Verein’s properly established conditions of employment 
and contractual relations,” and called upon the Guild to “devote itself to friendly negotiation” 
with the JWU to join or develop a better working relationship.563 
 The ILGWU Publications Unit levied even harsher criticism. The Unit’s leader, Harry 
Crone wrote to Einhorn, explaining that the ILGWU Publications Unit had voted to “condemn 
the action of the NY Guild leadership in precipitating the Day strike” on several grounds. First, 
the ILGWU Unit understood the Guild’s strike as “irresponsible and divorced from any 
legitimate principle of economic action in that it gambles with the jobs and livelihood of more 
than 200 people in a rapidly shrinking field.” In other words, the precarious nature of the Yiddish 
press meant that it could not be dealt with in the same way as other profitable English language 
publications. The ILGWU writers understood this, and saw the importance of maintaining these 
publications as part of a larger movement and community.564 
 Crone invoked this community, indicating a sense of solidarity among the Jewish 
institutions. “Large sections of the community,” Crone noted, believed “that the Guild must 
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answer the charge that The Freiheit (sic), the Jewish Communist Daily, is using our union as a 
tool to smash a competing newspaper.” The ILGWU unit defended the JWU as a “bona fide trade 
union which has done a magnificent job of protecting its membership and has a quarter century 
of admirable service to its credit.” They implied that the Guild organizers had little 
understanding of or respect for the JWUs importance and history, and branded them union 
busters.565 While the allegations seem dubious, the Guild was blind to the specific political feuds 
and divisions that had been at the heart of Jewish working class politics for decades. 
 The Guild’s response to these criticisms only exacerbated tensions. Einhorn wrote back to 
Crone, ordering the Unit to rescind their comments within five days. After meeting with the rest 
of the unit, Crone refused, and told him that this request violated “every tradition of trade union 
democracy and the rights of constituent bodies and rank-and-file members to express an 
opinion.” To them, it was “an unwarranted and autocratic assumption of power.” On March 18, 
the Newspaper Guild of New York brought charges against eleven members of the ILGWU Unit 
for allegedly interfering with the strike.566
 The economic mandates of the Yiddish press had forced the newspapers to assume an 
increasingly commercial model of production and management, outmoding its original 
community orientation. Many workers at the Day were no longer content with the JWU, and had 
come to see themselves, as a result of their working conditions, as laborers more so than 
participants in a broader movement. This view, however, remained contested among the writers 
at the Forward and at Justice. The stakes of the Day strike, then, went far beyond the working 
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conditions at that particular newspaper. It had implications for the relationship between the old 
institutions of the Jewish labor movement and the emerging CIO, as well as between the media 
of radical counterpublics and the normative conception of public interest journalism. Central to 
both of these concerns was an overarching theme: to what extent could the liberal consensus--
comprised of trade unions, commercial interests and the state, and mediated by professional 
journalism-- allow for democratic expression and participation? The Day strike precipitated 
decisions by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the Newspaper Guild International 
Executive Board, and the New York courts, to set the limits of democracy and media activism 
around anti-Communism. 
The National Labor Relations Board and The ILGWU Eleven
 In the midst of the strike, the Newspaper Guild filed an unfair labor practice with the 
NLRB against Der tog, on the grounds of discrimination. The Guild claimed that strike leader 
B.Z. Goldberg, the former business manager, had been fired due to his Guild affiliation. At the 
NLRB hearings, however, it was revealed that Goldberg had given Day credentials to a secret 
representative of the Comintern to operate as a Soviet agent in Europe. The agent, Schaeno 
Epstein, had authored several pro-Soviet articles for Der tog under the pseudonym A.S. 
Schmindler, his passport name while in the United States. Goldberg issued checks made out to 
Schmindler as payment for the articles. Although Goldberg claimed that the publisher knew 
about this activity at the time, he had since died. Thus, it was difficult to prove one way or the 
other if Goldberg had been guilty of a dismissible offense.567 
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 Further, Leo Feinberg, an ex-Communist and writer for Di frayhayt, noted that in October 
1938 a Guild organizer named M. Yushevitz had been at a Communist Central Committee 
meeting held at Di frayhayt’s offices, where they allegedly discussed taking over the JWU. 
Yushevitz denied the charges. Again, there was little way to determine who was being honest in 
the situation. The accusation of Communist activity, though, was enough to vindicate the Day of 
discrimination and ennoble the reputation of the JWU.568
 It is unclear from the evidence as to whether or not such a plan to take over the JWU 
actually existed. But what is striking either way is how the NLRB approved of the Day firing 
workers on the grounds of Communist activity. Here, the Board implicitly constructed a 
dichotomy: firing a worker based on trade union affiliation was an unfair labor practice. Firing a 
worker discriminatorily based on Communist support was justifiable action. 
 Liberal anti-Communism also served as the basis for the ILGWU’s arguments against the 
Guild during the strike at Der tog. Two members of the Brooklyn Eagle Unit brought charges 
against the ILGWU Unit members for opposing the strike. The plaintiffs argued that the Justice 
writers had violated the ANG constitution and the Newspaper Guild of New York’s bylaws, by 
undermining the union’s potential to win the strike.569 
 In April, the Executive Committee of the Newspaper Guild of New York recommended 
the creation of a trial board, comprised of five members. The trial took place at the New York 
Guild’s midtown Manhattan offices over the course of six hearings between June 4 through 
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September 3, 1941. The Guild dissidents were charged with four violations, and twelve 
subdivisions.570
 The defendants noted, however, that these charges all boiled down to one issue: “Whether 
members or a unit of the Newspaper Guild of New York may express an opinion on an action 
taken or to be taken by their employees or elected representatives constituting the Executive 
Committee of the Newspaper Guild of New York.” As Harry Crone explained, “We sincerely 
believe that if by any chance these charges should be sustained against us-- it will establish a 
precedent for possible action against you or any other member of the Guild in the future.”571
 The New York Guild leaders, of course, saw the issue a bit differently. Der tog published 
the ILGWU Unit’s statement, prompting some to believe they had passed the resolution and 
given it to the editors in order to assist breaking the strike. Further, the letter was distributed to 
the Guild Reporter, presumably to be published and stir debate, and among Der tog advertisers, 
in order to persuade them to maintain their financial support because it was not a legitimate 
strike. From the Guild’s perspective, Justice writers were acting in accord with their boss, David 
Dubinsky, who had also spoken in opposition to the strike. They believed opposition to the strike 
was part of a broader conspiracy, led by Dubinsky, to take over the Guild.
 This characterization, however, demonstrated the Guild’s poor understanding of the 
Yiddish press, the JWU, and the political history of the Jewish labor movement. While the 
relationships between the ILGWU, the Forward and the Day were economic and political, they 
were also rooted in a long history of movement building, of cooperation, and of culture. One of 
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the ILGWU Unit members, Sam Romer, wrote to the Guild’s Executive Committee in March, 
calling the strike “unjustifiable and foolish,” and claiming that it was “alienating a great part of 
the Yiddish-speaking community, traditionally pro-labor, from the Guild and from the CIO...The 
strike is evidence of an irresponsible leadership in the New York Guild which evidently neither 
understands nor seeks understanding of the basic problems of the newspaper workers.”572 
 Overlooking the profound commitment the ILGWU had made to the cause of labor was a 
severe insult. As another defendant, Bernard Breslaw, said, 
 the defendants are not merely members of a trade union-- they work for and represent 
 unions. The defendants are union fiduciaries, hired by their union employers by virtue of 
 their pro-labor activities and sympathies. To call such people strikebreakers or company 
 unionists at a union meeting is equivalent to announcement by the Guild that members X 
 Y and Z rated incompetent by his fellow craftsmen? What union would trust A B or C 
 branded anti-union by their own union?”573 
 Such an attempt to silence dissent flew in the face of any notion of democratic trade 
unionism, much less a union that prided itself on fighting for First Amendment freedoms. The 
defendants feared that these practices would ultimately damage the organization. Breslaw wrote, 
 If the Board concludes that the facts do fit a crime, it is officially pronouncing a death 
 sentence upon the bare minimum of trade union liberty-- the right to tell the Executive 
 Secretary that the Guild has committed an act that smells to high heavens. It will 
 constitute the surest official notice to the thousands of unorganized newspapermen of 
 America that in joining the ANG they had better check their minds outside. And if not 
 their minds, at least their voices. If the acts of the defendants do not constitute a crime, 
 then a rebuke of the Executive Committee is in order. It is in order to demonstrate to 
 guildsmen that democracy may be made to function in the ANG, that these things need 
 not happen here.
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Arguing for freedom of expression, the defendants pointed out the hypocrisy evident in the 
Newspaper Guild’s draconian measures against its own members. “If the stigma is not removed... 
so that freedom of expression is clearly made an axiom in the Guild rather than an objective, then 
no honorable person will care to have his name associated with the ANG.”574
 The ILGWU Unit believed that the outcome of their case would have significant 
implications for the democratic nature of the labor movement. Much like J.B.S Hardman and 
Fania Cohn, Harry Crone argued for the essential need to criticize the direction of labor 
organizations from within. “When it is considered that the only basis for the charges are from the 
fact that we wrote a letter of criticism to our paid Executive Secretary,” he wrote, “it is obvious 
that the charges are entirely baseless and absurd; they are unconstitutional in that they aim to 
penalize us for a routine and moderate exercise of the right of criticism within the Guild 
itself.”575
 Through the course of the trial, the deep-seated skepticism and suspicion between the 
garment unions and the New York Guild were laid to bare. According to the trial board’s report, 
“It was obviously the cause of some rancor, disputes and name-calling during the hearings, all of 
which was discarded by this Board and was not considered in the slightest during its 
deliberation.” While the defendants argued that the details of the strike should be a moot point, 
since the only issue was whether or not it was criminal to voice disagreement with the union 
leadership, the trial board instead determined that the strike provided necessary context in order 
to understand the case. Questions concerning the strike were of paramount importance in that 
they sought to establish possible intent of the defendants in the action they took, and that intent 
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in the charges on which they were being tried was one of the most important factors to be 
considered by the Board in reaching a verdict.576 
 Crone wanted to argue the case in strictly liberal terms-- in favor of the right to free 
expression, and opposed to totalitarianism on the left and the right. He drew an analogy between 
the charges and “a typical Communist-Nazi purge tactic,” indicating a “totalitarian structure.” He 
said,  
 [O]nce Communist-Nazi policy is made by its Executive Committee all members of the 
 party must strictly adhere and will be liable to dire punishment if they are heard to 
 express even the slightest criticism. Likewise, members of the Communist Party are not 
 permitted to associate, socially or otherwise with any individual or group who might 
 conceivably be considered as opposed to the Communist Party. It appears that...by their 
 charges...maintain just that, namely, that we may not even speak to personal friends if by 
 chance such friends are members of the Jewish Writers Union.
Continuing with the comparisons of the Guild leaders to fascists, Breslaw noted, “It is not a far 
cry from the repression of criticism to the goose-steps. It is not a great distance from a point 
barring minority criticism to a point barring the integration of members in groups of twos and 
threes.”577
 Thus, the ILGWU workers wrapped themselves in the flag. They claimed their allegiance 
to the Guild and to the United States, positioning themselves as good union citizens while 
implying that the Newspaper Guild of New York’s leadership was un-American. Crone said that 
members had an implicit duty to express their opinions on union matters, and that the charges 
against him and his compatriots were “based on a concept of dictatorship control.” The 
Executive Committee, he argued, “should declare the policy of this Union to be in conformity 
310
576 Trial Board’s Report, Newspaper Guild of New York, Box 40, Folder 20.
577 Answer of Eleven Members of the Newspaper Guild of NY to Charges Filed by Ed Hughes and Catherine Cole, 
Newspaper Guild of New York Records, Box 40, Folder 19; Statement of Defendant Bernard Breslaw to the Trial 
Board (To be read in his behalf by Harry Crone), Newspaper Guild of New York, Box 40, Folder 19.
with the policy of the United State Government on the right of its citizenry to criticize and 
express their opinion publicly.” Indeed, the record demonstrated that the ILGWU members had, 
in fact, supported the Guild, raised “considerable sums of money for them,” and hadn’t acted 
during their time with the Labor Press Unit “as anything other than good trade unionists.”578 
 Two significant events had occurred before the Guild trial board handed down its 
decision. First, the June 1941 ANG convention marked the official end of the radical Guild. The 
international leadership avoided the formation of a committee to investigate potential 
Communist sympathies by the narrowest of margins. But conservative forces were able to 
change the constitution so that international officers would be elected not at the convention, but 
through referendum of the entire membership. This helped to give voice to the staunchly anti-
Communist minority faction in New York, building a majority vote with many medium-sized 
conservative locals. By October 1941, the radical leaders were defeated by a 2 to 1 margin in a 
referendum vote, turning every spot on the international board and every executive position over 
to the conservative faction.579
 Amidst this enormous political transformation, the strike at Der tog ended in August 
1941. It was a devastating loss for the Guild. Upon returning to work, strikers were forced to 
rescind their Guild membership and rejoin the JWU. While the Guild continued to represent 
commercial and office workers, it was restricted from organizing editorial employees were the 
JWU retained its rights as the sole bargaining agent. Further, the Guild agreed to a reduction in 
payroll for the commercial employees, totaling $3650 of Der tog’s operating budget, and to drop 
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legal suits against the JWU and the publisher. Finally, the Guild and the JWU agreed to begin 
cooperating through a joint committee, and to move towards a possible merger.580 
 The settlement reflected many of the claims of the ILGWU members regarding the nature 
of the JWU, and the flawed organizing strategies of the New York Guild. As one of the trial 
board members noted, the settlement helped to confirm the position of the ILGWU unit. “Any 
dispassionate analysis of the Day strike,” the member wrote, “will show that it cost the Guild a 
great deal of money and energy, which might have been more usefully employed, antagonized 
number of important labor unions, and did absolutely nothing in the way of augmenting Guild 
strength or influence. It was because ILGWU unit members were convinced that these would be 
the results that they passed the resolution for which they have been brought up on charges.”581
 The ILGWU members were acquitted on all charges. But the trial board’s official 
decision did not reflect this acknowledgement of difference in the particularities of local 
organizing, at the resistance to a one-size-fits-all model of trade unionism. Instead, it adhered to 
the liberal logic the defendants had used in their arguments. The board concluded that although 
they believed the defendants had been “mistaken in their action,” calling it “hasty” and “ill-
considered,” they had the right to act in such a manner. “Whether they were right or wrong” was 
not as important as “whether, within our union, men have a right to be what the Executive 
Committee, or any other group, even a majority of the membership conceive to be wrong. Unless 
we recognize that, we violate our faith as democrats and we are untrue to both ourselves and you 
[the membership].” Displaying ideological unity between the aims of labor and the aims of the 
state, the trial board concluded, “Every member of the Newspaper Guild of New York can expect 
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from his union the same true and impartial justice as that given him by the state. More he cannot 
ask; less he must never be given.”582
The Day Strike, Advertising, and the Foundations of Taft-Hartley
 Although the strike against the Day was counterproductive for the Newspaper Guild of 
New York and inter-union relationships, the Guild’s approach to the strike acknowledged the 
extent to which the Yiddish press was integrated into a media political economy rooted in 
capitalism and commodification processes. One of the primary tactics they used was to picket 
not only the Day offices at 183 East Broadway, but at its advertisers as well. These “secondary 
boycotts” led to greater controversy and tension, as members of the Jewish Writers Union 
pressed for the arrest of Guild members targeting these businesses. Ultimately, the JWU’s 
hostility towards the Guild led to court rulings that would lay the foundation for the strict 
limitations to be put on the labor movement through the Taft-Hartley Act following the war, 
while making the politics of advertising invisible within media economics. 
 On March 28, more than one month into the strike at Der tog, Louis Fleischmann was 
arrested outside of Sussman’s Bakery on Clinton Street, just around the corner from the Day 
headquarters. Standing barely five feet tall, the 65 year-old writer was convicted of disorderly 
conduct and sentenced to a five dollar fine. He had been carrying a sign that read, on one side in 
English and on the other in Yiddish, “Unfair!-- This Place Advertises in the “Day” Which Is on 
Strike.” The complaining witness, another Day employee named Elias Ginsburg, advised 
Fleischmann “that we would be obliged to make an arrest” on behalf of the newspaper, consulted 
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with several police officers, and then initiated the arrest by placing his hand on the shoulder of 
the defendant saying, “You are under arrest.”583 
 None of Fleischmann’s claims were untrue. The bakery, in fact, had advertised in Der tog 
that day, and strike-breaking employees from Der tog’s advertising department had visited 
Sussman’s to discuss changing the copy. In no way was there any indication that Fleischmann 
presented any kind of violent threat. Ginsburg, however, argued that Fleischmann had been in 
violation of a vague statute that forbade acting “in such a manner as to annoy, interfere with, and 
be offensive to others, with intent to provoke a breach of the peace...” 
The defendant’s lawyers argued that this law was in direct violation of First and Fourteenth 
Amendment protections. So long as the picketers claims were not libelous, the law could not 
interfere.584  
 Other arrests followed. Joseph Landau and Morris Cohen were arrested outside of the 
Borden Company, a dairy producer who also advertised in Der tog. They had been carrying signs 
that read, “Elsie Died of a Broken Heart Because Bordens Advertises in the Scab ‘Day.,’”
with a picture of a dead cow. In defense of the charged picketers, their lawyer used truth as a 
defense. He argued, “Unless this Court is to take the judicial notice of the love life of cows, we 
do not see how this issue is to be determined on this record.”585
 The picketers’ actions were legally questionable for another set of reasons as well. 
Ginsburg insisted that Fleischmann, Landau and Cohen had been involved in “secondary 
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boycotts”-- industrial actions aimed at an employer or business not directly involved in a labor 
dispute. Secondary boycotts had long been the source of controversy, and were often stymied by 
court injunctions. While the federal Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 sanctioned either “direct or 
indirect picketing,” New York statute permitted secondary actions only “when the case involves 
persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation.” In 1937, a court 
ruling in the case Goldfinger v. Feintuch stated that secondary boycotts were legal where “unity 
of interest existed.”586 Thus, the strike at Der tog prompted an important question about the 
political economy of media-- was there “unity of interest” between advertisers and newspapers?
 For the Guild, these arrests presented a clear threat to free expression, to the rights of 
workers, and to the prospect of a just media system. As Guild lawyer Abraham Isserman noted, 
“The case presents a clear cut issue on what is perhaps the Guild’s most important strike tactic-- 
the peaceful picketing of advertisers.” In court, Isserman tried to explain how advertisers and 
publishers did, in fact, share a “unity of interest,” and how both parties benefited from the labor 
of others. He said,
 The bakery which was picketed patronized the struck newspaper. The advertising 
 department directly involved in the strike serviced the bakery by checking and preparing 
 the advertising copy through visits to the bakery premises. The business department 
 directly involved in the strike undoubtedly took care of the accounting side of the 
 advertising transaction. The circulation department directly involved in the strike 
 delivered the papers which contained the Sussman’s Bakery ad which were on sale ‘next 
 door’ as well as elsewhere. The editorial department directly involved in the strike made 
 possible the sale of the struck newspaper which contained the bakery ad, through the 
 preparation of news and editorial material which provides the reader interest. Thus, the 
 Sussman Bakery was serviced by all the struck departments of the newspaper and in turn 
 gave financial support to the employer against whom the strike was in progress.587
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 Isserman’s arguments did not hold water with either the Magistrates’ Court of the City of 
New York, nor with the appellate court one year later. Instead, the court determined that 
picketing an advertiser was in violation of New York law. Fundamentally, bakeries and dairy 
producers were not in the same industry as newspapers. As Isserman noted, “The complaint’s 
memorandum is devoted to the proposition that it is ipso facto ‘unlawful intimidation’ and a 
‘secondary boycott’ to picket a newspaper advertiser and that such picketing is disorderly 
conduct as a matter of law without regard to the manner in which it is done.”588 Together, the 
court and the JWU were paving the way for the stringent federal restrictions that would be put on 
labor unions in the postwar era. 
 If the Jewish working class counterpublic had helped to lay the groundwork for the New 
Deal and the CIO during the 1920s, it was laying the groundwork for its demise by the beginning 
of World War II. Although the Guild had intended to appeal the Fleischmann decision for a 
second time, bureaucratic confusion prevented Isserman from filing the paperwork in time. But 
by that point, in 1942, the height of New Deal optimism and the potential for progressive change 
had waned. “In view of the preoccupation with the war effort and the present temper of the 
courts in respect to labor disputes,” Isserman explained to the Guild, “it might be just as well that  
the appeal was not taken at this time. The matter of principle involved will have to be settled at a 
later time in some other case.
 “We are closing our file.”589 
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Conclusion
 Through the struggles that emerged between the Jewish labor movement and the 
Newspaper Guild, the state and the growing labor bureaucracy appropriated the anti-
Communism of the Jewish socialist movement. From these new institutional perspectives, anti-
Communism took on a fundamentally different meaning than it had in Yiddish socialist circles. 
For the ILGWU, the ACWA, the Forward and the Jewish Writers Union, anti-Communism 
emerged both as political strategy for self-preservation in the 1920s, as well as a commitment to 
democracy among the left-- the ability to freely express, debate and publish. It was part of a 
multi-decade struggle to, on the one hand curry favor with politicians and advertisers in order to 
avoid institutional annihilation, and on the other hand prevent dogmatic Communists from 
controlling the discourse and actions among the Jewish working class. But for government and 
union bureaucrats, anti-Communism would become in the coming years a way to discipline all 
worker activity and to unite all classes behind U.S. Cold War policies.
 Because the Guild did not understand the history of the Jewish working class 
counterpublic-- its specific ideological contours and factions, its values and its practices--it 
inadvertently positioned itself against organizations that had been central to the institutional and 
spiritual development of the CIO. As a result, a new consensus emerged between the remnants of 
the counterpublic and the new conservative, national leadership of the Newspaper Guild. As Ben 
Scott notes, it was at this point by 1941 that the Guild began to shy away from its broad social 
mission and adamant commitment to a press uninhibited by capital, and settled into a more 
moderate politics of trade unionism and commercial professional journalism.
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 The Fleischmann case demonstrates even further reaching implications. The “postwar 
settlement” for journalism mirrored the postwar settlement between labor and capital. As Victor 
Pickard describes it, the years immediately following the Second World War saw the possibility 
of the emergence of a progressive social contract between the public, the state and the press, 
alongside broader political upheaval.590 But this episode demonstrates that the conservative 
tendencies within the labor movement, with implications for both union rights and press 
freedoms. As courts sought to protect advertisers from the risks of labor disputes with the media, 
laying the groundwork for the strict provisions against unions that would be passed amidst 
controversy in the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act.  
  Yet it would be a misnomer to dub the leadership of the Yiddish press and the garment 
unions as conservative. To do so is to erase the decades of hard work, ingenuity and struggle that 
they endured in order to preserve and build working-class activism during the darkest days of the 
1920s. It is to erase the commitment that many of them had in theory, if not always in practice, to 
participatory cultural production and open, democratic debate. It is to erase the important 
particularities of ethnic perspectives that sometimes shed light on universal moral injustices. 
Given the privileges of hindsight, it would be difficult to argue that support for Stalin was a 
“conservative” position when it implied a lack of opposition Hitler. 
 By World War II, the Jewish working class counterpublic had outlasted its own utility as 
a democratic force. The emerging national system of professional journalism against a backdrop 
of lightly regulated “free enterprise” promised a level of social responsibility within the public 
sphere and the private economy that would make counterpublics, their media and their 
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movements unnecessary. But without independent sites of democratic discourse, it would be 
difficult to challenge the institutions of the U.S. political economy-- the corporations, the 
government, the trade unions, and the media-- in the coming decades. 
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The Uses of Counterpublic Histories in Moments of Crisis
 
My tongue is not long enough to express what I think of the FCC. I am a former network radio 
actor, news announcer and director. Today whilst scanning the radio dial, my stomach gets sicker 
and sicker with what I hear...The Empire of the Rat now...[has] bought WEVD. I understood the 
Forward's need to sell the station, but to do so to a corporation founded by a rabid antisemite 
(sic) who supported Gerald L. K. Welsch, Bilbo, Fr. Coughlin and the Dearborne (sic) 
Independent not to mention the most anti- union company in the country now owns a station 
named for labour leader Eugene V. Debbs (sic) is a crime against nature.
The world of corporate radio must end.
            -- Ira Shprintzen591
The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the ‘state of emergency’ in which we live is not the 
exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that is in keeping with this 
insight. Then we shall clearly realize that it is our task to bring about a real state of emergency, 
and this will improve our position in the struggle against Fascism.
            -- Walter Benjamin592
 A group of protesters gathered outside of the Forward Association’s midtown Manhattan 
offices on June 28, 2001. As Communist sympathizers had done upon Morris Novik’s arrival as 
station manager seventy years before, WEVD listeners once again objected to changes on the 
horizon at the station. The Forward Association, still WEVD’s proprietor, was about to sell the 
former Socialist institution to one of the half-dozen major global media conglomerates, the Walt 
Disney Company. The mega-corporation would convert the local AM talk radio station which 
still offered daily broadcasts in Yiddish, into the flagship station of the ESPN Sports Radio 
Network.593  
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 The Forward, by that point a weekly publication, had seen its circulation drop and its 
losses increase to more than $2 million annually. Undeterred by community anger, the Forward 
Association sold the marginally profitable station for $78 million amidst a wave of merger mania 
in the radio industry. The amount, however, was estimated to be enough to keep the staple of 
news for the Jewish community afloat for another four decades. But as liberal commentator Alan 
Combs, who had a program on the station, told the New York Times, “If the goal is to use WEVD 
as a way to help the financial underpinnings of the Forward, that can be done without selling the 
radio station. To let go of this would be a true shame in a marketplace where there are so few 
independent voices.”594 
 Former New York Mayor Ed Koch, also a WEVD host, claimed that the station was “as 
much a New York landmark as City Hall.” “WEVD is an institution that goes back as far as I can 
remember in giving voice to ethnic groups and giving voice to the poor,” he said. “And the call 
letters say it all-- it is for the great Socialists.”595 
 Although the Forward and WEVD had long abandoned their socialist politics, their 
audiences still wanted them to offer perspectives and programming determined by something 
other than profit motive. Much as it had often done under B.C. Vladeck’s management in the 
1920s and 1930s, the Forward compromised the interests of at least some of their loyal 
supporters in response to market demands. The demonstration, planned through a website by 
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postal worker Charles Zlatkin, brought the struggle for a more democratic Forward into its third 
century. Once again, members of the public felt the need to preserve the institutions of the old 
Jewish working-class counterpublic based on a mythology of what they once were, and a hope 
for what they could be.596  
 While opponents of WEVD’s sale invoked the history of Jewish labor in the U.S., the 
Jewish working-class counterpublic had disintegrated during the postwar era of commercial mass 
media to become an institutionalized component of U.S. society. With the expansion of a Jewish 
middle-class, the idea of a politics based in an ethnic working-class culture no longer made 
sense. What remained, according to Irving Howe, were merely “warm memories, large and 
unforeseen practical achievements, an intellectual tradition…,” a “sentiment.”597 
 That sentiment, however, as demonstrated by people’s frustration with the Forward and 
WEVD in 2001, retains political potential. In calling for resistance to whiteness and the creation 
of multiracial democracy, Karen Brodkin argues that Yiddishkayt and other “ethnoracial cultures 
of many subordinated peoples...embed funds of experience and alternatives to modernity.” 
Drawing on the “hegemonic Jewishness” of the past can still bring about progressive change. But 
this dissertation is in no way an instruction manual. “We should look at our histories not as 
models to emulate,” she argues, “but for insights, new ideas and conversations-- for resources 
and tools for thinking with-- for beginning to envision alternatives to whiteness, capitalism, 
modernism, and the stultifying organizations of social life they support.”598 
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 In this conclusion, I draw out lessons from the history of the Jewish working class 
counterpublic in order to understand contemporary issues in media politics. First, I present a 
brief narrative of the decline of the counterpublic in the postwar era, and its residual impact to 
the present day. Next, I discuss implications of this narrative for media historiography, future 
research and activism. Finally, heeding Walter Benjamin’s call, I argue that we must think 
through ways in which the history of counterpublics might help us “bring about a real state of 
emergency.”599 
The Counterpublic’s Decline
 By the time the United States entered the Second World War, the Jewish labor movement 
had become a central part of a governing coalition under the New Deal. At this point, the lines 
between the Jewish working class, the American working class, and “the public” writ large 
become somewhat difficult to distinguish. The Jewish working class’ labor in forging the New 
Deal yielded economic and cultural rewards. They became beneficiaries of policies that allowed 
them to attain middle class lifestyles. In the postwar era, they left the urban spaces that had 
allowed for the development of close communities and oppositional political movements. Jewish 
Americans began to purchase homes in the more atomized suburbs with the help of federal 
programs like the GI Bill and FHA loans. The government did not afford these privileges to 
African Americans, further enabling Jews to see themselves as part of the white middle class. 
But the suburbs did not provide an environment conducive to creating a sense of Jewish 
community. According to Irving Howe, the central institution of Jewish identity was no longer 
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the Workmen’s Circle or the Yiddish theater; it was “the temple, modernized, bland, affluent well 
staffed, sumptuously built,” shaping the conformist landscape of the new “consumer’s 
republic.”600
 In addition, the Jewish socialist unions were neither Jewish nor socialist any longer. 
Leaders such as David Dubinsky and Sidney Hillman cared less about ideological goals, and fit 
their strategies neatly into the framework of the welfare state. The ILGWU and the ACWA no 
longer represented primarily Jewish workers. The garment industry had expanded far beyond its 
New York base, and second- and third- generation Jews moved into middle-class professions. By 
1950, Jewish workers comprised only between 25 and 30 percent of the garment unions. 
Increasingly, members were African American and Puerto Rican. Still, the ILGWU in particular 
remained a “social union,” and continued to strive to place itself at the center of members’ 
lives.601 
 In order to extend the influence of the labor movement and the spirit of New Deal 
liberalism into the Cold War era, the ILGWU maintained a strong interest in shaping public 
opinion through the use of their own media. In the late 1940s, they fought for licenses to the FM 
spectrum. Michael Stamm has demonstrated that the union won the license for its New York 
station, WFDR, after the People’s Radio Foundation (PRF) and the American Jewish Committee 
challenged the FCC for awarding it to the Daily News. With labor’s support, the PRF criticized 
the Daily News because of its class politics. The AJC feared the Daily News operating a station 
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because of the paper’s anti-Semitism.602 Thus, the politics of class and Jewishness became 
largely disarticulated from each other. 
 Labor’s attention increasingly turned towards fighting for the right to participate in public 
discourse mediated by capitalist interests. The commercial broadcasting system, legitimated by 
Congress and the FCC, remained a point of contestation. Liz Fones-Wolf writes, “For industrial 
unionists, access to radio was critical because the ‘thinking of the American people on labor, 
social, and political issues is influenced more than almost anything else by what they read in the 
papers or hear on the air.’” The CIO Political Action Committee (CIO-PAC), co-founded by 
Hillman, battled the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) code for the right to airtime on 
commercial radio stations. Their political muscle meant that the networks had to cooperate to 
some extent. In 1942, for example, NBC granted the AFL and CIO a fifteen-minute weekly 
sustaining program, Labor for Victory, with the two federations alternating weeks. The program 
was the first produced by labor to use professional writers and entertainers, and provided a 
national, rather than a local, platform. While the CIO’s productions, in particular, focused on 
some controversial themes, including racial equality, Labor for Victory points also to the 
emerging consensus between capital and labor on the uses of mass culture, than towards a vastly 
different wartime ideology.603 
 Despite the significant shortcomings of Pins and Needles and in the ILGWU’s 
organizational culture with regard to race, they did use mass media to promote tolerance through 
World War II and into the late 1940s. These campaigns highlighted the fact that the union was no 
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longer at the core of a decidedly Jewish movement. Rather, they cast Americans as either black 
or white, making Jewishness invisible. By the 1960s, though, some critics and union members 
charged the organization with being a “racist autocracy,” actively preventing people of color 
from advancing to leadership positions.604
 While Jews gained greater access to capital and power and turned away from socialist 
politics and Yiddishkayt, the far right waged a vicious war against the New Deal through red-
baiting, often linking Jews to Communism. More than a hundred leaders of the Communist Party 
were convicted of violating the Smith Act. Fellow travelers’ of the Popular Front era were also 
suspect, as the House Un-American Activities Committee’s (HUAC) launched its witch hunt 
against the Hollywood Left in 1947, particularly impacting Jewish screenwriters. Of the 
Hollywood Ten, six were Jewish. Four years later, Ethel and Julius Rosenberg’s execution 
showed Jews the dangers of having left-wing affiliations at a moment when a white, middle-class 
lifestyle was increasingly available to them.605   
 As a result of these attacks, labor unions lost considerable strength. The backlash against 
the New Deal shifted the balance of power back towards corporate America and support for “free 
enterprise.” Most significantly, the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947-- prefaced in some ways by the 
controversy of the Guild strike at the Day in 1941-- placed new restrictions on unions in 
organizing and striking. The CIO era, which the garment unions had played a central role in 
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shaping with their pioneering attention to industrial organizing and to culture, came to an official 
end in 1955, with the re-merging of both bodies. Weakened by new legal and cultural changes, 
the AFL-CIO reestablished conservative trade unionism under the leadership of George Meany. 
Having risen through the ranks of the building trades, Meany came out of a distinctly different 
tradition of unionism than his Jewish counterparts, but cold war politics ultimately brought them 
together. Now, Meany “was the highest possible position within the labor movement, leader of a 
united-- if also thoroughly purged and terribly weakened--house of labor.” It was now difficult to  
see the garment unions as resembling a component of the left at all. Paul Buhle writes, “The 
American Legion’s National Commander J. Addington Wagner voiced the common sentiments 
of more fanatical delegates [to the AFL-CIO’s founding convention] from the building trades to 
the ILGWU that despite the rapidly accelerating arms race and domestic McCarthyism, President  
Eisenhower’s administration was ‘soft on communism.’”606                 
 In addition to domestic political transformations, several global events also had an impact 
on the remaking of Jewish working-class institutions and identity in postwar America. First, the 
aftermath of the Holocaust contributed to a crisis in Jewish identity, because it seemed beyond 
comprehension and incongruous with the new prosperity Jews were finding in the United States. 
This stifled discussion around the politics and economics of genocide. For many, the Holocaust 
served as a mark of shame which “set limits to assimilation.” Some have argued that the 
Holocaust took on the character in collective memory as “an event of great moral significance” 
rather than something of particular significance to Jews. Others have noted it spurred a 
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recommitment to Jewish identification as “a matter of honor.”607 Significantly, though, the 
Holocaust has never been widely understood within the framework of Jewish socialism.
 Second, the founding of Israel in 1948 “sped the dissolution of the ideologies that had 
prevailed among immigrant Jews.” Debate around Zionism essentially ceased, and the 
institutions of the old Jewish labor movement—and the labor movement as a whole—positioned 
themselves as supporters of the new state, alongside the U.S. federal government. While Israel 
helped strengthen the sense of self-worth among Jews after the Holocaust, it also made it more 
difficult for secular Jews to understand the meaning of their identity, as they were no longer 
united by the common, politicized culture of Yiddishkayt. Instead, Jews “preferred to see 
themselves as good Americans, or good liberals, or good human beings.”608  
 Finally, Khrushchev’s revelations about the nature of Stalin’s regime in 1956 further 
discredited Communism among American Jews. Among the criticisms that emerged of Stalin 
were the suppression of Yiddish culture in the Soviet Union. While the CP in the United States 
might have provided space to place renewed emphasis on democratic rights within a left-wing 
framework, dissenters went in all directions towards various shades of liberalism, Marxism, and 
neoconservatism. The Party now had little influence, and the Communists who had come of age 
during the Popular Front had been lost to other political movements.609 
 By the 1960s, one could no longer speak of a Jewish working-class counterpublic, of a 
hegemonic Jewishness centered on socialism, because the institutions which had comprised it 
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were weakened and no longer represented Jews. While significant numbers of young Jews—
sometimes “Red Diaper babies”—supported civil rights causes and helped establish the New 
Left and the feminist movements, the ideologies, cultures, and institutions of these movements 
were of a new breed. Their participants were, by and large, middle class and displayed little 
explicit connection to their Jewishness through their political work. Jewish radicals and liberals 
now tried to communicate their messages within the broader public sphere, represented by the 
commercial mass media.610  
 Yet, as Paul Buhle notes, “even as the proportionate role of Jewish participation (Jewish 
workers especially) declined, the stamp of multigenerational Jewish participation remained” 
within left and liberal activism after 1980. Despite the rise of Jews within the ranks of the 
Republican Party and neoconservative circles, Jewish progressive identity continues to inspire 
calls for a more democratic public sphere. For example, the Jewish Funds for Justice (JFSJ), an 
organization that “[invests] in low-income communities and grassroots organizations” and 
“[engages] Jews as partners, allies, and leaders in social change work” by linking its efforts to 
Jewish faith, history and culture, claimed victory in ousting Glenn Beck from the Fox News 
Network. JFSJ generated 10,000 petition signatures in January 2011, calling on Fox to pull the 
plug on the right-wing propagandist. JSFJ charged Beck, the complete antithesis of the 
Habermasian ideal, with abusing the history of the Holocaust and perpetuating anti-Semitic 
conspiracy theories as a part of a political strategy to maintain economic inequality. As a result of 
this effort, alongside a successful advertiser boycott organized by the African American civil 
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rights organization Color of Change and the media watchdog Media Matters for America, Beck 
lost his cable program on the eve of the Passover holiday. JSFJ proclaimed,
 This Passover, let us celebrate the expanded freedom in our public discourse."We hope that 
! the space Beck leaves behind will be filled with a more constructive commentator, willing 
! to address the serious challenges facing our country." In the meantime, we will keep 
! investing in solutions to the economic challenges facing millions of Americans while 
! standing up to demagogues like Beck who seek to divide us through scapegoating.611
 
 But while Buhle notes that Jews remain “vastly overrepresented at every level and age 
group within all progressive movements” in the U.S., this will not be enough to transform the 
country’s political, economic, and cultural system.612 The development of new working class 
counterpublics will be an essential component in the struggles for economic justice and 
democracy. Critical communications scholars must try to understand the conditions that might 
bring about these spaces.
Critical Junctures, Counterpublics, and the Politics of Periodization
 During the 1920s, organic intellectuals within the Jewish working class counterpublic 
helped to maintain an alternative ideology, a hegemonic Jewishness centered on socialism, 
through a variety of approaches to alternative media, culture and communication. By the 1930s, 
these efforts proved significant in building a broad, national labor movement and a new historical 
bloc. What institutions and practices might provide the basis for a twenty-first century movement 
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culture? What can we create now in order to maximize our power in the ongoing struggle for 
democracy? Where do we turn amidst our current crisis?
 Bob McChesney argues that we now are in a “critical juncture,” a moment in which we 
have the potential to remake the total media system. These moments arise with the emergence of 
new technologies, dissatisfaction with the current media system, and broad “social upheaval and 
reform in the society as a whole.” This third component is crucial in shaping the outcome of a 
critical juncture. For example, McChesney notes that if key debates about broadcasting had 
occurred in 1937 at the height of CIO organizing instead of a few years prior, the radical zeitgeist 
might have yielded different results.613 
 How can social movements garner support in an undemocratic environment? Quoting 
former FCC commissioner Nicholas Johnson, McChesney writes, “Whatever your issue of 
concern is...media reform has got to be your second. Because unless the media system is 
changed, it will be much harder, if not impossible, to win popular awareness and support for the 
first issue.”614 Thus, counterpublics, operating at the margins of the media system, are necessary 
in order to produce broad social upheaval and forge a critical juncture. If the dominant media 
system will not permit full democratic discussion around issues of labor, institutional racism, 
militarism, the environment, and the general political economy, there must be vibrant spaces 
outside of the dominant system for counter-discourses to emerge and flourish. By understanding 
how to create and preserve these spaces, we can begin to remake the public and the media that 
represent it. 
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 It is just as important, then, for communications historians to understand critical junctures 
as it is to understand the periods between critical junctures. Organic intellectuals such as B.C. 
Vladeck, J.B.S. Hardman, Fannia Cohn, and Morris Novik all helped to keep the light on for 
working people during the largely dark days of the 1920s. They opened a small but significant 
and powerful space for democratic discourse and action, challenging the enclosure of the state-
corporate nexus. They took a variety of strategies and approaches, all of them problematic and 
never complete, but in sum, quite effective.  
 While B.C. Vladeck was overly comfortable with reliance on advertising, allowing the 
demand for revenue to jeopardize the credibility of the Forward among much of its audience, his 
willingness to compromise helped to sustain an alternative voice to the dominant politics of the 
day. In founding radio station WEVD, this proclivity helped fracture a robust reform movement. 
J.B.S. Hardman’s struggle for an alternative to the Forward produced vibrant debate within the 
Jewish labor movement, but he was repeatedly marginalized throughout his career due to his 
staunch adherence to impractical principles. Fannia Cohn’s efforts at worker education through 
drama and direct participation drew new people, particularly women, into the labor movement, 
but were easily appropriated by the culture industry. Morris Novik helped to create public service 
broadcasting on WEVD, but he also turned ethnicity from a political identity into a commodity. 
The conflict that emerged with the formation of the Newspaper Guild demonstrated the 
problematic relationships between the politics of ethnicity and class, between the nature of 
dominant and alternative media.
 As Benjamin reminds us, crises under capitalism are constant. Attention to the history of 
counterpublics and alternative media lets us learn not just from those who acted when crises 
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were apparent to the many, but also from society’s most marginalized groups who experience 
crisis perpetually. With this fuller understanding of U.S. media history we might have a better 
sense of problems and possibilities, dilemmas and debates that media activists encounter today 
regarding their structure, their funding, their tactics and their alliances.615 
 The history of the Jewish working-class counterpublic highlights the tensions between 
commodification and community, between entertainment and information, between individual 
savvy and collective solidarity, all within the realm of media activism. Activists affiliated with 
media reform and media justice movements must grasp how these dynamics have played out in 
the past so that they may develop enlightened strategies. The experiences of the Forward and 
WEVD demonstrate the need for policies that promote minority views rather than leaving them 
to the market. The experiences of the ACWA and the ILGWU show the important role that media 
can play in building trade unions. And the story of the Newspaper Guild and the strike at Der tog 
demonstrates the complex ways ethnicity, class, and culture can intersect to make or break 
political alliances.    
 Certainly, there are more lessons to learn. C. Riley Snorton argues for greater historical 
attention towards the African American press, and African American criticism of the dominant 
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U.S. media system through the “long civil rights movement” beginning in the 1920s.616 Groups 
of Latino, Asian and white ethnic and non-ethnic workers also used media and developed 
communities of resistance. Knowing what counterpublics existed, what institutions supported 
them, what their media looked like, and what problems emerged might help us understand what 
produced the moments of upheaval in the 1930s, the 1960s, and perhaps the near future. 
 The efforts of the Jewish working-class counterpublic helped to make the U.S. more 
egalitarian, and its dominant media system more representative of society at large. But that 
system made it more difficult to sustain forms of media that reflected a radical democratic ethos. 
The Keynesian compromise between capital, labor and the state mirrored the “postwar 
settlement” around a commercial media system that operated in the public interest, partially 
regulated by the federal government. This representation, though, constituted commodification 
with deep social consequences. As Armand Mattelart observed, 
 [The people] no more participate in the determination of televised, radio broadcast or 
 printed products than they do in the decisions affecting the nature and hierarchy of material 
 consumer goods; all this escapes the alienated and atomised consumer. This passivity, 
 resulting from the process of alienation, affects the transmitter as much as it does the 
 receiver, given that the alienated consumer is also an agent of production.617 
More than a lack of diversity of perspectives in mass media, the most pressing problem related to 
the culture industry is that it works to turn all communication into sites of accumulation within a 
broader capitalist political economy. In this setting, communication reproduces economic 
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inequality and social alienation, rather than encouraging democratic engagement and creating 
community.  
 By claiming to serve the public interest through professional codes and a notion of social 
responsibility, the postwar media system worked to turn citizens into consumers. Drawing from 
the mass culture critiques, the New Left and a plethora of social movements emerged, 
demonstrating the fragmented nature of the public sphere. Histories of counterpublics in this 
period might help explain the role organic intellectuals and commercial culture played in shaping 
political expression within the anti-war, civil rights, Black Power, feminist, Chicano, American 
Indian, gay liberation and environmentalist movements. Perhaps the pervasive nature of 
corporate media and the institutional limits of alternative media made it difficult for these 
movements to combat the rise of neoliberalism in the 1970s and 1980s.618 
 Over the last 35 years, the social contract established during the 1930s and 1940s has been 
rewritten, with particular consequences for media and democracy. WEVD’s sale to Disney did 
not occur in a vacuum. Under the banner of “de-regulation,” the state re-regulated the 
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communications industries, allowing increased consolidation in the pursuit of accumulation, and 
doing away with virtually any regard for the public interest. The 1996 Telecommunications Act 
heralded an age of hypercommercialism on the air. Although President Bill Clinton pledged that 
the legislation would create competition, offering consumers lower prices for cable and 
telephone services and encouraging “a diversity of voices and viewpoints in radio, television, 
and the print media,” it did exactly the opposite.619 
 Since the mid-1990s, well over half of the radio stations in the country have been sold. 
Within a year, Clear Channel, Viacom and Disney swallowed “small broadcasters and minority-
owned stations while showing little interest in local content, whether it be news reporting or 
music programming” and came to dominate the field, as owners could now control an unlimited 
number of stations nationwide. The logic of neoliberalism completely turned the notion of 
federal regulation in the public interest on its head. The FCC now placed the burden of proof on 
the public to demonstrate the necessity for existing ownership caps and protective rules.620
 In response to this shift, the late 1990s and early 2000s saw the emergence of a media 
reform movement, originating with calls for the FCC to open up low power FM stations as well 
as stricter ownership rules. The growth of the internet brought new hope for democratic 
communication, as radio broadcasting had in the 1920s, and global web-based networks such as 
the Independent Media Centers (IMC) developed. In 2003, organizations such as Free Press, 
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Common Cause, Consumers Union and MoveOn.org successfully helped push Congress to halt 
further stripping of media ownership laws.621
 Michael Denning notes that these years also witnessed the birth of “a militant new service 
industry unionism.” Unions such as the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) and the 
Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union (HERE) often drew on the 
cultural backgrounds of immigrant workers in their organizing campaigns. These efforts 
coincided with “the emergence of a student movement against sweatshops, a brief wave of labor 
teach-ins on college campuses, the recruitment of student activists to union organizing 
campaigns, and the rebirth of new forms of culture industry unionism (like the campaigns of 
graduate and adjunct teachers in the universities)” and large-scale protests against the institutions 
of global capitalism such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). At times, these actions forced critical discussion in the corporate media about the 
politics of globalization.622 
 While the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent rush to war in 
Afghanistan and Iraq largely halted this emerging movement, the following years demonstrated 
the ever increasing need for structural changes in the media system. Between 2001 and 2003, the 
commercial pressures on professional journalism allowed for widespread misinformation by 
official sources and public relations agencies, leading the United States into expensive, 
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destructive and seemingly unending invasions in the Middle East. In 2005, the Supreme Court’s 
Brand X ruling brought a potential end to the principle of network neutrality, which protects 
online content from the political and profit motives of the telecommunications giants. And in 
2008, the global financial system collapsed, plummeting the U.S. into the worst economic slump 
since the Great Depression and sending the remnants of the newspaper industry into a free fall.623 
 Where are the democratic spaces today that can generate the outcry necessary to transform 
the failed political economy and media system? Working class resistance over the last few years 
has been meaningful but sporadic. Immigrant rights protests swept the U.S. in 2006, culminating 
on May Day with “virtual strikes” in cities with large Latino populations such as Chicago and 
Los Angeles. Labor unions, ethnic organizations, Catholic parishes, and worker centers for 
undocumented immigrants mobilized their members through ethnic media and new 
communications technologies. As one commentator argued, “Whether or not unions have proved 
capable of playing a significant role in the immigrant movement, this is an overwhelmingly 
working class movement whose base is made up of restaurant and hotel workers, farm workers, 
and construction workers.” 624 
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 In late 2008, Barack Obama’s election and the financial collapse gave yet another glimmer 
of possibility for renewed industrial action. Two hundred fifty laid off workers at Republic 
Windows and Doors in Chicago, most of them black and Latino, staged a sit-down strike 
reminiscent of the CIO era in order to receive just compensation. Their efforts captured the ear of 
the president-elect, and prompted recently bailed-out creditors JP Morgan Chase and Bank of 
America to offer workers a $1.75 million package.625  
 The spirit of Republic Windows and Doors did not last long, though, as President Obama 
failed to live up to progressives’ expectations and conservative forces capitalized on 
dissatisfaction with the economy and latent racism and nativism to harness control of the 
political agenda. But in February and March 2011, hundreds of thousands of union members, 
farmers, workers and their allies protested at the capitol building in Madison, Wisconsin in order 
to protect their basic right to collective bargaining. In the name of balancing the state budget, 
Governor Scott Walker, elected as part of a corporate-back, right-populist “Tea Party” 
movement, pointed a final dagger at the heart of opposition to the neoliberal agenda. The rapid 
mobilization of mostly white workers in the American heartland, sparked conversation about the 
potential for a bona fide social movement that could reverse the tide of plutocracy amidst a 
global economy in shambles. For a moment, the first general strike in the U.S. since 1937 
seemed possible.626  
 These three events beg the question, what cultural institutions and practices will Latino, 
African American and white workers draw on to forge a new progressive movement? What are 
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the prospects for our critical juncture in communications and the political economy as a whole? 
While it is widely acknowledged across the political spectrum that the status quo in the U.S. is 
not sustainable, it is unclear whether or not our political culture will enable us to change gears. 
Structural histories of alternative media and counterpublics can provide a wealth of knowledge, 
helping us think about how we can build that culture ourselves. The twin pursuits of social 
justice and media democracy will require an enormous amount of knowledge and labor in the 
neoliberal, digital age. McChesney writes, 
 [W]e have to use our intellects, imaginations, and research skills to develop alternative 
 models for media organizations. Perhaps the most important lesson we have learned in the 
 past decade has been that doing good media, even in the digital era, requires resources and 
 institutional support. The Internet does many things, but it does not wave a magic wand 
 over media bank accounts.627 
 The lessons from this dissertation for developing counterpublics, alternative media and 
working class movements cannot be reduced to universal theories. Media history is not a science. 
Or, as John Nerone puts it, “It’s jazz, not rock. It’s baseball.” But while we can never predict 
with certainty what a soloist might do, aficionados are less likely to be surprised than novices. 
Mookie Wilson’s grounder going through Bill Buckner’s legs in Game Six stands as a reminder 
that at any moment, anything can happen. “We know that the Jews were prohibited from 
investigating the future,” noted Walter Benjamin. “This does not imply, however, that for the 
Jews the future turned into homogeneous, empty time. For every second of time was the strait 
gate through which Messiah might enter.”628 
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 Benjamin’s proclamation brings hope to those who stand on the side of justice, and 
trepidation to those who don’t. But history offers us no pattern to follow. The future is not ready-
made. Rather, history challenges us to engage in skilled craftsmanship. We take threads from the 
past, stitch together fabrics of the present, and hope that through our labor we create not only 
value, but beauty.
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